


TIBET

THE **FACTS**



REVISED EDITION

TIBET UNDER THE COMMUNIST CHINESE RULE



- 1. Tibet Autonomous Region:**
Invaded by troops of the People's Liberation Army of China in 1950; proclaimed Autonomous Region of Tibet in 1965.
- 2. Qinghai Province:**
Includes most of Amdo region of Tibet. It was claimed as a Chinese province by the KMT regime prior to 1949.
- 3. Kanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture:**
Part of Amdo region of Tibet; reorganized as an autonomous Tibetan prefecture under a Chinese province of Kansu during 1958-1964.
- 4. Ngapa Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture:**
Part of Amdo region of Tibet; organized as an autonom-

ous Tibetan prefecture under a Chinese province of Szechuan prior to 1950.

- 5. Kanze Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture:**
Part of Kham region of Tibet. Occupied by the PLA troops before the communists came to power in Peking. Organized as part of Sikang province from 1950 to 1954; Sikang dismantled during 194-57; and Kanze reorganized as autonomous Tibetan prefecture under Szechuan province.
- 6. Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture:**
Part of Kham region of Tibet. Occupied by PLA troops prior to 1949 and organized as an autonomous Tibetan prefecture under Yunan province. There was widespread fighting in these parts of Tibet even before the PLA troops crossed the Dri-chu (Yangtse) in October 1950.

NB:—When the Chinese refer to 'Tibet' they mean the 'Tibet Autonomous Region' (1) The present 'Tibet' is substantially smaller than in 1950 (before the coming of the Chinese) as the former Tibetan province of Kham has been largely absorbed into the provinces of Szechuan and Yunan (5/6). The huge Amdo region of E. Tibet was first claimed by the Chinese Emperor K'ang Hsi in 1720, a claim which was also

pursued by the Kuomintang under Chiang Kai Shek when the province was renamed Qinghai. The Communists incorporated this area into China after 1950 but the Tibetans have never accepted such territorial claims deriving from remote imperial dynasties. The Chinese give the population of the 'ART' as just under two million but several million Tibetans still live in these eastern provinces outside the 'ART'.



TIANANMEN IS TIBET. TIBET IS TIANANMEN. (Photo: AP)

TIBET

The Facts

**A REPORT PREPARED BY
THE SCIENTIFIC BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION
FOR THE UNITED NATIONS COMMISSION
ON HUMAN RIGHTS**

**TIBETAN YOUNG BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION
McLeod Ganj, Dharamsala—176219
H.P. INDIA**

Copy Right : Paul Ingram 1990
First Edition 1984 : The Scientific Buddhist Association,
London
First Revised : The Tibetan Young Buddhist
Edition 1986 Association, Dharamsala, India, with
Permission of SBA.
Second Revised : Tibetan Young Buddhist
Edition 1990 Association

*This report was originally prepared for the United Nations
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities Working Group on
Indigineous Populations.*

*Also, introduced at the UN Commission on the
Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of all
Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief.*

Cover Design : Christofer Besuchet
Cover Photograph : Ganesh Films, Hamburg

Published by Tibetan Young Buddhist Association
Mcleod Ganj, Dharamsala-176219, H.P. India.
Printed at Indraprastha Press (CBT),
4 Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg, New Delhi-110002.

PUBLISHER'S NOTE

It is normal practice for publishers to say how happy they are to bring out such-and-such a book to the readers. But honestly speaking, we cannot say we are happy to publish this New Revised edition of *Tibet: The Facts*. How can anyone be happy reprinting the tragic account of the suffering of one's own people? For that is what *Tibet: The Facts* is all about—a chilling account of China's horrendous crimes in Tibet and the suffering of the Tibetan people.

Compiled for the UN Sub-Commission on Human Rights by the non-political Scientific Buddhist Association, London, *Tibet: The Facts* does not argue for or against Tibetan independence. But it does give an uncompromising and unbiased account of one of this century's worst and yet among the least known tragedies—the armed invasion and occupation of Tibet by Communist China and the systematic and ruthless campaign to exterminate the Tibetan people and their ancient culture. To that extent it is a challenge to the lies churned out by Beijing's propaganda machinery and a reminder to the silent world that all is not well on the Roof of the World and that what happened in Tiananmen Square had been happening in Tibet all along.

If nothing else, *Tibet: The Facts* will serve as a record of China's crime of GENOCIDE in Tibet. It will also serve as a tribute to the courageous Tibetans who struggled against all odds and sacrificed their lives in the struggle for freedom and in defence of their country, their faith and their homes. But more urgently, it is hoped that *Tibet: The Facts* will help to stir the conscience of the free world and to arouse international indignation against China's imperialist policies and her brute suppression of not only the Tibetan people, but also the

peoples of Eastern Turkistan, Inner Mongolia and Manchuria, who, among others, are struggling for freedom from Chinese colonial rule.

With this hope and the hope that Tibet will once again emerge as an independent and neutral buffer in the heart of Asia, we wish to thank the Scientific Buddhist Association (now OPTIMUS), and in particular its Secretary, Mr. Paul Ingram, who is the chief author of the Report, for making it possible to reprint this revised and completely up-dated edition so as to make it available to a wider audience.

Lhasang Tsering
Chairman

Tibetan Young Buddhist Association
Dharamsala (India)

March 1990

CONTENTS

Introduction ix

PART 1. THE DEATH OF AN ANCIENT CULTURE

Tibet—The Land 1

Tibetan-Chinese Relations 3

1949—The Chinese Attack Tibet 7

Tibetan Buddhist Culture 8

Systematic Destruction of Tibetan Culture 10

The Twenty Years War 12

The Cultural Revolution 20

Appeals to the United Nations 25

Population Displacement and Demographic Imbalance 26

PART 2. TIBET TODAY—THE IRON HANDSHAKE

Education and Language 39

Health, Hospitals, Abortions and Sterilisations 44

Food Production and Distribution 55

Racial Discrimination 62

Ecological Devastation 66

Liberalisation, Tourism and Religious Freedom 75

The Machinery of Fear—Renewal of the Terror
1983, 1987, 1988, 1989 83

Aftermath—Reports from the Prisons 110

PART 3. TIBET—U.N., U.S.A., AND EUROPE

Tibet and the UN 116

Tibet and the USA 123

Tibet and Europe 133

**Tibet and Britain: The Hong Kong factor and
British Appeasement of China 134**

China—The Honeymoon Era and its End 143

**The Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Speech and the
Tibet Society, UK 157**

PART 4. THE MYTH OF TIBETAN AUTONOMY AND THE INDIAN PREDICAMENT

**The Chinese Military Buildup Along India's
Northern Frontier 175**

**India's Political Predicament Caused by its Non-
Recognition of the 'Tibetan Government in Exile' 180**

PART 5. DETHRONING THE DRAGON— FACTS VERSUS MYTHS

**A Comparison of the Achievements of the Chinese and
Russian Revolutions 194**

Why should China behave differently to other countries? 205

The Nuclear Option and the Arms Trade 214

Arms Exports 216

He Who Controls the Past Controls the Future 217

Tiananmen and Tibet: The end of Sinological illusions 222

CONCLUSION 244

APPENDIX—The Making of Modern Tibet 257

NOTES 288

INTRODUCTION

The Tiananmen Square Massacre of June 1989 is provoking a major reassessment of the nature of the Chinese Government and the policies implemented in China since the establishment of the Communist regime in 1949, on the part of many governments throughout the world, media people and political analysts and the general public. Internal Chinese sources have confirmed that the 'Cultural Revolution' (1966-'76) resulted in 100,000,000 casualties (one hundred million) in China, and that total undoubtedly includes tens of millions dead, and it is known that during the 'Great Leap Forward' of the mid 1950's some twenty million people starved to death*. The human cost of such figures cannot be calculated but a considerable argument could be made suggesting that Communist China has proved one of the least successful countries in the economic sphere. For example, it is seldom pointed out that the per capita income in the People's Republic of China is only £180, similar to that of Malawi, which is one of Africa's poorest countries. Per capita income in Kenya is £642 Sterling, more than three times that of China, while the Soviet Union has a per capita income some fifteen times greater than China. Even Burma has a per capita income substantially greater than China**.

For a variety of different reasons these facts have been glossed over in many parts of the world and the reasons for this have been analysed in this Report (See section entitled *China—The Honeymoon Era and its End*). However, Tiananmen has 'cleansed the doors of perception', not only with regard to the rule of the Chinese Government over ethnic Chinese, but it has also resulted in a new willingness to listen to the tragic stories of 'minority peoples' such as the Tibetans, one of whom stated that 'Tiananmen is Tibet and Tibet is Tiananmen'. In the past

such a willingness could only be won by protracted and bitter campaigns of various kinds on the part of those concerned that human-rights abuses in Tibet should receive equal exposure to such abuses in Turkey, South Africa, Central America, and Chile, etc.

The armed occupation of Tibet by the Chinese Communist forces, which began in 1949 and the extermination of an ancient Buddhist culture is one of the worst tragedies of modern times. During the last few years the question of Tibet has received a considerable amount of publicity from many quarters and has become an international issue, having been raised at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva several times, most recently in 1989. Further evidence of the growing importance of Tibet as an international issue is to be found in the signing of the 'Tibet Bill' by President Reagan in December 1987, which condemned Chinese human-rights abuses in Tibet and linked the sale of arms to China to respect for human-rights in Tibet. Since Tiananmen the USA has terminated arms sales to China, something which Tibetans are grateful for since these weapons were used to consolidate the Chinese buildup in Tibet and facilitate armed oppression. In October 1987 the European Parliament reacted to a new bout of Chinese repression in Tibet by passing a motion saying that it was 'seriously alarmed' at the unrest in Lhasa. On the same day the German Parliament also adopted a motion dealing with Chinese violations of human-rights in Tibet, which was supported by all Parliamentary groups and adopted unanimously, provoking strong protests from the Chinese Government. Severe Chinese repression following the riots of early 1988 and '89 was widely condemned and the Chinese shootings in Lhasa resulted in protests from Swiss and Dutch Parliaments, the US Senate, France, Australia, the Indian Foreign Ministry and the British Foreign Office, which nevertheless displayed its customary wariness on the Tibetan issue (See section entitled *The Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Statement and the Tibet Society, UK and Tibet and Britain: The Hong Kong Factor*). In December 1988 the Green Party of West Germany adopted a Resolution

condemning Chinese human-rights violations in Tibet and describing the Chinese occupation of Tibet as 'incompatible with international law'. Earlier in October 1988 members of the Council of Europe also voiced protests over human-rights abuses and expressed concern over the disappearance of Tibetan national identity and culture. The international aspects of the Tibetan issue have been further highlighted by the awarding of the Nobel Peace Prize for 1989 to the Dalai Lama.

India is the country most affected by the protracted Tibetan crisis and India's northern border is the longest disputed frontier in the world. The importance of the Tibetan issue to India was shown by the fact that some 708 people comprising MPs and MLAs (Members of Legislative Assemblies) signed a petition demanding freedom and self-determination for the Tibetan people, which was handed to the then Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi in March 1987. A cross Party section of 212 Indian MPs supported the Dalai Lama's 'Five Point Peace Proposal' made in the USA and endorsed by that country, and gave particular approval for the concept of Tibet as a demilitarized 'zone of peace', neutral, unaligned and unoccupied and in April 1989 a cross-section of 55 Indian MPs signed a letter addressed to the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng, urging the Chinese Government to stop using violent measures against Tibetan demonstrators. There is little doubt that the still unresolved issue of Tibetan independence underlies the long crisis. Indian difficulties along the disputed frontier were emphasised when the Chinese occupied the Sumdo-rong-chu area in Arunachal Pradesh in October 1986 and earlier in June 1986 they occupied Bhutanese territory close to Dromo in the Chumbi valley. It is sometimes forgotten that a major war between India and China would involve nearly half the human race and could result in a nuclear exchange as the Chinese now have nuclear bases in Tibet, notably at Nagchukha in what is designated as the 'Autonomous Region of Tibet'. It is in this context that the Dalai Lama's 'Five Point Peace Proposal' assumes particular importance, together with an associated proposal giving the Tibetan people the right to vote on the

issue of their independence from China. Such a plebiscite would result in a majority vote in favour of Tibetan independence though it would have to be internationally supervised. Tibetans, like Namibians, would then become a free people.

For Tibetans the issue is one of particular urgency as scores of thousands of Chinese are pouring into Tibet and more than ever before the Tibetan people face the threat of assimilation and annihilation as a separate people and a distinct cultural and religious group.

As early as 1959 the International Commission of Jurists in their Report *The Question of Tibet and the Rule of Law* stated that there was evidence Tibetans were facing extinction as a people and there is no doubt that the conclusions of the Report have been largely substantiated by an enormous amount of information which has emerged from Tibet since about 1980, and that earlier criticisms of the Report are unjustified in the light of the fact that Tibetans are facing 'cultural genocide' or 'ethnocides'.

Tragically for the Tibetan people the fears expressed as to the ultimate destiny of the Tibetan people have proved prophetic as the Chinese carried out a ruthless and systematic programme to plunder and destroy thousands of monasteries in Tibet, to deport young children to China, to indiscriminately massacre large numbers of people, and to forcibly sterilise Tibetans. There is formidable evidence indicating that such sterilisations are continuing today. (See section entitled *Health, Hospitals, Sterilisations and Abortions*). Much material on Chinese human-rights abuses in Tibet has been sent to the highly respected organisation, *Amnesty International* and the '13 Testimonies' submitted to them in January 1987, and since supplemented with a great deal of additional material, catalogue a horrific series of human-rights abuses.

It is now reliably established that over one million Tibetans have perished under Chinese rule since 1949, *including nearly 100,000 Tibetans tortured to death* (See note 39). Such statistics suggest that the Chinese Public Security Bureau closely resembles the Gestapo or the former Japanese Military Police,

the *Kempeitai*. The destruction and decimation of the religious community in Tibet was carried out with a thoroughness and brutality reminiscent of the Pol Pot regime in Kampuchea. Some 600,000 monks, nuns and *nagpas* (tantric practitioners) were shot, worked to death in slave labour camps or simply disappeared and during the 1960's and '70's not a single robed figure could be seen anywhere in Tibet. Many of them doubtless perished in the Sining (Xining) labour complex, formerly in E. Tibet, which may contain some 10–15 million inmates today making it the most densely populated gulag on earth. It can be said that no major human rights organisation has extensively researched this area, but a start was made when Amnesty International, London, interviewed a former inmate some while ago.

Given the extent of their persecution it is hardly surprising that Tibetans have been referred to as *the Jews of Asia*, and it has been remarked that Chinese behaviour in Tibet differs little in most important respects, from that of the Japanese when they occupied large parts of China in the 1930's and '40's and created the puppet state of Manchukuo. Chinese Communist violence towards the Tibetan people has been matched by a similar violence towards the environment and fragile ecosystems and it has been calculated that 50–100,000 sq. miles (130,000–260,000 sq. kms.) has been deforested and that the resulting climatic changes may be affecting the regularity of the monsoon cycle (See section entitled *Ecological Devastation*).

Although the United Nations expressed its deep concern about human-rights abuses in Tibet on three separate occasions it was unable to go any further at that particular time, even though the second Resolution of 1961 linked human-rights violations to the question of Tibetan independence. Tibetans feel, in the light of their own persecution and the revelation of the Tiananmen Massacre, that a powerful case can be made in favour of a call for sanctions by member states of the UN, as has frequently been done in the case of South Africa.

The massive influx of Chinese into Tibet constitutes a critical threat to Tibetan national identity and formidable evidence has

been cited in this Report which suggests that the Chinese are discriminating against Tibetans to such an extent that their administration has come to resemble the Apartheid system of South Africa and many examples of Chinese racism and contempt towards 'minority nationalities' have been cited in this Report. Perhaps it is not surprising that Tibetans refer to such policies as *Beijingoism* and attention has been drawn to this phenomenon at the UN Human Rights Commission (Geneva) notably in the most recent presentation of February 1989.

Equally disturbing are the many parallels concerning Chinese rule in Tibet which can be made with Nazi rule over subject territories during the Second World War. The Chinese frequently display a 'Master Race' mentality towards their 'minority nationalities', and their constant border claims, particularly along the N. Himalayas, recall the 'Drang Nach Osten' of the Third Reich and it has also been observed that the manner in which the indigenous populations of Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Manchuria and Sinkiang (E. Turkistan), are being submerged in an influx of Chinese immigrants, resembles a policy of 'lebensraum', with all its unpleasant implications. The sterilisations and medical malpractices mentioned in this Report provoke further comparisons as do the continuing existence of concentration camps, the enormous use of slave labour and the virtual extermination of 'inferior' cultures. The attention of the reader has been drawn to many such parallels in this Report.

This detailed Report entitled *Tibet: The Facts* was prepared by the non-political Scientific Buddhist Association for the UN Commission on Human Rights and this Report (now extensively revised in its present form) provides a thorough and balanced assessment of the situation in Tibet. The Report does not argue for or against Tibetan independence from China and has been widely praised for its impartiality and factual accuracy. It provides a clear framework for an understanding of the Tibetan issue and relentlessly chronicles major human-rights abuses in Tibet perpetrated by the Chinese since 1949. Such abuses are continuing now following the riots, mainly in

Lhasa, of early 1988 and '89.

This updated Report includes many new facts and a great deal of material that has only recently become available which should prove useful for media research as well as promoting a greater general awareness of the long Tibetan crisis. This Report incorporates much material giving details of the most recent riots in Tibet, together with the aftermath of repression and analyses the international repercussions of these events, in the light of deteriorating relations between India and China and the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre. A special new section has been added to the Report following the Massacre and an effort has been made to analyse Chinese thought patterns, which so many people find baffling, when they lay claim to remote areas such as Tibet on the basis of claims made by long departed imperial dynasties. An understanding of their mentality on this and other related questions helps enable us to explain the present actions of the Chinese Government and to gain a perspective on likely future policies, not only towards 'minority nationalities', but towards the world in general. (See section entitled *China: Today's Nuclear Empire With a Mandate From the Past* and *Tiananmen and Tibet: An End to Sinological Illusions*).

Paul Ingram

* The figure of 100,000,000 casualties (one hundred million) includes tens of millions of people who starved to death during the 'Cultural Revolution (1966–'76)', multitudes who disappeared in labour-camps and prisons, millions who suffered beatings and torture and underwent 'Thamzings' (prolonged torture and public humiliation), those who sustained severe mental damage as a result of political indoctrination and 'brain-washing' sessions and a million people who died as a direct result of mob action. Details of this casualty list may be found in *People's Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception* by Roberta Cohen, 1987, p. 7, footnote 4, which quotes *internal* Chinese sources. An estimated twenty million Chinese people perished as a result of Mao's 'Great Leap Forward' which began in 1958. The above quoted work cites the figure of twenty million dead on p. 16 Footnote 47. Roberta Cohen's Report was made to the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, Chaired by Lord Avebury.

** The above statistics were taken from *The Yearbook of Labour Statistics*, International Labour Organisation, Geneva 1988, 48th Edition, pages 803–897. Per capita income for the People's Republic of China is £180 Sterling (1083 Yuan), while that of Kenya is over three times as great at £642 (22,357 Shillings). These figures gain an

1. The first section of the document discusses the importance of maintaining accurate records of all transactions. It emphasizes that proper record-keeping is essential for the smooth operation of any business and for the protection of the interests of all parties involved. This section also outlines the specific requirements for record-keeping, including the need for clear, concise, and legible entries.

2. The second section of the document addresses the issue of confidentiality. It states that all information contained within this document is strictly confidential and is intended solely for the use of the designated recipient. Any unauthorized disclosure or use of this information is strictly prohibited and may result in legal action.

3. The third section of the document provides a detailed overview of the terms and conditions of the agreement. It covers various aspects, including the scope of the agreement, the responsibilities of each party, and the procedures for resolving disputes. It is important that all parties carefully read and understand these terms before entering into the agreement. The document also includes a section on the governing law and jurisdiction, which specifies that the agreement is governed by the laws of the state of New York.

4. The final section of the document contains the signature lines for all parties involved. It is important that all signatures be clearly legible and accompanied by the printed name and title of the signatory. The document is dated and signed as follows:

PART 1

THE DEATH OF AN ANCIENT CULTURE

Tibet—The Land

The region inhabited by the people still speaking the Tibetan language and still attempting to follow their traditional culture consists of what was formerly called the 'Three Provinces of Tibet—Amdo, Kham and U-Tsang (see map).

The entire area is about 600,000 sq. miles (2.5 million square kilometres), more than two-thirds the size of India, and is composed of a plateau averaging some 11,800 ft. (3,650 metres) above sea level which is surrounded by the Himalayas, the Karakorum, Kunlun and Altya-tagh mountain ranges. The area stretches almost 1.5 thousand miles (2,500 kms.) from west to east and is the source of many great rivers such as the Yangtse, Mekong, Brahmaputra, Salween, Indus, Sutlej, Kali Gandaki, Trisuli, Manas and Subansiri. Much of Tibet is a remote uninhabited wilderness of mountain ranges and plains while the more fertile south contains the main cultivated area descending from some 16,000 ft. to 10,000 ft. (4,500m. to 2,700m.) These are rich in forests which today China is exploiting. The remoteness and relative isolation of this region resulted in a mainly pastoral and nomadic economy in the east and north, but a more settled and broadly based farming economy in the river valleys and the warmer southern regions.

The origins of the Tibetan people remain obscure but as H.E. Richardson points out 'they cannot with scientific accuracy

added weight when one considers the per capita income of Malawi, one of the poorest countries in Africa, is also about £180 Sterling (800 Kwacha). So after some forty years of socialism China has achieved a per capita income equalling that of Malawi. By way of comparison the per capita income for Cyprus is £4318 Sterling (£3441 Cyprus Pounds), while that of Singapore is £3104 (\$9841 Singapore Dollars), The Soviet Union has a per capita income about fifteen times greater than that of China, £2739 (2,686 Roubles). Surprisingly enough, even Burma, generally thought to be one of the poorest and least developed countries in the world, has a per capita income nearly 50% greater than that of China, £315 Sterling (3395 Kyats).

These figures were calculated with reference to the following headings: Wages in Agriculture, Wages in Manufacturing, Wages in Mining and Quarrying, Wages in Construction, Wages in Non-Manufacturing Activities, Wages in Transport, Storage and Communication (1986). In the case of Burma only 1985 figures were available, one of the above categories was absent and in one case only the wages of men working in agriculture were given. However, calculations made indicate that these figures bear a good resemblance to the truth.

Most statistics need to be treated with caution and any economist will point out that a wide range of commodity prices have to be taken into account. For example, many commodities in a country with a low per capita income may be cheaper than is the case in a country with a higher per capita income, and therefore the purchasing power will be proportionately greater. This is particularly the case in a country as large as the People's Republic of China which has widely differing income ratios and commodity prices. The effects of inflation also have to be calculated and conclusions correspondingly adjusted. The above figures should therefore be treated with these reservations in mind. But they are, nevertheless, substantially reliable, and constitute a good working 'rule of thumb' and represent the average figure from the categories enumerated above. The conclusion remains that after some forty years of socialism the average income in China is about £4 a week, as is the case with Malawi, and that the per capita income in Burma is substantially higher than that of China. The surprisingly low figure for Chinese income is due to decades of chaos and mismanagement. Calculations compiled during the course of this Report indicate that China's economy may well have collapsed but for the ruthless plundering of Tibet's natural resources, particularly timber, and in a very real sense Tibet is 'China's Ukraine'. (See section entitled Ecological Devastation).

Currency ratios and Sterling equivalents were taken from the *Financial Times* 3/10/89, 'FT Guide to World Currencies'.

PART 1

THE DEATH OF AN ANCIENT CULTURE

Tibet—The Land

The region inhabited by the people still speaking the Tibetan language and still attempting to follow their traditional culture consists of what was formerly called the 'Three Provinces of Tibet—Amdo, Kham and U-Tsang (see map).

The entire area is about 600,000 sq. miles (2.5 million square kilometres), more than two-thirds the size of India, and is composed of a plateau averaging some 11,800 ft. (3,650 metres) above sea level which is surrounded by the Himalayas, the Karakorum, Kunlun and Altya-tagh mountain ranges. The area stretches almost 1.5 thousand miles (2,500 kms.) from west to east and is the source of many great rivers such as the Yangtse, Mekong, Brahmaputra, Salween, Indus, Sutlej, Kali Gandaki, Trisuli, Manas and Subansiri. Much of Tibet is a remote uninhabited wilderness of mountain ranges and plains while the more fertile south contains the main cultivated area descending from some 16,000 ft. to 10,000 ft. (4,500m. to 2,700m.) These are rich in forests which today China is exploiting. The remoteness and relative isolation of this region resulted in a mainly pastoral and nomadic economy in the east and north, but a more settled and broadly based farming economy in the river valleys and the warmer southern regions.

The origins of the Tibetan people remain obscure but as H.E. Richardson points out 'they cannot with scientific accuracy

be described as a 'Chinese' people and indeed the Chinese have for two thousand years or more looked on them as a separate race.¹ The Tibetans may be the descendants of the nomadic non-Chinese Chiang tribes of E. Central Asia or possibly of earlier Ural-Altaic peoples. It is worth pointing out that the Tibetan language belongs to the Tibeto-Burmese family, being quite distinct from the Sino-Thai group. Tibetan is without ideograms, being written in an alphabetical form and is polysyllabic and inflected with case, declension and gender structure adapted from Sanskrit and is not semantically tonal. Chinese, however, is written in ideograms, is mono-syllabic, noninflected and tonal.² Research indicates that Tibetans have lived at high altitudes for far longer than Indians in South America, as they have developed a genetic factor which allows them to utilise oxygen more efficiently than other high-altitude dwellers who as yet lack such a sophisticated mechanism.³

Until the Chinese Communists entered Tibet in 1949 the use of land for food production seems to have been characterised by balance and common sense. The rampant exploitation of nature deriving mainly from Western attitudes was absent and famines were practically unknown in recent times. In the mountain areas vegetation is sparse but in the river valleys, particularly in the south of Tibet, there are good crops of barley (Tibetan's staple diet) wheat, peas, beans and buckwheat. Considerable amounts of land were allowed to lie fallow in order to increase their yield.

Tibetan society was originally nomadic in nature and gradually evolved into a system where the land belonged to the State but was held in estates by the government, monasteries or aristocracy. Tenant farmers worked the land, many of them bound to the estate, but to none of the various kinds of relationships whereby tenants paid taxes to their landlords do the terms 'serfdom' or 'slavery' seem to apply. Many other life-styles existed—nomads, merchants, semi-nomadic peasants and craftsmen. In the provinces of Kham and Amdo (E. Tibet) where fewer big estates existed and there were more large free peasant holdings, more individuals owned their land and paid

taxes directly to the government.

Some point out that the above mentioned terms 'serfdom' and 'slavery' seem rather more likely to be Chinese inventions designed to justify their armed occupation of Tibet which began in 1949. Mrs. D. Choedon, a Tibetan woman classified by the Chinese as a serf, whose writings make this designation doubtful, gives a portrait of a rather easy going society which was more or less self-sufficient. 'We never had any difficulty earning our livelihood. There was not a single beggar in our area.'⁴ Her writings have been described as 'wholly credible' by Mr. Chris Mullin, a journalist who is considered by many to write sympathetically of Chinese rule in Tibet.⁵ Various travellers in Tibet such as Mme. David-Neel, George N. Patterson and Heinrich Harrer have generally confirmed Mrs. Choedon's observations.⁶

Tibetan-Chinese Relations

Relations between the Tibetan and Chinese people have existed for well over two thousand years and it is not generally known that the Tibetans had a huge empire which developed during the 7th Century under the reign of the Tibetan king Song-tsen Gampo. This empire extended north into Chinese Turkistan, westwards into Central Asia and even into China itself. In +763 the Tibetans captured the then Chinese capital at Chang'an (Sian) but by the 10th Century the Tibetan Empire had collapsed, leaving considerable numbers of ethnic Tibetans outside the borders of political Tibet. For the next three hundred years or so relations with China were at a minimal level.

Chinese claims that Tibet has always been part of China derive from a period when both Tibet and China were part of the Mongolian Empire. In the 12th Century the Mongols began to extend their influence and Tibet (though not conquered) submitted in 1207 while China was overwhelmed by about 1280. *The only period when Tibet and China were in the same political grouping was when Tibetans and Chinese were both*

subject peoples under Mongolian rule. The Tibetans were able to free themselves from this rule in 1358 when, in an internal power struggle, Changchub Gyaltzen wrested power from the Sakya minister, Wangtson Wangtsen, terminated all relations with the Mongols, and started a new lineage known as Phagmo Drupa. The Chinese followed suit some ten years later, when in 1368 they were able to drive out the Mongols and establish the native Ming dynasty.

It seems that the Chinese, in continuing to claim that Tibet was part of China, inherited the expansionist and imperialist designs of a conquering empire whose rule they eventually threw off. It has sometimes been pointed out that by using similar arguments India could now lay claim to Burma on the grounds that they were once both part of the British Empire!

When the Communists came to power in China in 1949 they continued to claim, on the basis of the above position, that Tibet was part of China, and deliberately chose to follow the expansionist and imperialist designs of former imperial dynasties whose legacy they supposedly despised and it seems unlikely that Marx, whose writings they supposedly follow, would have approved of such a policy which contradicted his support for the right of self-determination of peoples. Instead of rejecting the imperialistic legacy of former emperors, Tibetans point out that the communists enthusiastically supported such claims, grounded as they were in a remote imperial past, and achieved a degree of success which any Chinese emperor would have envied. The question of the right to self-determination of the various non-Chinese peoples played no part in their policies. Such a right should have applied either to peoples who were ruled by the imperial Chinese but struggled against such rule, or to those who successfully resisted incorporation into the imperial Chinese Empire. Throughout most of their history the Tibetans fall into the latter category.

It is worth pointing out that had the retreating colonial powers adopted similar arguments and pursued them with such ruthlessness and dedication, then the European empires would have lasted far longer than they did, or might even be intact today.

What in fact seem to be distortions of history are to be found in various Chinese writers of both the following Ming and Ching Dynasties, particularly when it claimed that Tibet was a 'vassal state' of China. However, such assertions really need to be examined in the light of the fact that the Chinese have at various times claimed as tributaries Holland, Portugal, Russia, the Papacy and Britain.⁷

Further claims have been made to Tibet on the basis of the Emperor K'ang Hsi (himself a Central Asian, not a Chinese) and his intervention in Tibetan affairs in 1720. This established some two centuries of what the Chinese see as their suzerainty over Tibet. It was during this period that the Chinese, on the basis of military victories and forceful diplomacy, assumed a form of nominal control over areas of E. Tibet, notably the provinces of Kham and Amdo which were inhabited almost entirely by ethnic Tibetans. (However, large parts of these territories were recaptured by the Tibetans in 1865. They passed briefly under Chinese control in 1911/12 until the Tibetans once again expelled them a few years later in the wake of some prolonged and extremely bitter fighting). Further Chinese intervention in Tibet occurred in 1790 when Imperial Representatives (Ambans) took up residence in Lhasa (the Tibetan capital). However, their power rapidly dwindled away.

The eminent Tibetologist, Professor David Snellgrove in a critique forwarded to the Scientific Buddhist Association stated: 'On similar arguments of exercising previous control, the British should never have left India—not to mention Southern Ireland and the French should never have left North Africa etc'. Professor Snellgrove also referred to the 'many striking parallels' between British relations with Ireland and Chinese relations with Tibet.⁸ It may be argued that what one finds amidst a welter of historical detail is a depressingly familiar phenomenon—namely the interference of a large power in the affairs of a smaller one.

The Tibetans also experienced such interference at the hands of another imperial power—Britain. During the second half of the 18th Century British influence began to extend along the

Himalayas. With a few exceptions, notably the Younghusband expedition in 1904, the long border between India and Tibet was generally peaceful with very few troops along either side of a frontier which stretches for some 2,500 miles (4000 kms). Various British imperial officers seem to have given a somewhat bewildered acknowledgement of Chinese claims on Tibet. However, in concluding various trade and border agreements with China towards the end of the 19th Century they soon discovered that such agreements could not be implemented in the face of Tibetan opposition, provoking the realisation that whatever the Chinese might say about the position of Tibet their influence on it was in fact severely limited.

During the early 20th Century relations between Tibet and China steadily worsened. This was partly as a result of the British imperialist expedition sent to Lhasa in 1904 in order to forestall possible Russian influence. The British venture produced a destabilising effect and one of the main results was increased hostility between Tibet and China. A general rising in E. Tibet (in the provinces of Kham and Amdo, occupied by the Chinese in 1909) was savagely repressed by the Chinese General Chao Ehr-Feng—whose troops entered Lhasa in February 1910. Chao Ehr-Feng himself did not enter Lhasa but remained in Chamdo. However, there were distinct tensions between the Manchu and Chinese troops in his army which erupted into open fighting following the fall of the Manchu dynasty in 1911. Although they had no military assistance the Tibetans were able to throw out the Chinese and regain much of the territories which had been occupied by Chao Ehr-Feng. When he returned to Lhasa from his brief exile in India the 13th Dalai Lama, together with the Tibetan National Assembly, declared Tibetan independence from China. East Tibetans once again fought off encroaching Chinese forces in 1918 and in the 1930s.

Tibetan independence was confirmed at the Treaty of Simla (July 3, 1914) which the Chinese immediately repudiated mainly because they were unwilling to relinquish much of the territory they had recently conquered in Eastern Tibet. The

two remaining signatories (Tibet and British India) then abrogated the rights and privileges claimed by the Chinese in Tibet. For the next thirty-eight years Tibet was entirely independent of China.

1949—The Chinese Attack Tibet

Even before the communists came to power in China its armed forces had intruded into large areas of eastern Tibet. Widespread fighting was in progress all along the border areas of Kham and Amdo and the Chinese—who had no knowledge of the terrain—were suffering heavy losses and had been fought to a standstill by the Tibetan resistance groups.

But when the communists came to power they sent heavy reinforcements, along with better arms and supplies. The 'liberation' of Tibet as they called it—was high on their priority list. The Chinese stated that Tibet was an integral part of China and declared that Tibet would be 'liberated' from the 'reactionary Dalai clique' and foreign 'imperialist' forces. They further stated that foreign powers were arming Tibet for an attack on China. In fact there were only a handful of westerners in Tibet and the Tibetans had only received very small quantities of munitions from the newly independent government of Prime Minister Nehru, who was already casting apprehensive eyes on the hitherto peaceful and largely undefended northern border. Furthermore, the Tibetan army was tiny and ill-equipped and proved no match for the well-trained Chinese veterans. The Indian government, like the previous British administration, was prepared to recognize some general kind of Chinese suzerainty over Tibet, but also pointed out that 'Tibetan autonomy is a fact'.⁹ The Chinese swiftly rejected various Indian suggestions designed to defuse the escalating crisis and their victorious armies swept onwards.

On October 7, 1950 the vastly increased PLA forces launched a two-pronged attack across the Dri-chu (Yangtse river) against the Tibetan forces. After 12 days of bitter fighting the Tibetan troops were forced to concede Chamdo, the headquar-

ters of the governer-general of Eastern Tibet, on October 19, 1950. The '17 Point Agreement' was concluded on May 23, 1951.

The Tibetan delegates were told to sign or face war. Normally no political agreement could be concluded by any Tibetan delegates without the imprint of the Dalai Lama's official seal, but the Chinese produced facsimiles which were in fact made in Peking and these were used.¹⁰

The '17 Point Agreement' promised, among other things, to respect the religious beliefs and customs of the Tibetan people, the existing political system, the monasteries and the spoken and written language and to develop school education of the Tibetan nationality. During the following years all these promises were broken.

It is surely an important fact that at a time when large parts of the world were still under colonial rule Tibet was one of the first countries to declare its independence and repudiate what it felt were the expansionist pretensions of a late imperial power. It is also tragic that at a time when many countries were at last freeing themselves from foreign domination, Tibet was forcefully incorporated into the Chinese State, 'the one big Motherland'. The Chinese, while applauding liberation struggles in various parts of the world, continue to deny the request voiced by Tibetans both inside and outside Tibet, that they should be allowed to decide their own destiny by plebiscite under UN supervision.

After the Tibetan riots of October 1987 and March 1988 the press and mass media generally compare the plight of the Tibetans under Chinese rule with that of West Bank Palestinians who have also lost their homeland to an occupying power and who are similarly denied their right to self-determination.

Tibetan Buddhist Culture

To King Song-tsen Gampo (mentioned above) is attributed the all important founding of Buddhism in Tibet during the +7th Century. Buddhism reached Tibet from the Swat Valley in India and the Tibetans also imported their written script

from India during this period. The Chinese often assert that Buddhism reached Tibet from China, citing the fact that Song-tsen Gampo's Chinese wife brought with her a Buddha image which is still venerated in Tibet today. However, they do not usually mention that the Chinese princess was given as tribute on the basis of Tibetan conquests. (Song-tsen Gampo also had four other wives, one Nepalese and three Tibetans). The Chinese do not mention the fact that the Nepalese wife came first and she also brought an image of the Buddha. The famous Jo-khang Temple was built by the Nepalese princess Brikuti Devi. Furthermore, at a great debate in +792 Indian Buddhist masters defeated Chinese teachers, confirming the Indian basis of Tibetan Buddhism.

During the 10th Century, following various persecutions by the followers of the indigenous Bon religion of Tibet, there came a second wave of Buddhism spearheaded by the great teacher Atisha who reached Tibet from India in 1042. (Buddhism was fast disappearing in the land of its birth due to a resurgence of Hinduism and the Islamic invasions often involving the deaths of vast numbers of Buddhists by fire and sword). While keeping its distinct identity Tibetan Buddhism absorbed some of the iconography and meditational practices of the Bon religion, some of these introspective disciplines being thousands of years old, and purged Bon of its crueller sacrificial element. Gradually Buddhism came to permeate the lives of all Tibetans in a way that more secular cultures find difficult to understand. Tibetan Tantric Buddhism developed a religious art of extraordinary vigour and intensity, some of which was specially designed to create certain states of consciousness when used as objects of meditation. Great proficiency was also achieved with wood-carving and metalwork, most of which was on religious themes.

Gradually more and more monasteries and temples were built until they were found in every village and town throughout Tibet, together with resident monks. Even ordinary Tibetan homes had their altars and Buddha images. Huge monasteries, which were more like monastic cities, such as Tashilunpo, near

Shigatse, Drepung, Sera and Gaden, in Lhasa, were built during the 15th Century. Tibetan Buddhism came to be divided into four main Traditions, each with its own complex set of 'lineages' through which both written and oral teaching were transmitted from one generation to the next. Each Tradition had its own monasteries headed by an incarnate Lama who had reached enlightenment after years of arduous mental training and study¹¹. The secular and spiritual aspects of Tibetan government came to be embodied in the institution of the Dalai Lama, in 1642 at the time of the Great Fifth Dalai Lama. This represented the unity of Church and State. The present Dalai Lama Tenzin Gyatso, is the fourteenth in line. Over the centuries Tibetan national identity became indistinguishable from religious identity and every part of Tibetan society, from the highest to the lowest, was saturated by Buddhist folklore and teachings and Buddhism regulated their lives, their festivals and holidays, their work and their family activities. By 1950 there were over 6,000 monasteries and temples throughout Tibet and some 600,000 monks.¹² By 1979 most of the monks and nuns were dead or had disappeared and only 5 monasteries survived, and even these were damaged.

Systematic Destruction of Tibetan Culture

In a very real sense the destruction of Tibetan culture was inevitable given the Chinese materialist ideology. They simply could not tolerate any manifestation of religion, the more so when it was obviously inseparable from Tibetan national identity. Furthermore, they thought in terms of an oppressed peasantry continually rising against brutal landlords, as was indeed the tragic case in China. However, there are no recorded peasant rebellions in Tibet due partly to the all pervading influence of Buddhism, but also the fact that, with the exception of the large monasteries, there do not seem to have been the same extremes of poverty and wealth that existed in China. Also, the population of Tibet was of course far smaller than that of China and a fair balance seemed to have been reached

between population density and food production.

However, almost from the very beginning the Chinese held meetings in which they began to assiduously undermine the existing social system.¹³ Soon this escalated into the dreaded 'Thamzings' or 'struggle sessions' in which religious figures and local leaders were beaten, tortured and murdered, often by members of their own families who were threatened with similar treatment if they refused to co-operate. Children were made to see their parents dragged through the streets, beaten and stoned and finally executed for having served the former government, or for having been the descendants of age old landowners.¹⁴ The Chinese began deliberately and systematically to destroy Tibetan monasteries and temples, expertly dynamiting them after special teams had selected various valuable religious objects which were then taken out of Tibet, many of them being sold in foreign exchange markets (notably in Hong Kong and Nepal), bringing in much needed foreign currency.¹⁵ Ancient religious artifacts, priceless Tibetan paintings (thankas), art treasures and statues were either smashed to pieces by the Chinese or by terrified Tibetans obeying their orders. Sacred *mani* stones were used to make toilets; slaughterhouses were deliberately sited in the precincts of former monasteries, one monastery (the Jokhang in Lhasa—which is the most holy temple in Tibet) was used as a pigsty and sacred scriptures were ploughed in with manure.

The treatment meted out to Tibetan culture by the Chinese vividly calls to mind the fate of the Inca and Aztec cultures at the hands of the Spanish invaders or the efforts made by the Nazis to utterly exterminate all traces of Polish and Jewish culture and there are many parallels including the smashing of works of art, the burning of pictures, the systematic degradation of all that was held sacred, the destruction of anything beautiful and the burning of scriptures and texts of both the Jewish and Christian faiths. The Nazis attempted to wipe out the intellectual strata, such an example among many was the shooting of the entire academic staff of Krakow university and a fruitful parallel may be made in the systematic killings of

Tibetan monks in their monasteries and seats of learning. Benchen monastery in the former Kham province of Tibet had some three thousand monks before the coming of the Chinese, but today only eight of these are alive.

All this was (and still is) an utter cultural catastrophe for the Tibetans as a sustained and deliberate effort to destroy their rich and ancient cultural heritage. Lowell Thomas has referred to this as the... 'deliberate and diabolical murder of a country, its culture and its people unparalleled in this, our time'. Furthermore most of this destruction occurred *before* the Cultural Revolution 1966–76. The Chinese usually give the impression that Tibetan culture was destroyed mainly at the time of Cultural Revolution during the reign of the aberrant 'Gang of Four'. This does not appear to be the case at all. For instance five out of six monasteries had been torn down by 1959 in the Rungpatsa region of Kham (E. Tibet), some six years before the onset of the 'Cultural Revolution'¹⁶ In the Markam area of Tibet 35 out of 37 monasteries were destroyed *before* Mao unleashed the internal Holocaust of the 'Cultural Revolution'¹⁷. It is true that some of the monasteries were destroyed or damaged as a direct result of the fighting during the Twenty Years War, particularly by bombing, but most of them were dynamited and looted between 1959–61 as a matter of cold-blooded policy. Many Tibetans who were actually in Tibet during these years have confirmed this.¹⁸ Two reports issued by the International Commission of Jurists in 1959 and 1960 concluded that the Tibetans were facing cultural genocide.

The Twenty Years War

The Chinese generally assert that the war the Tibetans fought against their rule consisted mainly of a ruling class uprising which was easily repressed in 1959. This is now known not to be the case. On the contrary it was the Tibetan government in Lhasa who were hoping for a peacefully negotiated settlement and were doing everything to restrain the warlike people of Eastern Tibet. The Tibetan people opposed the

Chinese invasion from the very outset and there were pockets of sporadic resistance all along the border regions. When the PLA troops attempted to cross the Dri-chu (Yangtse river) in October 1950, they were met with Tibetan government troops and voluntary forces of the people. By the early and mid 1950's widespread fighting was raging throughout eastern Tibet. The war lasted for over twenty years and the degree of popular resistance was such that constant Chinese assertions concerning the repressive nature of Tibetan society seem very doubtful. The fighting, which at its peak involved hundreds of thousands of Chinese and Tibetans, raged throughout eastern, central and southern Tibet and involved all sections of the population. In 1949 the Chinese had entered the eastern parts of Tibet. They supported local feuds and their activities were aided by the vacillation of the central Government. The long war was caused by:

- a) Food shortages created by the presence of large numbers of Chinese troops.
- b) Chinese imposed taxes on crops, wool and herds to contribute to the 'Aid to Korea' fund.
- c) Attempts to disarm the Khampa tribesmen.
- d) Attempts to introduce the beginnings of a commune system which Tibetans disliked as it broke with well-established patterns of life.
- e) The incursions of large number of Chinese settlers.
- f) Most importantly, the attempt to undermine Tibetan religion.

At first the Chinese did introduce some quite beneficial reforms and had they continued in this fashion matters might perhaps have been rather different. The possibility seemed to exist that the Chinese might interfere only minimally with Tibetan society and content themselves with the establishment of military bases and there has been a considerable amount of speculation as to why it was that the Chinese embarked upon a far more repressive policy in 1953 which opened the way to full scale war. The answer may be that until the Korean War ended in July 1953 the Chinese feared that bold and far-sighted Tibetan diplomacy might well have succeeded in involving the USA

both politically and militarily in Tibet's struggle. It is quite likely that the US would have greatly appreciated the opening of another battlefield in E. Tibet and would probably have provided munitions, supplies and perhaps even troops. Such a front would have reduced the pressure on UN forces in Korea and could possibly have involved some kind of a nuclear commitment of Tibet by the USA. President Truman even offered to consider a military option if the Dalai Lama rejected the '17 Point Agreement' and it seems that the Dalai Lama's feelings prompted him to fly to the US to seek support but it may be that he was dissuaded by the Nechung Oracle and by powerful abbots.¹⁹ It is probably correct to say that this represents almost the only time that there could have been a great power involvement on behalf of Tibet, and it seems unlikely that the Indian Government would have been able to withstand determined pressure from the USA for military facilities in the north.

It is likely that the Chinese were only too well aware of these possibilities in 1950 and knew that a Khampa rising could easily be precipitated by their presence and by foreign involvement. This possibility must have been ever-present in their minds during the Korean War, but once it ended the need for caution in Tibet was reduced and they embarked upon a ruthlessly repressive policy which, but for the considerations described above, would probably have begun much earlier. When the Dalai Lama, clearly against his better instincts, returned to Lhasa in mid 1951 after fleeing to S. Tibet the Chinese were undoubtedly greatly relieved, for the link with the US was severed and all Tibet lay before them, practically undefended and bereft of foreign help.

Their ruthless insistence on far reaching and generally unwanted changes in Tibetan society provoked a growing rebellion in parts of Kham and Amdo which the Chinese countered with various atrocities. For example in the small town of Doi in Amdo some 300 out of 500 'serf owners' were shot in the back of the head before a horrified crowd which was told that such would be its fate if it opposed socialism.²⁰

The Chinese admitted the existence of rebellion on many occasions though the bulletins of the New China News Agency are often full of contradictions. Dr. Peissel points out that 'in a speech to the State Council the Commander-in-Chief of the 'Tibetan region of China' announced that difficulties had been encountered and there have been grave misunderstandings in Tibet'... 'Later in December 1957 Fan Ming, the Secretary of the Communist Party's Tibet Work Committee went so far as to declare that the apparently inexplicable rebellion of the Khampas was caused by 'Great Han Chauvinism in Tibet manifested in the feeling of the Han (Chinese) race and its repugnance for the backwardness of Tibet'.²¹

As the rebellion gathered momentum in 1955 bitter fighting raged around Lithang, Bathang, Derge, Chamdo and Kanze. It is difficult to know the exact numbers involved but, judging by the intensity of the fighting and the area it covered even during these early stages, well informed sources estimate that tens of thousands of Khampa horsemen fought the Chinese.²² Battles raged over huge areas as more Tibetans took up arms against their traditional enemy and fighting sometimes occurred at altitudes of over 14,000 ft (4,500 m.) in temperatures of around -40° centigrade.

Coming mostly from the steamy lowlands the Chinese were no match for the Khampas who were tough and knew the territory extremely well. The Chinese were fought to standstill by 1956 and the Deputy premier Marshal Chen-Yi was sent to investigate the causes of unrest. The Chinese then concluded a truce with the Tibetans which they later broke.²³

During the late 1950's the Chinese poured troops into Eastern Tibet. The huge monastery of Lithang was bombed flat on June 1, 1956, when it was full of pilgrims, in retaliation against a major offensive that had originated in Lithang. When the second fact-finding delegation, sent by the Dalai Lama at the Chinese request, visited Tibet in 1980 Lithang was a heap of ruins. In the aftermath the local governor of Lithang was publicly tortured to death and hundreds of monks were slaughtered.²⁴ Refugees and nomad encampments were machine-

gunned and bombed from the air and countless thousands of Tibetans disappeared in labour camps. As the rebellion swung west Tibetans of all occupations—farmers, tribesmen, nomads, traders and monks—united to defend their Buddhist culture and ancient way of life against the armies of the world's most populous nation.

One of the most graphic portrayals of the War and its effects on ordinary Tibetans is to be found in 'Horseman in the Snow': The Story of Aten an Old Khampa Warrior, now published by Wisdom as 'Warriors of Tibet'. The book is full of unforgettable images such as his little daughter dying in the snow with her intestines hanging out, the bullet-ridden corpses of his friends and relatives as hundreds of Chinese cavalry galloped at defenceless and frozen refugees, a nomad encampment where some 400 people had been slaughtered and only the dogs were left alive and were eating the dead. (see footnote 20).

Throughout the War Chinese atrocities were so bad that even Phuntsok Wangyal, Tibetan Communist leader for many years who held the important position of Vice President of Tibetan People's Political Consultative Committee was arrested and imprisoned for protesting against these atrocities and expressing his sympathy for the Tibetan struggle for freedom.²⁵ The PLA artillery commander in Lhasa Col. Cheng Ho-Ching defected to the Tibetan side recounting how he had simply become disgusted with killings and manipulation of what he felt were simple Tibetan people. Colonel Cheng Ho-Ching had fought against the UN forces in Korea and after several years as a soldier in Tibet he decided to desert to the Tibetan freedom fighters and fought against his former comrades. As he rose through the ranks he had access to papers which contained very detailed instructions on how Tibetan resistance would be overcome and how the country would be taken over through policies of infiltration and coercion. After severe fighting in Kham and Amdo he found Chinese records giving the number of 40,000 Tibetans killed and to prevent further revolts food rations were decreased, control intensified and the people were forced to work longer hours. In November 1958

he was made commander of the artillery in Lhasa with 1,200 soldiers serving under him. Many of the soldiers were not happy with their assignment and their posting, so far away from their homes in China.

One of the leading army officers Lin Chen, complained about the huge size of the army in Tibet and said that China was poor and could not support it. After that he was demoted and removed. At a meeting Colonel Cheng Ho-Ching (Tibetan name Lobsang Tashi), said that the Chinese were deceiving the Tibetans and that the poor remained poor in China in order to finance an unnecessary large army in Tibet. Knowing what his fate would be he escaped the same evening and deserted to the Tibetans and was surprised to find that considerable numbers of Chinese had already joined the Tibetans. Many times he saw tanks and aircraft used against civilians and large numbers of villages bombed.²⁶ He fought his way to India and lived there as a Tibetan refugee.

When the Uprising in Lhasa occurred on March 10, 1959 the War had been raging for nearly six years, and major fighting persisted in Tibet for about another four years, mainly in the southern province of Lhoka and continued during the Sino-Indian war of 1962. (According to Peissel there is some evidence that the Khampas severed the Chinese lines of communication during the War which might help account for their somewhat hasty withdrawal in the face of apparent victory).

No one knows how many were killed in the Lhasa Uprising which was repressed with a savagery reminiscent of the Nazis in Warsaw but the casualties may have been as high as 10,000.²⁷ Not generally known is the fact that two days after the Uprising had been crushed several thousand Tibetan women marched through the streets of Lhasa and called for the Chinese to get out of Tibet. There followed mass arrests and many Tibetan women, including most of the leaders, were imprisoned and tortured for years. Public executions followed later but most of those executed were unrecognisable as they had been so severely beaten.²⁸

After the Lhasa Uprising bitter fighting raged throughout

Central Tibet with more Khampas engaged in pitched battles with Chinese troops attempting to capture the Dalai Lama who, following his ministers' advice, was heading for the safety of India after reliable indications that the Chinese were about to try to kidnap him. During this middle phase of the War Tibetan resistance became more co-ordinated under Gampo Tashi Andrugtsang who formed the 'Four Rivers Six Ranges' Resistance Group and later died from wounds received in action. Chinese brutality was such that large numbers of Tibetans from the central and southern provinces joined the resistance forces even though they were of a far milder disposition than the Khampas. An enormous rebellion occurred in the southern province of Lhoka in 1969/70 during the years of the 'Cultural Revolution', only to be bloodily repressed by the Chinese and sporadic risings continued well into the 1970's, and began again in 1987 and 1988.

The last phase of what has become known as the Twenty Years War occurred in 1965-'74 when mainly Khampa forces attacked the Chinese from bases in Mustang (N. Nepal) about 1,000 miles (1,600 kilometers) from their homelands. Had the Tibetans received arms from India or elsewhere the rebellion would undoubtedly have lasted much longer and caused the Chinese even more trouble than it did. The Chinese only gained complete military control over Tibet in the mid 1960's. For example in late 1958 the Khampas stormed Tsethang the main Chinese base in the valley of the Tsang Po (Upper Brahmaputra) and wiped out a well-armed Chinese garrison of 3-5000 men and the areas through which the Dalai Lama passed on his way to exile in India in 1959 were under the control of the Khampas, as were large areas of E. Tibet at this time. (The previously mentioned Chinese, Colonel Cheng Ho Ching fought with the Tibetans at Tsethang who were covering the retreat of the Dalai Lama.) There is no doubt that Prime Minister Nehru bears a heavy responsibility for the destruction of Tibet. His anxiety not to offend the Chinese resulted in a systematic censorship which prevented information about Chinese atrocities from reaching the outside world. Because

his pre-occupation was with the threat posed by Pakistan he constantly under-estimated the threat posed by the Chinese and tacitly acquiesced in the destruction of an entire civilisation. Much could have been done to mitigate the catastrophe and at the very least arms and munitions would have proved an invaluable help to Tibetan freedom fighters as was the case with the Afghan rebels who withstood the Russian invasion.

However, the Bandung Accord which India signed with China in 1954, gave India the same status as China in the eyes of Asia and the world, and ironically one of its main provisions was non-interference by the signatories in the affairs of other countries. Nehru signed this agreement in the hope of somehow containing or placating China. It proved to be a futile hope, as others involved in the long crisis discovered to their cost. Having once signed the Bandung Accord Nehru could scarcely denounce the Chinese occupation of Tibet without violating the terms of the treaty and imperilling his credibility, and he went to extraordinary lengths to prevent news of the Twenty Years War from reaching the outside world. If Nehru had actively assisted the Tibetan freedom fighters large parts of Tibet could have been denied to the Chinese with the result that India's long northern frontier would not have been so difficult and costly to defend as it now is.

As it was, practically the only assistance the Khampas received was from the CIA during the last years of the rebellion in Nepal when they were used as pawns to embarrass the Chinese. The politically unsophisticated Khampas were desperate, having seen their homelands devastated and their families wiped out, and had to take whatever help they could get. Material assistance did not amount to much and US aid was hastily terminated when relations with China improved in the early 1970's.

The rebellion finally ended in 1974 when the Nepalese army attacked the Khampas. Many captured Khampas died or disappeared in Nepalese prisons while those that escaped this fate and were left after more than twenty years of fighting drifted southwards into India. Such was the end of the Tibetan War.

The Cultural Revolution

As has been pointed out most of Tibetan culture lay in ruins *before* the Cultural Revolution. What this period highlights is the sheer depth of psychological oppression endured by the Tibetans. The practice of religion was made utterly impossible, personal relationships, hair-style, clothing, personal habits and even sleeping arrangements were (and still are) carefully monitored. Even today unmarried couples caught sleeping together are often publicly humiliated and punished and homes are regularly entered to check on the authorised number of occupants. Most men were taken away from Lhasa in 1959 and sent to labour camps and it seems that very few returned. Lhasa was described as a city of 'frightened hungry women' and during the period of the Cultural Revolution even a brief conversation between two people was suspect unless it was sprinkled with Party slogans.²⁹ Countless numbers died at the Thamzing sessions. Not surprisingly many Tibetans went mad under conditions which seem to resemble Orwell's 'Nineteen Eighty Four' with its dreaded Thought Police. One Tibetan woman records that her sister had been reported as wandering around Lhasa wearing some kind of brightly coloured theatrical costume and talking to herself. She was concerned about her sister as she had five children and her husband was in prison. But she was unable to visit her because of strict controls on movement.³⁰ Another records seeing lorry loads of Tibetan children passing through Lhasa on their way to be executed. 'They weren't tall enough to see over the sides of the trucks but they were tall enough to be shot'.³¹ Nine and ten year old children were sent out in groups to hunt birds and kill flies and in the evening they were required to submit their kills before the Chinese. The least ardent bird hunters were subjected to brutal punishment and the parents were also punished for breeding 'reactionary offspring'. The Chinese stated that birds had to be killed because they ate the crops.³² However, Tibetans point out that this practice was more likely designed to break the mores of the previous culture which, because of the deep

influence of Buddhism, held all forms of life in deep respect in a way which is almost impossible in the urbanised, industrialised, and in some respects alienated societies of today.

The extent of the civil and social dislocation as gangs of Chinese teenage thugs roamed the country with a virtual *carte blanche* to destroy what was left of an ancient Buddhist culture, is almost unimaginable. 'After their rampage in Lhasa the Red Guards went to Kongpo. There they brutally raped the daughters of some four hundred woodcutters living at Powo Tramo. The girls were marched naked in public and punished with *Thamzings* (sessions of self-criticism). The Tibetans were so furiously helpless at these atrocities and insults that many of them committed suicide'.³³

'Although Paynak, under Shigatse jurisdiction, had been threatened with famine conditions before 1966 Red Guards from Peking attacked Tibetans who were harvesting crops in the fields for wearing the national dress or for having long hair in the traditional style. Dolkar the young wife of Tsering Sangpo, a middle class Tibetan, was criticised for her long hair and raped. The Red Guards then shaved half the hair off her head. Tsering Sangpo, in a fit of anger attacked the criminals, but was arrested and hanged. Because she had been assaulted by several people his wife suffered permanent physical injuries'.³⁴

'Before liberation the population of Galing Gang was approximately seven hundred. Now it is only about four hundred, the rest having been either executed or tortured to death, or having escaped into exile. Most of the young children have been sent to some unknown places where they are supposedly being given an education. My mother, Kyizom, was arrested in 1959, along with sixteen other people from Galing Gang. They were taken all around Dromo and brutally flogged in ten different sessions of public trial, after which they were sent to an unknown destination. My own turn came in 1961 when I was arrested with three others and put on trial three times. After that we were sent to Phari where we were made to do extremely hard manual labour and live on a daily ration of two bowls of *tsampa* (a Tibetan barley dish), and some black tea. After seven months I was released.

In 1962 I heard that my mother was in Lhasa and I sought permission to visit her. I got 24 hours leave and went to Lhasa where I found that she was locked up in the Drapchi prison. I applied to the prison authorities to visit her and was given one day. When I went to see her at first I could not recognize her at all, she looked so thin, pale and hardly human. I had to ask if she was really my mother. When she replied 'yes' we both burst into tears, but the Chinese guards did not allow us to talk as I had to go back to Dromo. My second request to see her was rejected on the grounds of 'insufficient reason'. This was the last time I saw, or heard about, my mother'.³⁵

During the years of the 'Cultural Revolution' the work quotas in the communes were such that many people died in the fields and refugees report that every moment of the day was regulated so intensely by the Chinese that these bodies often lay unburied for days and even weeks. Other well-authenticated reports coming from the late 1960's at the height of the 'Cultural Revolution' indicate that Tibetans, who were already starving as a result of the Chinese appropriation of their grain, were often compelled to give blood transfusions in an effort to build up a blood-bank which would be reserved for Chinese wounded in the event of war with India. Many of these famished Tibetans simply died while the blood was being drained from them or lacked the strength to rise and were thrown out by the Chinese to die outside the medical stations. The image of a Chinese vampire draining away Tibetan life-blood has often been used by Tibetans since 1949.

Kunsang Paljor, a Tibetan whose parents were murdered by the Chinese and who was transported to China along with thousands of other youths to be educated in communist doctrine, records murder, rape, torture, starvation, full-scale fighting and complete social dislocation. Like many other trusted Tibetan cadres he was disgusted by what he was and fled to India.³⁶

Finally, the Red Guards systematically killed all the dogs they could find, often cruelly by poisoning, beating to death, or strangling (the famed pigeons in Lhasa were similarly

treated). The Tibetans loved their dogs and they were treated as part of the family and many highly specialised breeds had been developed. There were often many stray dogs in the towns and villages but such was the nature of this easy going Buddhist culture that they were usually allowed to wander freely throughout peoples' homes and were fed. Rabies and associated diseases were practically unknown at this altitude (12,000–14,000 ft).

Whatever one thinks of the value or credibility of Marx's teachings it seems likely that he personally would have condemned such brutality and would have questioned how such carnage was achieving the goal of equality. Tibetans consider the racism displayed by the Red Guards towards Tibetans when they prevented them from following their customs and attacked them for wearing their national dress, to be of a kind which any staunch White Afrikaner would immediately understand and it is difficult not to sympathise with their outlook, particularly when there are many glaring examples of racism to be found throughout China today.³⁷

It is not easy to find an exact historical parallel that can match the immense destruction and the scale of social dislocation of the 'Cultural Revolution' and its effects upon Tibet. The closest analogy would seem to be Poland under Nazi rule or perhaps more aptly areas of occupied Russia which were simply given over to fire and sword by the SS troops. Even this analogy may not hold good since the Red Guards fought amongst themselves and no Tibetan could ever guess what terrors the morrow would bring as a result of Red Guard civil wars which often resulted in innocent bystanders being accused of various crimes or shot as supporters of rival factions. The SS slaughter in Russia and Chinese massacres in Tibet before 1966 were usually carefully planned and organised, whereas the period of the 'Cultural Revolution' was characterised by chaos. All Tibet was in a state of bloodshed and anarchy and the above examples are typical of the kind of atrocities that happened throughout Tibet during the years 1966–'76. The tortures described by John Avedon in *In Exile from the Land of Snows* and by Kunsang Paljor in *Tibet: The Undying Flame*

remind one vividly of those carried out by the Gestapo or those to be found in the dungeons of the Spanish Inquisition, and it may be that the closest historical parallel for this period is found in the witch burnings and wholesale madness that inflamed medieval Europe. Certainly both periods are characterised by bigotry, dogmatism and violence and this aspect of China's recent history and the continuing racism to be found in the Chinese national psychology today, do not readily square with the pretensions of the Chinese leadership to represent some kind of a social beacon pointing to the future or to be champion of oppressed Third World peoples.

It is important to understand that the present Chinese leadership tries to maintain that the 'Cultural Revolution' alone was responsible for the destruction of Tibet. They can then put the blame on the 'Gang of Four' and maintain this was simply an unfortunate aberration in Chinese history. The present Turkish government employs a similar historical device when it tries to place the blame for the Armenian Massacres of 1915 and 1916 on a small group. In fact, horrible though the 'Cultural Revolution' was it only marked the culmination of the destruction of Tibetan culture. *Most of Tibet lay in ruins before the onset of the 'Cultural Revolution' in 1966 and most of the great massacres of Tibetans had also occurred before this date.* When this point is clarified it becomes apparent that since 1950 Chinese rule in Tibet has been characterised by a deep continuity which has aimed to steadily obliterate Tibetan culture resulting in a huge loss of life before the 'Cultural Revolution'. Chinese policy in Tibet is still characterised by a determination to destroy Tibetan national culture as is shown today (1990) by the enormous and continuing influx of Chinese immigrants. Tibetan history since 1949 has been described as 'one long scream' and the picture entitled 'The Scream' by Edward Munch provides an illustration of the state of mind induced among Tibetans by the Chinese, in that the scream is of such intensity and mirrors such mental anguish that the person's perception of the environment is deeply affected and that too becomes part of the scream.

In a very real sense the 'Cultural Revolution' is considered by Tibetans to mark the apotheosis of Chinese policy in Tibet, rather than being a deviation from it as the Chinese leadership tries to maintain today. This is because both then and now the Chinese objective in Tibet remains the same. However, the present Chinese leadership does not thank anyone for pointing this out.

Appeals to the United Nations

While Tibet's initial appeal to the UN in 1950 met with only a limited response Chinese atrocities become so bad that the UN passed three resolutions in 1959, '61 and '65. The 1961 Resolution specifically linked human rights abuses in Tibet with the right of the Tibetan people to self-determination. 'Considering that these events violate fundamental human rights and freedom the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights the principles of self-determination of the people and nations...'. The 1965 Resolution demanded 'the cessation of all practices which deprive the Tibetan people of their rights and fundamental freedoms which they have always enjoyed'. The events itemised below, (1-6), together with the present situation in Tibet, suggest that two ICJ Reports levelling the charge of genocide against the Chinese and stating that 'acts of genocide had been committed in Tibet in an effort to destroy the Tibetans as a religious group...' are justified in the main thrust of their argument. Numerous other human rights violations were specified including murder, rape, torture, destruction of family life and deportation. Most of the main conclusions of these two Reports have now been amply confirmed from many different sources, some of them included here. The evidence strongly suggests that the Tibetans are a dwindling population whose culture is rapidly disappearing and who are being swamped by a Chinese influx.

The Chinese are in clear violation of Article 2 of the UN

Genocide Convention (signed December 11th 1946) which defines genocide as 'crimes committed with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group as such'. Quite simply the over-whelming evidence suggests that the Tibetans are facing cultural genocide at the hands of the Chinese. Within a generation or so they will cease to exist as an ethnic/religious group having their own language, culture and national identity.

The precarious situation of the Tibetan people has now been raised four times at the UN Human Rights Commission by the International Fellowship of Reconciliation, provoking abrasive and unconvincing replies from the Chinese delegation. Consequent UN syndication has greatly contributed to the worldwide publicity which the Tibetan issue is now receiving.

Population Displacement and Demographic Imbalance

Recent detailed research carried out by the Information Office of the Central Tibetan Secretariat Dharamsala, N. India, indicates that over 1,200,000 Tibetans, including nearly 100,000 tortured to death, have died during the last forty years as a result of the Chinese occupation. In 1982 Daljit Sen Adel of the International Secretariat, Asian Buddhist Conference for Peace, estimated that during the last three decades about four million Buddhists have been killed in Kampuchea and Tibet, and in the light of present evidence his estimate was an accurate one.³⁸

Until recently the absence of reliable Tibetan population statistics, both before and during the Chinese occupation, together with Chinese Communist propaganda, confused the entire question of the numbers of the present Tibetan population and the total of those killed during the years 1949-1979.³⁹ For example, the often quoted Chinese population figure of 1,190,000 Tibetans in 1959 refers only to the severely truncated 'Autonomous Region of Tibet' (much of the historic Kham province has now been absorbed into the neighbouring Chinese provinces of Kansu, Szechuan and Yunan.⁴⁰ It is

interesting to note that the 1982 census conducted by the Chinese gives the figure of 3,870,000 Tibetans in the 'ART'—a figure which must be treated with caution. New Chinese statistics for ART include Chinese settlers and officials who are registered in the ART. This is true of Qinghai and other Tibetan territories now absorbed into neighbouring Chinese provinces. The population figure is, therefore, much higher but does not reflect the real Tibetan population. A glance at the appended map also shows that what was previously called the Amdo region of Tibet, and largely populated by ethnic Tibetans, has now been renamed Chinghai province and separated from the rest of Tibet, and huge numbers of Tibetans perished in these provinces which are not part of the present 'ART' as officially designated by the Chinese.

Chinese claims to this region derive principally from the military and diplomatic successes of the previously mentioned Emperor K'ang Hsi in 1720. All one can say is that several million ethnic Tibetans live in regions now outside the 'ART'. One is entitled to make this statement on the basis of a generally agreed total of between 4-6 million Tibetans before 1949. Once again it should be noted that Chinese claims to the former Amdo region of Tibet derive mainly from the military victories of an emperor who ruled over 250 years ago and who was the chief representative of an imperialistic dynasty. In an age of liberation struggles when so many nations and peoples have achieved their independence one could be justified in believing such claims to be an extraordinary reversal of the current spirit of the times. There is no doubt that the Tibetan casualty list was much swollen by the fighting which took place in the Amdo area and the casualties for the years 1949-'79 (1,200,000 dead) include the areas comprised by the old Tibet, now part of new Chinese provinces, as well as the much reduced 'ART'.

The Chinese find it difficult to dispute the above casualty list point by point and their general tactic is to remain silent on the Tibetan losses during the Twenty Years War and by starvation, execution and torture and to simply dispute the estimates of

numbers of Tibetans living before 'liberation' and to refer to Tibetans scattered 'in the four provinces surrounding Tibet'. The matter is then reduced to an academic dispute on demographic figures. This is the equivalent to a discussion concerning the numbers of Jews in Central Europe during the 1930's and 1940's which did not mention the effects of the Holocaust. The Chinese ambassador's letter to the *Times* (12/4/89) provides a good example of this technique. When challenged on the sheer scale of losses during the Twenty Years War the Chinese deny that it ever took place and admit to only minimal 'hardship' during the bitter famine years. When confronted with specific facts and with information supporting such a factual analysis the Chinese invariably bypass such material and give an answer which circumnavigates such arguments and then repeat their standard propaganda reply. Such tactics would seem to indicate that they know they have much to hide and to remain silent about.

It seems very likely that there were some 4-6 million Tibetans living before 1949 with the total veering over the 5 million mark. The Chinese refer to their benevolent rule and give inflated population figures for Tibetans living outside and inside the 'ART'. But there is no doubt that the Tibetan population as a whole has declined in numbers despite Chinese assertions to the contrary. The reasons for this undoubted decline in the Tibetan population are:

(i) *The Twenty Years War*: A sub-committee of the Scientific Buddhist Association carried out detailed research into the Sino-Tibetan War and reached the conclusion that given the duration, scope and intensity of the fighting several hundred thousand Tibetans died (this estimate may well be a conservative one).⁴¹ This conclusion is supported by the fact that in many parts of Tibet there are more women than men, while in the area previously known as Kham, where the fighting was fierce, very few males are to be seen over the age of about forty. Two generations had been virtually wiped out in the fighting and its after-math.

The researches of the Information Office now indicate that

over 400,000 Tibetans perished during the Twenty Years War and further evidence for the severe demographic effects of the War reflected in the male/female ratio is to be found in The Population Atlas of China.⁴²

(ii) *Massacres* : Huge numbers of Tibetans have been massacred by the Chinese, 87,000 being executed in Central Tibet alone in 1960 following the Lhasa Uprising.⁴³ A pooled eye-witness report confirms that within a period of 17 days in 1966; 69,000 Tibetans were executed in and around Lhasa. (In 17 days the Chinese killed more people than the Nazis did in the whole of their four and a half year occupation of France.)

A typical pattern may be seen in the figures for the six districts of Golok in Amdo, E. Tibet. In 1957 the population of Golok was 120,000. Between 1958-62; 21,000 local Tibetans were killed fighting the PLA, 20,000 were executed in local prisons and a further 20,000 died of starvation as a result of famines caused by Chinese appropriations of food. A further 53,000 were deported in 1962 and 'disappeared'. Of the original population only 6,000 remained and between 1963-79 these were reduced to 4,700. New settlers were brought in to swell the population to 10,000, these being composed of 2,500 Chinese and 2,500 'non-Chinese'.⁴⁴

These years of terror have taken their toll. The village of Jhalung situated in the Tsolho region of Amdo (Qinghai) had about 50 households before 1959 but today (1988) only about ten are left. The rest died in the War, disappeared in prisons, committed suicide, starved to death, deserted the village to escape Chinese reprisals or were tortured to death. In Derge Meshoy the household of Sotsa Tsang had nine members. The old mother died of malnutrition and beatings during a series of Thamzings or struggle sessions, the eldest son Kunchok Tseten was killed in combat and six other members died in Minyak prison. Only the youngest daughter of the household is left alive today. The Dhogo Tsang household in Markham consisted of five members. Chiloe, the head of the household starved to death in Tsawa Pomdha prison, his two sisters Ani Lobsang and Ani Kunchok Tsomo, died under torture, and his

wife and son, the only two surviving members of the family are now physical derelicts.⁴⁵

(iii) *Labour Camps*: Countless thousands of Tibetans have died in prisons and forced labour camps during the past thirty years. Dr. Tenzin Choedak was incarcerated in a vast prison at Chiujin (part of the Sining labour complex) near the border of Inner Mongolia in 1961. When he arrived at the prison, mostly populated by Chinese, he found that of the 300 Tibetan prisoners there in 1957 only two remained alive, the rest having died of beatings, torture, starvation and forced labour. Conditions were so appalling that one prisoner killed an eight year old boy and ate him. Within three years two-thirds of the Tibetans imprisoned with Dr. Choedak were dead.⁴⁶ Apho Gaga, a former inmate of Tsawa Pomdha prison in Kham, says that in 1959 the Tsawa Pomdha prison had nine brigades of prisoners, each consisting of about 900 men. By the end of 1961, there were only about 370 left among all the brigades which had once totalled 8,100 men. This entailed a *death rate of about 85%*. It seems that some of the prisoners were shot by the guards for their own amusement. Another source mentions that out of a batch of 600 Tibetans from Lhasa sent to Chun Chin labour camp in Kansu *only 27 returned alive, a death rate of nearly 95%*.⁴⁷ A former Tibetan prisoner featured in 'Dispatches' BBC Channel 4 recalled deathpits full of Tibetan corpses with arms and legs sticking out of the ground and stated that he and other prisoners were forced to eat human flesh in order to survive. He was once a monk and referred to himself as a 'left over from death,' and his testimony called to mind similar descriptions of the Nazi deathpits in the Baltic States and the Soviet Union.⁴⁸

Another Tibetan, Mr. N.J. Topgyal, records how Tibetan prisoners died like flies while engaged in heavy construction work in the Kongpo area. "The Chinese used to pile up corpses and when they had reached the size of a small hill the corpses would be set on fire."⁴⁹ Another former prisoner estimates that some 10,000 people died in the notorious Drapchi prison in Lhasa during the period 1960-'65.⁵⁰ A huge prison complex is

known to exist at Sining (Xining) in Central China and many Khampa tribesmen were transported there during the 1950's and '60's. Numberless thousands of Tibetans died of hunger, beatings, torture and forced labour in this remote and desolate area. Normally information from this region is scarce but one report from a former American prisoner indicates a vast prison complex reminiscent of Stalin's Siberia in 1930's. He also stated that many of the Tibetans living in this region were prisoners or 'forced employees.'⁵¹ Dr. Choedak estimates that the number of prisoners currently (1988) contained in the Sining labor complex may be as high as ten million and another former prisoner, Jean Pasqualini, gave an even higher estimate for the years of his incarceration.⁵²

The testimonies of Tibetans in prisons and labour-camps at this time cannot fail to remind one of the accounts emanating from the Nazi concentration camps in Poland during the Second World War, and they particularly call to mind such books as *The Theory and Practice of Hell* and *The Stones Will Shout*. The eye-witness accounts of rows of famished Tibetans, chained and manacled, being beaten to death in sub-zero temperatures in dimly lit prisons by Chinese prison guards armed with huge clubs are not easily forgotten and vividly recall the 'commissar beating contests' with which the SS enlivened their periods of duty in the concentration camps. A significant difference, however, lies in the fact that prisoners who survived beatings and 'thamzings' were sometimes brainwashed and indoctrinated to such an extent some of them actually believed the experience was good for them and they were even required to thank their captors. A former Tibetan prisoner once remarked that on balance the Nazi concentration camps were preferable, the dimension of political indoctrination being virtually absent and the Germans knew that they were inflicting pain for their own amusement. Once again one is reminded of the Inquisition who tortured victims supposedly for their own good, but there does not seem to be any evidence that even the Inquisition expected those tortured to extend their thanks to their tormentors. Allied prisoners experienced brainwash-

ing during the Korean War but given its obsessive extent it would seem that we are dealing with a peculiar aspect of Chinese national psychology when it is allied to such a dogma as Marxism and interwoven with their own deeply-rooted racism. At any rate it is something not very easy to understand. An excellent analysis of this mentality has been given by Jamyang Norbu.⁵³

Prisons and labour camp complexes such as Minyak, Drapchi and Sining are known all over Tibet and cause the same dread as mention of Auschwitz, Belson and Dachau does in Europe. But at least in Europe it all ended in 1945. For Tibetans it still goes on.

The Dalai Lama has stated that before 1950 there were some 600,000 monks in Tibet. Most of these were jailed, tortured and massacred. Huge number of monks from monasteries such as Drepung, Sera, Gaden, Lithang, Derge, Bathang, Chamdo, Tashi Kyil, Kubum etc. simply vanished without trace. In 1979 it was estimated that there were some 80,000 Tibetans in prisons and labour camps.⁵⁴ During the brief period known as 'liberalisation' many of these were released and some were allowed to visit relatives who had escaped to India. It was only with detailed testimony such as that given by Dr. Choedak that it became possible to gain a fully comprehensive picture of what has happened in Tibet during the 1960's and 70's and this has been supplemented by the findings of the three fact-finding delegations, both in verbal testimony and on film.⁵⁵

There now exists evidence which suggests that during the years 1980-'87 the above quoted number of 80,000 prisoners was substantially reduced. For example, John Avedon, author of *In Exile from the Land of Snows* estimated that some 20,000 Tibetans were detained in 84 prisons in 1986. However, with the clampdown which began in September 1987 and intensified during the riots during the Butter Festival in March 1988 it is known that many arrests are taking place and that the prisons are filling up once again. An estimated 2,500 people have already been arrested in Lhasa alone and this figure is probably much higher when arrests outside the general area of Lhasa

are included, and added to the arrests following the riots of March 1989.

All the revelations of the last seven years have allowed a substantially accurate picture of Tibetan history since 1949 to be drawn. This is particularly the case during the last three years when tourists from all over the world have visited Tibet, some of whom can speak fluent Tibetan, or are familiar with patterns of Chinese oppression. Many recent testimonies, notably some obtained before and during the 1987 and 1988 and 1989 riots in Tibet have proved to be extremely valuable and have played a significant part in refuting the earlier accounts of supposedly independent journalists who were in fact little more than extensions of the New China News Agency (Beijing) and who gave little or no indication of the horrendous dimensions of Chinese oppression in Tibet. In some respects their accounts resemble those of some people who visited Stalin's Russia in the late 1920's and early 1930's, when large areas of Russia, particularly the Ukraine, were being decimated and subjected to a reign of terror, and who gave glowing accounts of Soviet progress and praised their human-right record.

(iv) *Famine Caused by Chinese Policies* : Over 300,000 Tibetans have starved to death as a result of Chinese destruction of well-established agricultural patterns, thereby contributing to a further decline in the Tibetan population. In the words of Stephen Corry, Project Director of Survival International (UN ECOSOC NGO) 'Far from providing the poor with enough to eat the overwhelming evidence suggests that the Chinese totally disrupted an essentially self-sufficient society and caused, through their brutality and colonialism massive food-shortages and widespread hunger as the masses were put to work to feed their new masters'.⁵⁶

Before 1950 barley formed the staple diet of Tibetans (from which they make a dish called tsampa). Because the Chinese do not like barley and prefer wheat this new crop was sown to feed the Chinese armies. This precipitated famines since wheat takes longer to ripen than highland barley and the Chinese

evidently lacked either the intelligence or the powers of observation to realise that the short Tibetan summer would not allow enough time for the wheat to ripen and that severe winter frosts would destroy the crop before it could be harvested.

Under the old system fields were left fallow while under the new one all agricultural land was farmed as intensively as possible with disastrous results. Also, lands which had been previously used for grazing were ploughed and used as farmland, even though in many cases the pasture-land soil composition was unsuitable for the growth of wheat. As a result little was gained and many livestock died. Much grazing land also disappeared as the Chinese built numerous roads to facilitate troop movements and herds were not allowed to graze in the vicinity of Chinese bases of which there are many in Tibet so that more livestock died. Because of over-cultivation, the consequences of which many Tibetans foresaw and warned the Chinese against, yields even in fertile areas, became disastrously low. Widespread famines occurred in 1960 and 1962. In Kanze and Drayab, once famous for their grain, people were reduced to begging and abandoning their homes in search of food.

Descriptions given by refugees remind one vividly of eyewitness reports of the potato famine in Ireland under British rule in 1840's. Fatal shortages of food occurred again spasmodically during the 1960's and there were crop failures in Dromo and Phari in 1959, '63 and '66⁵⁷. One story (among many others) of this period concerns a famished mother who made a soup of her own blood to feed her starving children while her husband was in prison⁵⁸. Mrs. D. Choedon reports harrowing cases of starvation where villagers sold their last few possessions to buy food and then starved to death. Anyone who admitted the existence of food shortages was violently punished by the Chinese and declared 'an enemy of socialism'.⁵⁹ In many parts of Tibet food shortages still exist after more than thirty years of Chinese rule and in autumn and summer many people have to resort to trying to live on wild vegetables.⁶⁰

Recent research indicates that during the era of the Great Famines over 340,000 Tibetans died of starvation. During the

late 1960's when the villagers had gathered together their grain the Chinese soldiers came and loaded the grain on to convoys of trucks or made the villagers deposit it at convenient pickup points. These starving Tibetans wandered about in search of food only to die in sub-zero temperatures in the snows amidst the ruins of their monasteries, in graveyards of tree-stumps caused by Chinese deforestation.

Recent statements of visitors and tourists to Tibet give good reason to believe that many people still go hungry in Tibet. Many references have been made by tourists and foreign correspondents to the abject poverty of the Tibetan people and one such account is worth quoting in full. "17 May (1987) 'I went to a restaurant owned by a man from Sining. There were lots of diners inside. As soon as people from a table finished eating, hordes of Tibetans—both young and old—carrying empty tin cans entered the restaurant and scrambled over the leftovers on plates and bones thrown under the table. Also in Lhasa I went to a large shop called 'Dalethang' and witnessed a moving scene. One Mrs Nima from Nagchuka was there with a five year old son named Damdul. She was shouting from a corner, 'Does anybody want to buy this child?' At one time she was angry that one man made her an offer of only twenty yuans. I asked her why she wanted to sell her son and she replied, 'I am pregnant again and have great difficulty getting enough food and clothes.'

"On my return (19th May) I was dining in a restaurant in Shigatse. There were altogether twelve other customers—Western tourists and Chinese. When they finished eating, a group of children rushed in and scooped up all the leftovers from the plates. Later we saw them not very far from the restaurant sharing the food with some elderly people. I also saw many Tibetans openly begging in the streets. On 20th May in Lhatse I saw a group of Tibetan children pick up empty fruit cans thrown by the Chinese and lick them clean."⁶¹

One can only guess at the cumulative effect of such famines, which dwarf the recent ones in Eritrea, and prolonged food shortages upon the Tibetan people. Studies carried out on the

Indian peoples of South America indicate that such shortages spread across generations, produce mental retardation and a decline in intelligence. Before the coming of the Chinese, famines were virtually unknown in Tibet.

(v) *Influx of Chinese soldiers and settlers* : In Central Tibet, the truncated area which is known as the 'Autonomous Region of Tibet', the Chinese have about half a million troops.⁶² As has been pointed out the Chinese gave the figure of 1,190,000 Tibetans in the 'ART' in 1959 and 3,870,000 in 1982. *These figures indicate that the Chinese are claiming that the Tibetan population has increased threefold in twenty-three years during a period of starvation, massacres and warfare.* Such figures are not credible and the Tibetan 'Government in Exile' estimates that there are about 2,000,000 Tibetans in the 'ART' today which seems a far more realistic figure. If this is the case then Chinese troop concentrations are equal to about *one quarter of the total Tibetan population.* Heavy troop concentrations are known to exist in the former Kham and Amdo regions as well as in Kongpo, Dromo and Lhasa. A huge influx of Chinese settlers (Tibetans call them colonists) has taken place in the warmer and more temperate regions of Tibet including Chamdo, and in the so-called Dechen Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture (which is a part of Kham, annexed to Yunan Province) it is feared that few, if any Tibetans are left. A good example of the proportions of the Chinese influx is to be found in Lhasa (the Tibetan capital). Until the coming of the Chinese the population was almost entirely Tibetan but today, on Chinese figures, they actually outnumber the indigenous Tibetan population.

It is now known that the Chinese influx into Lhasa has drastically increased and that PLA figures must be added on to any estimate of the Chinese population. The Tibetan population now numbers about 60,000 and it is believed that at least the same number of Chinese troops are present in the city, so that there is now one Chinese soldier for each Tibetan. Ngabo Ngawang Jigme stated that there were 100,000 Chinese civilians in Lhasa (Radio Lhasa 23/3/89) but he does not seem to have

added that these are registered Chinese. There is good reason to believe that there are about the same number of unregistered Chinese present in the city. *Therefore it is likely that the Tibetans are outnumbered by more than 3-1 in their own capital.* Of further concern to Tibetans is the fact that Chinese settlers are also pouring into other parts of Tibet. For example, the former Amdo province of Tibet now has some 2.5 million Chinese settlers. In the Kokonor area of this region there are some 700,000 Tibetans constituting the main bulk of the Tibetan population and it is likely that the Chinese outnumber the Tibetans by at least 2-1. The former Tibetan province of Kham, the scene of exceptionally bitter fighting during the Twenty Years War, is believed to contain at least two million settlers which means that Tibetans are probably outnumbered in the ratio of 2-1. Only in the 'Autonomous Region of Tibet' does it seem that the Tibetans may still outnumber the Chinese. The figures published by the Chinese in 1982 state that there were slightly over 100,000 Chinese in this area. However, mass immigration has been continuing during the last five years or so and in September 1988 Mao Rubai, Vice Chairman of the 'ART', admitted that there were about one million Chinese in this area. Tourist observations certainly refer to an enormous and continuing Chinese influx, and it is probable that this belated admission is still an underestimate⁶³. The Chinese speak of 'western frontier regions that could easily absorb 200 million Chinese settlers'. The meaning of this population transfer spells one thing for Tibetans—cultural genocide.

The Tibetan predicament resembles in many respects the plight of Tahiti which is at present under French control and it is likely that the indigenous inhabitants of the nickel rich French colony will find themselves outnumbered by the French in less than a decade. As is the case with parts of Tibet, nuclear tests have resulted in radioactive contamination and the French, like the Chinese, continue their nuclear tests despite widely based protest movements.⁶⁴ (See section entitled Ecological Devastation).

(vi) *Refugee Outflows* : About 100,000 Tibetan refugees are settled all over the world, mostly in India. It is not known how many died escaping the Tibetan holocaust during the last thirty years. Refugees who survived record seeing mountain passes covered with dead. Furthermore, very large parties, sometimes numbering tens of thousands are reported as setting out from the southern and central provinces of Tibet, most of them never to be seen again, having either starved to death or been buried alive in avalanches or shot down by pursuing Chinese. Many Tibetans who actually reached India died of starvation, the heat or tropical diseases, to which they were (and still are) particularly susceptible having come from high altitudes.⁶⁵ Often forgotten is the fact that large numbers of the refugees attempting to walk from eastern to central regions of Tibet during the mid and late 1950's (in order to be near the Dalai Lama) were either caught in bitter fighting, or machine-gunned both from the air and on the ground by the Chinese, or herded into labour camps where they disappeared. Of the many thousands who did reach Lhasa and camped outside the capital, large numbers were killed in the subsequent fighting. We can never know how many Tibetan refugees were killed but several hundred thousand seems a plausible enough figure given the length of the crisis and the extent of social dislocation, and there is no doubt that the number of refugees killed forms a considerable proportion of the 1,200,000 Tibetans who have died as a direct consequence of Chinese rule.

PART 2

TIBET TODAY— THE IRON HANDSHAKE

The following sections give some idea of conditions at the present time (1988). Some of the material gathered by the fact-finding delegations who visited Tibet in 1979–'80 has been used but also incorporated in this updated report is very recent information coming from Tibet via tourists and Tibetan refugees, as well as media reports. Many of the facts presented in all the previous sections, and in the following ones were itemised in an open letter from the Scientific Buddhist Association addressed to Professor Wang Yao, described as 'China's leading Tibetologist'. As no reply has been received it seems reasonable to assume that he has been unable to answer any of our main points.⁶⁶

Education and Language

The main aim of education in Tibet seems to be to sinocise the Tibetan population and indoctrinate them with political dogma. The official language is Chinese and this discriminates against Tibetans in every sphere of life. Promises made in 1988 that Tibetan would be used in ART from July 1989 have not been carried out. While teaching of Tibetan has been permitted in some village schools, the best schools continue to teach in Chinese medium. In any case there is little incentive to study Tibetan as no jobs are available unless one is well versed in Chinese. The written language has almost disappeared and in many places spoken Tibetan cannot be understood. Many place

names are in Chinese and even today the Chinese often forbid parents to give their children Tibetan names.

For example, the fact-finding delegations found many children named after their weight or their father's age at birth, i.e. '7½' or '42'. It is interesting to note that Tibetan words for 'Tibet', 'Chinese', 'King', and 'History' have been suppressed and replaced with words that play down Tibet's distinctiveness. One is inevitably reminded of Orwell's 'Newspeak' with its progressive elimination of concepts unacceptable to the party.

The Chinese frequently give inflated figures supposedly to illustrate their educational achievements, i.e., 6,000 schools started by the people with 200,000 students.⁶⁷ However the fact-finding delegation to Tibet included educational specialists who visited some 85 schools and were dismayed by what they saw. In many places they were informed that the schools were 'closed for the summer'. Another school was 'closed for lunch' at 10 a.m. with all its classrooms stacked with timber. Radio Lhasa itself announced the dismal quality of teaching in Tibetan Schools.⁶⁸ Even official figures of the schools visited show that only 44% of the children were Tibetans, the rest being Chinese and almost 70% of the teachers were Chinese. Most newspapers, books and periodicals in Tibet are written in Chinese not in Tibetan. In many parts of Tibet no Tibetan is taught at all and in Central Tibet it is taught only for 3 years and then merely as a vehicle for communist ideology. Dawa Tsering was a Tibetan Marxist/Leninist educated abroad who voluntarily returned to Tibet and studied at the Landou Minorities Institute. He found that the majority of Tibetans there were simply cadres studying the Chinese language and the science faculty was restricted entirely to Chinese. He was so disgusted that he left Tibet.

As far as the overall educational situation in Tibet is concerned there have been few widespread and general improvements in the last six years, despite Chinese assertions to the contrary. According to details contained in the 1982 census less than one Tibetan woman in six can read and the literacy rate is only 26.8% compared with literacy rates of 83.4% in Liaoning Province and 85% in Beijing. The Chinese authorities now

allow limited numbers of Tibetans to study at universities outside Tibet in mainland China. It seems that in most cases they are not allowed to return to Tibet during vacation periods, notwithstanding the fact that Chinese students can return home during vacations. This means that a Tibetan student could be away from home for three years or more and this naturally constitutes a powerful disincentive to study in Chinese universities outside Tibet.⁶⁹ At present about 2,500 Tibetans are studying at universities in China.

Although there are many thousands of Chinese students at present studying abroad, until very recently no Tibetans were allowed to study outside China. Now, however, two students will be studying English at Oregon university and small numbers may also be allowed to study elsewhere. The tiny numbers involved show a great unwillingness on the part of the Chinese to allow Tibetans to study abroad as they undoubtedly fear that such Tibetans might ask for diplomatic asylum.⁷⁰

The consensus of opinion is that educational standards are still very low throughout most of Tibet. The Chinese claim to have recently built 3 institutes of higher learning, 13 technical colleges, 55 secondary schools and 250 primary schools.⁷¹ However, tourists who have been able to roam over large areas of Tibet have seen little to support such claims. For example, during the visit of a US delegation led by Senator Leahy in August 1988 regional officials stated that many Tibetan children go without any formal education.⁷² Generally Tibetans still seem to be extremely uneducated and there are very few persons with sufficient education or experience to act as community leaders, teachers, or intellectuals or to fulfill any of the positions or professions needed in a developing community.⁷³ In Lhasa for example, it seems that about 70% of the Tibetan people are illiterate and one visitor pointed out that during her time in Lhasa she never saw a Tibetan bus-driver, post office employee, policeman, bank or tourist bureau employee. Tibetans generally had unskilled or labouring jobs.⁷⁴ It is likely that Tibetan as a spoken language will disappear as it will only be taught to children who have spent some six years in China, an option

understandably rejected by most Tibetan parents. Recent reports now strongly indicate that as a matter of general policy few if any Tibetans are allowed to study the Tibetan language after the age of twelve years. At Lhasa University, probably something of a Chinese educational showpiece, Tibetans in the *mainstream of modern studies* constitute less than a quarter of the actual number of students. There are a total of 639 pupils of whom 258 were Chinese. Of the 413 Tibetan students 251 were in the Department of Tibetan and Tibetan Medical Studies and students refer to this as “the Department of Political Manipulation!”⁷⁵

Perhaps the most surprising revelations about Lhasa University have come from Julie Brittain who taught English there for a year. She estimates that less than half the students at Lhasa University are Tibetan and these are very often the children of cadres or are half Chinese and many were not sufficiently well educated to begin the university courses. She found a rigid quota system in existence concerning the ratios of Tibetan and Chinese students, the policy seeming to be ‘this university is virtually Chinese—we need Tibetans to balance it out.’ She found that the Chinese students despised Tibetans and one told her that he ‘never bought food from a Tibetan as they are not clean’. It was clear to her that Tibetan as a language is dying out. Tibetan students spoke Chinese to each other during the breaks. Once when she and some Tibetan students went on a picnic she sang an English song but the Tibetans knew only Chinese songs. The teachers were generally dilatory and only taught about 4 hours each week and regarded Tibet as an unwelcome transit camp where they could earn more money without doing much work. All they wanted to do was go back home. Like many Chinese they appear to regard Tibet as a ‘hardship post’ displaying an attitude similar to that of officials in the Roman Empire who were posted to England or Israel.

The British Council had sent huge numbers of well produced textbooks for the use of Chinese teachers, but these lay gathering dust and were seldom, if ever used. She was consistently abused by the university authorities who spread rumours

about her and students were told not to speak to her as she has 'a bad attitude'. Her friends were interrogated and one was even put under house arrest without good cause. She found many Tibetan students hard-working and eager to learn, but the odds were stacked against them and they resented the constant discrimination they encountered. She realised that the Chinese regarded her as a political pawn to cement relations between Britain and China and as she could not appear to sanction the inequalities and discrimination she had witnessed she accordingly refused to meet former President Jimmy Carter when he visited the English students in June 1987. Having been sent by the Voluntary Service Overseas, which is supposedly apolitical, but which receives half its funding from the British Government and whose presence generally signifies an acceptable human-rights record on the part of the host country, she felt she was being politically manipulated not only by the Chinese but in a sense by the British as well in-as-much as her presence and that of other foreign teachers conferred a certain respectability on the realities of Chinese rule in Tibet. She had come to Lhasa with an open mind but finally left in disgust in the autumn of 1988. It is interesting to note that she regards the Chinese attempts at 'liberalisation' as inadequate and fraudulent and saw the realities of exploitation, discrimination, repression, institutionalised hypocrisy and poverty. The Chinese hunger for foreign currency is largely responsible for a controlled, partial and temporary toleration of such Tibetan culture as has survived over the last forty years. After some four months work in Lhasa she discovered the reality which lay beneath appearances. 'As regards work, it is true to say that all menial tasks are performed by Tibetans—they are undoubtedly second class citizens in their own country. You will never find a Chinese doing the following jobs: toilet cleaning, street sweeping, gate keeping, road mending, electrician, plumber or carpenter, to name a few I'm sure about.'

Her comments on health care are very revealing and in the light of all that she had seen and experienced she advises a re-think on the part of British agencies who may be considering

various educational or cultural ventures in Tibet in co-operation with the Chinese authorities. This particularly applies to the Save the Children Fund, which is now working in Tibet in collaboration with the Beijing based 'Tibet Development Fund', formerly headed by the late Panchen Lama, which exists for the purpose of attracting foreign aid to Tibet. She is not at all happy with this commitment on the part of Save the Children Fund since it appears to legitimise Chinese rule, and she wonders if the policy makers have asked themselves how the Tibetans ever came to require such assistance in the first place.⁷⁶

Recently published figures reveal that in 1984 only some 600 Tibetan students graduated from college and technical schools and there does not appear to have been any significant increase in this number to date.⁷⁷ All in all the educational picture seems to be a very depressing one for Tibetans and such educational facilities as are available will not materially assist the maintenance or re-creation of Tibetan culture and will tend to perpetuate the inferior position of Tibetans to the Chinese. There is no doubt that the Chinese do not want to create an articulate and well educated Tibetan class who would in all likelihood undermine their position in Tibet by drawing attention to the racist aspect of their policies and by arguing for complete independence. This is one reason why most of the intellectuals were murdered during the years 1950-'79.

Health, Hospitals, Abortions and Sterilisations

Health and Hospitals : "Even to the casual observer it is evident that the standard of health care is much lower than in the rest of China" writes Mr. Chris Mullin .⁷⁸ The Chinese themselves admit that the average life expectancy in Tibet is still only about forty years contrasted with the claimed national average of about sixty-five years, and the infant mortality rate is still extremely high. It is unlikely that Chinese figures can be trusted, but if comparisons are made with other poor countries in the world who have little or no access to modern hospital

facilities it is probable that it is in excess of 150 per thousand births. Even today (1989) it is known that very few Tibetan doctors have been trained by the Chinese and Dawa Tsering (the Tibetan referred to in the above section) found that in 'socialist' Tibet ordinary people usually have to pay for medical treatment.⁷⁹ Barefoot doctors receive only minimal training and the Chinese interpreter accompanying the second delegation suffered severely from an inaccurate diagnosis and wrong prescription. Many have died in similar circumstances while others have been blinded.⁸⁰ Not surprisingly Chinese officials prefer to fly home for medical treatment, particularly in the light of the fact that failed Chinese medical students are sent to work in Tibet.⁸¹

When the second fact-finding delegation visited Tibet, Tibetans in hospitals were found to be suffering mainly from problems connected with spine and kidneys, probably caused by working very hard for long hours in the severe cold without adequate clothing. (Clothes are very expensive in Tibet and many Tibetans have to make do with old patched garments). Until 1979 many Tibetans had to work 7 days a week and this seems to have taken its toll in terms of general health of the Tibetan people. Other recent travellers to Tibet have noticed that people were often partially deaf as a result of severe beatings, while many Tibetans, even young people, had few or no teeth, caused principally by vitamin deficiencies during the great famines.⁸² Julie Brittain states that the Tibetan people favour their own doctors and medicine over that offered by the 'modern' Chinese hospitals even when they are insanitary, as is the Mentsekhang. Ironically enough Tibetan medicine is gaining in credibility in the West and many Chinese are benefiting from treatment by Tibetan doctors. While being fully aware of its origins the Chinese claim it as their own whenever it hits the headlines or attracts the attention of members of the international medical profession. Julie Brittain visited one hospital in 1987 and found that conditions were appalling. There were no pillows, 'the sheets were dirty, and an unemptied bedpan lay under the bed. Although very ill (her friend) was

fully clothed. I never saw a nurse in the three days I visited. Visitors wandered in at any time in any numbers. The doctor attending her smoked. There was no curtain for privacy when she used the bedpan, neither from other patients and their relatives, nor from the outside world through the window. She was afraid to eat the food provided or drink the water, and lived on biscuits and sweets brought by friends'.⁸³

Particularly during the year 1987 the Chinese produced various questionable figures concerning the number of hospitals and medical facilities in Tibet available to the ordinary people. Their assertions are contradicted by very detailed testimonies obtained from Tibetans who had been allowed to cross into India before returning eventually to Tibet. These documents were handed to Amnesty International in January 1987 and are now being actively investigated. One theme which emerged on many different occasions was poor or non-existent medical facilities, priority being given to Chinese citizens and to Tibetan cadres. Suffering Tibetans were frequently turned away from hospitals or even turned out of bed when Chinese patients arrived needing attention. In Tibet today Tibetans invariably have to pay for medical treatment and such treatment as they do receive is often inadequate and sometimes even dangerous.

The altitude at which most Tibetans live is such that very few germs can live or thrive and before 1949 almost the only serious disease to be feared was smallpox. However, all this changed with the coming of the Chinese Communists. Their mass contacts with the Tibetans have infected this remote and isolated people with communicable diseases to which they have little or no resistance. Exactly the same thing happened when the white races colonised large parts of the earth causing enormous numbers of indigenous peoples to die. This phenomenon was particularly noticeable with the Indians of the USA and is still happening today in many parts of the world, notably among the hapless Indian peoples of South America. Tuberculosis is very prominent in Tibet. According to a recent issue of the *International Union Against Tuberculosis and Lung Disease Journal*, in 1979 a random survey of pulmonary TB was con-

ducted in the 'Autonomous Region of Tibet' and China. The sample consisted of 888 clusters comprising a population (taken across China) of 1,295,083. An average cluster examined comprised 1,458 persons. In the 'ART' twenty such sample areas were selected, encompassing 26,690 persons of all ages. The prevalence rate in the entire area (that is for China as a whole) was 0.72% and the rate of smear positive was 0.19%. However in the 'ART' it was 1.26% and 0.316 respectively.⁸⁴ *This means that the incidence of TB is about twice as high in Tibet as it is in China generally, second only to Eastern Turkestan (Xinkiang), another important area which has been decimated and occupied by the Chinese. Of the total sample in the 'ART' 26,583 (98.858%) were not immunised against this disease. When tubercular tested the average infection rate was 27.3% for all ages and 11.3% for those under fifteen years and in the total sample area the annual risk of TB was 0.8% This risk and incidence rate is much higher than in mainland China and Tibetans not unreasonably regard it as a means by which the Chinese are weakening and decimating them as a people. Most accounts of Tibet before 1949 agree that TB was virtually unknown before the coming of the Chinese and the prevalence of this disease is probably attributable to the effects of the great famines which have weakened Tibetan resistance to such ailments and whose genetic effects may play a part in producing a generation of wasted and retarded children as has happened today in the case of many South American Indian peoples. The main conclusions of the above mentioned report were supported by the programme 'Tibet: A Case to Answer', which featured an interview with a Tibetan doctor who stated that dramatic increases in heart and lung complaints were attributable to the cumulative effects of prolonged malnutrition. (see footnote 48).*

Such reports certainly contradict the impression that the Chinese give to the rest of the world at medical conferences when dealing with the 'achievements' of their health programmes throughout China.

It would seem to be clear that the Tibetans as a people have been weakened by the drastic fall in their population, the genetic

consequences of wholesale starvation or prolonged food shortages, the seemingly deliberate Chinese policy of allowing TB and other related diseases to spread virtually unchecked, enforced abortions (which will be dealt with later) the huge Chinese influx and by the severe psychological consequences of the destruction of their culture. What would seem to exist is the classic formula found in a brutally exploitative colonial situation. Tibetans consider it to be at least as bad and arguably far worse than the imperialism emanating from the West, for the wholesale destruction of entire peoples and their cultures was the exception rather than the rule. They consider that the Chinese have added a new dimension to colonialism by physically destroying the cultures of the lands they have occupied and by deliberately weakening the biological constitution of entire peoples and undermining their strength and resistance on a variety of interrelated levels.

Yet another example of such a classic colonial situation is to be found in the fact that the Chinese are bringing huge quantities of cheap and damaging alcohol into Tibet and as many Tibetans are disorientated and psychologically debilitated they turn to drink. This is particularly the case with young people who are disillusioned with the racism and the virtual apartheid system they encounter every day, and who are unemployed. The Chinese tactic here strongly resembles the way in which the white settlers in the USA undermined the indigenous Indian capacity for resistance by giving them large quantities of whisky which they referred to as 'firewater'. Respected Indian chiefs gave away all or most of their lands to obtain whisky and the whites were swift to recognise that alcohol could be potent in more ways than one.

The Chinese seem to have realised this too. According to Mr. Tseten Samdup who spoke to a Canadian sociology lecturer who had been in Tibet, a cup of tea costs \$0.10 cents and a big bottle of San jui spirits (which usually come from Szechuan) costs \$0.40 cents. This alcohol is made from the worst quality raddish and the Canadian referred to above used it to keep his room warm during the winter and found that a bottle of it

lasted about one hour. This alcohol is available all over Tibet and destroys the kidneys very quickly.⁸⁵

Sterilisations and Abortions : The many accounts of abortions and enforced sterilisations in Tibet contain such a wealth of detail that it is clear this is standard Chinese practice despite the fact that it is official Chinese policy to exclude 'minority nationalities' from the provisions of Chinese family planning legislation. The testimonies referred to above, which were handed to the Scientific Buddhist Association and submitted to Amnesty International, include disturbing and factual accounts of forced abortions practiced upon Tibetan women who have exceeded the birth quotas.⁸⁶ One such woman actually heard her baby crying, but was told that it had died and was then sent back to work in the fields in the afternoon as is the usual practice. Other accounts refer to foetuses thrown into a hospital's public toilet and dumped in the storm drains of Chamdo public hospital. Many hospitals have specific departments which carry out abortions and sterilisations without the mother's consent. Other material submitted to Amnesty International includes reports of truck loads of Tibetan women being taken away to be sterilised, together with harrowing accounts of such sterilisations, which seem to afford the Chinese doctors a great deal of pleasure.

More recent evidence of forced sterilisation has come from Mrs Dolkar of District Dechen who arrived in Dharamsala early in 1988. She and 23 women from her district were sterilised against their will and it seems that many hospitals have specific departments which carry out abortions and sterilisations. Most of the children delivered in these hospitals do not survive and Tibetans refer to them as 'butchers' shops'.⁸⁷ A film made in Tibet without the consent of the Chinese carried an interview with a Tibetan doctor who spoke of compulsory abortions and forced sterilisations in Chamdo hospital after pregnancies of 3 months, 5 months and even later.⁸⁸

A recent and very detailed account gives cause for deep concern. It involves two tiny villages in Toelung Dechen district.

Mrs Dechen from Village No 2, Seno sub-district, Toelung Dechen District, says that in her village there are 12 households, and 9 women named Anu, Penpa, Tsering Dolma, Tasam, Wangdu Dolma, Choedon, Lhakpa Dolma, and Tsan-Choe were subjected to forced sterilisations. In the nearby village of Donkar there are 29 households and 13 women were sterilised against their will. These sterilisations occurred around the end of 1982 and 1983.⁸⁹

Shocking allegations have emerged from two monks from Amdo. 'In Autumn of 1987 a Chinese birth control team set up their tent next to our monastery in Amdo (northeastern Tibet). The villagers were informed that all women had to report to the tent for abortions and sterilisations or there would be grave consequences. For the women who went peacefully to the tents and did not resist, medical care was given. The women who refused were taken by force, operated on, and no medical care was given. Women nine months pregnant had their babies taken out'. The monks claimed that *all* pregnant women had abortions followed by sterilisation, and *every* woman of childbearing age was sterilised. 'We saw many girls crying, heard their screams as they waited for their turn to go into the tent, and saw the growing pile of foetuses build outside the tent, which smelled horrible. The birth control teams do not round up Chinese women who live in these villages'. Such testimonies inevitably call to mind accounts from the concentration camps during the Second World War when women were lined up to be sterilised or waited their turn to have medical experiments performed upon them, their captors having ensured that they were near enough to hear the screams of the doctors' victims.

A demonstration denouncing forced abortions and sterilisations occurred in Qinhai, formerly Amdo, E. Tibet, (see section entitled 'Renewal of the Terror 1988) included some monks and was violently repressed. It is reported that Tibetan women in the Autonomous Prefecture of Huangnan died after operations that went wrong and one resident stated that young shepherdesses had been pursued through the countryside and

taken away in trucks. 'They treat our girls like animals, sometimes they take them just to do experiments on'.⁹⁰

This last statement is supported by a considerable amount of information coming from other sources. For example, the Tibetan nurse Gadrang Lobsang Tenzin who recently escaped to India has said that in 1964 a team of Chinese doctors toured Tibet and used Tibetans as guinea pigs for surgical practice. An article describing his experiences states that 'Whether surgery was necessary or not and whether facilities existed or not, operations were performed. Many hundreds of healthy Tibetans died as a result or were killed. When the bodies of those who died on operating tables were being dismembered to feed the birds, as per the Tibetan Buddhist tradition, there were many cases of finding operating instruments and bandages sewn up in them.'⁹¹ Rumours of medical experiments continue today and seem to occur mainly in rural areas and in prisons. However, such reports are not easy to confirm but in the light of overwhelming evidence concerning forced abortions and sterilisations, such reports must command respect.

One is inevitably reminded of the Nazi sterilisations and experiments performed on subject peoples during the Second World War and certainly the racist aspects of Chinese policies in Tibet, together with their 'Master Race' mentality, provoke many striking parallels between Chinese occupied Tibet and Nazi occupied Poland or Russia. Such reports are proving of increasing concern to a considerable number of international organisations working in the area of human-rights, and the second report of the US based 'Asiawatch' has recently echoed a growing disquiet over this matter.⁹²

Testimony concerning enforced sterilisations and abortions was also given to US Congressional staff who travelled to India and Nepal, principally to assess the eligibility of Tibetan refugees for assistance. The previously quoted example in which Tibetan women were sterilised against their will by special teams was brought to their attention and they referred to this as 'a particularly poignant interview' after being informed of these events by the escapees from E. Tibet.

The Chinese say that they wish their 'minority nationalities' to thrive, but one is entitled to doubt such sentiments on the basis of evidence now available. As pointed out it is official Chinese policy that 'minority nationalities' should be exempted from family planning regulations but refugee testimonies suggest that such policies are applied at least as vigorously in Tibet as in mainland China. Because the Tibetan population is so small the Chinese could well afford to allow Tibetan women to have more children than is stipulated in the national quotas, particularly in the light of the vast Chinese influx.

It is rather revealing that in a speech at a meeting in Beijing in March 1989, Mr. Lhoga, Mayor of Lhasa city, stated 'In Tibet for example, the population is extremely small because of which Tibet is facing difficulties in manpower. Therefore we shouldn't pursue the birth-control policy in Tibet.'

However, their policy specifically prohibits this and they must be aware of the fact that within a few generations the Tibetan race could well dwindle to such an extent that it would face ultimate extinction. The two devices of enforced abortion and sterilisation will greatly facilitate this policy. Tibetan women who have undergone sterilisation have been medically examined in Dharamsala (N. India) by trained western doctors, among them Dr. Diana Gibb of London, and the accounts given by refugees and the material submitted to Amnesty International contradicts the Chinese explanation that sterilisations have been confused with anti-syphilis injections and treatment. Given what seems to be Chinese indifference to Tibetan health and even their attempts to undermine it, one could be pardoned for wondering if the Chinese would object to the progressive spread of syphilis among the Tibetan population, any more than they appear to object to the prevalence of TB among Tibetans, particularly as it would contribute to the decline of the Tibetan birthrate. However, Chinese cadres are often encouraged to marry Tibetan women, as a means of diluting the Tibetan population, so it is reasonable to assume that such women would undergo an intensive medical examination before any marriage was allowed.

The question of the existence of sterilisation programmes may no longer be considered an open one since there is now very formidable evidence indicating that Tibetan women are being sterilised as a penalty for having exceeded the birth quotas, and this directly undermines the Chinese contention that such procedures are often confused with anti-syphilis injections. Ironically enough, it is likely that syphilis was brought to Tibet a century or two ago, and even today the Tibetans still refer to it as 'the Chinese disease'.

It is difficult, if not impossible, to obtain reliable figures on infant mortality and life expectancy. But the facts adduced in this section would seem to cast into doubt Chinese assertions that life expectancy has increased and infant deaths have declined under their rule. The demographic effects of the Twenty Years War and the great famines are well known and under the circumstances it is not surprising to find general agreement among visitors to Tibet that most Tibetans die at about the age of 40 years and that infant mortality has not improved as a result of Chinese rule. One report states that one in six children die shortly after birth and this statistic seems more believable than Chinese claims of dramatic improvements in this area.⁹³

Such Chinese claims should be balanced against reliable accounts of what is actually happening in mainland China and one such account is provided by Dr. Bao Fu, a doctor from the PRC who is at present studying in China.⁹⁴ He states that many millions of female and male babies have been killed as a result of family planning policies. Newborns are often suffocated in specially designed jars, or injected in the head with pure alcohol. 'The newborn without a 'birth permit' falls into an eternal sleep before his eyes can open to see the world that injects him'. Babies born at home often fare no better and family planning cadres, most of them women, break into the home and kill the baby on the spot. Such activities recall the work of similar squads in Tibet who are paid a bonus, the amount of which depends on the number of operations conducted. His article is a chilling one and if a government mistreats its own

people in such a way it is not surprising that similar behaviour is to be found in its more recently occupied territories.

Finally, visitors to Tibet have been disturbed to find that many Tibetans are subject to nervous disorders caused by living in a state of almost permanent terror for much of their lives, knowing that at any time their homes may be searched (as happens frequently in Tibet) or that they may be arrested, tortured and executed. Professor Robert Roaf who recently travelled to Tibet, remarked at a talk in London in March 1987 that there was none of the usual laughter and gaiety for which the Tibetans had once been so well known, and the frequency of nervous disorders stands in marked contrast to their former reputation of being a robust and laughter-loving people.

The evidence now overwhelmingly suggests that the Tibetan people undergo a form of health discrimination in contrast to Chinese settlers which is tantamount to medical Apartheid. The evidence for enforced abortions and sterilisations is particularly strong as it comes from so many different sources, and it seems that the Chinese are largely indifferent to the spread of diseases such as TB among the Tibetan people given the statistics quoted above. There is a good deal of evidence suggesting that the Chinese would not have objected to the extermination of the Tibetans as a people during the 1950's and 1960's. However, their policies, appalling as they were, only reduced the Tibetan people by about 25-33% and it may be that the Chinese version of the 'Final Solution' favoured by the Nazis, is to continue to ensure that the Tibetans are destroyed as a people by the spread of disease, virtually non-existent medical facilities, a drastically declining birth-rate caused by abortions and enforced sterilisations, continuing food shortages and starvation with the consequent biological weakening of future generations, together with the debilitating effects of poverty, overwork, and living conditions resembling the sodden slums of Soweto. It is hardly necessary to add that the sum total of these policies will be reinforced by the endless influx of Chinese settlers which threatens to destroy what is left of Tibetan civilisation. If this interpretation is placed upon the above facts

is it possible to detect an inner consistency and cohesiveness in Chinese policies in Tibet, when they might otherwise seem somewhat disorganised and fragmented.

Food Production and Distribution

In June 1980 Hu Yao Bang, then General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party, promised to restore the Tibetan economy to the 'pre-1959 level' within three years—that is to restore it to the level it was *before* the Chinese extended their influence into all parts of Tibet.⁹⁵ This statement was a most significant one and indicated the failure of Chinese economic policies in Tibet.

During his recent visit to Tibet Professor Robert Roaf observed that the poverty he encountered was worse than that he had witnessed in Ladakh in 1936. While there have been some improvements in the general food situation since about 1980 it is surely worth remembering that, taking into account the deaths of some 340,000 Tibetans through starvation, caused by Chinese policies, it could hardly have got any worse. Many recent accounts record extreme poverty, particularly in north eastern Tibet and the above account is representative of many contemporary testimonies. Small farming villages on the road to Lhasa have hardly, if at all changed since 1950 or 1959. The standard of living in these villages appears to have been raised to the pre-1959 levels after years of hardship and turmoil, as a result of the reforms announced in 1980, 1981 and 1983. On the other hand, in Lhasa, Shigatse and Gyantse, the standard of living for the average person is somewhat higher than in the villages.⁹⁶

There is a considerable amount of evidence which suggests that yak herders, who probably comprise about 60% of the population, have benefited from the reforms introduced by the Chinese in 1978 and 1980 and by the results of massive inflation. The declared value of the Gross Value of Agricultural Output per capita for some rural areas of Tibet is between 500–600 Yuan (about £100 Sterling) which is well ahead of the

Chinese average of 276 Yuan (about £49 Sterling).⁹⁷ But it is worth remembering that this relative prosperity has been partly caused by inflation and therefore has a fortuitous element to it. Furthermore, in April 1988 an official at the National Conference for Commending Outstanding Figures on National Unity and Development said that although gross output of the five autonomous regions was up 10% last year (1987), 20% of the population were still denied basic food and clothing.⁹⁸ More generally, the work of two Chinese economists Wang Xiaoqiang and Bai Nanfeng gives a revealing picture of the economic legacy of Chinese rule in Tibet.

They point out that every major enterprise in the developing regions is a vertical, closed system which produces the goods local inhabitants do not want and exhausts state subsidies intended for the local people, in an effort to cover the costs of transport and of building up a separate secondary society, which has little or nothing to do with the average Tibetan. Such a society exists mainly to fulfill the needs of the Chinese workforce which has its own hospitals, schools, cinemas, etc. The two economists state that the Chinese appear as 'Martians visiting Earth, speaking a different language, and with a completely different system of values.' They further state that the situation is no different from the global North-South divide: it is a structural inequity which it is in the interest of the developed sector to maintain. They add that the western regions are China's own Third World.⁹⁹

With particular reference to food production, that is to agriculture and animal husbandry, the two authors consider that the general strategy is doomed to fail because of overproduction, transport costs and because of the enormous environmental destruction that Chinese policies have already caused. (See section entitled *Ecological Destruction*). In this context it is also interesting to note the reported comments of the Panchen Lama who stated that China is a Third World country and Tibet a third world region in the Third World country. Furthermore, it should be remembered that the cost of living in Tibet is generally much higher than in the rest of China, which in-

evitably means that figures showing the wealth of certain sections of the Tibetan people must be placed within the context of money often buying less than elsewhere in China, and it is certainly a matter of general observation that goods sold in Tibet are frequently much more expensive than in mainland China. Therefore figures showing the relative wealth of certain Tibetans have to be treated with grave reserve.

The reservations about the performance of the Chinese economy expressed by the two above mentioned authors are also evidently felt by the analysts on the *Financial Times* as an article written by Colina MacDougall shows (3/6/89). 'China is a vast country which in times of energetic dynastic rule from the centre has held together and in weakness has begun to break up. Even last year the troubles in Tibet plus the restlessness among economically independent provinces like Guangdong in the south, had led some Chinese intellectuals to wonder if the Communist Party's dynasty was cracking'. This wary article is characteristic of many others and gives a red light to investors and businessmen. It now seems that the widespread optimism once felt about the Chinese economy is evaporating all over the world, particularly since the Tiananmen Massacre, first hand experience of Chinese red tape and bureaucratic inefficiency, and a variety of irksome obstacles which have intruded upon the operations of foreign businessmen.

There is much evidence to show that since the early 1980's the communes in most areas of Tibet have been dismantled, but as most Tibetans are still suffering from their legacy and as it is likely that some Tibetans are still working within the commune system or diluted variations of it, no discussion of the food situation in Tibet today would be complete without some insight into the workings of the commune.

In the early days of experimentation the commune system failed disasterously and when some successes were achieved Tibetans seldom benefited from them. Most Tibetans, even today, are paid in grain rather than with money and are given a ration card indicating how much grain they will receive and it is with this grain that they mostly have to buy the necessities of

life. The amount of grain that a worker receives depends upon her or his performance and the 'work points' are recorded on the grain card. Grain is usually paid in quarterly instalments, while work points are awarded at the end of each day. As a result of this system the aged and infirm often go hungry and people labour under endless nagging restrictions never knowing if they or their families will receive enough grain to buy food and other necessities. The fact-finding delegations saw people working in the fields from 6 a.m.–8 p.m., some of them very young children with scarred and knobbly hands. Many such children have to work in order to contribute to the work points needed by their family and one is entitled to wonder how much education these children receive. The second delegation also encountered children roaming the countryside in search of food. Their parents could not afford to feed them and they had been asked to leave home.

Many Tibetans live in villages and conditions seem to be worsening as the grain value of the work point does not seem to have been increased for some time but the amount of work expected for it has been raised by about 50% during the last two or three years and conditions were very bad before this increase took place.¹⁰⁰ Much of the commune's produce is appropriated by the Chinese along classic colonial lines. For example 50% is withdrawn as 'Surplus Grain Sales' by the State and bought very cheaply by the government. This is followed by more deductions such as 'Love the Nation Tax' etc. and Tibetans work extremely hard for subsistence rations.

The communes left such a legacy of starvation and destitution, soil erosion and administrative chaos that their debilitating effects can be seen everywhere. Tibetans point out that communes were mainly the result of blind dogmatic adherence to the tenets of Marxist and Maoist ideology, irrespective of the prevailing conditions, which made it quite clear that such policies were doomed to failure. In his highly revealing book *Breakfast With Mao*,¹⁰¹ Alan Winnington the communist correspondent, gives examples of innate Chinese racism and intolerance, and quotes Chinese cadres who said it was possible

to smelt iron with a candle in one hand and the works of Mao in the other. Such attitudes are dogma devoid of common sense or scientific or empirical feedback and account for the catastrophic failures and famines of the 1950's and 1960's.

It seems that the household is now generally the basic unit of production in Tibet and about 90% of agricultural families have been given leases over their land for between 30–50 years at least double the most generous rural leases in the rest of China. In addition 95% of agricultural families have been given animals to raise, following the distribution of communal stocks. However, every Tibetan knows that Chinese policies can be reversed at the stroke of a pen as has happened so often in the past and the fact that a family will only have the land for two or three generations does not serve to restore a lost continuity or allow a great deal of confidence in the future. It must also be uppermost in the minds of many Tibetans that the fall of Hu Yaobang and more recently Wu Jinghua, senior Communist Party leader in Lhasa, could herald an approaching era of Leftism in which communes could re-emerge and even another 'Cultural Revolution' convulse China once again. The slaughter in Tiananmen Square has raised this spectre.

The Tibetan food situation has been compounded by three seasons of the worst drought on record and there are indications that some Tibetans are suffering afresh from food shortages. Meat, butter and cheese are still a rarity for many Tibetans, and the Chinese export abroad much food produced in Tibet as well as sending food, wool, dairy products, etc. to the rest of China, in official language they are 'offered to the State', and the scale of these colonial appropriations has only recently become apparent.¹⁰²

Evidence recently seen on television strongly suggests that many Tibetan herdsmen and their families are worse off under Chinese rule than was the case before the occupation began. Many families owned at least 100 cattle but this number has been greatly reduced by the Chinese and compulsory payments are made to the State.¹⁰³

Recent information from Tibet provides a revealing insight

into indirect taxation levied by the Chinese upon Tibetans. A family classified as rich by the Chinese has to sell 60% of their livestock to the government, a middle ranking family must sell 50% and a poor family only 40%. The government usually pays only about one tenth of the market price in the case of male yaks and about one sixth in the case of female yaks. The government pays less than half the market price for sheep, only about one quarter for wool and one half for butter. If anyone keeps more than the regulated number of animals they are fined a 'grass fee' each month and if after a period of some six months it becomes clear that no effective use can be made of this additional livestock then the animals are nationalised without any compensatory payments being made. In some cases rich families have been hindered by Chinese legislation since they cannot purchase beyond the stipulated number. Apparently there was a timely and abundant rainfall in the Toe area of Western Tibet (in contrast to the severe droughts that are at present affecting large areas of Tibet) resulting in a considerable increase in pastureland, but owing to the depletion of such pastoral areas, largely caused by the Chinese legacy of ecological destruction, it is forbidden to purchase extra animals.¹⁰⁴

Large parts of China are now suffering from severe drought, the river levels are low and rainfall in many eastern parts of the country was minimal during 1988. Grain production fell by some 10 million tons in 1988 and many farmers are hoarding it since the state price for grain has not risen, or they are attempting to sell grain unofficially. Jasper Becker, the *Guardian* correspondent, said that the Chinese Government was unable to control the food situation and that about 100,000,000 Chinese (one hundred million) are suffering from malnutrition and that some 30–40 million people may be in danger of starvation in Western China, including Tibet. Matters have scarcely been assisted by the fact that in 1988 the Chinese population rose by about 15–16 million. Grain is being rationed with coupons in the cities and Becker estimates that per capita protein consumption is lower than in most Third World countries. China is at present purchasing grain from the USA and other countries.¹⁰⁵

The January 1985 edition of the *Shanghai World Economic Journal* stated that between 1952 and 1985 the Chinese Government had poured more than \$3,050 millions in Tibet, a mere fraction of what they have taken out, and admit that these subsidies have produced little improvement in living standards. In 1983, 62% of the subsidies had been spent on buying goods from other parts of China which accounted for 96% of the goods retailed in the region and they admit that little has been done to develop local production and that the entire economy has declined. Tibet, Inner Mongolia, Xinjiang (E. Turkestan), and several other regions account for only 11% of nationally recorded profits in 1986, while their losses accounted for more than 20% of the nationwide total.¹⁰⁶ These three areas have been particularly plundered and devastated and enormous wealth has been drained out of them. This is what accounts for their poverty and consequent effects upon the Chinese economy as a whole, not the innate laziness and backwardness of the inhabitants as the Chinese authorities maintain.

Today, Tibet is the poorest of China's western regions and there are good reasons to believe that the average per capita income for Tibetans is about 350 Yuan (about £60 Sterling). By any standards this represents stunning poverty after some forty years of 'liberation'. It was estimated in 1980 that the per capita income within Tibetan peasant families was less than \$62 (about £42 Sterling) and this means that in a period of about a decade there has been some improvement. By way of comparison though the average per capita income in India in 1978 was \$180 (£112 Sterling) and is now estimated to be slightly over \$400 (about £250 Sterling). This means that the average Indian *has a per capita income over four times as high as the average Tibetan and nearly half as much again as the average Chinese peasant and the Indian experience since 1947 has not been characterised by the same slaughter, massive self-inflicted starvation and social dislocation associated with China since 1949*. These figures put the Tibetans among the poorest people on the planet.¹⁰⁷

Tibetan poverty is still legendary throughout Asia at a time when many countries have markedly improved the economic

conditions for many of their people, even if they have not eradicated poverty. The overseas Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan and Singapore have demonstrated exceptional capacities for economic progress when unencumbered by convulsions such as the 'Cultural Revolution', the 'Great Leap Forward' and a vast and inefficient bureaucracy. Tibetans who have experienced Chinese rule since 1949 would certainly understand the truth of Mahatma Gandhi's saying that 'poverty is the greatest violence' whatever modest and uneven and perhaps temporary improvements some of them may have experienced. Even the Chinese have commented on the utter destitution of many Tibetans today (1988) as have many foreign tourists.

Any discussion of food production or income may sound somewhat rarified and most conclusions have to be treated with a certain detachment and reserve. But it should never be forgotten that over 300,000 Tibetans starved to death as a direct result of deliberate and premeditated Chinese policies, and any discussion of the current state of the Tibetan economy occurs within the shadow of the dead.

Racial Discrimination

From the age of seven Tibetan children face institutionalised discrimination at the hands of the Chinese. If they attend school they will find that they are expelled on the slightest pretext whereas Chinese children are always encouraged. A person's class has to be entered on his or her ration card, along with name, date and place of birth. This means that a child of eight has to be categorised into one class or another. The qualifications for making progress in life and becoming an officer are 'right class' and 'right attitude'. Neither administrative ability nor education are taken into account. As far as work goes it has been remarked that Tibetans are reminded of the Apartheid system of South Africa. Young people soon find out that whatever job they get they are always subordinate to a Chinese and that the latter are given priority in any competition for employment. They are given the best jobs in offices and

factories and look after the supervision of fruit farms in south Tibet. Unskilled labour in the factories or in agriculture or on the roads is always provided by Tibetans who are made to work under conditions tantamount to forced labour.

The Chinese eat different food and earn higher wages. New housing is reserved for Chinese and Tibetan officers and many houses in Tibet are in a chronic state of disrepair. The Chinese authorities have a monopoly of trade through State controlled shops where the goods are mostly too expensive to buy. It seems that many Tibetans can seldom, if ever, hope to improve their economic conditions because of irrationally high taxes imposed on the Tibetan entrepreneurs by the Chinese authorities. A slightly well-to-do trader has to pay a tax of 1,200–1,500 Yuan a month (about £200–250 Sterling), a middle level trader 600–800 Yuan a month (about £100–130 Sterling) and a small trader 70–100 Yuan a month (about £11–16 Sterling).¹⁰⁸ The poverty in Tibet is such that these sums are far out of reach for most Tibetans unless they are extremely successful traders and the taxes levelled against them are specifically designed to impede their progress and facilitate a Chinese takeover in a wide variety of different economic sectors, representing a form of ‘economic racism’.

Tragically, Tibetan music and dance, whose origins are lost in antiquity, have all but vanished and the Chinese are adamant about their cultural superiority. African students in China have discovered this to their cost and frequently complain of the crudest racial abuse.¹⁰⁹ The assumption behind sinocisation is that of a ‘superior’ culture, so deeply embedded in the Chinese consciousness that their paternalism, verging on racialism, is mostly unconscious and therefore all the more resistant to reform.¹¹⁰ As is quite clear this particularly obnoxious form of racism ultimately means the destruction of the ‘inferior’ Tibetan culture and its replacement by an all pervading Chinese culture. One of the latest manifestations of this long and agonising process is the reported altering of the tombs of the Dalai Lamas in the Potala Palace in Lhasa, together with the replacement of authentic records and inscriptions, in order to

convey the impression that they owed allegiance to former Chinese dynasties.

A recent example of Chinese racism was widely reported in the world's press and featured on BBC Channel 1 among other networks. A considerable number of African students are at present studying in China and in 1986 a demonstration of African students occurred in Beijing, prompted by Chinese racism. Chinese students had produced a leaflet which was widely circulated and which said words to the effect that 'Africans were black apes who had only recently come down from the trees!' An African interviewed on BBC News said that racism in China was 'as bad if not worse than that to be found in S. Africa and that all he wanted was a ticket home.

A series of more recent incidents occurred in January 1989 when African students in the eastern city of Nanking were stripped naked and struck with electric prods by Chinese police who had stormed a hostel in which the students had barricaded themselves for their own protection. About one hundred of them had sought refuge there after a brawl on Yuletide Eve at the university and mobs of Chinese roamed the streets screaming racist abuse such as 'down with black devils' and 'blacks go home' and the general situation has been further inflamed by Chinese newspaper reports that most Africans have Aids, an assertion which is obviously untrue.

Mamah Gobo Bio, a diplomat at the Benin embassy, said that his West African state had received eyewitness accounts of police brutality and was trying to send a mission to Nanking to investigate, and he stated that the Benin embassy would make formal representations to the Chinese foreign ministry. African students in the city of Hangzhou, near Shanghai, barricaded themselves in their dormitory for more than a week to protest against an article in a local newspaper linking them to Aids. It is significant that both Chinese workers and students have combined against black students and one Sudanese student has said that 'the Chinese equate black with bad. They have an idea about you before they even meet you'. It would seem that these unfortunate African students are now encountering the deep

racist component in Chinese psychology, something that tragic 'minority peoples' such as the Tibetans, have experienced for some forty years.¹¹¹ Similar incidents involving African students occurred in 1962, after which most African students in China were sent home, and riots broke out in Shanghai in 1979.

Now waves of Chinese are pouring into Tibet. Most of them are supposed to be 'experts' who have come to help in the development of Tibet. Already tens of thousands of these 'experts' have settled in Tibet and many more are on the way. In fact they are causing severe problems for the Tibetan people by taking away the choicest jobs and also driving them out of their traditional occupations.

There are many reports of gangs of unemployed labourers roaming the country looking for work having been driven out of their occupations by the endless Chinese influx. This was graphically illustrated in '*Tibet: A Case to Answer*' featured in 'Dispatches' BBC Channel 4, when it was estimated that 70% of Tibetans are unemployed in Lhasa. One is reminded of the plight of unemployed blacks in South Africa, victims of a racially selective political and economic system, as are the Aboriginal peoples of Australia and the Maoris of Aetearoa (New Zealand), all of whom are suffering from white oppression just as the Tibetans are suffering from Chinese oppression.¹¹² Finally, this oppression is compounded by the fact that Tibetans are denied any voting freedoms and cannot usually travel without first obtaining permission, often involving long bureaucratic delays.

Tourists have reported on the large number of beggars to be seen in Tibet, particularly in Lhasa, and respected journalists such as Dr. Jonathan Mirsky, have commented on the poverty and hunger which is still so evident in Tibet.¹¹³ It comes as no surprise to learn that throughout large parts of Asia, Tibet is referred to as China's 'Deep South'.

Ecological Devastation

Deforestation : Large areas of Tibet have been deforested by the Chinese. In the Ngapa and Dechen areas over 65,000 are employed in the lumber industry and for many years almost all the wood has been sent down river to central and southern China.

Recent research now indicates that the Chinese have extracted some 54 billion dollars worth of timber from Tibet (300 billion Chinese yuan).¹¹⁴ This figure has been arrived at after consulting published and secret Chinese documents and by monitoring Radio Lhasa broadcasts and covers not only the 'Autonomous Region of Tibet' but the whole of traditional Tibet including the lost provinces which have been incorporated into other regions of China. The major forest areas in Tibet are Kyirong, Kongpo, Pema Koe, Po, Zayul and Monyul (central and southern Tibet), Chamdo, Drayab, Zogong and Markham, situated in what was once eastern Tibet. Together these areas constitute China's third largest forest reserve. When such traditional Tibetan areas as Derong, Mili, Minyak, Tawu, Drago, Nyarong, Lithang, Gyalthang, Kanze and Ngapa (which have been incorporated into the Chinese provinces of Chinghai, Sichuan and Yunnan) are added to the total this must constitute the largest forested landmass in China today. Radio Lhasa (25/6/88) claimed to have deforested some 70% of the forest lands of Nagpa, Karze, and Mili and an estimated 50-100 lumber trucks travel east to Sichuan daily.¹¹⁵

Gyalthang's forests are now in the Chinese province of Yunnan and include valuable varieties of furs, pines, and Tibetan cypress and dragon spruce. Pandas, golden monkeys and white-lipped deer abound, and it is also a rich source of plants essential to China's herbal pharmacopoeia. This is apparently being plundered. A Radio Lhasa broadcast (22/8/86) claimed that between 1965-'85 a total of 18 million cubic metres of timber were transported from Nyitri, Gungthang and Drago, to China. It is also known that enormous quantities of timber have been felled by the inmates of Powo Tramo, a large prison

camp in S. Tibet, with some 10,000 inmates, set deep in a forested region. According to Chinese broadcasts most of the areas of Tibet which have been totally deforested have become barren and in 1985 a visitor to Tibet witnessed wholesale deforestation taking place E. Tibet, especially in Gyalthang (Zhongtian) and other places.¹¹⁶ In November 1988 British television featured a programme which provided a graphic illustration of the effects of Chinese deforestation in Tibet and viewers saw hillsides once covered with trees, which are now bare and empty, containing only the occasional tree stump. These pictures were taken in the Kham region (formerly part of E. Tibet) and it was pointed out that the soil had degenerated due to the lack of trees and that flooding and landslides were the inevitable result of such deforestation.¹¹⁷ Most of the animals once to be found in the forests had either died or moved away in search of food. A letter written to *The Times* drew attention to Chinese deforestation in Tibet at a time when those sympathetic to the legacy of Chinese rule were either, denying that such deforestation was occurring or were studiously evasive on this issue.¹¹⁸ A good example of the kind of insanity that has characterised Chinese environmental policy in Tibet was the destruction of some 250,000 walnut trees declared 'elitest' by the Chinese Red Guards.

It does not seem that the Chinese have any major replanting programmes in Tibet and the consequences of such destruction are now becoming apparent. It is quite clear that the Chinese are creating an ecological catastrophe in Tibet comparable to the destruction of the rain forests in Brazil and Indonesia or to the creeping desertification which is occurring in large parts of Africa. There is now some evidence to suggest that these deforestation schemes in Tibet have played a part in the increasingly erratic behaviour of the monsoons.¹¹⁹ There is no doubt that the ecology of very large areas has been ruined and that the Chinese are guilty of 'ecocide' in Tibet. This has also become apparent in the agricultural sector. (See previous section entitled *Famine Caused by Chinese Policies*). Ecological devastation in Tibet has also caused concern in the US Congress.¹²⁰

As a result of Chinese agricultural and pastoral mismanagement the grasslands were ploughed, and unable to resist the powerful Tibetan winds, are now becoming dustbowls and the ground-cover has been destroyed by over-grazing and by the uprooting of brushwood to be used as fuel in place of traditional yak dung. Deserts of Northern and Western China (which used to be E. Tibet) are devouring land faster than the Chinese can stop them. Experts say that deserts now occupy 15% of China's total land area and are growing at about 600 sq. miles (1,000 sq. kilometres) a year. This is due mainly to neglect, the catastrophic impact of the 'Cultural Revolution' and overuse of water resources. Large areas of land were destroyed by Mao's campaign in the 1960's to plant grain regardless of whether or not the land was suitable for it. Efforts have been made to control the growth of deserts during recent years.¹²¹.

Calculations completed during the preparation of this Report indicate that 50–100,000 sq. miles (130,000–260,000 sq. kms) have been deforested by the Chinese in Tibet. It has to be admitted that this figure is an estimate derived from monitoring of Radio Lhasa broadcasts, testimonies of Tibetan refugees and foreign travellers to Tibet, together with figures given for the amount of timber removed from various areas with reference to their tonnage and cubic volume. The above estimate is, however, a conservative one, and some involved in the preparation of the above figures considered that the total area of deforestation in the 'ART' and the former Tibetan provinces of Kham, and to a certain limited extent, Amdo, was considerably in excess of 100,000 sq. miles. Although such sources are difficult to obtain, they are by no means inaccessible, and it is surprising to see ecologists bewailing the effects of deforestation in Brazil, Brunei, Indonesia or Nepal etc. but seldom if ever mentioning the devastating effects on Asian weather patterns of relentless Chinese deforestation in Tibet. All the evidence tends to suggest that Chinese deforestation in Tibet is likely to reach Amazonian proportions within the next decade, it is already vast, and it should surely receive the same kind of attention from ecologists and climatologists which is at present devoted

to other parts of the world.

Destruction of Wildlife : A once flourishing wildlife seems to have been virtually wiped out by the Chinese. There were once bears, wolves, wild geese and duck, black-necked cranes, fish, eagles, and ospreys and great herds of Tibetan blue sheep, wild yaks, deer and gazelles.¹²² Most of them seem to have now disappeared, the herds having been machine-gunned (generally from jeeps) to feed the new Chinese population.

It seems that in some areas of Tibet the Chinese are still indulging in such butchery, sometimes without any aim or purpose. For example, large numbers of wild asses have migrated from Tibet to the neighbouring Chang Thang plateau of Ladakh because of the indiscriminate slaughter carried out by the Chinese. Some 2,000 of these wild asses (kyangs) have sought sanctuary in Ladakh, and herdsmen living there are worried that they will deplete the already limited supply of food. The kyang is about 4 feet in height and its colour ranges from ruddy chestnut to brown on the back while its belly is white and it has slanting black stripes on the legs. Kyangs have been found in this part of Tibet for many centuries and they would not willingly leave their traditional habitat.¹²³ The seemingly callous attitude which individual Chinese often exhibit towards other species is illustrated by a curious incident in which some Chinese soldiers started beating some cows for no apparent reason. These soldiers were attached to the Nepalese consulate in Lhasa and went for a stroll near the Norbulinka palace. On encountering a herd of cows they began to beat them, watched by Tibetans picnicking in the sprawling compound of the Norbulinka. Some Tibetan children, having been brought up as Buddhists and therefore having a deep respect for all other forms of life, began to lecture the Chinese pointing out that though the animals could not speak they could still nevertheless feel pain as was the case with human beings. The soldiers argued with the children and a scuffle ensued. Members of the Nepalese consulate eventually restored some peace to the scene.¹²⁴

Nuclear Pollution : Further dangerous damage has been

done to the environment by Chinese nuclear tests in the Lop Nor area and the Chinese admit severe atmospheric radiation poisoning. Many Tibetans living in this region have had to be evacuated to Peking at short notice.¹²⁵ Concerns about the consequences the Chinese destruction of Tibetan eco-systems is becoming increasingly widespread and a Bill introduced into the US House of Representatives in May 1988 reflects such disquiet. It proposes, among other things, an assessment of environmental damage by the United Nations and the establishment of a Tibet Commission by the President to ascertain environmental and natural resource conditions.¹²⁶

Major demonstrations have taken place among the mainly Uighur peoples of Xinjiang (E. Turkistan) against the effects of Chinese nuclear testing in and around Lop Nor. Until the recent Chinese influx Xinjiang was mainly inhabited by Turkish Moslems who have frequently resisted Chinese rule, sporadic violence still takes place and an extremely bloody uprising occurred in mid-1940's. The Moslem Uighurs have frequently called for complete independence from China and resent the depletion of their mineral resources and the destruction of their culture in accordance with traditional Chinese patterns. In May 1986 a group called 'Committee of Uighurs for Nuclear Free Zone Movement in Eastern Turkistan' sent an anti-nuclear declaration to foreign organisations in Beijing. They called for an end to nuclear testing, with consequent fallout, and the abrogation of an agreement which allows other countries to dump or store radio-active materials in Eastern Turkistan.

Several huge demonstrations against the threat posed by nuclear fallout, and the many deformed births that this has caused have recently occurred. One such demonstration took place in Urumchi in December 1986 and also in Beijing during the same month when Moslem students marched on Tiananmen Square calling for an end to testing. Participants estimated that about 100,000 people were present in each demonstration, but the Chinese authorities gave a much lower estimate. These demonstrations were widely reported and contained a very strong nationalist element mingled with *calls for independence*.

A similar demonstration also occurred in Shanghai during this period.¹²⁷

Another anti-nuclear demonstration occurred in the town of Riwoche in the former Tibetan province of Kham, as the local people fear that uranium found close to a sacred site will be mined by the Chinese in an act of desecration which they fear will cause nuclear pollution.¹²⁸ (See also section entitled *Liberalisation Tourism and Religious Freedom*).

As is well known the ozone layer is in danger of depletion owing to the extensive use of Chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) found in aerosols, refrigerators, air conditioning and packaging materials and a conference is to be held in London at some future date to discuss the threat to the ozone layer. China is an offender in this respect and she has not signed the Montreal Protocol, which was developed under UN auspices in order to reduce the discharge of CFCs into the atmosphere, despite the fact that CFC substitutes are becoming increasingly available. Enormous numbers of refrigerators are manufactured in China and these are largely responsible for the extensive CFC pollution caused by the Chinese. Bearing in mind well attested Chinese indifference to many forms of pollution it may be a considerable while before the Chinese Government signs the Montreal Protocol.¹²⁹

Indifference to the effect of nuclear pollution to the environment may be considered to be yet another aspect of the brutish attitude the Chinese have towards nature. T.L. Danlock observes that the Chinese carry with them 'a centuries-old bias against nature and consequent lack of ecological understanding... a fact made obvious by the omnipresence of terraced fields and hills; the token bamboo forests with consequent starvation of giant pandas, the almost total absence of natural predators such as hawks, owls, weasels, and certain small birds with consequent rat and insect infestations; the excessive deforestation with subsequent flooding of rivers and erosion of soil, etc,' and he comments on the apparent delight taken by many Chinese in the indiscriminate slaughter of wildlife.¹³⁰ This trait was also fiercely criticised by Alan Winnington, the

communist journalist, when he was in China in the 1950's. His fierce criticism of policies which he considered as being little short of ideological insanity, led to his departure from China as an 'un-person'.¹³¹ Professor W. Smil has written of enormous and virtually uncontrollable pollution throughout large areas of China resulting from ill-considered and frequently contradictory policies.¹³² This pollution involves, chemical effluents, severe toxic agents and radiation. In this context the near certain prospect of the construction of the Daya Bay nuclear power station opposite the island of Hong Kong is unlikely to reassure the 6 million people who will suffer in the event of any radiation leaks.¹³³

Natural Resources : As has already been remarked the Chinese have extracted timber from Tibet valued at 54 billion dollars and the sale of religious artifacts taken from looted monasteries sold on foreign exchange markets would undoubtedly have brought in many billions more dollars for the Chinese. Therefore the following communication sent by the Chinese embassy to exiled Tibetans in Canada can only come as a considerable surprise as the rest of this section will make clear. Addressing the Tibetans as 'Friends' the communication continues 'You have all been away from your homeland for a long time, and it is understandable that you should not be well acquainted with the factual situation in Tibet'. It then goes on to say 'Here we would like to give you another fact: the Central People's Government of the People's Republic of China has never asked for a single penny from Tibet.'¹³⁴ Certainly they may not have *asked* for a single penny, they *simply took billions* as all the facts show and this example typifies the casuistic attitude the Chinese have when they refer to the legacy of their rule in Tibet.

The Chinese claim that there are over 300 industries in Tibet now and also refer to some 43 'major infrastructure projects'. In general it seems that Chinese industrial development in Tibet has not matched Chinese expectations and this is probably due to costs, distances involved and unrest and uncertainty in Tibet. Dairy plants, leather factories and woollen

mills have been observed but as with other industries their products are taken out of Tibet to the rest of China, Hong Kong and Nepal. In official language they are 'offered to the State' and such is the case with foodstuffs too (section on *Food Production and Distribution*). In such industries and industrial projects as has been observed the work-force is mainly Chinese (75-80% or more) and they hold all the vital posts. Tibetans generally have menial or at best semi-skilled jobs.

Interestingly enough the Chinese name for Tibet (Xizang) means 'Western treasure' and Tibetans maintain that this is one of the main reasons why China has coveted Tibet for so many centuries. In 1985 an effort was made to estimate the extent of Tibetan mineral resources and the result was many trillions (billion x billion) of dollars and it is generally thought that this is probably an underestimate.¹³⁵ The list of rich mineral resources in Tibet includes asbestos, borax, chromium, cobalt, coal, copper, diamonds, gold, graphite, iron, iron ore, jade, lead, magnesium, mercury, molybdenum, nickel, natural gas, oil, iodine, petroleum, radium, silver, tungsten, titanium, uranium and zinc. To this list must be added some \$54 billions worth of timber so far extracted from Tibet and enormous amounts of bell metal, found in N. Tibet where the Chinese have begun geological activity. These deposits probably account for more than half the world's known reserves.

Coal is mined extensively in the Phenpo area, in the north of Tibet, Chamdo in the east, Gongkar, near Lhasa, Shigatse, Ngari, Amdo and other places. The Tsaidam Basin, in the former province of Amdo, contains huge mineral reserves and there is evidence to suggest that the Chinese were able to pay off their debt to the Russians, incurred during the 1950's in the form of borax mined by Tibetans in conditions of slave labour in which many thousands died (see footnote 43). Amdo has become one of the main oil producing centres since the 1950's and in the Golok area alone more than 2,000 people are engaged in extracting gold. In 1982 Yin Fatang revealed that the biggest uranium resources in the world are to be found in the mountains of Lhasa.¹³⁶ It is also known that the Chinese are

exploiting Tibet's abundant geothermal springs and are using them to produce electricity and some of the electric facilities available to the Chinese in Lhasa are produced from this source.

One further resource of incalculable value to the Chinese is hydro-electric power and there is no doubt that Tibet is the single most potent hydrographic entity in Asia, perhaps in the world, with the potential of billions of kilowatts. When India effectively abandoned Tibet to her fate it might perhaps have crossed Nehru's mind that he was also allowing the Chinese to control the source of some of Asia's mightiest rivers including the Indus, the Brahmaputra, the Mekong and Salween, the affluents of the Yangtse Kiang and the inland rivers of the Kun Lun range and the Chang Thang deserts, together with the Sutlej and Sindhu in Kashmir. If the Chinese begin large-scale hydro-electric projects the consequences for India will be incalculable since they are not given to exercising their minds with thoughts of possible ecological effects.

Some of these large rivers are pushing their sources westwards and the consequences of soil erosion, deforestation, winds, industrialisation and earthquake tectonics are immense. The prospect of the sharp bends and steep cataracts of the Brahmaputra (Tibetan: Tsangpo) being interfered with by scientists and technologists, at best indifferent to the interests of India, is a daunting one, and could have incalculable effects on Indian ecology.¹³⁷

All in all Tibet has vast and virtually untapped mineral resources and an almost infinite hydro-electric potential, but its timber reserves have been severely depleted. Industrialisation may be said to have hardly begun.

The above facts make it quite clear that the Chinese have wrought changes in the Tibetan ecological system which are little short of catastrophic. Large areas are now barren as a result of intensive deforestation, enormous tracts of once fertile agricultural land have been ruined, possibly forever, an intricate and highly developed wildlife chain has been destroyed and many rare species of animals and plants have been lost forever.

This compares with similar irreversible losses which are occurring daily in the rainforests, (the Madagascar Periwinkle plant, for example, is known to exert a powerful curative effect on leukaemia, and it was almost lost as a result of relentless deforestation), while nuclear tests and dumping may well exert an incalculable effect environmentally and genetically as is happening with US and Japanese nuclear dumping in the Pacific, together with French testing. There is formidable evidence to suggest that the extent of Chinese deforestation in Tibet has been responsible for the increasingly abnormal behaviour of the monsoon with its potentially disastrous effects upon the Indian economy and ecology (see footnote 119). There is also the possibility that Chinese hydraulic projects in Tibet may alter river patterns causing flooding with serious consequences both to Tibet and to India.

The above picture forms a tragic contrast to conditions in Tibet before Chinese occupation in which so many accounts speak of the wonderful abundance of wildlife and the sanctity in which it was generally held, together with the virgin forests and carpets of wild flowers extending as far as the eye could see. Here there was no industrialisation, no mining and no pollution. Man and nature were in complete harmony.

Liberalisation, Tourism and Religious Freedom

During 1979/80 a much heralded programme of Liberalisation began in Tibet. However it does not really seem to have amounted to very much and probably represented a somewhat resigned response to the fact that it had proved impossible to eradicate Buddhism from Tibet. It also seems possible that between the years 1979-'83 Chinese policy towards Tibet was characterised by considerable vacillation which might have reflected deep conflicts in the Chinese government itself.

The Chinese undoubtedly hoped that, in the face of apparent improvements, the Dalai Lama would return. He would be a valuable asset to the Chinese as he is held in very great esteem by the Tibetan people. All over Tibet people flocked to see the

fact-finding delegations as they knew that the Dalai Lama had sent them and many large meetings were filmed. People often tried to reach out and touch delegation members begging them to give their children Tibetan names. Many children and young people approached them with flowers in their hands to give them saying 'May the sun of the Buddha's teachings rise again one day'. The fact that Buddhism has managed to survive what Stephen Corry of Survival International has called 'thirty years of grotesquely violent repression' belies Chinese assertions about its supposedly oppressive nature under the old regime.

It is an undoubted fact that the existence of what is known as the Dalai Lama's Government in Exile in N. India is an increasing embarrassment to the Chinese at a time when they are striving to present an impeccable exterior to the international community in an effort to get technical expertise and knowledge.

They may also have been trying to present a humane and moderate exterior to the world, partly as a result of their desire to woo Third World countries and to pose as champion of oppressed peoples, and partly because of their increased international obligations and ambitions deriving from their active role at the United Nations, though the slaughter in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 has inevitably reduced the credibility of all such attempts. As far as Tibet is concerned the Chinese seem to have thought that the Tibetan people would remain passive and that the dialogue which they began with the Dalai Lama would prove fruitful to them. However, they did not modify their stand on Tibet being part of China, while considerably more flexibility was displayed by the Tibetans, and it soon became clear that the talks were unlikely to be particularly productive in a long-term political sense.

The period known as 'Liberalisation' may be divided into two phases 1979-'1983, followed by a renewed bout of repression in late 1983 which extended to about mid-1984. A rather weaker period of 'Liberalisation' then continued for the next 3 years until September 1987. Although Chinese policies often present a Machiavellian exterior to the rest of the world they are frequently contradictory and liable to arbitrary alterations

and during this period Chinese policy in Tibet contained at least three discrepant elements. They hoped to gain the Dalai Lama's recognition that Tibet was inalienably a part of China without conceding anything of substance themselves, they had to convince the rest of the world that conditions in Tibet were ideal, and to conceal the consequences of their legacy of oppression they had to prevent the Tibetan people from contacting foreigners in Tibet, or from mounting demonstrations against their rule, particularly in the light of the enormous Chinese influx. This task was plainly impossible and it became clear to many visitors to Tibet that something was deeply wrong in that country.

During this period of 'Liberalisation' some taxes seem to have been lifted but only for a while. In most of Tibet communes have been dissolved but at Tselna there are believed to be about eight agricultural communes in existence and the work unit, consisting of between five and ten families, is still the main administrative unit throughout most of China. One cannot be sure what the real policy is and it is worth bearing in mind that the transition from a work unit to a fully fledged commune would be relatively easy. The advent of a more Leftist government in Beijing could result in their reintroduction. Communes were, in the main, an unmitigated disaster and this was even the case with China's model commune, Dachai. Mao was very fond of saying 'learn from Dachai'—which had impressive production figures. However, it was later discovered that all the figures had been falsified and that Dachai's record was appalling, with the result that several people received sentences of imprisonment.

During 'Liberalisation' Tibetans were allowed to visit relatives in India, but their families remained in Tibet to ensure their return and 'good' behaviour while abroad. One among many such examples is to be found in the 'Tibet Newsletter'.¹³⁸ Two brothers had recently arrived in India from Tibet and recounted how they had been forced to leave their sister as a hostage. The Chinese authorities had her name and address and if they failed to return within a year she would have been killed.

There was some increase in religious freedom but Tibetans could still be arrested for carrying pictures of the Dalai Lama because they allege that it has political significance. Also, while they overlook open demonstrations of religious fervour by the Tibetans like putting up prayer flags, burning incense, doing prostrations and circumambulating—which the tourists can see, they impose restrictions in the real teaching and practice of religion.

There are many well-authenticated instances of this which have been recorded both by ordinary tourists and by trained observers. For example, monks are closely watched and great efforts are made to restrict their contact with tourists. There is invariably a Chinese supervisor in charge to whom the monks must refer and there are even spies among the monks who report conversations and activities. Also, any person under the age of 18 years finds it very difficult to become a monk due to Chinese policy and the permission of the Chinese authorities always has to be sought and it is frequently refused. Many of the monks are not permanently based at the shells of the partially rebuilt monasteries, but are only there for limited periods of time.

The Chinese do not hesitate to lie whenever it suits them. In February 1985 a presentation was made by the International Fellowship of Reconciliation to the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, which drew attention to the near extermination of Tibetan culture by the Chinese. In their reply the Chinese delegation stated that Ganden monastery, which was utterly destroyed, was being restored with a large sum of money provided by the State. In fact Tibetans began to rebuild parts of it in the early 1980's and the Chinese authorities tried to stop them, but when they were unable to do this they made it look as though they had initiated the process. This kind of thing has happened, and is happening, throughout Tibet.

Another direct lie was reported by Professor Roaf at a talk given in London in March 1987. A party of tourists were travelling across Tibet in November 1986 and one of the tourists remarked on the enormous numbers of ruined monas-

teries. When asked about these the Chinese guide said that they had been destroyed by the British in 1904 (during the Younghusband campaign). In fact the monasteries were destroyed in the 1950's and 60's by the Chinese and the part of Tibet through which the tourists were travelling (now re-named Zhangmu) was hundreds of miles away from the route taken by Younghusband. It is reasonable to assume that all Chinese guides have been instructed to give this standard answer.

Newsmen who often reported displays of religious fervour during the period of 'Liberalisation' sometimes did so without any real understanding of the harsh realities underlying it, though generally speaking they cannot really be blamed for this since the Tibetan issue contains so many separate strands of information which have to be woven together before any accurate perception of current day realities can fully emerge, and there has been a very great improvement in reporting standards during the last two years or so. The Chinese have clearly stated that while individuals are free to worship, they may not influence others to practice religion—which is to say that the older people may not teach the younger generation. This fact alone reveals that the facade of religious freedom in Tibet is a means to deceive the outside world.

Moreover, the Chinese forbid the search for and recognition of incarnate Lamas. They have announced that anyone under eighteen years of age may not become a monk; that those who choose to become monks should make arrangements for their own upkeep and that they may not depend on their families; that donations may not be solicited for religious purposes and that parents may not take their children to religious ceremonies. All this makes it clear that the real policy of the Chinese remains to eradicate religion from all parts of China, including the occupied territories such as Tibet. *The Red Flag* makes this perfectly clear.¹³⁹ Tibetans, however, refuse to give up their religion.

It is not generally appreciated that torture and beatings were still widespread during Liberalisation even while the Chinese were admitting the existence of 'mistakes' made, according to

them, mainly during the 'Cultural Revolution'. For example, the Tibetan woman, Tsering Lhamo, was tortured into temporary madness by electric shock for shouting anti-Chinese slogans during the visit of the first fact-finding delegation towards the end of 1979. The Scientific Buddhist Association and Tibetan Buddhist organisations took her case to Amnesty International and she was reported to have been released in May 1982. Her son, Lobsang Chodag, was also arrested and is reported to be suffering from severe beatings, possibly his jaw is broken.¹⁴⁰ He was adopted as a Prisoner of Conscience by Amnesty International and his exact whereabouts are unknown at the present time. Tsering Lhamo is now in India but torture at the hands of the Chinese and a former prison sentence of twenty years have ruined her health.

During this period of Liberalisation Yin Fatang, then the First Secretary of the Committee of the Chinese Communist Party in Tibet, reported to the Party's Representative Conference in Lhasa in 1981 that 'widespread serious unrest, including sabotage along with popular resistance, had broken out in Tibet'¹⁴¹In May 1982, 115 people were arrested in the Tibetan town of Shigatse (not on political charges, which the Chinese seldom use now), but ostensibly for indulging in decadent Western ways, having long hair etc. Many were severely beaten. Even in the heyday of 'Liberalisation' conditions were still so bad in Tibet that pregnant Tibetan women whom the Chinese had allowed to temporarily cross into India to visit relatives or attend religious festivals, often left their newly-born babies in India with friends or relatives or Tibetan children's homes, rather than subject them to the miseries of life in Tibet. There have been many such painful partings.

All this happened during Liberalisation and even at the very outset the Chinese curtailed the visit of the second fact-finding delegation because of a demonstration in support of the Dalai Lama by a large Tibetan crowd who evidently wanted the delegation to know what their feelings were about Chinese rule. The Chinese forcibly prevented the many journalists present from questioning delegation members and the incident was

widely reported in the world's press.

From the early 1980's there has been an increasing influx of tourists into Tibet who have observed 'Liberalisation' for themselves and have inevitably reported what they have seen and heard. The reason why the Chinese have opened Tibet to tourism is because they hope to attract much needed foreign currency, but as has been remarked this involved a highly convoluted and basically unstable policy. They now had to go to considerable pains to reconstruct elements of a culture they had so brutally destroyed, and it probably crossed the minds of various Chinese officials that had they simply walked in and left the culture alone and retained the goodwill or at least neutrality of the Tibetan people then Tibet would certainly have been a goldmine and would have caused them little if any trouble at all. As it is the new policy has proved almost unworkable and Tibetans have seized the chance to contact foreigners and as a result China's human-rights record has been widely attacked and there have been international calls for Tibetan independence.

According to the New China News Agency (Xinhua) more than 28,000 tourists visited Tibet and spend some 24 million Yuan (£4 million sterling, approx.) and they talk of receiving nearly five times as many tourists by the end of the century. It is likely that what is left of Tibetan culture will be weakened by the tourist influx, but on the other hand Tibetan culture has proved surprisingly resilient and the flow of tourists helps keep Tibet in the news. In 1949 the Chinese must have thought that the Tibetan issue would be swiftly settled. However, it has cost them the 'Twenty Years War' and world-wide adverse publicity, including bitter criticism of their human-rights record and has earned them the title of 'the new imperialists'. With all its defects the period of Liberalisation has certainly internationalised the Tibetan question, and even if the Chinese instigate a permanent clampdown in Tibet the world will still be watching them. Such a clampdown seems to be happening at the present time (June 1989) and their legacy in Tibet is proving increasingly embarrassing to the Chinese.

Some Tibetans have expressed regret that during the four year period of 'Liberalisation' the Tibetan 'Government in Exile' did not seem to make any real effort to consolidate Tibet's position internationally, that is, to ensure that the status of the 'Government in Exile' was recognized as legitimate by foreign countries and as being the true government of the Tibetan people, as distinct from the government set up in Tibet by the Chinese, which is a device designed to legitimise their occupation. It is a fact that no country has yet recognized the 'Government in Exile'. It does seem likely that from approximately the summer of 1979 until July 1983 Chinese policy on Tibet was vacillating and unsure and it has been pointed out that this presented an opportunity for the 'Government in Exile' to gain support for their cause in the international community, since recognition by even a few countries would have greatly strengthened their hand and weakened China's position on Tibet. However, little or nothing seems to have been done, or if some efforts were made in this direction they seem to have been halting and hesitant in the light of the fact that the Tibetan people are facing cultural genocide or 'ethnocide'. Tibetans in India and elsewhere have expressed regret that such an opportunity appears to have been lost during this important four years period.

Rightly or wrongly one commentator described the defects of the Kashag by using the well known epitaph once applied to the Bourbon Kings of France, 'They learned nothing and forgot nothing'.

Regret has also been expressed that the 'Government in Exile', sacrificed opportunities of international recognition, particularly during the 1960's and early 1970's in order to maintain its freedom of manoeuvre. It is possible that the Indian Government, anxious to defuse the Tibetan crisis and to maintain its own great influence on the Dalai Lama's administration, undermined any such initiatives emanating from or directed towards the 'Government in Exile'. Although this could have been the case, many people find it difficult to avoid the impression that much more could have been achieved in

this direction and it is likely that even modest successes would have forced the Chinese to display more flexibility on the Tibetan question generally, and perhaps even on the question of Tibetan independence. It is possible that lack of success on this issue has played into the hands of the Chinese Government.

The Machinery of Fear—Renewal of Terror 1983, 1987, 1988, 1989

1983

At the end of August 1983 the Chinese began a new bout of repression. Executions occurred in Shigatse (27/9/83) and Lhasa (30/9/83 and 1/10/83). Further executions were reported in Kanze with more arrests in Chamdo and Gyantse.¹⁴² The Chinese classify those arrested and executed as criminals, anti-social elements, etc., but the classification seems to mean anything the Chinese want it to mean, and seems to particularly include those who have spoken up for, or tried to practise Buddhism, political activists and those who have argued for Tibetan independence such as Geshe Lobsang Wangchuck (who did so by citing the works of Mao Tse Tung).

He died in Lhasa's notorious Drapchi prison on November 3, 1987 as a result of severe beatings. His case was actively investigated by Amnesty International and was cited in the 1985 edition of Amnesty International Report and he was declared a Prisoner of Conscience. The Chinese at first denied reports of his death but they have now confirmed it. Many Tibetans were held in the infamous prisons of Sangyip and Drapchi in the vicinity of Lhasa, some of them chained and manacled and locked up in individual cells.¹⁴³ On 13/9/83 some 370 monks who were attempting to rebuild a part of Ganden monastery, destroyed by the Chinese, were surrounded by 1,000 troops, beaten up and thrown into trucks. An old monk and former Abbot, Gyamtso, was beaten to death. It seems that many of those arrested (the total ran into thousands) were sent to labour camps in the north of Tibet from which few have so far returned.

Even Tibetan refugees from India have been arrested while visiting their families in Tibet as happened to a monk named Wangdak.¹⁴⁴ Amnesty International also reported the arrest of Kalsang Tsering, interviewed by journalists at Drepung monastery and reportedly arrested on 26/8/83.¹⁴⁵ Then, as now, August 1989 all Tibet was in a state of terror waiting for a knock at the door. As has happened so often in the past the families of those about to be publicly executed were forced to attend the execution dressed in their best and to thank publicly the Chinese for eliminating 'anti-social' reactionary elements'. During this bout of repression it was reported that the Chinese prevented those about to be executed from denouncing them by severing their vocal chords, a feature of the 'Cultural Revolution'. More reports, which have since been confirmed, state that after execution in Lhasa the bodies were returned to the homes of their relatives who were made to pay equivalent of 25p Sterling for each bullet used to kill that particular person. Executions continued throughout late 1983 and early 1984.¹⁴⁶ However, worldwide protests from human rights organisations, Tibetans in India and many other countries, religious organisations including Western Buddhists, and wide media condemnation resulted in the Chinese modifying their oppressive policy and some efforts were made to return to the new policy of Liberalisation before a fresh clampdown in September 1987.

Although Liberalisation was the official policy arrests nevertheless continued in 1984, '85, and '86. For example, in early May 1986 about 350 people, mainly young Tibetans, were paraded through the streets in Lhasa and described as 'anti-social elements' and in late May 1986, 30 people were arrested for listening to cassettes of the Dalai Lama's December 1985 speech at Bodh Gaya. The *Tibetan Bulletin* (November 1986) reported that on 17th August 83 people were arrested outside the High Court and People's Representative Assembly in Sining (Xining), in E. Tibet for distributing pamphlets, the contents of which were unknown. During these years the tourist influx continued and many tourists were caught in the riots in Lhasa in September/October 1987.

1987

Various accounts written by tourists in early 1987 gave indications of the potential for serious unrest in Lhasa. Mr. William Peters, C.M.G., L.V.O., M.B.E. chairman of the Tibet Society Council, UK, who had a long and distinguished career in the British Diplomatic Service, referred to the obvious hostility felt by Tibetans towards the Chinese in Lhasa and wrote: 'The dominant image I recall from Lhasa is of a dynamic fair-skinned Chinese woman, svelte in black lycra and silver studs, astride a roaring motorcycle (Japanese) which scattered the swarthy, befurred and beskinned Tibetans as she sped towards new Lhasa.'¹⁴⁷

The riots were caused by the reported public execution of a Tibetan youth, Kesang Tsering, in Lhasa on 26th September 1987 after what seems to have been the accidental murder of a relative, Nyima Tashi, during a drunken brawl which occurred after an animated discussion of the prospects for Tibetan independence. The Chinese executed him as an 'anti-social element'. A third man who was present during the fight, Migmar Tashi, but who did not participate in it, is now in Drapchi prison having been sentenced to two years, but his parents and relatives have so far been denied access to him.

The Chinese announced that those who did not come to witness the execution would be fined and a crowd of about 3,000 turned up. Two days after the execution the Public Security Bureau came to the house of the deceased to collect money for expenses incurred during the execution. They charged 5 yuans for one bullet, 2 yuans for the rope, 10 yuans for digging the ditch, and 300 yuans for the dead body, at total of about \$80 which represents a small fortune to Tibetans in Lhasa, since most of them are virtually destitute. Grief stricken neighbours drove out the PSB men with knives and spades. However, it was later learned that this amount was deducted from the salary of Kesang Tsering's mother, Nyima Tsamchoe, who works in the Lhasa Municipality Granary Office.¹⁴⁸ Such are the realities of Chinese rule in Tibet and among other 'happy and thriving minority nationalities'.

The summary execution of two, possibly three Tibetan dissidents, after having been sentenced to death at the Lhasa Intermediate People's Court in the People's Stadium in front of a crowd of about 15,000, further inflamed the situation in Lhasa, as did the severe punishment of nine other dissidents. The executions probably represented an effort on the part of the Chinese to silence and cow the Tibetans who had continually approached newsmen and tourists, and expressed pro-independence sentiments. If such was indeed the case the strategy backfired disasterously and precipitated the first demonstration which occurred on September 27th when about thirty monks and over one hundred lay people performed three circuits of the Bar-Khor, carrying flags and demanding independence for Tibet. Many of these were immediately arrested and tortured by hanging from the wrists and by injections. Two more demonstrations occurred on October 1st and 6th. These events were observed by some two hundred western tourists and forty-five of these tourists later pooled their observations in an extremely detailed account which was first sent to The Office of Tibet in Zurich, and then to Amnesty International, London. This comprehensive account was compiled by Robert Barnett and Nicholas Meysztowicz of Australia.¹⁴⁹

The second demonstration, like the first, was a peaceful one, but the Chinese arrested some 60 people and used considerable violence. Monks were beaten with shovels and electric stun-guns were used. About 3,000 angry Tibetans gathered outside the police station in Bar-Khor Square and stone-throwing began about 9.45am and at 10.39am the Chinese began shooting indiscriminately into the crowd. The third demonstration on 6th October was a peaceful one but the police showed considerable brutality while making arrests, which seemed quite unnecessary to Western tourists and observers. It is estimated that about 700 people have been arrested and there are reports that the Chinese charged 330 Yuan (about £55 Sterling) for the return of bodies to grieving relatives. One woman had her back broken during prolonged beatings and was not given any medical treatment, other prisoners were severely beaten with

iron rods or given electric shocks for up to five minutes at a time with stun-gun devices. The situation in Lhasa eventually became so bad that on 3 November group tourists were turned away from Sera monastery.

The names of many of those arrested have been published and handed to Amnesty International and a list is included here (see footnote 150) but it is certain that many have been arrested, whose names are not yet known. The 13 testimonies now being examined by Amnesty International, report frequent beatings and torture in Tibetan prisons, particularly Drapchi, in Lhasa, starvation rations and the manacling of prisoners for long periods of time, and it is certain that many of those arrested are undergoing such treatment at this present time. One case that has recently come to light is that of Tashi Lhamo, a young Tibetan woman, who was arrested on 1st October 1987 and who went on hunger strike for 11 days while in jail. She was subsequently beaten by the police who dislocated many of her joints. She has not been released and is feared dead by Tibetans in Lhasa.

At the end of October foreign journalists were expelled from Lhasa as were three foreign teachers of English on dubious grounds, Richard Lanchester (British), a German national, and Rupert Wolfe Murray, (British) and a Canadian national has also been harrassed by the police. Rupert Wolfe Murray gave a graphic account of a narrow escape he had, together with the US Consul, and the death of seven year old boy who had been shot by the Chinese. He went to teach in Lhasa on a British Council scheme, but was bitterly disillusioned by what he saw.¹⁵¹

This and other demonstrations provoked memorable portraits from tourists present at the time, an old Tibetan women doubled up with tension hiding in a doorway during the shooting, ordinary Tibetans approaching tourists with information, their faces often grey with fear, numerous trucks full of armed soldiers rumbling through the stricken city day and night, watched by ragged Tibetans, some of whom were talking to themselves, having been unhinged by the atmosphere of all

pervading terror and paranoia, and by uncontrollable thoughts of their own relatives undergoing severe torture or facing execution.

An appeal written by Mrs Tsering Lhamo, who was tortured into temporary madness by the Chinese in 1979, was issued by the Tibetan Youth Congress, Dharamsala (N. India) in March 1988, which recounts her own imprisonment and torture, the detention and illtreatment of her family, the theft of her possessions by the Chinese and gives a graphic idea of the almost unimaginable state of terror in which Tibetans exist today.

Amnesty International has voiced its deep concern about recent events in Tibet, detailing widespread arrests, beatings and torture as well as the shooting of civilians during the riots, and in Jan. 1988 AI sent a memorandum to the Chinese Government detailing human-rights abuses and giving a list of 126 people reported to be detained.¹⁵² It has also been in touch with the Chinese Government over the arrest of Yulo Dawa Tsering, Tenpa Tsering and Jigme Gyatso in connection with the October 1987 riots and has expressed fears that they may be summarily executed.¹⁵³ It seems likely that about 12 people were killed in the rioting and discrepancies in the Chinese account of police shootings involved them in a major climb-down at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva.¹⁵⁴ (See following section entitled *'The UN the US and Europe'*). Dhondup Dorjee, a Tibetan appointed as Third Secretary at the Chinese embassy in Delhi was sent back to Peking on the night of 27 October 1987 and he has since disappeared. It is known that the Chinese view many members of the Communist Party with great suspicion.¹⁵⁵ His removal recalls the fall from power of the General Secretary Hu Yaobang in January 1987 which was probably caused by opposition to some of the reforms he was trying to implement.

The state of Chinese disorganisation during the demonstrations is attested to by the fact that the mayor of Lhasa, the provincial party secretary and the governor, were all absent. The mayor was visiting Boulder, Colorado, with which Lhasa is twinned. The provincial party secretary was in Beijing to

attend October Party Congress, and Mr. Yan Xianxu, deputy director of the foreign affairs office of the 'Tibet Autonomous Region' stated that the governor 'is on holiday. He had been away for six weeks and I don't know when he will return or where he is'.¹⁵⁶

Renewed rioting of a much more serious nature occurred on the weekend of March 5/6. The Chinese authorities evidently hoped that about 2,300 monks would participate peacefully in the Great Monlam Festival. The Chinese were ready with film cameras and evidently hoped to convince the world in general and their own population in particular, that the events of September and October 1987 were a mere aberration. However, about 90% of the monks did not attend the festival as a gesture of protest against the new clampdown. Some 150 monks held an alternative meeting in Drepung monastery to hold an unofficial prayer meeting of their own. The Chinese bribed monks to attend the Festival but their efforts met with little success.¹⁵⁷

1988

On the morning of March 5th, 1988 the last procession of monlam began and Gyalwa Jampa (Future Buddha) was displayed. At the end of the rock carrying ceremony a monk called for the release of Yulu Dawa Tsering, an incarnate Lama who had been arrested for speaking to foreign reporters about Tibetan Independence. One of the Chinese officials threw a stone at the monk and told him to shut up. The Ganden monk threw the stone back at the Chinese and it hit the megaphone. An assistant monk named Zambala shouted that Tibet was an independent country and the Chinese should go back. All the people supported him and chanted pro-independence slogans. One of the Chinese pointed a pistol at the monks but a middle aged Khampa came forward and was shot in the forehead at point blank range and died immediately. The body was put on a stretcher and large numbers of people walked towards the Barkhor shouting slogans. After this matters swiftly got out of hand and the Chinese began using

tear gas and firing into the crowd.¹⁵⁸

At this point what seems to have been a deliberate and premeditated massacre of monks occurred in Tibet's holiest temple, the Jokhang. While completing the last circuit of the Barkhor the monks decided to return to their quarters as the situation was becoming increasingly confused and dangerous. It seems that a man standing near the main entrance to the Jokhang directed them to go inside. Exactly why they did this rather than return to their quarters must remain a matter of speculation, but they may have believed that they would be safe inside the Jokhang. In the confusion many other monks followed but the Chinese police were waiting inside and once the monks had entered the gates were closed and the police began beating them. However, as the monks outnumbered the police at this stage more police reinforcements were sent in by ladder over the walls. The police and soldiers who attacked the monks used clubs with nails and knives attached and this explains the severed hands and fingers that were later found near the entrance to the Jokhang. At this point a nun outside the Jokhang was reported by an eyewitness as saying 'Don't you know they're killing monks in there'.¹⁵⁹ After beating the monks police snatched wrist watches and other personal possessions and some young novice monks who were found hidden in cupboards were beaten and thrown to their deaths through windows. People going to the Jokhang next day found every nook and cranny spattered with blood. They also found lumps of human flesh and items of bloodstained clothing and it is believed that at least sixteen monks were killed in this massacre.¹⁶⁰ The Chinese do not seem to have attempted to clean up the temple or to have concealed evidence of the killings and maimings.

The fact that this massacre was premeditated and was intended to teach the Tibetans a lesson and to add to their condition of more or less permanent terror is indicated by the presence and preparations of police and soldiers and reports that common criminals were apparently removed from Sangyip and Gutsa prisons *before the massacre occurred* so that monks captured during the massacre could be detained and interrogated. It

seems that when police film of the events in the Jokhang was shown to Tibetan security officers they became so angry that they needed to be disarmed.¹⁶¹ Other reports state that a number of Public Security Bureau Tibetan cadres who helped the demonstrators in October and March are in Gutsa prison where they are being interrogated three times during the day and three times at night. They have been given electric shocks and made to walk on burnt bricks until their legs have become useless.¹⁶²

According to M. Patrick Lescot, who works for AFP, and was the only Western newsman there, some 6,000 Tibetans erected barricades and battled with police in the side-streets and he estimates that there were about 100 monks inside the Jokhang and he saw four monks shot dead outside the Jokhang, even though they were unarmed.¹⁶³ Some sources, one attributed to the late Panchen Lama, a once respected religious leader who generally co-operated with the Chinese, put the number of demonstrators at 10,000. The Central Tibetan Secretariat, Dharamsala (N. India) stated that about 50 Tibetans have died as a result of the riots and subsequent torture and that about 2,500 have been arrested in Lhasa alone.¹⁶⁴

Amnesty International has expressed its concern over the violent repression of the pro-independence demonstration and the deaths of Tibetan rioters. It quotes unofficial estimates of 20 deaths or more and also quotes the Panchen Lama's estimate of 4 civilian deaths. Four Tibetans have been arrested in connection with the death of a Chinese policeman Yuan Shisheng on 5th March 1988 who was allegedly attacked with knives and thrown off the roof of a post office. The names of the accused Tibetans are Lobsang Tenzin, Gyaltzen Chopel, Tsering Dhondup, and Sonam Wangdu. They face summary execution and Amnesty International has sent an appeal on their behalf to the Chinese Government.¹⁶⁵ In January 1989 Lobsang Tenzin received a death sentence suspended for two years, Sonam Wangdu was sentenced to life imprisonment and Yulu Dawa Tsering was given a sentence of 14 years for 'counter revolutionary' offences. The latter does not seem to have been

involved in any independence demonstrations but angered the authorities by having a meal at his cousin's house in July 1987 at which two foreigners were present, one of them Stefano Dellari, an Italian dentist from Milan.¹⁶⁶ There is also evidence to support the belief that the other two Tibetans sentenced were not involved in the killing of the Chinese policeman, but were simply part of a struggling crowd. Chinese tactics here strikingly resemble the South African doctrine of 'common purpose' as the basis for convictions of murder where killings occur in a crowd and about which Amnesty International has protested. *AI* has also protested against the heavy prison sentences and has reported that about 24 other Tibetans have also been tried and sentenced for their part in pro-independence demonstrations.¹⁶⁷

Apart from the known cases of death and imprisonment it seems that 144 monks are still missing and their whereabouts are unknown.¹⁶⁸ Details concerning the condition of those detained have begun to filter through and Tibetans have been subjected to fearful tortures reminiscent of those inflicted by the Gestapo upon the Poles and Jews. Tenzin Sherab, a driver aged 22, was arrested after the 5th March riot and around 23rd March his family was asked to come to one of the city morgues. His sister could only identify him by his clothes because his face was so badly battered and both his eyes had been torn out. One of the men who assisted with the funeral rites said afterwards that all the bones in his body were broken. His family had to pay 600 yuans (about \$150) for the release of the body, which represents a small fortune for the impoverished Tibetan families of Lhasa. Phuntso, aged 37, formerly employed in Banak Shol Hat and Shoe Factory, committed suicide in prison as he could not endure the incessant beatings and torture. Anu, a resident of Banak Shol, was severely beaten by PSB men and died shortly afterwards. One of his eyes had been gouged out, his kidneys ruptured and hands and legs fractured in a display of traditional Chinese cruelty. A female inmate of Gutsa prison has testified that prisoners have their hands and legs fettered and shackled and that young girls between the ages

of seven and thirteen are imprisoned and live on a starvation diet. During the March demonstration prisoners in the dreaded Sangyip Prison set fire to some prison cars.¹⁶⁹ These events were widely reported in the world's press.¹⁷⁰ and received extensive coverage from Amnesty International.¹⁷¹

It would be correct to say that all Tibet is now in a state of terror. Participants in the demonstrations, knowing that they have probably been photographed and recorded on video, have been desperately trying to change their personal appearance, as they know what lies in store for them after being arrested.¹⁷² It is known that further arrests are continuing in and around Lhasa but people are being arrested during the day not in the early hours of the morning as is the customary Chinese practice. Police vans wait at key points in the city and then the detainee is beaten in full view of onlookers, bound and thrown into vans which take them to prison. For example on 6th March, Mr. Tenchoe, a 30 year old caretaker was arrested around noon and Mr Pasang, 32, a former driver of the Tourist Office, but now jobless, was arrested at night after earlier attempts to find him. No reasons were given for their detention and both of them are at Sangyip prison. A man from Amdo, E. Tibet (now renamed Qingai) was arrested on the Nepalese border as police in Lhasa had come for him with a photograph. His was a particularly tragic case as he may not have realised that Nepal does not accept Tibetan refugees and he was returned to Chinese custody.¹⁷³ Daytime arrests are used by the Chinese as a device of completely cowing the population of Lhasa, in that they often have a visible display of violence as happens frequently and under similar circumstances in South Africa and Chile. Lord Ennals, chairman of the All Party Parliamentary Group on Tibet recently visited Lhasa and recorded his impressions.¹⁷⁴ He told the press that the Chinese should 'call off their thugs' and described how 'electric cow prodders' were used to disable prisoners and referred to the 'poverty of the Tibetans in their own country'. The constant arrests in Lhasa remind one of the 'disappeared' since it is certain that many will not be seen again and the systematic way in which this device is used recalls the

'night and fog' technique used in Nazi occupied territories to instill the maximum amount of fear into those arrested and to their grieving relatives.

Amnesty International has sent regular communications to the Chinese authorities and expressed its concern at reports of the massacre in the Jokhang Temple to the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng and to the Chinese embassy in London and the Dalai Lama has appealed to the Chinese to call off the execution of those allegedly involved in the killing of a Chinese policeman in Lhasa.¹⁷⁵ So far the Chinese have not responded to any of the appeals they have received and they deny that any massacre in the Jokhang ever occurred.

There seems to be little doubt in the minds of most Tibetans that it was only the presence of foreigners in Lhasa, particularly backpackers, that prevented a series of full scale massacres similar to those of March 1959 and graphic accounts emerged from such sources in both the October and March riots.¹⁷⁶ It is significant that the activities of backpackers have been severely curtailed, at least for the time being and Tibetans in Lhasa believe that if all foreigners depart there will be widespread killings. The worldwide publicity seems to have taken the Chinese unawares and they have been unable to cope successfully with it. However, some Westerners inadvertently disclosed sources of information to the Chinese authorities when detained or questioned and neglected to destroy their reels of film which could have supplied the Chinese with information on the identity of rioters. Robert Barnett of IFOR also made the point that tourists should never write down the names of Tibetans and claimed that some journalists were careless or even unscrupulous about protecting their sources. While this is to be deeply regretted it is nevertheless a fact that on these occasions Tibetans had cause to be deeply grateful to the world's media reporting the events in Lhasa so swiftly and with a generally high degree of accuracy.

In February 1988, just before the March riots, Asia Watch,¹⁷⁷ a Washington based human-rights organisation affiliated with Helsinki Watch and Americas Watch, reported on the situation

in Tibet and accused the Chinese of systematically violating human-rights through arbitrary arrests, imprisonment, and forced abortions performed without the consent of the mother and described in detail a system of repression and an extensive surveillance network. Jack Greenberg, Chairman of Asia Watch and Vice Dean and Professor of Law at the Columbia University School of Law, recognized that there had been a good deal of liberalisation since 1980, but Asia Watch criticised the Chinese for their brutality, discrimination practised against Tibetans, extensive use of torture, including shackling and the use of electric cattle prods, indiscriminate shootings and detentions during the recent riots. It further criticised them for the lack of real religious freedom in Tibet, expresses concern about the huge and continuing Chinese influx into Tibet and noted that there is 'no place in the prevailing legal system for any sort of outside assistance, representation or other concessions to allow the accused to mount a defence.'

The report catalogued racial discrimination against Tibetans in housing, education, economic opportunities, freedom of movement, and access to services and noted that China is a signatory to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and called upon the Chinese to end all inequalities experienced by Tibetans. This extremely influential report relied on interviews with private citizens in Tibet and on its reading of documents published by the government. The material was gathered in 1987 and although Asia Watch asked to send a formal delegation to Tibet to meet Chinese officials and to obtain their views, their request was refused. Asia Watch stated that 'the situation in Tibet will not be turned into a non-issue through silence and evasion' and called upon the US Government to take a stronger stand over human-rights in Tibet.

Asia Watch published a second report on July 30th 1988 entitled 'Evading Scrutiny: Violations of Human Rights After the Closing of Tibet'. It further criticises the US for not raising the issue of human rights with the Chinese Foreign Minister during his March visit and quoted reports from various sources

indicating that as many as 50 people may have died in the March riots which involved up to 10,000 Tibetans in street battles with security forces. Representative Tom Lantos, co-chairman of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus, said that the report confirmed information the Caucus had been receiving since unrest began in Tibet last year. He stated that the 'Chinese authorities must understand that just as the American people have insisted on observation of human-rights by the Soviet Union as a condition of improved US-Soviet relations, so Chinese observance of Tibetan human-rights is a precondition for further improvement in US-Chinese relations'.¹⁷⁸

Despite the horrendous lengths of the Chinese crackdown in Tibet well-authenticated reports indicate that more demonstrations against Chinese rule have occurred in Lhasa and in other parts of Tibet. On April 17th 1988 a demonstration of nuns from the Chubsang nunnery near Lhasa took place, during which time they shouted demands for Tibetan independence, and this was followed by another demonstration of nuns on May 17th 1988 in front of the Jokhang Temple. This provoked police intervention and beatings and a small riot in which four people are reported to have been shot dead by the police, and a new and apparently stronger form of tear gas was used upon the demonstrators. Some nuns managed to escape while others are reported to have been arrested and taken away by truck to an unknown destination.¹⁷⁹ The nuns who participated in the second demonstration were from Ghari nunnery and some villages near Lhasa, and they had evidently demanded the release of some nuns who were arrested during the first demonstration.

On May 30th 1988, the holiest day of the Tibetan Buddhist calendar, 6 monks appeared outside the Jokhang Temple carrying Tibetan flags and were confronted by about six hundred Chinese soldiers. The soldiers then threw tear-gas at the watching crowd and the monks were bound and loaded into trucks upon which Tibetan children had written the slogans 'free Tibet' and 'Long live His Holiness the Dalai Lama'. The Press Trust of India reported from London that Western

travellers had witnessed this demonstration.¹⁸⁰

Credible reports have also recently emerged of demonstrations and unrest in other parts of Tibet. A planned demonstration by Tibetan students studying at the Sining (Xining) National Minority Institute was forestalled by the Chinese authorities in the summer of 1987 (Xining is the area which contains the most densely populated labour camp complex on earth). But a more successful demonstration occurred in the third week of December 1987 and was carried out by about three hundred Tibetan students of Malho Tru (Malho Autonomous Prefecture) Medical College and this was followed by another demonstration in Rekong also located in the former Tibetan province of Amdo, now renamed Qinhai by the Chinese.

This demonstration which evidently involved 200–500 Tibetan students, 10 teachers and about 100 monks from Rongpo Gonpa, occurred on 1st February 1988 and was stopped by the Chinese authorities. Four monks who were among those detained have not yet been released and their whereabouts are unknown. Yet another demonstration took place at the Chentsa Hsien National Minority School a few days later and Tibetan students chanted slogans demanding independence for Tibet, an end to forced abortions and family planning in Tibet. Unconfirmed reports indicate that several executions have occurred as a result of these demonstrations. Further reports indicate that a police station in Kanze, situated in the eastern-most part of E. Tibet, has been burned down, though the precise date at which this incident took place is unclear. Kanze is now situated in the Chinese province of Sichuan.¹⁸¹

The significant point about these demonstrations is that they have occurred *outside* the area officially designated by the Chinese as the 'Autonomous Region of Tibet' and in areas that are extremely remote. Together they give some indication of the deep hatred the Tibetans have for the Chinese, and the dimensions of the problem which the Chinese are still unable to solve.

Meanwhile there are continuing reports of unrest involving harassment of Chinese and Tibetan cadres in Lhasa, together

with the appearance of wallposters demanding Tibetan independence, and there are reports that Chinese settlers in Tibet carry handguns and regard it as a 'frontier region.' At the beginning of May 1988 wallposters appeared at Tashilunpo Monastery in Shigatse, the seat of the late Panchen Lama saying that his monastery was Chinese and not Tibetan. Threats were made to burn the monastery down and 300–500 troops were sent from Lhasa to prevent any protests. More reports indicate that wallposters have appeared in Gyantse, Chamdo, Chatring, Lithang, Nagchu, Lhoka, Nyemo, Gyaltse and Ngamring. Meanwhile tourists are closely supervised and Tibetans are not allowed to leave the country, whether for pilgrimage or to visit friends or relatives in exile and it is reported that new identity cards are being issued in an effort to monitor peoples' movements more effectively. Arrests are evidently continuing and there are reports that those returning to Tibet after visiting relatives in exile have been arrested as have people going to India for purposes of pilgrimage.¹⁸²

Despite these precautions there have been further disturbances in Lhasa and elsewhere. On September 27th 1988 a small pro-independence demonstration was held by about 10 monks in lay clothes and they were believed to be from Gaden monastery. This demonstration was witnessed by tourists and Tibetan national flags were flown in various parts of Lhasa during the day. The Chinese authorities used teargas and there are reports that police trucks filled with prisoners patrolled the city in an effort to discourage any further demonstrations.¹⁸³ There are also reports that Lhasa was sealed on October 1st and that security personnel have been deployed all over the city and that a special squadron consisting of some 12,000 soldiers have been sent into Lhasa to deal with any future Tibetan demonstrations.¹⁸⁴ Claude Levenson, a French journalist who was in Tibet during late July 1988, estimates that there are already between 150,000–200,000 Chinese soldiers stationed in and around the city. She also gave a detailed account of various surveillance procedures used by the Chinese at monasteries and in other parts of the city.¹⁸⁵

This increasingly belligerent attitude of the Chinese authorities was shown earlier when the senior politburo member in charge of police affairs, Mr. Qiao Shi, is reported to have said 'The monks are bad and if I had it my way, there wouldn't be any monks in Tibet' and he called for the 'merciless repression' of demonstrators.¹⁸⁶ These sentiments found direct expression on 10th December 1988 when Chinese police fired into unarmed demonstrators numbering about three hundred. A Dutch woman, Ms Christa Meindersma, was among the many injured. An American tourist witnessed the demonstration and Danny Gittings, *Guardian* correspondent, saw the body of Jaba, a monk aged 28 years, who had been shot in the temple at close range.¹⁸⁷ It is believed that the unarmed demonstrators were attempting to capitalise on China's own celebrations of the 40th anniversary of the UN Universal Human Rights Day, which provoked this bizarre sequel.

It is now reported that 18 people were killed and 136 wounded.¹⁸⁸ and Amnesty International has telexed the Chinese Prime Minister Li Peng calling for an inquiry into the killings and asking for clarification about the use of firearms by police.¹⁸⁹ Beijing first stated that only one person had been killed. The Dutch woman who was wounded has had her passport confiscated and had been refused permission to leave Tibet for a while.¹⁹⁰

When it became known that a Dutch national had been wounded the Chinese admitted that 'warning shots' had been fired at the demonstrators and suggested that bullets fired into the air may have injured some people as they fell to the ground, an interesting proposition for a ballistics expert. Following the demonstration 9 busloads of armed police drove to Drepung and Sera monasteries and arrested a number of monks. Six nuns from Garu nunnery were also arrested. During the following day groups of Tibetans offered prayers near scattered pools of dried blood or made small shrines of stones around them.¹⁹¹

Yet another demonstration took place in Lhasa on 30th December 1988 consisting mainly of students and teachers from the two Tibetan speaking departments of the 'University

of Tibet'. One foreign national, Mr. John Sevcik from Alaska, was beaten by Chinese police until he thought he had been paralysed and two Europeans who had been taking pictures had their films impounded.¹⁹²

The demonstration of December 10th and its brutal repression provoked Tibetan students in Beijing to march in protest, to the acute embarrassment of the Chinese. It occurred 8 days later in Tiananmen Square (the scene of a Moslem demonstration in December 1986 calling for an end to Chinese nuclear tests and dumping of radio active material in E. Turkistan/Xinkiang). The demonstration took place on the eve of the arrival of the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi for four days of what appeared to be inconclusive talks. A Tibetan student said 'We had to express our anger about what happened in Lhasa on December 10th'.....'All Tibetans everywhere are angry because the police are killing our people'.¹⁹³ This demonstration proved to be a precursor to the tragic events in Tiananmen Square in June 1989.

There have also been reports of disturbances in Dartsedo, Lithang (Tibetan areas of Sichuan) Zedong (about 50 miles SE of Lhasa), Zangmu on the Nepalese border, Chamdo, capital of Chamdo Prefecture, and the Kongpo region where the Brahmaputra bends towards India.¹⁹⁴ Reports have also been received of disturbances in the town of Riwoche in E. Tibet, about 4 hours drive from Chamdo. These appear to have been caused by the discovery of uranium in the hill behind the famous Trachen-ma Temple of Riwoche, which has been traditionally considered a sacred site and the protests were precipitated when Tibetans learned that the Chinese were intending to mine the uranium. Three jeeps were reportedly burned and the area was sealed off when Chinese troops arrived. A large number of Tibetans have been arrested and interrogated.¹⁹⁵ (see section entitled *Ecological Devastation*).

It seems clear that the Chinese hoped a relaxation in the severity of their rule would satisfy the Tibetans, blunt any protests, facilitate a profitable tourist trade and deflect attention from their appalling human-rights record in Tibet. But the

legacy of some four decades of repression cannot be easily obliterated from the hearts and minds of a people, particularly when torture and imprisonment are still realities in everyday life. As a result of the continuing ferment Mr. Wu Jinghua, senior Communist Party leader in Lhasa and first Party Secretary since 1985 has been replaced. To some extent he seems to have been a scapegoat, and he was certainly associated with a more lenient policy towards the Tibetans and even attended religious ceremonies and supported the revival of Tibetan Buddhism. He had also spoken out against the 'ultra left' policies of Chinese officials who still regard the Tibetans as inferior people and he had been praised by the Chinese Party leader, Secretary General Zhao Ziyang for abolishing the 'people's communes' in Tibet.¹⁹⁶ Had his policies received the kind of support from Beijing and from the Chinese administration in Tibet which he was entitled to expect, they might have been considerably more successful and his untimely removal is to be regretted. His successor Mr. Hu Jintao has been identified with reform policies but the riots of early March 1989 are likely to result in such policies being placed in abeyance, at least for a while.

1989

The gravity of the current situation in Tibet has been underlined by the March demonstrations, together with the Chinese response and the admission of Major-General Zhang Shaosong, the political commissar of martial law in Lhasa, that riots in Tibet have cost 600 lives in the uprisings since September 1987 and the recent unrest left 40 Chinese policemen dead or wounded.¹⁹⁷ The United Nations' Secretary-General Perez de Cueller, agreed on the 'necessity of sending UN observers to Tibet', during a meeting with M. Bernard Kouchner, the French Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs, on March 13th 1989.¹⁹⁸

Just after noon on March 5th 1989 a group of about 12 monks, nuns and youths aged about 12–16 years approached the Jokhang chanting independence slogans and this peaceful demonstration was timed to occur exactly one year after the

massacre of monks in the Jokhang. At least two policemen were videotaping the demonstrators, who now numbered about 40, and were mostly adult. Eye witnesses state that police had taken up positions on the roof of the nearby police-station and that they were carrying pistols. The crowd began to retreat in panic and the police threw beer bottles at the crowd and some stones were thrown back at them. The police then opened fire and it is estimated that most, if not all, the original demonstrators were killed.¹⁹⁹ After this incident a serious riot developed and assaults were made upon Chinese property by an angry crowd and although Chinese goods were burned there are no eye witness accounts of theft, such is the powerful influence of the Buddhist religion.

Poverty stricken Tibetans even refrained from stealing Chinese food, which they burned in an effort to erase any evidence of the Chinese presence in this part of the city. Further serious demonstrations occurred on March 6th and 7th when the Chinese sent armed troops into the Tibetan part of Lhasa in an effort to regain control. Martial law was decreed which took effect at midnight on March 7th and about 2,000 Chinese soldiers carrying automatic weapons moved into the centre of Lhasa during the night and began searching houses for those suspected of involvement in the unrest of the previous days during which much unnecessary force seems to have been used.²⁰⁰ Western travellers reported that dozens of Tibetans, including children, were seized and thrown into military trucks and the Chinese admit that at least 12 people were killed. Foreign eye witnesses however believe that between 30–50 people were killed, while Tibetan estimates are double this number.²⁰¹

The numerous reports of beatings and night searches and deportations call to mind eye-witness descriptions of 'Crystal Night' 1938 in Vienna, when the Nazis rounded up large numbers of Jews. Reports speak of trucks full of stunned Tibetans disappearing into the night and savage reprisals. On March 6th Chinese soldiers entered a house and shot an 18 year old Tibetan woman in the eye as she was making tea and on

another occasion they raided a house and bayoneted a pregnant Tibetan woman in the back, killing both mother and child. It is also reported that two Tibetans standing on the side of the road with their hands in their pockets were gunned down and killed by Chinese soldiers.

Another example of Chinese brutality is worth quoting in full as it was reportedly given by a Chinese cadre. 'A young Tibetan threw two stones at the armed police. A vice-platoon leader asked: 'Should we beat him?' As the stones hit a vice-battalion commander in the leg, he ordered: 'Beat him!' Then he led three armed police to chase after the Tibetan who had thrown the stones. The Tibetan ran into the house of an ordinary Tibetan family. The armed police crashed upon the door and raked the residents with gunfire. All six members of the family were killed, the youngest being only 11 years old. But the Tibetan who threw the stones climbed over the wall and ran away. The armed police ran after him and shot him in the leg. An armed policeman then rushed forward and, with his rifle, hit the Tibetan in the head. Unexpectedly, the rifle went off accidentally and an armed policeman behind him was struck in the neck. The policemen died instantly. When the vice-platoon leader saw the warrior die, he angrily hit the Tibetan, who had thrown the stones, in the head, smashing the brains out of the Tibetan's head. When the policemen hit this young Tibetan with their guns, six Tibetans from one family stood in their doorway not far away and cried 'Murderers! Murderers!' The vice-platoon leader picked up his sub-machine gun and raked them with gunfire. All six Tibetans died.'²⁰²

It is now estimated by Tibetans that about 1,000 people have been arrested. Westerners sheltering in Tibetan houses have given vivid accounts of Chinese soldiers running along the narrow streets firing indiscriminately while voices called out for a 'free Tibet'. Such incidents would then be followed by long silences which these observers found terrifying. Tibetans have been begging foreign tourists to stay despite having been ordered to leave by the Chinese, since they know what is in store for them and it is reported that some 60,000 troops and

paramilitary forces are now stationed in and around Lhasa and further disturbances have also been reported in Shigatse.²⁰³

These disturbances have been characterised by the use of almost unrestricted violence by the Chinese ranging from beatings to indiscriminate firing of handguns and automatic rifles into unarmed crowds in accordance with new policy of 'merciless repression'. The concensus of opinion is that the Chinese could easily have prevented the demonstrations from ever occurring with a minimal use of force and they must have known that there was a strong likelihood of some kind of trouble in Lhasa in early March and Lhasa police should have been sufficiently well-equipped and organised to enable them to contain an initially small demonstration with ease. These facts would seem to indicate that the Chinese were determined to 'teach the Tibetans a lesson' and one East European diplomat was quoted as saying that (the Lhasa police) '..... have had training from East European security forces. Instead the death toll was the highest yet. It is very odd.'²⁰⁴ The situation seems to have been exacerbated by the extreme youth of some of the Chinese police and soldiers whom westerners reported as looking tense and nervous, even though they were armed and the demonstrators possessed no weapons other than stones and bottles.

Tragic confirmation of the scale of the killings is indicated by the fact that on March 5th 35 sky burials of Tibetan dead were carried out. In Tibet it is the custom to leave the dead to be devoured by vultures. On the following day, March 6th another 25 sky-burials were carried out. It is significant that these figures come only from the sky burial area above Sera monastery, which is considered very sacred. Others are likely to have occurred at other burial spots. More reports state that a Tibetan astrologer in Lhasa has been approached by over 120 Tibetan families to perform astrological calculations for those killed. (Information Material No. 17, Office of Information and International Relations, Dharamsala).

The March 1989 riots and the consequent Chinese repression were widely featured in the world media. Shortly after the

riots the US Senate passed a resolution criticising the Chinese for the use of violence against unarmed demonstrators and calling for the lifting of restrictions on foreign reporters' access to Tibet; and the monitoring of human-rights violations there. The Chinese accused the US of 'gross interference in China's internal affairs' and the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National People's Congress expressed its 'utmost indignation' and said that the resolution supported a handful of separatists who had fired on armed police on duty, and there seems little doubt that the human-rights issue is responsible for a considerable deterioration in relations between Washington and Beijing.²⁰⁵

The British Foreign Office stated that it was 'gravely concerned at the loss of life' and urged Britons not to travel to Tibet²⁰⁶ and stated that there must be a dialogue between the 'Chinese Government and the Tibetan people, including the Dalai Lama'²⁰⁷ but did not go quite as far as the US State Department which drew attention to the 'legitimate grievances' of the Tibetan people.²⁰⁸ However, Sir Geoffrey Howe wrote expressing the concern felt by his government about reports of human-rights abuses in Tibet, particularly relating to the loss of life in recent disturbances. He recognised that 'there is a real concern in this country about the Human Rights situation in Tibet' and undertook to continue to remind the Chinese of this concern on 'suitable' occasions.²⁰⁹ Chinese discomforture was further increased by a resolution of the European Parliament on March 15th 1989 which condemned the 'violence of the crackdown by troops in Tibet' and described this resolution as 'wanton interference in China's internal affairs'. Chinese sensitivity on the Tibetan question was further illustrated by its government's refusal to allow a leading dissident, Mr. Fang Lizhi, from attending President Bush's farewell banquet in Beijing.²¹⁰

The Chinese were clearly upset by Swiss, Dutch and Australian reactions to the shootings. On March 16th, 1989, 29 out of 46 members of the Upper House and 141 out of 200 members of the Lower House of the Swiss Parliament sub-

mitted an urgent appeal to the Swiss Foreign Minister, Rene Felber, and to the Chinese embassy in Berne which, among other things, called upon the Chinese government to respect the rights and dignity of the Tibetan people, and to end the violent measures of repression. A call was also made for a lasting political solution which 'meets the requirements of the Tibetan self-rule'. On March 14th the Dutch Foreign Minister, Van den Broek, stated in the Lower House of the Dutch Parliament that Holland had voiced its concern to the Chinese arising from the imposition of martial law in and around Lhasa. In Paris the French Secretary of State for Humanitarian Affairs, M. Bernard Kouchner, following his meeting with the UN Secretary General, declared his readiness to provide support for 'any undertaking such as sending volunteers, medicine or first aid equipment to Tibet or for Tibetan refugees'. In Australia 95 Federal Parliamentarians presented a memorandum to the Chinese embassy on March 9th asking the Chinese government to restore human-rights in Tibet, and to hold peaceful dialogues with the Dalai Lama about the future of Tibet. It is also reported that the Indian Foreign Ministry expressed 'concern' over the incidents.²¹¹

What has prompted quite unequivocal expressions of concern from various governments and from the UN Secretary General has been the shooting of unarmed Tibetan demonstrators. 'If the KGB were to gun down peaceful demonstrators in Estonia or Lithuania, even super-salesman Mikhail Gorbachev would have trouble persuading Washington to continue improving relations. But Gorbachev's counterpart in Beijing evidently think they can murder Buddhist protesters in Tibet without suffering any damage in their ties with the west.²¹² It has also been remarked that the 'uneasy standoff between Tibetans and ethnic Chinese has been replaced by something like the spirit of Belfast or the West Bank,²¹³ and that 'Tibet has been treated far more brutally than were the Baltic states after their seizure by the Soviet Union. Even the invasion of Hungary in 1956 was not followed by a campaign to destroy every vestige of that country's nationhood'.²¹⁴

It is this kind of press comment which has proved to be particularly damaging to the Chinese when it is clear that their explanations of the March riots have proved largely unacceptable to many politicians, political commentators and to members of the general public in many countries. The Chinese have maintained that 'separatist cliques' abroad had sent people into Tibet, some armed, under the guise of tourists²¹⁵ and the New China News Agency claimed that Tibetans had on March 5th fired first on security forces. Amnesty International has pointed out that there is no independent evidence to support this assertion and that foreign eye-witnesses deny this allegation.²¹⁶ Video recordings seen on television have shown Chinese police firing on demonstrators who were obviously unarmed, and no picture have emerged showing Tibetans returning fire or precipitating the Chinese reaction by firing first at the police.²¹⁷

Chinese credibility was further undermined when Yan Mingfu, a senior Communist Party official, accused the Dalai Lama of sending people into Tibet with the express purpose of causing a riot and the China News Service stated that Japanese trained agents were responsible for planning the anti-Chinese disturbances.²¹⁸ No proof of this assertion has been forthcoming and Tibetans find it an astonishing allegation since Japan, although a country in which Buddhism has long been established, does virtually nothing to assist the Tibetan cause or to help Tibetan refugees, (see footnotes 311 & 312).

Foreign tourists who were in Lhasa at the time of riots un-animously reject Chinese claims that armed Tibetans fired first. 'We are surprised that in the press it is reported that the Tibetan people used guns in the demonstration. We categorically state that we saw no Tibetans with guns in the demonstration.'²¹⁹ They further added that 'As far as we are concerned, no foreign tourists were actively involved or in any way provoked the demonstrators. Any suggestion that foreigners provided arms is preposterous'. S. Fawl has stated 'At NO time during the 3 days of being out for approximately 10 hours a day did I see Tibetans with guns or any evidence to justify this rumour. Nor

do I think the Tibetans would have faced automatic weapons with stones IF they had any other alternative.²²⁰

There have been many occasions in the past 30 years when the Chinese, unable to reconcile themselves to the fact that the Tibetans generally hate their rule and wish for independence, have attempted to explain anti-Chinese demonstrations as the machinations of foreigners, who are essentially enemies of China. When the Chinese first began to occupy Tibet in 1949 foreign influence was greatly exaggerated and furnished a pretext for intervention and the great rebellions of the 1950's and 1960's were attributed to foreign influences at work in Tibet, and many Western supporters of China have, at various times, been content to echo this theme. So when Li Zuomin, Alternate Representative of the Chinese delegation at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, spoke on March 6th 1989 and accused foreign based separatists of inciting riots in Lhasa, his statement cannot have surprised observers of the Tibetan scene.²²¹

Mark Turner, a foreign tourist who was in Lhasa during the riots, refers to reports of 'weapons smuggled from India' issued by the New China News Agency, adding that as herdsmen's slingshots have often been used by Tibetans during demonstrations, the weapons smuggled from India, 'must have been stones!,'²²²

It is possible that a Leader in the *Guardian* played a major part in contributing to the belief that the rioting Tibetans were armed.²²³ The Leader stated that 'It does not really matter whether the police shootings of last Sunday were provoked by one of their number being shot first by a Tibetan demonstrator...' Unfortunately the *Guardian* did not make it clear from whence this report originated. In fact it was contained in the Chinese newspaper the *People's Daily*, (10/3/89) and if this circumstance had been mentioned a rather different perspective would have emerged as, it was a *Chinese* propaganda organ which first made this accusation. This fact should surely have been mentioned in the Leader in the interests of accuracy and a balanced perspective.²²⁴ It is likely that this editorial was writ-

ten by John Gittings, Asian Editor.

The conclusion reached by all foreign tourists who were in Lhasa during the riots, and by Amnesty International, is that no evidence has emerged which suggests that any of the Tibetan demonstrators were armed. The scale of the demonstrations and the numbers of Tibetans indiscriminately gunned down by the Chinese Security forces resembles the infamous Sharpville massacre in South Africa. Tourists in Lhasa have stated, 'We believe the death toll and number of casualties was several times higher than those reported by the Chinese press. We suspect that it could even run into hundreds.'²²⁵

Reports featured in the *Tibetan Bulletin* (June/July 1989) state that more demonstrations have occurred not only in Lhasa, but also in Amdo, formerly in E. Tibet and in Phenpo, an area east of Lhasa. Police activity in Lhasa seems to have assumed the dimensions of a full scale manhunt and there have been first hand reports of executions carried out in Lhasa under martial law. Ten bodies have been reported in a hospital morgue and all the victims were young men who had been shot in the head. A report in the *Observer* (23/7/89) by Arthur Kent and entitled 'Rule by Kalashnikov' gave a clear idea of the misery of Tibetans today. It was the first report by a Western eyewitness since the imposition of martial law and its tone clearly reflected the bitterness and sharp criticism which the leaders of post-Tiananmen China are now receiving from the world's media. Other reports indicate that several hundred people, mainly traders from Kham and Amdo, have refused to obey martial law to register with the authorities. Recent disturbances are also reported from Labrang (Chinese Xiahe) in Amdo and Ngaba (Chinese Aba). Leaflets calling for Tibetan independence have been printed and distributed and a number of people are reported to have been arrested in connection with this.

The sentencing of ten Tibetans in connection with the March riots has resulted in Amnesty International issuing an *Urgent Action Bulletin* which states that '...all those sentenced for peacefully demonstrating their fundamental human right to

freedom of expression and association be immediately and unconditionally released.' The Office of Information and International Relations in Dharamsala has published comprehensive lists of those Tibetans arrested, tortured and executed, or who have disappeared.

Aftermath—Reports from the Prisons

As the previous section has made clear, torture is used as a matter of deliberate policy in Chinese prisons but in the past it has sometimes proved difficult to obtain full and comprehensive testimony from Tibetan prisons due to the distances involved, the difficulty of crossing the Himalayas, the danger of refugee arrests in Nepal and problems with translations and dissemination of information etc. However, the present disturbances have yielded a rich harvest of information and it is to be hoped that Amnesty International will send a team to visit prisons in Tibet as they have done so often in the past in such cases as Vietnam, Egypt, Japan, Israel, Brazil, Taiwan, Mauritania, Tunisia, etc.

The recent disturbances have also confirmed the existence of arrests for political offences (highlighted at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, in March 1988 (see Section entitled *The UN, The US and Europe*), and the number of prisoners released has illustrated Chinese susceptibility to international pressure in the area of human-rights.

A considerable number of interviews with former prisoners have been sent to Amnesty International from the Tibetan offices located in Dharamsala and Delhi and these contain detailed testimonies from those incarcerated in such prisons as Gutsa, Sangyip and Drapchi. It appears that the Chinese employ the following techniques of torture which include electric shocks from stunning batons applied to the mouth, genitals or chest, severe beatings with wooden truncheons, immersion of prisoners in icy water for long periods of time during the winter, attacks by dogs, application of burning cigarettes to the face and other parts of the body (recalling current testimony

from Turkish prisons), and being strung up for hours from a roof beam with arms tied behind back resulting in the dislocation of shoulders which is known as the 'flying aeroplane' and which can last from a few hours to days at a time. At Sangyip prisoners were shackled, the cells were overcrowded and totally bare and the prisoners slept on a cement floor. Other reports of prisoners refer to particularly cruel torturers such as Shobi (or Shou Bi), a 28 year old Tibetan policemen, and Lhartse, who not only beat prisoners to a point close to death but also trampled on them. A nun held in solitary confinement for several months stated, 'I was made to stand by the wall. They slapped my face until it was swollen, then they set a dog on me and gave orders to it in Chinese'. On another occasion her hands were tied behind her and she was beaten by five guards. She was made to stand on a table and two guards held her hands while they beat her until she became unconscious. She was revived with cold water and beaten again. Reports very recently received (August 1989) indicate that dogs are set loose on nuns with increasing frequency, possibly resulting in some deaths, recalling the antics of the SS who unleashed starving alsatians on women and children in the concentration camps, whom they then tore to pieces. Other reports indicate that cattle prods are applied to nun's private parts and that they are hung upside down for long periods of time. There are also rumours, not yet confirmed, that some nuns have had their breasts hacked off. This would not be altogether surprising since this is known to have occurred during the 'Cultural Revolution'.

More testimony records nuns from Gha-ri nunnery being burned with lighted cigarettes and given electric shocks and there is also evidence that girls as young as 14 years are detained in prison as is the case in South Africa and Turkey and are sexually molested by Chinese guards on various occasions. A particularly tragic case of torture is that of Lobsang Chungda (also known as Kusho Khenpo Chungdak) formerly a leader (Ch. 'Turing') of Ganden Monastery who was prominent in the disturbances. His arms and legs have reportedly been

broken as a result of prolonged beatings and he is at present shackled and chained in solitary confinement in Sangyip prison. Several independent prison testimonies have referred to the beatings he received and to his place of detention. Another case concerns that of a Lhasa man named Shelog, aged 21 years, who was killed during the demonstration on 5/3/88 as a result of police beatings. His wife worked at a hospital in Lhasa and after a week's investigation she found his body in the hospital morgue where it appeared that all the bones in his body had been broken. The hospital required 300-500 Yuan for release of the body. As a result of her husband's death and supposed guilt she was dismissed from her job, even though pregnant. Another statement records the death of a man whose limbs had been broken and as his family were unable to pay the standard collection fee the dead man's wrist watch was kept by the Chinese authorities.²²⁶ More reports speak of starvation rations in prison consisting of thin gruel or watery porridge and some prisoners have stated that guards often urinate in their food.

The above section gives some idea not only of the determination of the Tibetans to regain their independence, but of the state of almost unimaginable terror in which most of them live and it is arguable that the oppression of the Tibetan people by the Chinese since 1949 *constitutes one of the very worst examples of a policy designed to break the heart and spirit of a people pursued with a scientific attention to detail combined with a ruthlessness and a manic thoroughness which is unique even by the exacting standards of the 20th Century.*

Although conditions have generally improved for many Tibetans since about 1979 there exists the possibility that the present regression could culminate in wholesale repression reminiscent of the days of the 1950's and 1960's despite international protests.

The aftermath of the riots continues. A letter smuggled out of Tibet states that 'it is widely believed that 132 people are missing from Lhasa, who the Chinese claim escaped to India, whereas we suspect them to have fallen victim to secret

Chinese executions. In short, those killed by the Military Security personnel had died of gunshots, lashings by chains or beating by nailed clubs. Most victims had their limbs broken, skulls shattered, were stabbed in cold blood or were just pushed over roof tops.'²²⁷

Further direct evidence of torture in Tibet has emerged in the written testimony of Christopher C. Beyer, MD, an American doctor who ran a 'tent Clinic' for Tibetans in India, three of whom had undergone recent torture. One patient had bruised and swollen ankles and a loss of sensation in both feet. When questioned she broke into tears and said that she had been manacled about the ankles for 18 days in an unheated cell and regularly beaten about the legs, feet, back, shoulders and hands. The second patient was a 41 year old mother who had weakness and abdominal pain. She was found to have a cardiac arrhythmia and a heart murmur. She had been interrogated for three consecutive days with an electric prod which flung her across the cell each time she was struck with it. She eventually escaped from a prison window and found her way on foot to the Nepalese border. She had been forced to leave her husband and several children behind and to avoid any contact with them for fear of reprisals by the Chinese. The third patient was a Buddhist monk in his sixties who complained of a painful gluteal abscess. He eventually broke down and showed rope burns (which were now healing) on both forearms. He had been interrogated after the October 1987 riots in Lhasa and ropes had been gradually tightened over his skin until it tore. The report concluded, 'As a young physician these were some of the most disturbing patients I have ever encountered. I believe my clinical judgement to be sound when I assert that these people have been victims of systematic physical torture. Such torture, while under interrogation, is clearly a part of Chinese treatment of ethnic Tibetans.'²²⁸

As has been pointed out, China signed the UN Convention Against Torture in December 1986 and the Chinese Criminal Law Clause 163 forbids torture in prison and provides only for the reform of prisoners through labour and re-education

sessions. But it is quite clear that torture in Tibet is sanctioned at a very high level because it is so widespread and because it occurs so frequently. Furthermore, China has not yet signed the Universal Declaration of Human Rights formulated on December 10th, 1948.

The international protests following the October 1987 and March 1988 riots seem to have taken the Chinese by surprise and probably account for the fact that a large number of prisoners were released after relatively short periods in detention. Scott Bellard, the US Consul in Chengdu, expressed this opinion, as have a considerable number of human-rights activists, and it certainly proves that whatever the Chinese might say, they are nevertheless increasingly receptive to pressure from human-rights organisations. It seems likely that about 2,200 Tibetans were arrested following the riots and it is likely that at least half of them have been released and an estimated 92% of those arrested following the March riots have been freed. One monk who was released from Gutsa prison on July 10th 1988 has stated that the Chinese Government sent a letter to the prison directing them to release prisoners. He has no other explanation as to why he was released.²²⁹ However, it is known that many more arrests have continued following further demonstrations which occurred throughout 1988 though the precise number of those arrested is not known but it probably totals many hundreds in Lhasa alone. Claude Levenson, the French journalist, estimates that there are still some 60 monks and 2,000–3000 lay Tibetans in prison in Lhasa.²³⁰ The Chinese released 52 prisoners during the visit of Mr. Bill Hayden (18th–28 July 1988), the first approved visit by a senior foreign government official since the March riots and it seems likely that the publicity generated by his presence encouraged the Chinese to display more leniency, once again illustrating their increasing sensitivity to international opinion. Mr Hayden reportedly raised religious freedom and human-rights issues in discussions with senior government and Communist Party officials in his capacity as Australian Foreign Minister.²³¹

There is little doubt that the period from September 1987 has

been a traumatic one for many Tibetans, but this extraordinarily tough people seem determined to continue their resistance to the Chinese occupation. But it is also likely that the Chinese have been taken aback by the hatred they have encountered and by the adverse publicity they have received not only in Western countries but also in an increasing number of Third World countries, who were erstwhile admirers of China. The riots and protests have inevitably undermined the fiction maintained by the Chinese that all arrests are for criminal offences. The arrest of Lhakpa Tsering, a former Security Officer of the Central Bank of Lhasa City, on September 28th 1988, provides a graphic example of this since he was termed an 'anti-revolutionary' illustrating the point conceded by China at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva in March 1988 that political prisoners do exist in Tibet.²³²

The continued volatility of the situation has been shown by the arrest of Yeshi Lhundup, aged 75 years and a former official of the Tibetan 'Government in Exile', who is now reportedly detained in Sangyip prison, having undergone severe torture and by the trial believed to have been held in August 1988, of three of the four Tibetans charged with having murdered a policeman on March 5th. Amnesty International has expressed concern that the four may be executed if they are found guilty.²³³

The aftermath of the riots is still continuing²³⁴ and the question of Tibet and continuing human-rights abuses perpetrated by the Chinese is receiving increasing media exposure in many parts of the world and the Chinese human-rights record and their habit of arbitrary executions has been vigorously condemned at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, in February 1988 and February 1989.

PART 3

TIBET-U.N., U.S.A. AND EUROPE

Tibet and The United Nations

The first edition of the Report 'Tibet: The Facts' was used as a basis for two presentations on Tibet made at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, by an officer of the International Fellowship of Reconciliation (which has NGO status at the UN) in 1985 and 1986.²³⁵ Since this date IFOR has made two other presentations on the questions of religious freedom and human rights during which time the Chinese reacted with verbal abuse and threats. Their behaviour surprised a lot of observers, particularly those from Third World countries, who were critical of racist aspects of Chinese policies in Tibet. The Chinese replies were unconvincing and often ignored the main points in the presentations.

Presentations of this nature sometimes encounter certain obstacles at UN fora, for it is an unwritten convention, amounting to a 'gentleman's agreement', that Asian countries rarely criticise each other's human-rights record and as a result of this understanding human-rights violations occurring in Asia are vastly under-exposed at the UN. It is well known, for example, that the Bangladesh Government is pursuing a deliberate policy of genocide against the mainly Buddhist, but also Christian and Hindu peoples of the Chittagong Hill Tracts ceded by the British in an extraordinarily inept decision to Pakistan rather than India in 1947. Indonesia is also waging a campaign of genocide against the tragic peoples of E. Timor and West Irian (Papua) but these events have received virtually

no exposure at the UN from fellow Asian countries and it has been left mainly to non-governmental organisations to raise these matters. This is the situation in which the presentations against the Chinese record in Tibet occurred and it is clear that the question is an extraordinarily fraught one, and the Chinese are not used to having to defend themselves in such a way and their fellow Asian delegates have some difficulty in adjusting to the fact that the Chinese are being publicly attacked at the UN.

Another presentation was made in February 1987 followed by two more in February and March 1988 during the aftermath of the demonstrations in Tibet. The question of Tibet was first raised in an oral address at Geneva by the representative of Pax Christy International on 8th February 1988 in which he said "over the past few years the Commission has adopted resolutions concerning South Africa, Palestine, Western Sahara, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, all of which are tragedies caused by non-respect for the principle of the right of peoples to self-determination. What may be said of Irian Jaya, Tibet, Eritrea or Kurdistan? These oppressed peoples, who have been annexed by force, whose culture the occupying powers have more often than not attempted to destroy—have they been able to exercise their right to self-determination?"

Another Report was submitted by Mr. Angelo Vidal d'Almeida Ribeiro the Special Rapporteur dealing with questions of religious freedom and tolerance. He referred specifically to Tibet and mentioned restrictions on the practice of religion, pointing out that Buddhist monks are designated by a Government Committee, and that donations to the monasteries were not under the control of the monasteries themselves but of the Office of Religious Affairs. In his reply the Chinese representative Mr. Pan Weihuang denied all these charges, and referred to the 'peaceful liberation of Tibet' during which time an agreement for the policy of freedom of religious belief in Tibet had been drawn up between 'the central Government and the local Government'. He stated that none of the religious bodies in China was dominated by outside forces.

Mr. Amos Wako, the UN Special Rapporteur on Summary Executions, sent a letter dated 4/12/87 to the Chinese Government alleging that 3 people had been executed in the Tibet Autonomous Region in September 1987 immediately after being condemned to death at a public rally, and also that on 1st October 1987, a number of persons had died in Lhasa during and after a riot as a result of the activities of the police. The Chinese reply was received on 13/1/88 coming from the Permanent Mission of China to the United Nations Office at Geneva. The reply denied that summary executions existed in China and stated that executions could only take place at the conclusion of criminal procedures. In reply to his other question the Chinese, most importantly, denied that the police in Lhasa had fired at the rioters or counter attacked them, and said that *rioters had snatched guns and fired them into the crowd*. This statement made the Chinese position an untenable one. René Wadlow and Robert Barnett of IFOR gave, in separate presentations, detailed statements from eye-witnesses, including Barnett himself, who stated that they had seen Chinese police firing into an unarmed crowd, and that they had seen Tibetans killed and wounded. Earlier, on 24th February Amnesty International under Item 10, had also referred to eye-witness accounts which insisted that policemen had fired into an unarmed crowd and referred to allegations that prisoners held in Lhasa had been tortured. The Chinese representative, in oral and written presentations, said that the riot was anything but peaceful and that it was instigated 'by a handful of separatists co-ordinating their illegal actions with the Dalai clique who are agitating for so-called Tibetan independence' and hinted that foreigners might be partly responsible for the riots. They continued to deny that policemen had caused deaths by firing into the crowd.

However, on 4th March 1988 the Chinese substantially altered their position admitting at the UN that police had opened fire and consequently killed Tibetan demonstrators in Lhasa, completely changing their story that Tibetan rioters had seized weapons and fired into the crowd. *They admitted that police*

had fired into the air and that two Tibetans and one Chinese national were killed accidentally, one of them by a ricochet. The late Panchen Lama admitted that demonstrators had been killed by police bullets and his statement was featured in the *Tibet Daily* and was reported by *Reuters* and featured in the *South China Morning Post* (15/2/88). Therefore the Chinese position at the UN concerning the demonstration has been publicly modified and is almost untenable. (The late Panchen Lama, violated his monastic vows by marrying and having a daughter, see *Ming Pao Daily News* and *South China Morning Post* 26/2/88).

The Chinese position at the United Nations has also ceased to be tenable on another count. On 23rd February Ms Myriam Schreiber, representing the International Federation of Women in Legal Careers, referred to the appalling conditions in prisons such as Sangyip and Drapchi 'which house political prisoners from all over Tibet'. In the course of an insulting reply the Chinese representative asserted that 'there are no political prisoners in China, not a single one, they are all common criminals as anyone who has been in a gaol can testify'. He further added 'Anyway, in all of Tibet, there is only one single prison. The Chinese delagate (Chen Shigiu) also denied the existence of torture in Tibet. However, according to a AFP report from Beijing (1/3/88) the Chinese have admitted the existence of political prisoners. This was admitted by the Chinese News Service editor-in-chief Lin Anwei and was reported in the '*South China Morning Post*' (3/3/88) and the *Independent* (2/3/88).

The net result of all these disclosures and contradictions is that the Tibetan issue has received major publicity through the forum of the United Nations and that the Chinese position on Tibet has been shown to be full of inconsistencies and this is certain to have more repercussions in the future. Finally, an astonishing aspect to this affair was reported by Robert Barnett of IFOR. After the presentations he had a conversation with a Chinese official concerning the recent riots in Lhasa. The Chinese official then stated that 'we have the right to say what

we must to correct *subjective views*' (our italics), which presumably means that the Chinese version represents objective truth and all other versions are subjective and therefore unsound and open to correction. It does not seem to have occurred to the Chinese representative that their view is inevitably subjective too. When Barnett offered to show the official photographs which contradicted his account of events in Lhasa during the riots, he referred to a video in Beijing, *but refused to look at the photographs which Barnett was holding in his hand.*²³⁶

Another and more limited presentation was made at the 40th meeting of the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities on August 24th 1988, in the form of an Appeal requesting that the Sub-Commission raise the Tibetan issue in its next session. The Appeal says: 'The undersigned NGO's concerned about the worsening of the human-rights situation in Tibet, taking into account the issues raised in the reports submitted to the 44th session of the commission on human-rights by the special rapporteurs on religious intolerance and summary or arbitrary executions, hereby appeal to Sub-Commission to take appropriate action and adopt a resolution:

1. Recommending to the special rapporteurs on summary or arbitrary executions, religious intolerance and torture to carefully examine the situation with respect to basic human-rights and fundamental freedoms in Tibet.
2. Deciding to take up the question of human-rights and fundamental freedoms in Tibet at its 41st session.

It is likely that the Tibetan issue will be raised elsewhere in the United Nations during the course of 1989 such is the momentum which recent events have generated.²³⁷ The Chinese delegation had the difficult task of defending itself against forceful presentations made in February 1989 at the UN Human Rights Commission by the Minority Rights Group and the International Organisation for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. The Chinese delegation attempted to refute claims that Tibetan protesters had been

tortured and declared that torture was a 'barbarous affront to human dignity as well as a gross violation of human-rights' and added that law enforcement personnel in China were being given 'regular educational programmes... to make it clear to them that torture and forced confessions are criminal acts'. It is significant that the governments of both the Netherlands and Canada forcefully condemned the Chinese human-rights record in Tibet.

The Chinese then accused by name the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture, Professor P. Kooijmans of submitting to them allegations of torture that were 'incredibly absurd and one short glance is suffice to find out that they are all sheer fabrications'. The allegations, related to evidence submitted to the UN by Amnesty International, the Tibet Support Group, UK and other Human Rights Groups, included reference to the four nuns on Channel 4 television who described their torture while in custody, but the Chinese stated that as they had not been given the correct names of the nuns who had appeared on television there was no possibility of their allegations being true.²³⁸ (See *Tibet: A Case to Answer*. Channel 4 television 9/11/88). It is generally agreed that the Chinese performance was not very impressive and did not successfully counter the numerous allegations made by NGO's.

The presentations on Tibet caused a considerable amount of comment and it did not go unnoticed that Mr. Henry Steel, head of the UK Human Rights Delegation to Geneva did not mention human-rights abuses in Tibet during his speech made on March 7th 1989 but *did* condemn similar abuses in such countries as Afghanistan and Kampuchea etc.²³⁹

Effective presentations were made at the UN Sub-Commission, Geneva in August 1989 by Tica Broch (on behalf of the Minority Rights Group) the International Fellowship of Reconciliation and Pax Christy, among others. A Tibetan hunger striker Tseten Ngodup Gonpa, addressed the Sub-Commission and has received hundreds of letters and messages of support from all over the world. A resolution censoring China for human rights abuses was also passed at 'the UN

Commission, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (41st Session, Agenda item 6) and this evidently infuriated the Chinese who had done their best to undermine the effectiveness of this meeting. There appear to have been a number of serious procedural wrangles which were only settled by the statesmanlike suggestion of M.L. Joinet, that there should be a secret ballot and it was also accepted that the delegations would vote secretly as experts and not as the representatives of various countries. It seems that about four votes had to be taken before a secret ballot was finally agreed upon. When this ballot was taken by a majority of 15-9 the following Resolution was then passed.

Situation in China

The Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities:

Concerned about the events which took place recently in China and about their consequences in the field of human rights.

Requests the Secretary General to transmit to the Commission on Human Rights information provided by the Government of China and by other reliable sources; and

Makes an appeal for clemency, in particular in favour of persons deprived of their liberty as a result of the above mentioned events.

As can be seen the Resolution is a mild enough one and did not mention Tiananmen Square specifically, neither did it mention Tibet, yet it provoked furious protests from the Chinese. The narrowness of the majority inevitably provoked comment from the observers, but the fact that the Resolution was passed at all marks an important turning point at the UN, and indicates that the former indulgence extended to China by many countries is waning. Allies of China such as Cuba and Nicaragua have said nothing about Tiananmen, though doubtless their tongues would have been loosened had the event

occurred in South Africa or Namibia. This important event clearly illustrates the kind of opposition that those keen to expose human-rights abuses in China have encountered until recent times, and it is significant that those who are the first to condemn imperialism and human-rights abuses in Capitalist countries manage to avoid censoring similar behaviour on the part of Communist countries, while constantly denouncing the hypocrisy of other countries, etc, etc, etc.

With all its defects and limitations the above Resolution passed on 31/8/89 is extremely important and is likely to be built upon in succeeding years. (The above information was kindly provided by Martin Ennals, brother of Lord Ennals and Secretary General of International Alert during a telephone conversation on 28/9/89). The draft Resolution was submitted by Mr. M. Bautista, Mr. Van Boven (Chairman of International Alert), Mr. Quiros, Mr. A. Eide (a member of International Alert), Mr. Fix-Zamudio, Mr. R. Hatano, Mr. Joinet, Mrs C. Palley and Mr. W. Treat.

Tibetans and their supporters are determined to ensure that similar meetings at the UN Human Rights Commission scheduled to be held in 1990 mention Tibet and refer to the yearning of Tibetans for their independence. However, this issue will raise the twin spectres of hysterical Chinese opposition and British Foreign Office influence at the UN which many fear will be used to water down any such Resolution, in 1992 when the Tibetan and China Committee, headed by two respected figures, Lord Ennals, former British Foreign Office Minister, and Mr. William Peters C.M.G., L.V.O., M.B.E. (former British diplomat), will be attempting to get an 'effective resolution' on Tibet passed at the UN General Assembly. (For a discussion of this issue see Footnote 174 and the section of this Report entitled '*The Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Speech and the Tibet Society, UK*').

Tibet and the United States of America

The Tibetan issue was polarised along rigid Right/Left

political lines until about 1980. Since this date the Chinese have been condemned on their human-rights record in Tibet and on their tendentious historical claims that Tibet has always been part of China, both by people of highly discrepant political persuasions, and by non-political human-rights organisations. Delegates from African countries at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, have sharply criticised the Chinese for their racism and imperialism and respected Special Rapporteurs have demanded answers from the Chinese on highly specific questions.

Another significant development has been the US 'Tibet Bill', the amendments to which were finally signed by President Reagan on 22/12/87, which condemned Chinese human-rights abuses in Tibet in the strongest possible terms. Though the British have a legacy of deep implication over the Tibetan question, arising from their occupation of India and the Northern frontiers they helped to demarcate, for various reasons the Foreign Office seldom condemns the Chinese (this matter will be dealt with later in this section), or draws attention to atrocities perpetrated by them in Tibet. Two documents published by the US Government in 1982 gave clear indications that the US did, or was approaching, a position where it might, recognize Tibet as being separate from China.²⁴⁰

The US press has also given Tibetan matters a higher profile than was to be found in Europe until quite recently. In particular, there was wide US press comment on the extremely tight precautions taken by the Chinese in Tibet during supposed celebrations, in September 1985, marking the twentieth anniversary of the 'Tibetan Autonomous Region'. The Chinese were displeased by the wide editorial comment and were incensed when in 1986 the US Congress had revised the US Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 in which Tibet was given the status of a separate state. US retractions were at first muted and contained certain contradictions and the matter became so serious that it required President Reagan to defuse the issue by stating that the US regarded Tibet as part of China.²⁴¹

In June 1987 the US House of Representatives unanimously

passed an amendment to the Foreign Relations Authorisation Act in which they denounced Chinese human-rights violations in Tibet and in September of the same year the Dalai Lama testified before a Congressional Human Rights Committee and itemised his 'Five Point Peace Plan' which was accepted in the final version of the US Tibet Act of December 1987, but has at present been rejected by the Chinese. As a buildup to these events the Tibetan Government in Exile in Dharamsala (N. India) and the Office of Tibet in the US, together with other Tibetan organisations, provided a great deal of literature for American Congressmen and Senators. A former version of this report, *Tibet: The Facts* was also widely circulated to US politicians and it seems to have exerted a considerable effect in generating a momentum for the Tibet Bill.

The Bill passed through the Senate on 6/10/87 and contained an even stronger amendment condemning China than that passed by the House of Representatives in June 1987 and in October a delegation of US Congressmen led by Tom Lantos, Co-Chairman of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus applied for permission to enter Tibet to examine the human-rights situation there, but this was refused by the Chinese authorities in a statement issued by Beijing.²⁴²

It is likely that the Chinese feel they have much to hide and were in considerable disarray over the passage of the Tibet Bill. Their professed stand on human rights may be found in an article written by Guo Shan stating that China 'joins the majority of countries in strongly condemning gross violations of human rights when they occur, especially when they deny or undermine national self-determination, encroach upon the sovereignty and territorial integrity of another country, or force dependence on others' and also states that 'China observes the principle of promoting and encouraging respect for human-rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion' and is playing an active role in human-rights realm within the United Nations system.²⁴³ However, the prospect of a US delegation visiting Tibet was not to their liking.

Following this refusal eight US Congressmen wrote a letter dated 18/12/87 requesting the Chinese Premier Zhao Ziyang to reopen Tibet to Western journalists, following the mass expulsions of 6/10/87 'so that the world may know what changes have occurred since the troubled times of last October'. Shortly after this the State Department Appropriation Bill was signed by President Reagan. The Bill condemns Chinese human rights violations in Tibet, calls upon the Chinese to release all Tibetan political prisoners, ties the sale of arms to China to a presidential perception of respect for human rights in Tibet, and grants scholarships and other aid to Tibetan refugees. Of great importance is the fact that the US also endorsed the Dalai Lama's Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet. This called for Tibet to be converted into a demilitarised 'zone of peace', an ending of the transfer of large numbers of Chinese into Tibet, an end to all human-rights violations in Tibet, protection of Tibet's ecology, which is in the process of being destroyed with possibly serious climatic results, and negotiations on the future status of Tibet and the relationship between the Tibetan and Chinese peoples. The Resolution also called on President Reagan to meet the Dalai Lama and urged Secretary of State, Mr. George Schulz 'to call attention to the rights of the Tibetan people'.

Interestingly enough the Amendment to the 'Tibet Bill' passed by Congress specifically refers to the 'implementation of the right of the Tibetan people to self-determination', [Section 1. Findings (11)] but the final version stops just short of such a clear and unambiguous stand. Although the USA did not recognize Tibet as separate from China, it seems likely that, given anomalies in past US policy, the Chinese may have some grounds for fearing that at some later date the US might possibly acknowledge Tibetan independence. As their claim depends upon remote imperial and imperialist dynasties whose legacy they have supposedly rejected, the Chinese undoubtedly feel very exposed when arguing their case in international fora, just as the British would if they were seeking to justify a recent occupation of Southern Ireland on the basis of claims made by

the English Plantagenet kings of the 13th Century.²⁴⁴ Equally, the Chinese must be concerned that the recent and more securely based detente between Russia and the US could result in the downgrading of relations with China and a greater willingness to recognize Tibet as an independent entity, for which there are precedents in US policy. Despite a continuous Chinese outcry against the Tibet Bill a virtually identical Bill was introduced to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs on 29/10/87.²⁴⁵

An underlying hysteria seems to have characterised Chinese reactions to the Bill and the Vice Foreign Minister Mr. Zhu Qizhen lodged a strong protest with the US ambassador accusing the US of 'gross interference in China's internal affairs.'²⁴⁶

It had been hoped that the passage of the Bill might result in US assistance to Tibetan refugees, many of whom exist in abject poverty and in the amendment in favour of Tibet to the Foreign Appropriations Bill enacted on 22nd December, 1987, the US Congress seemed to extend this as a possibility. But the Secretary of State said that Tibetan refugees were 'doing quite well' compared to the indigenous population of the host country, India, and therefore there was no need to set aside a special fund for their assistance. However, fifteen scholarships have been made available to Tibetan students and professionals who are outside Tibet for study at institutions of higher education in the US.²⁴⁷ The first four students arrived in August 1988.

Yet another Bill charging China with human-rights violations in Tibet and supporting Tibetans in Tibet as well as in exile was proposed in the House of Representatives on 11th May 1988 by Congressman Charlie Rose and his colleagues Tom Lantos, Gilman, Conyers, Dornan and Porter. One of the proposals is to provide US aid for Tibetan settlement programmes, so the question of aid for Tibetan refugees is not yet entirely settled and there would seem to be some possibility that such aid may be granted. This possibility has been strengthened by the November 1988 visit of eight members of the US congressional staff to Dharamsala and Tibetan settlements in South India to assess the economic situation of Tibetan refugees. Despite the

hard work of many Tibetans and their helpers from abroad there is no doubt that pockets of extreme poverty still exist among Tibetan refugees, scattered as they are throughout India. An illustration of this terrible poverty and hardship was given by Mr. K. Dhondup in a controversial report dealing with the plight of Tibetans in Rabangla in the Kunpheling settlement in South Sikkim.²⁴⁸ His report is still relevant today (1989) and it is to be hoped that members of the US congressional staff took these facts into account. They will bring out a report before Yuletide 1989 which will decide whether and how much aid can be channelled to these settlements.²⁴⁹ The Bill also seeks to ban US support of credit for China from international lending agencies and to provide for the Voice of America broadcasts in the Tibetan language and to act for the 'preservation of Tibetan culture'. The Congressional Human Rights Caucus heard accusations of abuses in Chinese-ruled Tibet during a hearing that, in an apparent coincidence, began at the same time (10th May 1988) that the Chinese Vice-Premier Tian Jiyun was at the White House for talks with President Reagan. Tom Lantos, co-chairman of the Caucus, has said that he hopes the Reagan administration will raise the issue of human-rights in Tibet with the Chinese leaders and *AP* has quoted him as saying that 'it will not only be in the interest of the Tibetan people but of the Chinese themselves to put an end to these barbaric practices.'

These sentiments have been echoed by many organisations concerned with human-rights throughout the world, notably by the President of the Australian Section of the International Commission of Jurists, John Dowd, MP. On 21st February 1988 he publicly supported the US Congress stand on Tibet, the Dalai Lama's Five Point Peace Plan and called on the Chinese to end their human-rights violations in Tibet and, among other things, requested that the Chinese allow the International Commission of Jurists, Amnesty International and other human-rights organisations and the International Red Cross to send investigative teams to Tibet. Some ten weeks earlier there was a heated exchange in Sydney between the

Chinese Ambassador to Australia and Tibetan sympathisers who had argued against the Chinese occupation of Tibet, the occasion for the altercation being a press conference during the 'good will' visit of the Chinese State Councillor Gu Mu. The *Sydney Morning Herald* reported the Ambassador Zhang Zai as being 'visibly shaken by the exchange.'²⁵⁰

Relations between the US and China would still seem to be suffering from the aftermath of the March 1988 riots. According to the New China News Agency two US delegations visited Tibet in the first week of April. One was a delegation of assistants to the Science and Space Technology Committee of the US House of Representatives led by Mr. Harold Hanson, and the other consisted of a delegation from the House Armed Services Committee headed by the Democratic representative, Sonny Montgomery. There has been some speculation that, following the Chinese foreign minister's trip to Washington, there has been something of a thaw in the formerly tense relations caused by the situation in Tibet and the Chinese sale of Silkworm missiles to Iran.²⁵¹ The Tiananmen Massacre has greatly reduced this possibility.

The later visit of the senior-most US Government official to visit Tibet in recent years, Mr. Stapleton Roy, a high-ranking US State Department official, appeared to be a fact finding one and received little publicity. Mr. Roy said he met some officials, was shown a 40 minute video of the March rioting, and spoke to 'everybody we came across'. Mr Roy stated that 'You do not have to dig deep to run into views that there was tension under the surface and potential for further problems.' He raised US concern about human-rights in Tibet, but was given the standard reply that this was interference in China's internal affairs. It is likely that any apparent improvement in US Chinese relations has been damaged by the US Congress support for the Dalai Lama's June initiative in Strasbourg and it is not at all easy to give an accurate assessment of the current position.²⁵² It is possible that the above events reflect some deep-seated difference of opinion on Tibet in the US administration.

A letter written by George Bush when he was a vice presi-

dential candidate lends some support to this conclusion since he specifically says that '... this Administration cannot support all elements in the Dalai Lama's Five Point Peace Programme.'²⁵³ This statement seems to contradict US acceptance of the Dalai Lama's proposals in December 1987 and George Bush's reservation hinged upon the issue of Tibetan independence. However the Dalai Lama did not demand Tibetan independence in his proposals though it was present as a background issue and George Bush's reservation seems groundless since the US 'Tibet Bill' of December 1987 did not specifically recognize Tibet as being separate from China, though it came quite close to it and upset the Chinese.

Some recent statements by prominent Americans have also offended the Chinese. The US ambassador to China, Mr. Winston Lord, visited parts of Tibet in August 1988 and has requested that journalists be allowed to have free access in Tibet and asked that American officials be given permission to visit prisons in Lhasa. Referring to his talks with the Chinese on the Tibetan situation he is reported as saying 'I conveyed forcefully and in detail the deep concern of both the executive and congressional branches' (of the USA).²⁵⁴ In mid-August 1988 Tom Lantos introduced a resolution in the US House of Representatives calling for the immediate cessation of the issuance of US visas to Chinese officials until Beijing 'approves visas without any delay for all members of Congress who have requested them'! This statement was apparently prompted by the Chinese refusal to issue visas to members of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus who wished to visit Tibet, and he further stated that 'at a time when the American Government is diligently pursuing the improvement of relations between the United States and China', this slap in the face aimed not only at Congressman Rose but also at the entire Congress and the American people is unacceptable.²⁵⁵ Shortly after this a three member US Senate delegation, led by Senator Patrick Leahy, visited Tibet for three days and the delegation members expressed the opinion that the USA and the human-rights community generally should condemn such abuses in Tibet with

the same vigour that similar abuses are condemned in the Soviet Union. They further stated the Americans should not cease asking China for information on the condition and status of political prisoners in Tibet, and should urge full Chinese compliance with internationally accepted human-rights standards.²⁵⁶ Tibetans are monitoring the situation in the US with particular care and the recently formed International Campaign for Tibet, based in Washington, aims to build on the many contacts already established in the Senate and Congress and elsewhere.

There have been other similar statements from prominent Americans in recent months indicating that the question of Tibet is generating considerable controversy and interest, particularly in the light of somewhat fraught and seemingly cautious and somewhat spasmodic attempts to improve relation with China. For example, Senator Jesse Helms has formally requested a series of hearing on human-rights in Communist China in the next session of the US Congress. He spoke in the Senate and protested against the denial of Tibet visas to Hank Kinney and William Tripplett, senior staff members of his committee. He further stated 'Now it is absolutely clear, it is obvious Mr. President, that something disgraceful is happening in Tibet and has been happening. The Chinese communists do not want the world to find out what is occurring. They do not want bipartisan experienced Chinese speaking specialists to go to Tibet and ask questions about the political killings, the torture, the forced sterilisation and the suppression of religious freedom. As far as I am concerned, and I believe I speak for other Senators on this, Mr. President, they are not going to get away with it.' He further stated that his intention was 'to seek a legislative solution, if necessary, to the problem of political warfare by the Chinese Communists aimed at the people of Tibet'.²⁵⁷ On December 22nd 1988 twenty-two members of the House of Representatives wrote to Premier Li Peng expressing concern over the police attack on unarmed demonstrators in Lhasa on December 10th and requesting a governmental account of the circumstances surrounding the incident as well

as a description of the Chinese Government's plans for punishing those responsible for the shootings. A request was also made that foreign journalists and human-rights monitors be allowed into Tibet to conduct independent observations into the current situation.²⁵⁸

It seems possible that the tempo of the rapprochement between the USA and China may have been somewhat affected by the considerable improvement in relations with the Soviet Union and by the repercussions of the Tibetan question which are still continuing today. There is no doubt that the events at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva during the months of February and March 1988, together with the passage of the US Tibet Bill, the strong US condemnation of the shootings in Lhasa in March 1989, coupled with widespread international coverage of Chinese human-rights abuses in Tibet, have greatly contributed to the internationalisation of the Tibet issue and seem likely to provide a springboard for new and other important developments. The slaughter in Tiananmen Square in June 1989 has resulted in a drastic deterioration in relations between the USA and China, together with an almost universal condemnation of the Chinese Government, and signals the end of their undoubted propaganda triumphs, particularly in Western countries. It also heralds a greater willingness to pay attention to the skeletons rattling in the Chinese cupboard on the part of the media and many world leaders, and there is no doubt that amongst the many skeletons clobbered in the Chinese cupboard, that of Tibet is rattling most loudly of all. It is significant that the Tiananmen Massacre has resulted in a far greater willingness on the part of many people to listen to the grievances and demands of the Tibetans since they now understand *that a government which massacres so many people in its own capital, irrespective of world opinion, will not hesitate to act in a similar fashion in areas far from Beijing and when Tibetans point out that such actions have characterised Chinese behaviour for the last forty years in Tibet, they are listened to with respect and a new interest.*

Tibet and Europe

Generally speaking it is correct to say that the Tibetan question has not received the same degree of exposure in Europe as it has in the USA. Nevertheless, during the last few years the Dalai Lama has travelled widely in Europe visiting among other countries, France, Italy, Spain, Britain, Western Germany and Switzerland. His visits focussed a good deal of media attention upon Tibet and during a French tour he was accorded the honours conferred upon a head of state. These tours abroad have incensed the Chinese and in Italy they came close to using physical force to prevent the Tibetan delegation from entering airport reception. As mentioned in the introduction the German Bundestag passed a resolution (15/10/87) which called upon China to restore the human rights of the Tibetan people. The Bundestag also supported the 'Five Point Peace Plan' formulated by the Dalai Lama. Petra Kelly, a member of the Green Party, has been particularly active in publicizing the Tibetan question and in early December 1988 the Green Party adopted a motion condemning the continuing Chinese human rights violations in Tibet and described the Chinese occupation of Tibet as incompatible with international law.²⁵⁹

Earlier, on 14/10/87, the European Parliament passed a resolution supporting the Dalai Lama's peace initiative. In October 1988 several members of the Council of Europe, the widest organisation bringing together all European democracies, called in a written declaration upon China to promote peace processes in Tibet and to respect the human-rights of the Tibetan people. They also expressed concern about the risk of the disappearance of Tibetan national identity and culture.²⁶⁰

As has been seen in the previous section, several European countries voiced strong protests concerning Chinese human-rights violation in Tibet, both in the riots of February/March 1988 and February/March 1989 and there have been many hard-hitting press reports which were intensely critical of the Chinese.

Tibet and Britain : the Hong Kong factor and British Appeasement of China

In Britain the position is rather more complex. The Government, closely advised by the Foreign Office, are extremely sensitive to the Tibetan issue for several reasons and the cornerstone of their policy is not to offend the Chinese. This has been standard policy for many years. The reason is that in 1997 Hong Kong will be returned to China and this entailed a series of intricate negotiations which Britain considered would have been imperilled had any kind of exposure or support been given by the government to the Tibetan cause, even as much as is customary by accepted political standards. This has resulted in members of the Royal Family being forbidden to meet the Dalai Lama, a virtual silence on the part of the Foreign Office when presented with detailed information concerning Chinese human-rights abuses in Tibet, together with unconvincing explanations as to why such a silence has been maintained, and severe constraints being placed upon the Dalai Lama when he visits Britain. This latter point was remarked upon in a press handout which accompanied the important Parliamentary Human Rights Group Report, written by W.P. Ledger and entitled *The Chinese and Human Rights in Tibet*, which appeared about a week before the Dalai Lama's April 1988 visit to the UK and aroused much media attention. (This group is chaired by Lord Avebury who is well known for his uncompromising utterances on Chinese rule in Tibet). Similar constraints do not exist in the USA, even though the situation there is a complex one. An editorial in the *Times*²⁶¹ commented on '...the ignoble approach of the Foreign Office to the issue of Tibet' and the *Straits Times*²⁶² referred to British 'timidity' on this issue. This policy of the British Government has certainly caused a good deal of comment abroad and one Swedish political commentator referred to 'the obsequiousness and servility which characterises the British Government's relations with the People's Republic of China'.

It would seem that the British position on the Tibetan issue

is not a consistent one because during the Treaty of Simla in 1914 Britain actually entered into relations with Tibet as an independent state and the final versions of the treaty abrogated all rights and privileges claimed by the Chinese in Tibet, and for some years Britain maintained a diplomatic mission in Lhasa which was closed shortly before the Chinese army marched in. There is no doubt that during the period following the Treaty of Simla to 1950 Britain treated Tibet as an independent country, but failed to clarify this point at the crucial UN debate which occurred in November 1950. In fact, both Britain and India took a leading part in obstructing the Tibetan appeal to the UN which was made on 7th November 1950, and only the Republic of El Salvador condemned the Chinese Communists for entering Tibet. The UN resolution of 1959 was far more outspoken, both Ireland and Malaya being firm in their support of the rights of the Tibetan people, but once again Britain and India did not lend any support to Tibet and the British delegate, Sir Pierson Dixon, stated that Tibet's juridical status was 'far from clear'. The Dalai Lama has said that Britain's 'silent denial of the Tibetans is a very sad thing'.²⁶³ This interview given by the Dalai Lama to *The Times* in August 1985 provoked a retort from the Chinese ambassador and led to correspondence during which the legacy of Chinese rule in Tibet was described as 'despicable'.²⁶⁴

The Foreign Office attempt to silence the Dalai Lama during his April 1988 visit to the UK failed disastrously and the enormous publicity he received was helped by the timely appearance of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group Report on Tibet. The *Independent*²⁶⁵ in an editorial entitled 'Shameful Silence Over Tibet' deplored the refusal of diplomats to meet the Dalai Lama while he was in Britain, pointing out that he is a man of peace and asking how they can possibly justify their silence on human-rights abuses in Tibet while they condemn such abuses in the Soviet Union, South Africa and the West Bank and referred to their attitude as 'extraordinary and craven'. Lord Avebury and Lord Ennals called the Foreign Office attitude as 'hypocritical' and 'gutless'.²⁶⁶ Lord Ennals, a former

Foreign Office minister had visited Tibet early in April 1988 and stopped off in Beijing where he told the Chinese to 'call off their thugs'. He further stated that he was shocked to see the 'poverty of Tibetans in their own country' and made a striking analogy between the 'disappeared ones' in Argentina and those who are snatched from their homes in Lhasa every night and who disappear in Chinese prisons.²⁶⁷ Coverage of the Dalai Lama's visit to Britain was particularly comprehensive in the *Scotsman* which featured an interview with the Tibetan leader and gave considerable coverage to the PHRG report on Tibet.²⁶⁸ Most of the wide media coverage, while focussing on the Dalai Lama and conditions in Tibet following the March riots, also raised the wider questions of Britain's relations with China and the related and much fraught issue of Hong Kong was never far from the forefront. A good example of the controversy generated is to be found in the Chinese Ambassador's letter to the *Times*²⁶⁹ (Ji Chaozhu) written in response to a *Times* Leader (6/4/88) and the reply that this provoked from Sir Algernon Rumbold, former President of the Tibet Society of the UK, which dealt in no uncertain terms with the arguments given by His Excellency.²⁷⁰ Another letter in the *Times* on the same day voiced the impressions of an Irish visitor to Tibet who was so horrified by the extent of the destruction he had witnessed that 'Coming from Ireland I was tempted to invoke the name of Cromwell!²⁷¹ The publicity generated by the visit led Robert Adley, Conservative MP for Christchurch and Chairman of the British-Chinese Parliamentary Group, to assert that the Dalai Lama '...is about as innocent a persecuted non-politician as was the Ayatollah Khomeini when he was engaged on his round the world campaign exercise before he returned to Iran'. This statement is an astonishing one since the Dalai Lama, unlike the Ayatollah, rejects violence as an option and caused a considerable amount of comment at the time.²⁷² During his visit the Dalai Lama met former Prime Minister Edward Heath who is highly regarded in China and seems to have hoped that he would agree to mediate between his 'Government in Exile' and the Chinese Government. How-

ever, shortly after the meeting, Mr. Heath defended China's position on Tibet and declared that reports of large-scale Chinese immigration to Tibet were 'grossly exaggerated' though he did not factually substantiate this statement.²⁷³

Further direct coverage of the Dalai Lama's visit occurred after his departure on Friday, April 15th (he had arrived on April 4th), as various television interviews were broadcast later in April.²⁷⁴ It seems that the Dalai Lama's advisors did not recommend that he appear on the Terry Wogan show where he would have reached an audience of over 10 million people and Tibetans and their supporters greatly regret this fact.²⁷⁵ Nevertheless, the publicity accorded to the visit of the Dalai Lama did much to publicise the plight of the Tibetan people under Chinese rule.

The Dalai Lama was aware of British concern over the question of Hong Kong and has remarked on more than one occasion that as far as dealing with Communist China are concerned 'six million does not seem to be a very lucky number' (this figure being roughly the population of both Hong Kong and Tibet). However, it has been reported that the British Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary did in fact raise the question of the suppression of Tibetan nationalists when the Chinese Foreign Minister visited London in March 1988.²⁷⁶ But it seems safe to assume that their questions were not pressed to the point of imperilling the talks. Tibetans have frequently remarked that the British have effectively given way over the question of Hong Kong, and it is therefore difficult to understand their continuing reticence on the question of human-rights abuses in Tibet. In current journalistic parlance Hong Kong has already been 'sold down the Yangtse'. Many British newspapers have remarked that 'under Chinese pressure the British Government has put off the introduction of representative institutions to a point where they will hardly have had time to strike root before Peking takes command.' The Foreign Offices' attitude towards China has also been called 'supine' and it has also been pointed out that Peking's representatives regularly set limits to the extent of future democracy in the

territory and have even said that discussing the Basic Law, the post 1997 constitution, is not a matter for Parliament or even the debating chambers of Hong Kong.²⁷⁷ These facts stand in contrast to the promises the Chinese originally made and the frightening similarity of the 'Seventeen Point Agreement', inflicted by the Chinese upon Tibetan representatives in 1951 as a prelude to the destruction of their culture, and the Sino-British Joint Declaration on the Question of Hong Kong and its interpretation by the Chinese, have been widely commented on.²⁷⁸ As is well known, Amnesty International has recently criticised the 'Basic Law' and has stated that the draft does not adequately guarantee basic rights and freedoms to the people of Hong Kong under Chinese rule and there is now no doubt that the political structure of Hong Kong will be dictated by Communist China *after 1997* and any hope of Hong Kong being 'reunited with the one big Motherland' as a representative democracy has now been effectively abandoned by the British.²⁷⁹ Lord Ennals, former British Foreign Office Minister and now President of the Tibet Society, UK, has expressed grave doubts about the future of Hong Kong after 1997 and referred to the fate of Tibet under Chinese rule.²⁸⁰ Similar sentiments were also expressed by Lord Avebury when he referred to the many doubts surrounding the prospect of 'one country, two systems', solution to Hong Kong's future.²⁸¹ Blame for the present situation in Hong Kong does not devolve entirely upon the Chinese. A point that is seldom, if ever, made is the fact that the British, having occupied Hong Kong for over 150 years have had ample opportunity to introduce representative institutions and a democratic system. In fact they have done virtually nothing and the little they have done is only as a result of pressures from the unfortunate inhabitants of those islands.

Mr. Simon Ip, President of the Hong Kong Law Society, while giving evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, stated that 'If Sir Geoffrey Howe, the Foreign Secretary, is truly confident that Hong Kong has a rosy future under Chinese sovereignty, he should ensure that the Government 'put its money where its mouth is', by granting

local people the right to live in Britain'. The Conservative MP, Michael Jopling said that it was 'impossible for Britain to absorb all these people' from its former colony and informed the lawyer that the nationality laws were the most difficult to push through Parliament.²⁸² The Foreign Affairs Committee of the House of Commons was also told by Hong Kong's Governor, Sir David Wilson, that the problem of the great bitterness felt by the people of Hong Kong as a result of British policy would be solved 'if they had the automatic right of settlement as they had before 1962'. Sir Geoffrey Howe made it clear that Britain was not prepared to amend its immigration laws to allow Hong Kong Chinese the right to settle in Britain, but the Hong Kong Law Society stated that 'an open ended access to Britain would act as a check on Peking after 1997'. About three million Hong Kong Chinese have British passports.²⁸³ The recent confiscation by Chinese officials in Beijing of a petition signed by some 24,000 Hong Kong Chinese, which called upon Beijing to release all political prisoners has heightened fears for the future of the colony after 1997, particularly in the light of the fact that such petitions had in the past been allowed to be brought into Beijing by human-rights activists. It had been hoped that the petition could be delivered to the National People's Congress on the 10th anniversary of the jailing of *Wei Jingsheng*, China's best known political prisoner, but the delegation was harrassed and secret police openly recorded a dinner conversation between one of the delegates and the astro-physicist and leading dissident Mr. Fang Lizhi and his wife at their hotel.²⁸⁴

Large numbers of people, mainly middle class professionals, are leaving Hong Kong every year and there is already a notable labour shortage in many fields.²⁸⁵ An estimated 70% of the population of Hong Kong fled from China or had one parent who did, and an estimated 100,000 people have departed from Hong Kong. About 80,000 of this total left in the period 1986-'88, and people are now leaving at about the rate of 50,000 a year, four times the rate of departure for 1985.²⁸⁶

Under these circumstances British policy towards China

and its attitude towards Tibet is hardly an essay in logic. It may be that the British Foreign Office hopes that its obsequious policy will win lucrative trade agreements, but history suggests that the Chinese always despise and seldom reward those who *kow tow* to them, and it is significant that the British balance of trade with China is considerably less favourable than that of several other European countries, though a £3 billion trade agreement was recently signed.

It is well known that the Chinese Government could cut off Hong Kong's water supply which may account for the weakness of the Foreign Office on this issue and most of Hong Kong's essential supplies also come from mainland China. However, according to Mr. Richard Margolis, a former adviser to the Governor of Hong Kong, 60% of all investment in China is channeled through Hong Kong, 33% of all China's trade passes through Hong Kong, and trade with and through this small island accounts for about 33% of all China's foreign currency earnings. Bearing these facts in mind Tibetans point out that the Foreign Office has a powerful counterweight in its negotiations with China, but evidently prefers to practise its traditional policy of Appeasement towards China. It was this policy which played a major part in precipitating the Second World War and the resulting 70 million dead and it is now known that there were several occasions when, had the British Foreign Office acted with even moderate resolution, Hitler could have been stopped or perhaps overthrown. The British policy of Appeasement was undoubtedly one of the greatest mistakes ever made in the history of international relations, and it is interesting to note the efforts of various Foreign Office participants to distance themselves from this policy, both in comments on television programmes dealing with this period, and in the newspapers. Nehru's policy of Appeasement towards China, so widely criticised in the Indian press, has proved similarly fruitless.

What many people regard with surprise is the fact that it was a policy of Appeasement, similar to that followed in its relations with Nazi Germany in the 1930's, which resulted in

Britain effectively handing Tibet over to China at the UN in 1950, despite former close links and a de facto recognition of Tibetan independence which was actually voiced in the British Parliament by a member of the Foreign Office.²⁸⁷

There are some reports that members of the Foreign Office have privately said that the Tibetans cannot realistically hope for independence and the word 'realism' seems to be increasingly used by Westerners sympathetic to China when discussing the Tibetan issue. It would appear that the word 'realism' is being used in the West in an effort to justify the status quo in Tibet and to defuse the long crisis. It could be pointed out that many British newspapers in the 1930's stated that the Indian people could not 'realistically' hope to achieve their independence and similar sentiments were voiced when S. Ireland fought for and gained its independence. Supporters of France in the 1950's frequently asserted that the Algerian people could not 'realistically' hope to gain their independence from France and this word has been used on many other occasions such as the Kenyan struggle for freedom and Egypt's stand against the British in 1956 and it is not surprising if this word is gaining respectability in the British Foreign Office today.

The Foreign Office attitude was made clear during the February and March 1988 meetings at the UN Human Rights Commission in Geneva, where Robert Barnett was told that the British Government did not wish to prejudice the Hong Kong situation by raising the issue of Tibet in the wrong way now. Recently the British Government colluded with the Communist Chinese in a measure which will make it relatively easy for them to introduce censorship constitutionally in Hong Kong in 1997, and Michael Trend of the *Spectator* experienced a vivid illustration of the Foreign Office pre-occupation with Hong Kong similar to that mentioned by Robert Barnett. He was rebuked by an FO functionary for the *Spectator's* part in preparing the British press for the Dalai Lama's April visit and was accused of being 'unpatriotic'.²⁸⁸

As has already been pointed out Mr. Frank Steele, Head of the UK Human Rights Delegation to the UN Human Rights

Commission, Geneva, remained silent about human-rights abuses in Tibet while condemning similar abuses in many other parts of the world. It is likely that this silence was ordered by the British Foreign Office or is a reflection of their policy towards China.²⁸⁹

Perhaps it is not altogether surprising that Tibetans and those of Hong Kong origin, often refer to the Munich Agreement of 1938 and consider Chinese guarantees to be as worthless as those given by Hitler to Czechoslovakia. The evidence now shows quite conclusively that Chinese policy in Tibet has been characterised by fathomless duplicity. Tibet has been absorbed and Hong Kong seems destined to fall victim to a similar policy of Appeasement, when decisive action could certainly have secured a more equitable agreement for the people of that small island.

However, the situation is still an open one. There is no doubt that the Chinese have been greatly disturbed by the chorus of international criticism which has greeted their actions in Tibet and by the telling analogies between Tibet and Hong Kong which have been used to illustrate Chinese perfidiousness. Such criticisms, given the twists and turns of international foreign policy, might possibly result in changes in the nature of Chinese rule in Tibet in order to lessen the storm of criticism that such analogies inevitably provoke, and this could in turn affect the destiny of Hong Kong. There is no doubt that the two questions are intimately related and could react upon each other during the passage of the next decade.

The massacre of up to 10,000 young people in Tiananmen Square has understandably caused grave concern throughout Hong Kong, since a government which behaves in this fashion in its own capital will not hesitate to act similarly in Hong Kong and the people of this unfortunate little island are undoubtedly aware of the fact that if they attempt to exercise their present freedom to criticise the government after 1997, they could be imprisoned, tortured, and shot.

China—The Honeymoon Era and its End

The great philosopher Bertrand Russell observed that every age cherishes certain illusions and applies a creative attitude towards reality in order to sustain those illusions. The Tibetan issue certainly confirms the truth of this observation and it is worth commenting particularly on the British attitudes towards Tibet, including media coverage during the last three decades or so since until recently it has reflected, most acutely, the general predicament of the international media when confronted with the Tibetan question. However, these comments apply in varying degrees to many other countries too.

In Britain and in many other countries, one of the illusions which is now beginning to lose much of its force is the belief that in some sense Communist China represents some kind of a social and political beacon for the future. Many well-meaning and well-intentioned people came to believe this during the 1960's and 1970's for a variety of different reasons, and these attitudes were inevitably reflected in the media coverage dealing with China and Tibet generally. Understandably enough many people had become disillusioned with capitalism and its grave shortcomings, involving exploitation and short term profit, and saw communism, or at least some kind of planned economy, as a viable alternative to capitalism, and did not believe that capitalism might be able to divest itself of its less attractive aspects without a full-scale revolution.

Generally speaking these people were left-wingers who had become utterly disillusioned with the Russian example under Stalin, involving the purges of the 1930's, collectivisation with its toll of 30 million dead, and the persecution and massacres in the Ukraine which many people refused to believe despite formidable evidence, since their most cherished preconceptions were being destroyed.²⁹⁰ For large sections of the Left the Chinese Revolution came like a breath of fresh air. Here at last was the spectacle of a wise and ancient people embracing the progressive revolutionary philosophy of Marxism, who would undoubtedly progress without the excesses of the Russian

example. The Right wing of the political spectrum, while loathing communism as such, were relieved at the thought of a powerful counterweight to the USSR, and their joy knew no bounds when the two countries began a long ideological dispute in 1960.

It also occurred to many industrialists, bankers, and prominent people in multi-national corporations that China could constitute a gigantic market of consumer durables and offer the prospect of lucrative contracts involving development of mineral resources etc. For this reason the right wing press often tended to minimise the destructive effects of the 'Cultural Revolution' forgetting that it condemned China to years of economic backwardness along with the 'Great Leap Forward' resulting from Mao's reversal of Congress decisions. Only now is China's poverty becoming apparent to those whose interests lay in believing the opposite, and it is also becoming painfully clear that rather than ordering vast numbers of tractors or trucks etc. from the industrialised countries, the Chinese order a few and then copy them.²⁹¹

Middle of the road or liberal opinion has until recently been similarly sympathetic to China. Disliking the excesses of both Right and Left and wary of the blood-stained legacy of Russian communism, many people of liberal political opinions came to believe that the Chinese social experiment was progressing quietly and efficiently with a concern for ecology, racial harmony, balanced industrialisation, careful agricultural planning etc. It was admitted that mistakes had been made but nevertheless quite plausible reasons were given for these, and generally speaking the liberal press was prepared to give China the benefit of the doubt when it came to reports of brutal persecution of 'minority nationalities', racism, gross inefficiency, corruption, policies of cultural or actual genocide, comparable with, or even worse than the Russian example, wholesale massacres similar to those perpetrated by the Turks upon the Armenians, and the almost unbelievable dislocation of the 'Cultural Revolution'. Each shading of the political spectrum had its own reasons for wanting to sustain its illusions about

China and this came to be reflected in media coverage generally, whether Right, Left or Centre.

These processes were probably compounded by the Chinese propaganda machine, the New China News Agency, and by the fact that owing to their long experience of colonialism, the Chinese understand the Western mentality much better than the West understands them. In addition to this, hand-picked correspondents, usually communists, or at least fellow travellers, were allowed to report from China. Not surprisingly, they generally sent back glowing accounts of Chinese progress, which, for the reasons given above, people of widely discrepant political persuasions tended to believe. It is probably correct to say that this curious situation, while present in the West generally, existed in its most acute form in Britain and may have something to do with the legacy of Britain's Indian empire and other associated factors, and that furthermore, all these different political strands became concentrated in one single issue—Tibet.

When gravely disturbing reports began emanating from Tibet in the early 1950's and '60's the Tibetan question rapidly became a *mindfield* because people who believed passionately in the Chinese Revolution, the last resort after the failure of Russia to live up to its communist ideals, and who had invested an enormous amount of emotional capital in their Chinese commitment, simply could not believe what they were hearing. Furthermore, it was very easy to believe that Tibet was a cruel feudal tyranny and to ignore first hand testimonies that contradicted this fact and from then it was a short step to regarding the Tibetans as ignorant and backward, impressions assiduously fostered by the Chinese, who should have been grateful for the favours bestowed upon them in the name of 'liberation'.

The Tibetan issue became politically polarised in the early 1950's with the result that evidence of Chinese atrocities was ignored by many sections of the Left, with their hatred of an ancient and religious culture. Generally speaking religion to left-wingers meant oppression and tyranny on the medieval model, combined with fierce intolerance and endless cruel wars

in which ordinary people suffered abominably. They tended to ignore first hand testimony which gave a different account of the nature of Tibet before 1950 and which emphasised that cruel punishments had largely been abolished at the turn of the century and that Tibetan religion was not characterised by the same excesses that had been found in medieval Europe. Many sections of the Right tried to exploit, often ineptly, evidence of Chinese atrocities, while Tibetans who scarcely understood the realities of the modern world, could only marvel at the remoteness of the debates when contrasted with atrocities they had witnessed involving full-scale massacres and the slaughter of their families.

What many people found surprising was that those who remained silent about the consequences of Chinese intervention in Tibet, rose in an outraged and united chorus to condemn American intervention in Vietnam. These same people generally maintained a silence on the question of Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. Whatever one feels about any of these wars consistency would seem to indicate that if *one* is to be condemned then they should *all* be condemned as the result of aggressive intervention whatever the perception of the situation might have been, or the pretexts involved. On many different occasions the United States has been censured at the UN and elsewhere for various aspects of its foreign policy by many countries and organisations and it does not fall within the ambit of this discussion to analyse the justification or otherwise of such criticisms. But what Tibetans have frequently pointed out is that similar actions by the Soviet Union or China often receive little if any criticism at the UN General Assembly and elsewhere, when consistency and fairness surely demand that *all* countries deserving of such criticism should receive it. Those defending the Chinese would often state that what China did in Tibet was 'an internal matter', and while espousing independence causes all over the world, would proceed to ignore the fact that the Tibetans were fighting for their independence. When this was pointed out and their attention drawn to an apparent double standard in their judgements, such people

would either become abusive or walk away.

Hand picked correspondents, generally of this disposition, were allowed into Tibet by the Chinese and their reports led the Tibetans to coin the word 'sinophant', derived from sycophant and sinophile, because such reports were usually devoid of any critical or empirical feedback and simply served to validate their own preconceptions. It has to be admitted that unlike most people of a liberal disposition who were simply mistaken in their beliefs about China and later admitted it, many communist correspondents deliberately and cold-bloodedly misreported the facts in order to deceive and to disseminate falsehoods about Tibet. However, it must also be remembered that other communists, such as Alan Winnington, heartily condemned the Chinese for their record in Tibet, and that many communists are now speaking up today, and it seems likely disenchantment with the Chinese 'social experiments' may come to characterise all the various groupings within the political spectrum in a mirror-image reversal of former sympathies and affiliations, particularly if Mr. Gorbachov's 'Glasnost' policies succeed in the USSR and a new and deeper detente continues. Infatuation with China may soon become a thing of the past. (These words were written some while before the Tiananmen Massacre whose consequences are confirming the above prediction).

The extremely deferential treatment which China has received at the UN until recently is largely explained by the above factors and a general atmosphere of guilt that China was not allowed to become a member of the UN until 1971, some 22 years after the communists took power, together with a general reluctance on the part of many western Governments, particularly Britain, to risk upsetting a country which is still seen as a counterweight to Russia.

There are many other factors which served to disseminate illusions about China and which generally worked to the advantage of the Chinese. Understandably enough many emerging Third World countries who had gained their independence during the 1940's, '50's and '60's felt a considerable

kinship with the new Chinese regime. China too had suffered greatly from imperialism and colonialism, and had freed itself by its own efforts. One cannot blame such countries for often being unaware of the brutality and racism which characterised the new regime since the Western media was often responsible for shaping their attitudes towards China too. Media imperialism is still with us today and opinion in these newly emerging countries frequently reflected, through no fault of their own, the misconceptions of Western countries concerning China generally.²⁹² This was even the case with India who has suffered directly at the hands of the Chinese. (See the section entitled *The Myth of Tibetan Autonomy and the Indian Predicament*). Lack of concrete information about China, its isolation for more than twenty years, partly self-imposed and partly due to US policy, difficulties with the language, and a general uncertainty about conditions in China further compounded the problem.

The scale of the difficulties involved was emphasised when information on the scale of human-rights abuses in China began to emerge in the late 1970's. For example it is now known *on the basis of Chinese statistics that during the period of the 'Cultural Revolution' (1966-76) one hundred million people suffered politically motivated beatings, imprisonment, forced labour, internal exile, torture or death.*²⁹³

These figures do not include any mention of the undoubted millions who starved to death during this period, over 300,000 in Tibet alone. When various human-rights agencies were confronted by such facts their reaction was often one of stupefaction.

It is also a fact, remarked upon by various Tibetans, that some human-rights activists, both in Britain and abroad, were usually willing, albeit with a certain reluctance, to indict the Chinese for human-rights abuses involving ethnic Chinese citizens protesting at lack of personal freedom, or agitating for greater democracy in China. But at various times an extreme reluctance has been displayed to focus on the human-rights abuses suffered by so-called '*minority nationalities*' such as

the Tibetans, Turkic peoples or Mongolians, perhaps because of a general feeling that revelations from these areas would undermine their own belief in the Chinese social experiment as well as tarnish China's international image generally. As far as Tibet is concerned this unfortunate situation has improved considerably during the last five or six years.

For the reasons given above much of the debate generated by these issues tended to centre on Tibet and only those involved in this issue can fully appreciate the almost elemental qualities of the passions generated amongst those who are anxious to exonerate China from charges of genocide committed against many 'minority peoples', cultural genocide in Tibet and horrendous human-rights abuses, and the lengths to which some of them went to conceal evidence of such atrocities, or to minimise formidable evidence associated with them. Ultimately, however, it must be admitted that successive governments of Communist China have betrayed everyone. They betrayed the Chinese people when they unleashed the 'Cultural Revolution', an internal holocaust which left their own ancient cultural heritage a shambles; they betrayed peoples within the Chinese mainland who might have proved amenable to rule from Beijing had it really been inspired by ideals of equality, non-exploitation and justice. Lastly they betrayed their supporters both in China and abroad, many of whom, in order to preserve their own ideals, were forced to undergo prodigies of self-deception, and to ignore mountains of evidence which illustrated the Nazi-like brutality of Chinese rule in Tibet, and to construct labyrinthine justifications for Chinese behaviour in Tibet by a highly selective use of source material, or even an invention of it, which they would have been the first to condemn in apologists for white rule in South Africa, or for the rule of the Junta in Chile. *Surely human-rights abuses should be unreservedly condemned wherever they occur in Capitalist or Communist countries, East or West, North or South, in the interests of fairness and justice.*²⁹⁴

More Recent Myopia: The British Foreign Office, somehow characterising the obsessive attitude which the Tibetan

issue generates, does not hesitate to be selective in its condemnation of human-rights abuses and this is never more evident than in the case of Tibet. Frank Dobson, MP (Labour) spoke up in the House of Commons following the Chinese crackdown in Tibet in August 1983 and asked the government whether representations were being made to Beijing voicing British concern at alleged Chinese human-rights violations in Tibet. He received a bland and unhelpful reply from the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth affairs, and a similar response was given to a written question in the House of Commons (11/3/88) which greatly contrasted with a former assurance given by a Foreign Office representative at the beginning of the long Tibetan crisis (see Footnote 287). Tibetans and their supporters find the Foreign Office attitude difficult to understand since it is quite clear that the British Government has effectively surrendered to Communist China on the issue of Hong Kong, and they have some difficulty in explaining British obsequiousness.²⁹⁵

However, as has been noted, the government's reticence on Chinese human-rights abuses in Tibet stands in contrast to its willingness to condemn similar abuses in the Soviet Union and elsewhere. It applauds various Chinese reforms which, judging by the previous twists and turns of Chinese policy, may only be short-lived, but maintains an almost total silence on human-rights matters in Tibet and in China generally. This has been very widely commented on by the media which is, in general, increasingly sympathetic to the plight of oppressed Tibetans, and though the Foreign Office has condemned the Tiananmen Massacre *it maintains a virtual silence on the shootings of Tibetans in Lhasa*, and in this respect its behaviour bears a curious resemblance to some human-rights activists who, in the past, both in Europe and elsewhere, have rather hesitantly condemned human-rights abuses in mainland China, *but maintained a general silence on such abuses in Tibet*. As far as Britain is concerned this situation, in the opinion of some Tibetans, has been compounded by the activities (or non-activities) of prominent right wingers in Parliament, who, while serving on committees

concerned with promoting the cause of Tibet, in fact do virtually nothing from one year's end to another, except make sonorous speeches at various Tibetan functions. Rightly or wrongly some Tibetans also fear the activities of some left-wing members of Parliament who seem to obstruct the cause of Tibet, even though condemning Tiananmen and who, strangely enough, seem to see eye-to-eye with the Foreign office, and its official and unofficial representatives, as regards the issue of Tibet, and who succeed in getting themselves elected onto prominent Parliamentary committees concerned with the issue of Tibet.

Surprisingly enough some magazines, such as the *New Internationalist*, who are usually keen to expose oppression and discrimination, maintain an almost total silence on the Tibetan issue generally. The *New Internationalist* features a 'Letter from China' in each issue, which contents itself with whimsical and uninformative chatter and at a time when Tibetans were having their eyes torn out in the dungeons of Lhasa, it featured a somewhat eccentric item on Chinese hotel regulations.²⁹⁶ Many items and reports on Tibet have been sent to the *New Internationalist* but little or no use is made of them. The *New Internationalist* boldly proclaims that it 'Takes a topic—be it the world financial system, or overseas aid, or pollution or China and breaks it down into digestible chunks'. By this criteria events in Tibet would seem to be particularly indigestible for the *New Internationalist* since events there are seldom, if ever mentioned. One further reads that 'The *New Internationalist* cuts through the blizzard of misinformation and confusion that pours from TV and the newspapers...' As far as the *New Internationalist* is concerned the question of Tibet would seem to be hidden under a veritable snowdrift and far from a 'blizzard of misinformation' the TV and newspapers generally give a fair coverage to Tibet now. Given its virtual silence on the many horrendous events in China generally it can be reasonably concluded that the *New Internationalist* represents one of the few surviving examples of a magazine that is so smitten with China that it will go to almost any lengths to avoid exposing the grave shortcomings that are to be found in China today.

This reticence extends even to the issue of deforestation with all its dire implications. While condemning deforestation in many parts of the world it did not mention that one of the very worst examples of the 'chainsaw massacre' has been perpetrated by the Chinese.²⁹⁷ (See the section of this Report entitled 'Ecological Destruction'). Many other similar defects could be mentioned and it is to be hoped that the *New Internationalist* will give a more informative and less biased picture of events in China, with particular reference to Tibet, since it avowedly despises racial oppression and apartheid, and will cease to be guilty of the very behaviour it loudly condemns the right-wing press for.

While on the subject of deforestation it has to be pointed out that even the respected Jonathon Porritt of *Friends of the Earth* seldom, if ever, refers to the enormous deforestation programmes in China, or to their effect upon the environment and it is difficult to trace a single utterance of his which specifically mentions the ecological catastrophe faced by Tibet as a direct result of Chinese policies.²⁹⁸

With the spate of disclosures coming from China during the last 8 or 9 years such biased and selective reporting is on the wane now. However, the writings of John Gittings of the *Guardian*, a newspaper which usually gives a fair and comprehensive coverage to events in Tibet, could be mentioned in this context (see the section entitled The Strasbourg Speech) and the *New Statesman* recently provided an example of exceptionally misleading reporting on Tibet.²⁹⁹

It is also unfortunate that the *United Nations Association*, based in Whitehall, London, never gives any attention to the question of human-rights abuses in Tibet, though condemning them vigorously in many other parts of the world such as South Africa, Chile, Turkey, and Central America etc. This is unfortunate since the UNA does a lot of good work and raises money for a wide range of UN agencies which are concerned with the alleviation of poverty and hunger such as the UN High Commission for Refugees, UNESCO and UNICEF, the UN Children's Fund, and participates in major campaigns to

relieve the effects of famines. However, despite being sent a considerable amount of material on human-rights abuses in Tibet, including various editions of the report *Tibet: The Facts* the UNA *never* mentions the plight of Tibetans in its newsletter entitled *New World*, and invariably gives a highly sympathetic coverage to China, despite the fact that the PRC has record of human-rights abuses which is second to none.

For example, the President and some UNA members visited China in June 1988 and he found it 'tremendously exciting' to stand on the Great Wall of China. Once or twice his gaze would certainly have strayed in the direction of Sining (Xining) the world's most densely populated labour complex which probably has upwards of ten million inmates. But if the President knew about its existence he preferred to maintain a decent reticence on this subject while condemning the existence of far smaller complexes in various parts of the world. He hopes to 'build on the contacts made during this fascinating visit to the land of 300 million bicycles' etc etc.³⁰⁰ It is sad that while receiving Buddhist financial contributions to UNA appeals in the UK on behalf of various UN agencies in January 1987, no coverage whatever was given to the oppression of Buddhists in Tibet and to the riots and disturbances which occurred there early in 1987 and throughout 1988. One could be forgiven for wondering whether the selectivity and partiality in the coverage of human-rights abuses which is exercised by the UNA, at least as far as China is concerned, harmonises with the provisions of its mandate.

In a long article in *New World* he gives a thought provoking perspective on the 'end of colonialism', he writes: 'The UN can take a very great deal of the credit for the relatively peaceful end of colonialism all over the world. It put pressure on the imperial powers and emancipation was the end result. The struggle is not yet finally over, as such tragedies as the Namibian saga remind us, but it is in the UN that action is still sought to make colonialism finally a thing of the past'. Nobody could reasonably dispute that the UN has indeed achieved a great deal in this sphere but it is quite surprising that the President

makes no mention whatever of the colonialism which many people consider to characterise the existence of communist countries, with particular reference to China (and the Soviet Union). No one would ask him to necessarily agree with such a perspective but it should surely, in the interests of fairness and balance, at least have been mentioned as a point of view to which many people subscribe, particularly those unfortunate enough to be on the receiving end of Chinese 'liberation'. However, a total silence was maintained on this question. It is to be hoped that the UNA will devote some future attention to major and continuing human-rights abuses in China, with at least some coverage given to Tibet, otherwise it is difficult to see how this branch of the UNA can escape the twin charges of selectivity and hypocrisy, and it is interesting to see that Namibia was mentioned in the above quotation when Tibet could easily have been included too. It seems that colonialism and imperialism are quite acceptable when practised by the communists, though not by anyone else, at least as far as the present leadership of the UNA London, is concerned.

Almost all current affairs programmes now give a reasonable coverage to the Tibetan issue, one of the few exceptions being *Bandung File* Channel 4 which seldom, if ever, mentions the Tibetan question and generally gives a very sympathetic coverage to China while condemning racism, oppression and human-rights abuses in many other parts of the world. Letters of criticism were sent to the producers of *Bandung File* over a period of several months, but no reply was ever received.³⁰¹

A series of programmes on BBC 2 during the summer of 1988 entitled *The Yellow River* provoked a considerable amount of criticism since their reported object was to comment on the state of the various cultures to be found in the general area of this volatile river, which inevitably included parts of the Tibetan culture, as well as those of other 'minority peoples', including those of E. Turkistan (Sinkiang) comprising Moslem peoples. As far as Tibet was concerned the series gave the clear impression that the Tibetan culture was more or less intact and made no mention of over 6,000 obliterated monasteries and temples and

over a million Tibetans killed since 1949. Little insight was given into the desperate plight of the few 'minority peoples' who have survived the realities of Chinese rule, and no mention was made of the fact that there is clear evidence that about 90% of these tragic peoples have been wiped out during the last forty years or so.³⁰² Little indication was given of the fact that the Tibetan and Moslem cultures of E. Turkistan are being swamped by a huge Chinese influx and the compiler of the series, Mr. Stephen Jessel, when covering E. Turkistan, neglected to mention the fact that 250,000 Moslems have been killed, numerous mosques destroyed, and some half a million scattered to the winds as refugees from Chinese 'liberation'. Action is now being taken on this matter in an effort to correct the misleading Tibetan coverage.³⁰³

The behaviour of the dwindling numbers who give almost unqualified support to Communist China inevitably reminds one of the immortal scene in *Martin Chuzzlewit* by Charles Dickens. One part of this book features the experiences of Martin Chuzzlewit when he visits America in the 1840's and attends a meeting of the Watertoast Sympathisers who are loud in their support of an Irish patriot who has roundly condemned British oppression in his country. Some tremendous speeches are made amidst storms of cheers but then an official enters the hall with the news that the Irish patriot favours black emancipation in the US. Instantly all is chaos and the 'Sons of Freedom' dissolve their Association amidst scenes of anarchy.³⁰⁴ The 'Sons of Freedom' went quite bersek at the mention of black emancipation.

There seems to be an uncanny resemblance between the antics of the 'Sons of Freedom' and those who support Communist China and simultaneously condemn racism, apartheid, and oppression in many parts of the world *except when such policies are carried out by the Chinese in Tibet*. These latterday 'Sons of Freedom' frequently evince a reaction which is in many respects as extreme as that described by Dickens when the subject of Tibet arises. Several years ago the power of such people in the mass media, particularly in Britain was quite

considerable, but they have generally been discredited now and the Dalai Lama's April 1988 visit to Britain and the Tibetan question received a very wide and a generally fair coverage.

There is no doubt that for the reasons given above the Tibetan issue generates extreme passions among those who support Communist China and these reactions are not necessarily confined to those of left-wing opinions. The Chinese Government frequently displays great irritation when the question of Tibet is inevitably raised, and this has been particularly apparent at the United Nations and at press conferences. Until fairly recently China was invariably given the benefit of the doubt by large sections of the media, notably in Britain, when confronted with examples of oppression and human-rights violations in Tibet and among other 'minority nationalities'. This picture has swiftly changed and the evidence suggests that the Chinese, who are unaccustomed to criticism, and in whose culture it is not generally found other than within certain accepted contexts, were at first unable to cope with it and entirely misunderstood the motives from which such criticisms arose.

The Chinese are now having to defend their human-rights record in international fora and the Democracy Movement in China proved that there is an intense desire among many sections of the Chinese people for greater freedom and the elimination of human-rights abuses, and the frequency of torture was something consistently commented upon. Although China has not ratified either of the two International Conventions of Human Rights they have signed the Convention on Torture and maintain that when torture occurs, it is usually as a result of the police exceeding their powers. The degree of official sanction it receives renders this explanation highly unlikely and the evidence suggests that in 'frontier regions' such as Tibet, it is used as a result of deliberate policy. Chinese human-rights violations are now consistently raised by such organisations as Amnesty International and *China Spring*, an extremely influential journal run by Chinese intellectuals in the USA, together with the International Fellowship of Reconciliation. Over the last year or so the Chinese Government has

proved somewhat more amenable to international pressure over human-rights issues, but this is only a beginning.³⁰⁵

In the past at the United Nations and elsewhere it seems that the Chinese derived considerable pleasure from seeing the USA and, to a lesser extent, the Soviet Union, attacked and criticised on many different fronts at a time when scarcely a whisper of criticism was directed towards them. However, in the face of disclosures which suggest that more people have died in China since 1949 than perished in Stalin's Russia or fell victims to Nazi oppression, and in the light of some of this century's worst human rights abuses, the continuing results of which can be seen in Tibet today, the Chinese are now having to defend themselves at the UN and elsewhere. The honeymoon is over and they are in the front line too.³⁰⁶ It is undoubtedly a fact that the goodwill felt by both governments and Peoples towards the Chinese Government has evaporated as a result of the Tiananmen Massacre and the long term effects of this tragic event will probably prove to be of great significance.

The Dalai Lama's Strasbourg speech and the Tibet society, UK

On June 15th 1988 the Dalai Lama addressed members of the European Parliament in Strasbourg and his speech was mainly an elaboration of the fifth point in his Five Point Peace Plan. However, this speech has caused a considerable amount of controversy, particularly amongst Tibetans, since the Dalai Lama appeared to be willing to settle for something less than complete independence. It is very difficult for a non-Tibetan to fully understand the issues involved or the depth of feeling that the question of independence provokes among the Tibetan people both in Tibet and outside. The Chinese occupation began in 1949 and it can only be said that large scale resistance to Chinese rule ended in Lhoka (S. Tibet) in 1969. During this period and ever since the Tibetans have been sustained in their struggle by the belief that one day all Tibet would gain its independence once again. Like many exile communities the

Tibetans are divided on many issues, but the issue of independence is one of the few on which they are united. Hence the controversy caused by the Dalai Lama's speech.

The Chinese have rejected the Dalai Lama's overtures calling them 'disguised independence' and this may be one of the few occasions when a Chinese statement about Tibet or Tibetan politics may be an accurate one.³⁰⁷ The essence of the Dalai Lama's thoughts voiced at Strasbourg (no concrete and final proposals were made) was that Tibetans should have control of all Tibetan affairs except for foreign relations. However, the central point of the speech is as follows and is worth quoting in full. "*I would like to emphasize, however, that whatever the outcome of the negotiations with the Chinese may be, the Tibetan people themselves must be the ultimate deciding authority. Therefore any proposal will contain a comprehensive procedural plan to ascertain the wishes of the Tibetan people in a nationwide referendum*".

Anyone who is at all familiar with the Tibetan question will know that the Tibetan people will not settle for anything other than *complete independence*. This being the case any proposals which stopped short of this would be rejected. The Chinese Government have undoubtedly realised this implication of the speech, hence their rejection of it as a call for 'disguised independence.' The Dalai Lama's 'Government in Exile' are unlikely to recommend any proposals which stop short of this demand, since they too know that the Tibetan people will reject such proposals in a referendum. However, should proposals be recommended and rejected the basic position remains unaltered since the above makes it quite clear that the call for *independence remains the basis of the Tibetan position, it even underlies the Strasbourg speech since the Tibetan people would vote on their own destiny and they would vote for full independence*.

It therefore seems that much of the controversy generated by the Strasbourg speech was unnecessary since in essence nothing has been conceded, a detour was taken but as the decision is to be left in the hands of the Tibetan people, nothing has in fact been altered. This point is further emphasised by the fact

that the Dalai Lama made it clear he was voicing some *thoughts* on this matter, no final concrete proposals were made.

The Strasbourg speech was supported by both the US Senate and House of Representatives on 23rd June 1988 introduced by Congressman Charlie Rose³⁰⁸ and since both Houses stopped just short of recommending Tibetan independence when they supported the Dalai Lama's Five Point Peace Proposal one is entitled to wonder if they realise the full implications of the Strasbourg speech. Section (F) of the Congress Resolution states: '*Before ratification of any agreement, the proposal will be submitted to the Tibetan people in a popular referendum.*' The implications are obvious. If proposals settling for anything less than complete independence are put to the Tibetan people they will be rejected and the issue of Tibetan independence will loom as large as ever, since only apparent concessions were made, nothing of substance was conceded. It would seem on the above analysis that the US has in fact advanced some way to acknowledging the Tibetan right to independence.

Further support for the Strasbourg statement has been expressed in Resolution 324 "expressing the support of Congress for the Dalai Lama and his proposal to promote peace, protect the environment and gain democracy for the Tibetan people". However, this is non-binding legislation and does not require the Presidential signature. Another Bill, H.R. 240, at present links the failure to improve human-rights in Tibet with economic sanctions against China involving, amongst other things, non-extension of preferential treatment of PRC products, six month suspension of Most Favoured Nation status and possible disapproval of loans from international bodies for economic or technical assistance to the PRC. But this Bill is only in the preliminary stage though it has some powerful support.

Before the Tiananmen Square massacre it seemed likely that negotiations would take place between the Chinese and Tibetan representatives in Geneva. But the Chinese appeared to reject Tibetan overtures and it is difficult to say how the Tiananmen Massacre has affected the proposed negotiations. Should a re-

ferendum take place the Tibetans would be wise to insist that it was carried out under international supervision since the Chinese might well include their own recent settlers in any nationwide vote. There would not appear to be any immediate obstacle to the United Nations being involved in a supervisory capacity since UN experts visited Tibet in May 1988 to appraise a 'food-for-work project' in the Lhasa river valley area,³⁰⁹ and as has been seen, the Tibetan issue has been widely aired at the UN. Should the Chinese refuse to grant this the Tibetan negotiating team would be well advised to consult with their government before proceeding further and if, during the negotiations, the Chinese attempt to remove or dilute the referendum proposal some observers find it difficult to see what Tibetans could ever hope to achieve from such discussions. Some Tibetans contrast their own position unfavourably with that of Namibia, mentioning UN Resolution 435, and the fact that the UN took charge of the independence process on April 1st 1989. They further point out that Japanese officials have been scheduled to fly out and monitor national elections there on November 1st 1989 and that Namibia will become independent in April 1990 and ask why it is that similar activities do not occur on behalf of Tibet.³¹⁰ Others have pointed out that enormous Buddhist organisations such as Soka Gakkai exist in Japan and that their leaders regularly have meetings with top Chinese leaders,³¹¹ and yet the oppression of Tibetan Buddhists seems never to be raised at these meetings, neither are Tibetan refugees assisted by large Buddhist organisations such as the Soka Gakkai.³¹²

According to information received from Dharamsala (N. India), the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Speech seems to have caused controversy amongst Tibetans in Tibet, as well as among exiled Tibetans in India and elsewhere. Some Tibetans thought that the Dalai Lama was attempting to achieve a realistic settlement. However, many of the general populace appear to be very disheartened at the apparent foregoing of outright independence. This has produced dissension among three or four Tibetan underground groups, and several people, lay and

monk, have expressed disillusionment about what they perceive to be lack of leadership and guidance from Dharamsala. This disillusionment seems to stem from a failure to properly explain the Strasbourg Speech to Tibetans in Tibet, a general lack of communication between Dharamsala and Tibet, producing a sense of lack of guidance, and the feeling among some Tibetans that the speech is a rejection of all that Tibetans strive for.

Recent evidence suggests that the Chinese are preparing for some kind of a referendum and that steps are being taken to ensure that the result would be favourable to them. Opinion surveys, which include questions about independence, are being conducted in Lhasa and Tsethang and about fifty officials are believed to be involved. The survey is camouflaged under the guise of academic research and is being conducted by two organisations; the Sociology Department of Beijing University and the Tibetan Culture Research Centre.³¹³ A 12 page questionnaire written in Tibetan has been distributed since June 1988 and while some people have written that they support Tibetan independence there is evidence that others have been frightened to express their opinions since they fear the penalties that could be incurred.³¹⁴ It is not easy to believe that the Chinese would gratuitously provide the Tibetan people with facilities to vote on the issue of their independence if they felt that the result of an internationally supervised plebiscite might prove to favour their departure from Tibet. This point has been emphasised by the October 1988 arrest of about twenty monks from Rato monastery near Lhasa who, by answering the questions frankly, declared their loyalty to the Dalai Lama and expressed views favouring Tibetan independence.³¹⁵

The Dalai Lama, perhaps responding to the opinions of many Tibetans, has gone on record as saying that no further compromise beyond the Strasbourg proposal can be made from the Tibetan side in negotiations with the Chinese and it remains to be seen whether the Chinese will prove to be more flexible in the light of this stand.³¹⁶

Some Tibetans consider that the Strasbourg speech may have

been partly due to pressure from interested countries such as Britain and the USA and emphasise this point with reference to the fact that English and German translations of the speech were available in Strasbourg some while before the Tibetan translation was accessible. It is difficult to know what influence Britain may have had upon the Dalai Lama, since the attitude of the Foreign Office towards the Tibetan issue is one of implacable non-cooperation and even hostility, while the US has not hesitated to display a measure of assertiveness and independence in its dealings with China and its handling of the Tibetan question which is almost completely lacking in Britain, and reinforces the point, now frequently made in many quarters, that the US is in many respects, a far more democratic and open country than Britain. If there was any pressure some of it is likely to have been applied by the Indian Government which at present shelters nearly 100,000 Tibetan refugees. The Indian attitude to the long-standing and intensifying Tibetan crisis will be examined in the next section.

There has been a considerable amount of speculation, particularly amongst Tibetans, as to the rôle of the Foreign Office in promoting and encouraging the Strasbourg initiative. Bearing in mind the fact that Britain does nothing internationally for the cause of Tibet it may be asked how the Foreign Office could bring pressure to bear upon the Dalai Lama's 'Government in Exile', and it may be that self-interested advice is given through the Tibet Society, UK, since various officers on its Executive Body have actually served in the Foreign Office or still maintain strong links with it.

The Tibet Society, UK, includes the Tibet Relief Fund of the UK and there is no doubt at all that this part of the Tibet Society has done an enormous amount of good in assisting Tibetan refugees who have escaped Chinese persecution. Countless lives have been saved, medical facilities installed in remote settlements, schools have been built and equipped and many exiled Tibetans have been given an excellent start in life. However, the first stated object of the Tibet Society is: *'By non-party political action to promote the cause of Tibetan inde-*

pendence and to bring before the world the sufferings of the oppressed people of Tibet'. Tibetans point out that the Tibet Society does virtually nothing to promote the cause of Tibetan independence given the extremely influential contacts that it has had in successive governments, and fear that the great assistance it has given to Tibetan refugees might influence members of the Tibetan 'Government in Exile' to incline too sympathetic an ear to the thoughts or advice of some of its Council members, particularly those who have served, or have links with the Foreign Office. This is not of course to suggest that the British Foreign Office is *dictating* the policy of the Tibetan 'Government in Exile', but a formidable case can be advanced suggesting that the above factor has resulted in the Foreign Office being able to exert much influence upon the Tibetans for reasons far more in tune with British ambitions and policies, than for any concern whatever with the well-being of the Tibetan people and their long struggle for freedom.

The British Foreign Office has at heart what it considers to be the best interests of Great Britain, and therefore it is possible that advice given to Tibetan Government members and negotiators may be in harmony with perceived British interests, but actually inflict grievous damage on the prospects of oppressed Tibetans ever gaining their independence from the Chinese. Once again it may be that the Hong Kong question and bilateral trade agreements are strongly influencing the kind of advice that is being given to the Tibetans, and it has to be remarked that for some 40 years the British Foreign Office has not hesitated to abandon Tibet to its fate, when it is arguably the only European country that has some kind of responsibility to Tibet deriving from treaties concluded after the Chinese were ejected from Tibet in 1912. Some Tibetans consider that the Foreign Office seems to have an extremely strong influence on the Council of the Tibet Society and there are fears that such influence could be exerted upon Tibetan negotiators in Geneva to the detriment of the cause of Tibetan independence. Some reports, apparently emanating from the 'Bonn Hearing' an international seminar on Tibet held in April 1989, suggest that

the Tibetan 'Government in Exile' has requested that future Sino-Tibetan talks be held in Hong Kong. If this is true then there is no doubt that many Tibetans would regard such a venue as mistaken, since it would expose the Tibetan negotiators to considerable British influence, and would see this proposal as representing the unwelcome and unwholesome influence of the British Foreign Office upon the ultimate destiny of Tibet.³¹⁷

Most Tibetans are acutely conscious that their cause stands or falls upon the single issue of independence and that whenever this struggle is marginalised, by whatever combination of forces, their chances of success are correspondingly diminished. Understandably enough they ask why it is that independence should be withheld from them when it has been achieved by scores of countries since 1945. An excellent examination of this question was written by Robbie Barnett of the Tibet Information Network (23/7/89) entitled 'Human Rights Abuses in the People's Republic of China: The Dangers of Linking the Tibet and China Issues'. He points out that by simply concentrating on the issue of human rights abuses in Tibet, (as is mostly the case with Tibet Society UK, International Alert, The Tibet and China Committee etc) the issue of Tibetan independence is marginalised and human rights abuses in Tibet inevitably become viewed as an 'internal problem of the Chinese Government.' The wheels are then quietly oiled for an analysis which regards the problem of Tibet as one which is primarily attributable to an inefficient Chinese administration in 'this remote region', and of course a similarly extenuating analysis could be extended to encompass British atrocities in Ireland committed over a period of many centuries, or to the Holocaust which occurred mainly in areas far from Berlin.

Barnett writes: "A detailed analysis would show that the pattern of human rights abuses in Tibet are part of a political arrangement and have a strong racial element; they are not merely the results of a corrupt or an incompetent administration. Most of the abuses institutionalised throughout China's

territories are used in Tibet for quite different purposes: either to sustain the power of the occupying forces, or to impose a modernising or improving 'superior' ideology on a supposedly backward people. The function of these human rights abuses is different when applied to non-Chinese peoples: it takes on the characteristics of traditional colonialism and of large-scale racism." Barnett points out that the unspoken corollary of concentrating entirely on human-rights abuses in Tibet is the assumption that improvements in the administration of the judiciary or of the security forces would swiftly solve the problem. This is not to deny the great value of articulating human rights in Tibet as many people do, but if the issue is raised on its own and is not linked to the question of Tibetan independence, then it can become a dagger turned inwards which legitimises the Chinese occupation of Tibet. It is as though Israeli shootings in the occupied West Bank were condemned without the issue of self-determination of the Arab people ever being raised. Inevitably it would become 'Israel's internal affair'.

Many Tibetans regard this as an extremely pernicious development reflected particularly in the writings of such people as A. Tom Grunfeld, the Canadian Sinologist (see Appendix 1), who has claimed that there is no political dissent in Tibet other than that responding to flaws in the local administration, and a recent paper of his implied that Chinese would be pleased if criticism over Tibet was confined to simple questions of human rights. This kind of approach to the Tibetan question has tended to facilitate the tactic of criminalising dissent in Tibet on the grounds that it threatens 'the unity of the Motherland', and it is only recently that the existence of political dissent in Tibet and of political prisoners was admitted by the Chinese. Barnett states that 'Vague though it is, the term 'self-determination of the Tibetan People' offers the safest context for the discussion of human rights in Tibet and distinguishes it from the demands of demonstrators in China itself. He adds that the term 'self-determination' is used by some indigenous peoples at UN fora to refer to limited forms of autonomy, but

it is also used in the UN Charter to indicate the rights of people and nations to determine their own destinies and that in Tibet's case this term must be taken to include the full range of possibilities including independent statehood. He concludes by pointing out that emphasis should be placed on the political rights of the Tibetans as a people, rather than on their individual rights alone which some human rights activists tend to do, to the detriment of any real understanding of the fact that the entire problem stems from the Chinese occupation of Tibet, which is illegal under the terms of the UN Charter and which has been strenuously resisted by the mass of the Tibetan people.

Inevitably the Strasbourg speech, probably favoured by the British Foreign Office and advised by those with FO connections on the Council of the Tibet Society, UK, has resulted in much discussion of the previously mentioned questions. A careful reading of the speech indicates that little, if anything, was in fact conceded by the Dalai Lama, but the dialectic analysed in the above paragraphs has been complemented by another which Tibetans have cause to fear.

In the past, as has been described, many people tried to ignore the issue of Tibet, or to belittle it whenever this fraught question arose and different political groupings sometimes had attitudes towards the Tibetan problem which were surprisingly similar, even though they were often at opposite ends of the political spectrum. This is happening now, and such attitudes are intimately involved with the explosive issue of Tibetan independence. Some people, who never lost an opportunity to disseminate false information about Chinese human-rights abuses or to distort facts emerging from Tibet, are now, in the light of the Strasbourg speech, or rather their interpretation of it, quite eloquent in condemning human-rights abuses in Tibet *because they believe that the issue of Tibetan independence is in the process of being successfully buried, which would inevitably mean that all or most of the activities carried out by Tibetans and on behalf of Tibetans, are under-pinning the present status quo in Tibet and legitimising the Chinese occupation.* Under these circumstances people whose contribution was at best to

remain silent on the Tibetan issue have now rallied in support of the Strasbourg speech. For example, in July 1989 an Early Day Motion was tabled in the House of Commons by six Labour MP's and ultimately signed by 31 Labour MP's. There is no doubt that many of them acted in good faith and out of a desire to publicise the suffering of the Tibetan people, but it is noticeable that the motion began by saying, 'That this House congratulates the Dalai Lama on his recent generous and far-sighted plan for the future of Tibet; notes that the Dalai Lama enjoys the absolute support of the Tibetan people' and, among other things, called for an end to the 'brutal suppression of the Tibetan people'.

Such a Motion undoubtedly seems fair and reasonable, but it seems to have been prompted primarily by the *apparent* abrogation of the struggle for Tibetan independence contained in the Strasbourg speech. Many people will eloquently condemn Chinese human-rights abuses in Tibet when they believe that the issue of Tibetan independence has ceased to exist, or has at least been shelved. It is also clear that the Tibetan issue is in danger of becoming trapped in a particularly strange dialectic emanating from opposite ends of the political spectrum which resembles in some respects a pincer movement between the Chinese and British Governments and between the political forces of Left and Right. The Canadian Sinologist A. Tom Grunfeld, who has been previously mentioned, made some proposals for the resolution of the Tibetan question in his book *The Making of Modern Tibet*, which bear an uncanny resemblance in many significant aspects, to the Strasbourg speech, but which were formulated *some six years before*. For example, 'Beijing would remain responsible for Tibet's security and external relations'. However, his proposals lack the vital component of a plebiscite in Tibet in which Tibetan people would determine their own destiny by voting to accept or reject the result of Sino-Tibetan negotiations. Those reading Mr. Grunfeld's book find it difficult to ignore his profoundly pro-Chinese sentiments or the fact that he is probably a communist, or at least far to the Left. (His proposals on the

Tibetan issue may be found in Appendix B, p. 231 of *The Making of Modern Tibet*).

There seems to be some speculation as to how the Dalai Lama's senior advisors could have possibly advocated the Strasbourg initiative when, in many significant respects, it resembles a solution proposed by a Sinologist who is no friend to Tibetans, who invariably follows Beijing's line on most matters connected with Tibet, and who gives virtually no coverage to human-rights abuses in Tibet, as is particularly the case in his latest book. (However, as has been pointed out, Grunfeld did not include a plebiscite of indigenous Tibetans as an option to be considered).

The other part of this dialectic may be found in the fact that people far to the Right of Mr. Grunfeld, and his ilk have also advocated a similar solution, but unlike Mr. Grunfeld have actually been in a position to influence the 'Dalai Lama and his Government in Exile'. For example, there is evidence that Mr. William Peters, the respected Chairman of the Tibet Society, UK, and former British diplomat, together with Lord Ennals, President of the Tibet Society, UK, and former Foreign Office Minister, have, together with others, had long discussions with members of the Tibetan Government in Exile, and with the Dalai Lama, on the question of Tibetan independence and may have played a prominent part in the formulation of the Strasbourg initiative. It is interesting to note that Mr. William Peters, whose politics, one may surmise, differ drastically from those of Mr. Grunfeld, has written an article entitled: '*The Unresolved Problem of Tibet*' (*Asian Affairs*, Vol. XIX. Pt. 2.) in which Tibetan independence does not figure and which states, "Between the needs of national defence and the desirability of Tibetan compliance in the Chinese military presence is there common ground which could be fruitfully discussed by the Chinese with the Dalai Lama?" (not, apparently with the Dalai Lama's Government in Exile which the Chinese do not recognise). He adds, "It would clearly be a great gain for the Chinese to hold the frontiers of Tibet, backed by an acquiescent population." We further read, "Apart from removing an internal

threat to the western and southern frontiers of China, a negotiated settlement would greatly benefit the Chinese reputation internationally.” This article was written shortly before the Strasbourg speech and Mr. Peters has had contact with the Dalai Lama since 1984. It is surely worth remembering that the first Object of the Tibet Society is ‘By non-party political action to promote the cause of Tibetan independence...’!

It seems clear that just as prominent figures on the Right and Left formerly had an identity of interest in avoiding discussion of Tibetan issues, or of doing their best to bury them, the latest manifestation of this dialectic consists of a mutual, perhaps unspoken agreement, to consign the question of Tibetan independence to oblivion which then of course frees them to condemn Chinese human-rights abuses in Tibet with the result that such abuses become a Chinese ‘internal affair’. Seen in this context the Tibetan question becomes like a barrel of gunpowder in a world where there is no fire. This is not to deny that many people, both to the Right and Left are well intentioned when they condemn such abuses, or that such condemnations often have a positive and beneficial effect. But there are others, at both ends of the political spectrum, who perhaps know just exactly what they are doing.

It could reasonably be asked from what combination of forces the above dialectic derives and the answer may be a chilling one and the following analysis was provided by a member of the Indian Government who wishes to remain anonymous.

In July/August 1983 the Chinese policy in Tibet changed drastically. A new bout of repression began and the Chinese accelerated the movement of settlers into Tibet. But one thing seems to have become apparent to them, namely that over 30 years of oppression had not resulted in the physical disappearance of the Tibetans as a people and the Tibetan Government in Exile, though small and perhaps not as efficient in some sectors as it would wish to be, had somehow succeeded in not only keeping alive the issue of Tibet, but accelerating its international tempo. He also stated that the Indian Government has mixed feelings regarding the operations of various Western

groups who are loud in their condemnation of Chinese policies in Tibet and about the Non-Governmental Organisations who operate at the UN human Rights Commission, Geneva. Some in the Indian Government are happy to see the Chinese severely embarrassed, while others regard them as 'a thorough damned nuisance'.

On the one hand the Chinese realised that the Tibetan people were still 'in being' and that their spirit remained unbroken despite the massacres and long years of terror, the rope, the bullet and the axe and the refinements of torture in which the Chinese have traditionally specialised. They, therefore, determined to submerge the Tibetan people in a tide of Chinese immigrants and intensify their 'birth control' policy, that is enforced abortions and sterilisations, which taken together with their policies of medical apartheid, would result in the virtual disappearance of Tibetans as a people within a few generations.

However, this was not enough. Some tactic was required to deal with the Tibetan Government in Exile which the Chinese often attempted to influence, with varying degrees of success, and to compel it to cease its call for an independent Tibet, since this greatly embarrassed the Chinese at the international level. It was pointed out that the Chinese could of course do what they liked in Tibet, but abroad they had to proceed with far more circumspection. Above all they needed an ally to help them defuse the issue of Tibetan independence and they found such an ally in the British Foreign Office. The diplomat who provided the above analysis was asked about the *obsessive* attitude of the British Foreign Office. One could quite understand why the efforts of Tibetans should be blocked, but why were they apparently going to such extraordinary lengths not merely to stifle Tibetan protest but to take the *offensive* in many different areas in order to ensure that the entire issue was demolished?

The diplomat stated that it seemed likely that some deal had been struck with the Chinese concerning Hong Kong and the mainland after 1997. He thought it likely that provided Britain

handed Hong Kong over in more or less the condition they desired it to be, politically and economically, then British companies operating in Hong Kong had been promised some kind of deal which would enable them to penetrate the Chinese market from an ideal forward base actually *inside* the political boundaries of China. Such an understanding could be worth many billions to both parties. He added that it was possible that many individuals might also benefit from having helped facilitate such an arrangement, but obviously he could not be certain about this and it was only speculation.

The *quid pro quo* was Tibet, or rather the disappearance of Tibet as an international issue, and it was almost certain that the British Foreign Office had agreed to help facilitate this and had chosen to secure the services of former members who were on the Executive Body of the Tibet Society and on its Council, but he emphasised that most of the members had no idea what was going on, and would be extremely upset given the fact that the Tibet Society is supposed to be working for Tibetan independence. He added that generous assistance provided to Tibetan refugees by the Tibet Society gave its Officers 'a great deal of influence' in the Government in Exile, and surmised that various organisations and bodies who help with refugee relief in the Tibetan Government may fear, rightly or wrongly, that such assistance could be withdrawn if advice tendered was not heeded at the higher levels of the Government. He pointed out that the issue of Tibet had resulted in a curious intertwining of the policies of the Chinese and British Governments and that in a very real sense the Chinese *need* the Foreign Office if the question of Tibetan independence is to be successfully demolished. This is because there is only a limited amount the Chinese can do to defuse this question in the international arena and often their efforts are counter-productive in that it becomes clear to many people that they have a skeleton in their cupboard. It occurred to the Chinese that the only person who could successfully defuse the issue of Tibetan independence was the *Dalai Lama himself*, and hence the pressures on him to embark upon the Strasbourg initiative.

For various reasons this initiative misfired badly, at least from the Chinese point of view. The Tibetan Government did not prove nearly as amenable to the blandishments of the British Foreign Office as the Chinese had hoped and the Strasbourg initiative contained several elements which the Chinese disliked to such an extent that they appeared to entertain the notion that the Foreign Office 'was playing some game of its own'. Here the diplomat smiled and used the phrase 'perfidious Albion'. As a result of endless power struggles and shifts in policies, and above all the Tiananmen Massacre, the Strasbourg initiative foundered. Hence the new initiative which aims to get an 'effective resolution' on Tibet passed at the UN General Assembly in 1992. The diplomat observed that "this is primarily a campaign organised by the British Foreign Office and the kind of 'effective resolution' they want is one which effectively results in the disappearance of Tibet as an international issue". Needless to add, the diplomat strongly disagreed with his Government's policy on Tibet and stated that the Indian Government should immediately recognise the Tibetan Government in Exile in order to rationalise its policy towards China. He had asked to read the draft version of one section of *Tibet: The Facts*, namely the section entitled '*The Myth of Tibetan Autonomy and the Indian Predicament*', and stated that it was 'most perspicacious', and added that there were many voices in the Indian Government advocating a drastic reappraisal of India's policy on the Chinese occupation of Tibet.

It certainly has to be admitted that much of the above is speculation and it is rather difficult for a non-Tibetan to know exactly what to make of all these complex questions. But since the issue of Tibet is uniting many people, both inside and outside Westminster, who are at opposite ends of the political spectrum, and who would not be seen dead in the same coffin, as well as causing a great deal of speculation amongst Tibetans in the UK and abroad and amongst Buddhists and Westerners working for the cause of Tibetan independence, the matter seems well worth airing.

However, it seems that the Tiananmen Massacre has already

exerted an effect upon this question since the Dalai Lama has stated in an interview given to the *New York Times* (24/6/89), that he is no longer keen on entering into negotiations with the present Chinese Government, as he feels that it cannot now be considered the people's government and there seems little doubt that many Tibetans are relieved that the prospect of direct talks with the Chinese Government has been greatly reduced, thereby minimising the opportunity of the British Foreign Office to influence and to interfere in this matter.

Media reaction to the controversial Strasbourg speech has been generally favourable and it may be that the verdict of the *Japan Times* which described the speech as the 'most conciliatory yet' is somewhat short of the mark since, whatever the origins or genesis of the speech and whatever its merits or lack of them it has undoubtedly contributed to the further internationalisation of the Tibetan issue³¹⁸ which is something that the Chinese will scarcely relish. Unfortunately a few reports of the Strasbourg speech, notably the reporting of John Gittings of the *Guardian* gave the impression that the Dalai Lama 'has effectively given up his struggle for Tibetan independence' and he further quoted the Dalai Lama as saying 'China will never give up Tibet... I feel there is nothing wrong in trying to explore some middle way.'³¹⁹ True to the traditions of the *Guardian* this piece of extremely selective reporting was corrected in a letter written by Sean Jones³²⁰ in which he pointed out, having attended the conference himself, that the Dalai Lama did not assert that 'the Chinese will never give up Tibet' but quoted this stand as current Chinese policy. He further added that Gittings omitted the rest of that sentence which consisted of the words '...but on the other hand the Tibetans will never give up their claim for independence' which places the matter in a different perspective. Sean Jones emphasised the point which is well understood by the Chinese, that the proposals in the Dalai Lama's Five Point Peace Plan, elaborated in the Strasbourg speech, would not prejudice the right of the Tibetans to continue claiming independence. Mr Gittings is a former trustee of the Society For Anglo Chinese Understanding, an organisation which is profoundly

sympathetic towards Communist China and this is frequently reflected in his coverage of the Tibetan question. A Tibetan who has followed this controversy remarked that 'presumably Mr Gittings would object strongly if the leader of the African National Congress was quoted out of context to give the clear implication that blacks in South Africa were giving up their struggle for freedom!'

It is too early to assess the full effect of the Strasbourg speech and it may be that Tibetans are right to treat it with caution in this most crucial period in their history. Much depends on the Chinese reaction to it and upon Indian foreign policy towards China, with particular reference to the long and troubled northern Indian border. The speech could mark the beginning of a new and more open initiative possibly involving international organisations, or the intensification and escalation of the Tibetan struggle for independence.

PART 4

THE MYTH OF TIBETAN AUTONOMY AND THE INDIAN PREDICAMENT

The Chinese Military Buildup along India's Northern Frontier

The long border between India, India's allies and Chinese occupied Tibet is some 2,500 miles (4,000 kilometres) in length *and it is the longest disputed border in the world today*. In some parts of the border the situation between China and India is becoming increasingly fraught, and given the current information available it would seem that China bears the prime responsibility for this. Increasing numbers of Chinese troops and weapons are being moved into Tibet and the presence of some half a million Chinese troops in Tibet would seem to present a particularly strong argument against any kind of Tibetan autonomy. Sizeable garrisons exist in each military district together with concentrations of troops in border areas like Pemako and Metok Dzong, their grip being consolidated by military 'feeder' roads that proved indispensable to the Chinese when the Khampas rode west at the height of the Tibetan War.

Detailed reports over the last three years indicate that China has established over a dozen new military posts close to the Indo-Tibetan border in Ladakh in the east of Kashmir, particularly in the area of the Chip Chap, Karakash and Galwan valleys along the Kailash range. The strength of Chinese troops drawn from some main force divisions and equipped and trained for mountain warfare has reportedly been augmented around Numkum, Dungu, and Khiranli fort across Chushaul and else-

where. The Chinese now have nine military airfields, eleven radar stations and at least three nuclear bases in Tibet. It is reported that about one-third of China's nuclear arsenal is now situated in Tibet with Medium-Range Ballistic Missiles aimed at major centres of population and industry in India, and some are also sited on areas in the Indian Ocean, while others are targetted on the Soviet Union, possibly involving a Launch on Warning (LOW) system. Other smaller missiles with a range of about 500–1,500 nautical miles are known to be based in certain areas of Tibet and an unspecified number of land-based tactical missile weapons systems are to be found in parts of the province of Sinkiang (E. Turkistan).³²¹

The nuclear base at Nagchuka is being modernised in order to incorporate more sophisticated missiles designed to increase the Chinese strike capability in India and in S.E. Asia and there are reports which indicate that China is planning to deploy more nuclear missiles around Golmud in the Amdo region of Tibet. There seems little doubt that the Chinese have used other remote mountain areas and deep caves to establish missile silos in the hope that they would survive a pre-emptive strike.³²²

In the light of all this information it is difficult to believe that until 1950 this long border had only the occasional border policeman. Now it seems with hundreds of thousands of troops on both sides as the Indians have had to respond to the Chinese presence and actual conflict in 1962³²³ Beijing continues to deny that there is military buildup in Tibet and in particular denies the existence of nuclear missiles in Tibet, but the evidence for their existence is now very strong.

Very recent reports indicate that sophisticated jet fighters, helicopters and large numbers of anti-aircraft guns are being moved into Tibet, some 600 such weapons have been recently installed in the Chumbi valley near the border with India's Sikkim state. An American aviation journal *Aviation Week and Space Technology* has reported that the Chinese have deployed a squadron of J-7 fighter aircraft in Tibet (the Chinese version of the Soviet Mig-21) at Gonggar airfield,

about 60 miles from Lhasa and communications facilities have been accordingly improved. For two weeks in May 1987 the airport was closed to commercial flights on even numbered days. A great deal of jet activity has also been reported over Lhasa and a new tactical command has been created in the strategically sensitive region near Nyitri about 120 miles east of Lhasa. Tourists have reported seeing U.S. made Sikorsky helicopters, suitable for operating at high altitude, and Black Hawk helicopters have been observed supporting the PLA. Tourists have also reported seeing trucks loaded with missiles heading towards the Indian border in the Lhasa, Chamdo and Kongpo areas and twice a week enormous transport aircraft have been sighted flying towards Mount Kailash.

There have also been reports of the recruitment of able-bodied Tibetans for heavy manual work arising from the demands created by a major offensive and the Chinese authorities have told farmers in disputed areas not to grow grain crops, possibly because they might be damaged during military activity. It is also known that Tibetan troops whose loyalty could not be counted upon in any border conflict with India, have been withdrawn from the frontline.³²⁴

A large Chinese military post of some kind has also recently been reported to be situated on a hill-top near the Karnali river N. Nepal and has been fenced off. Local Tibetans say that the Chinese have made caves and dug tunnels in the hills in which thousands of soldiers could be concealed. A water tank lorry apparently makes about thirty trips a day.³²⁵

Equally worrying to the Indian Government is an out flanking movement which is being undertaken by the Chinese with the progress of a project upgrading the Karakorum highway linking Kashgar in the north-west Sinkiang (E. Turkistan area) with Pakistan held Kashmir across the Siachin glacier. The road has been called 'the new silk route' but it has been constructed so that heavy military supplies can pass along it. Pakistan regards China as a possible ally against India and the Chinese have been quick to take advantage of this, and in 1963 an agreement was concluded between China and Pakistan in which

Pakistan ceded 2,100 sq. miles of Kashmir to China. This 'axis' between the two countries has inevitably compounded the tension in the Aksai Chin region which was formerly part of India, but which was occupied after 1950 when the Chinese marched across N. Tibet and which, somewhat predictably, they now claim as being part of China. They then occupied some 14,500 sq. miles of the Aksai Chin, which is vital to their continuing occupation of Tibet, and the western sector of the above mentioned highway, which was opened on 6th October 1957, passes through the Aksai Chin, and is now an all weather pass which connects China's Sinkiang Province (E. Turkistan) with Gilgit in Pakistan held Kashmir through the Kunjerab Pass. The Aksai Chin is in the Ladakh area and China has offered to relinquish her claim to some 33,000 sq. miles of Indian territory in the eastern area of Arunachal Pradesh if India chooses to recognise the legitimacy of the Chinese occupation of the Aksai Chin. The Indians could not expect to gain a great deal from any such projected agreement as a considerable number of Indian politicians have pointed out. This western sector of the long border, linking China with Pakistan, constitutes a great danger to Indian security, while the middle sector of the long border, consisting of Himachal Pradesh and Uttar Pradesh is somewhat less fraught as the Chinese only lay claim to some 500 sq. miles though it should be remembered that the area under dispute is close to Indian places of pilgrimage such as Mount Kailash and Lake Manasarovar which are in Tibet. The third part of the frontier consists of the McMahon Line (see next section) running from Bhutan to Burma and includes the disputed territory of Arunachal Pradesh.

Recently this section of the frontier has become more active as in October 1986 the Chinese moved into the disputed Sumdorong-chu in Arunachal Pradesh and in June 1986 they occupied Bhutanese territory close to Dromo in the Chumbi Valley. A permanent border post seems to have been built and temporary roads have been constructed to facilitate the transport of military materials. Fortunately for Bhutan it is a full member of the United Nations and had the Tibetans been as similarly far-

sighted the task of the Chinese would have been immeasurably more difficult. Recent, though as yet unconfirmed reports, indicate puzzling events on the Nepalese border. It would seem that early in 1988 the Nepalese border with Chinese occupied Tibet was closed for about one week or possibly longer, between Pokhara and Daulagiri, during which time some 400 Chinese military trucks were driven into Nepal, and it is thought that some of these trucks contained Chinese soldiers. The Chinese are also strengthening their links with Nepal by an air link between Lhasa and Kathmandu but these flights were interrupted during the recent riots in Tibet which began in September 1988.³²⁶ Nepal, like Bhutan is a full member of the United Nations, but nevertheless generally follows a policy of appeasement towards the Chinese. A recent example is provided by the deportation of 26 Tibetan escapees who were returned to Chinese occupied Tibet in September 1988. The refugees were aged between 13–29 years and included a monk.³²⁷

The escapees were shackled and some bound with jute and taken to Sangyip prison in Lhasa. After eight days incarceration they were told they were going to Golmud where it seems there may be a large prison/labour camp. However, seven managed to escape, though two and possibly four, were recaptured by the Nepalese police who evidently act as watchdogs on behalf of the Chinese. This affair has already had international repercussions and it is interesting to note that Lord Ennals, a former distinguished servant of the British Foreign Office and now President of the Tibet Society, UK, raised this matter with the Nepalese ambassador to Britain, who apparently denied that the Tibetan refugees had been repatriated. Lord Ennals has raised this matter again with him. Meanwhile there are clear indications that the Chinese have territorial ambitions along the Nepalese border and Nepal, hedging its bets, has strengthened its ties with India and declared itself to be 'a Hindu Kingdom'.

It would seem that the long northern border contains the potential not only for limited incidents but for full scale fighting between India and China, the two giants of Asia, possibly involving some form of nuclear exchange. A recent TV programme,

after a careful sifting of sources, came to the conclusion that India's nuclear weapons programme was in response to the Chinese nuclear buildup and tests carried out in the Gobi desert. The Indian Government referred to China's 'nuclear colonialism' and became the sixth nation to conduct a nuclear test on May 18th 1974.³²⁸

In the light of all this intense military activity the designation of Tibet as an 'Autonomous Region' is untenable, and lends emphasis to the Dalai Lama's 'Five Point Peace Plan' backed by the USA, which advocates the withdrawal of all Chinese forces and the establishment of Tibet as a 'Zone of Peace'.

The McMahon Line: India's Political Predicament Caused by its Non-Recognition of the 'Tibetan Government in Exile'

It is probably correct to say that of all the disputed frontier regions in the world the McMahon Line is among the least understood, mostly because of its remoteness and partly because of Chinese propaganda. Yet it is here that a major conflict could break out between the world's two most populous nations, possibly involving the use of nuclear weapons and where Tibet's destiny could be decided. Furthermore, as was pointed out in the US Tibet Bill of December 1987, the Chinese occupation of Tibet has produced a dangerously destabilising effect in Asia. The McMahon Line stretches along sections of the 700 miles of mountain ridges running from Bhutan to Burma and was drawn up in its final form in negotiations between British India and Tibet during the Treaty of Simla in 1914, which confirmed Tibetan independence (see section entitled *Tibetan/Chinese Relations*), and which the Chinese government rejected, resulting in the abrogation of all rights and privileges claimed by China.

Successive Indian governments have put themselves in an almost impossible position which the Chinese have exploited to the full. The crux of the question is that an *independent Tibet, which had just ejected Chinese armies, assented to the McMahon Line together with British India, and that Nehru too*

accepted this line and requested and received an assurance from the Tibetan government that it would agree to a continuation of relations on the basis of that previously existing with the British government. As long as any Indian government recognized the independence of Tibet, a solid basis existed for the demarcation of the long frontier in the form of the McMahon Line. But when in 1954 Nehru concluded the Panchsheel Treaty with China and recognized Tibet as being part of China, he effectively threw away any basis for the demarcation of the frontier, since the Chinese (somewhat predictably) pointed out that 'Tibet had always been part of China', and that any treaties concluded by a so-called independent Tibet were invalid.³²⁹

Had Nehru refused to assent to Chinese claims in Tibet his position on the frontier area would have been consistent and self-sustaining. But as it was the position of successive Indian governments became untenable and the Chinese were swift to exploit this fact to the full and this entire frontier was thrown into the melting pot. Understandably enough such politicians as Nehru and Krishna Menon, Indian representative at the United Nations, loathed the legacy of British colonialism in India, but Tibetans point out that this did not justify them turning a blind eye to Chinese colonialism in Tibet in the hope that some kind of a peaceful rapprochement could be reached with Peking. For many centuries Tibet had been a buffer zone between China and India and Tibet had only seldom engaged in disputes with its neighbours and these were very limited affairs. But the Chinese occupation of Tibet created a flashpoint where there had been none before and was completed on the basis of claims made by remote and imperialist dynasties, which if taken to their logical conclusion, could serve as the basis for the reconstitution of the European and Japanese empires on the grounds of former control, real or imagined, the claims of expansionist dynasties, and perceived strategic necessity.

Ironically enough the Chinese are even claiming areas once controlled by Tibet *before* the Chinese occupation, which the

British demarcated as being separate from Tibet proper. It would be correct to say that there appears to be almost no precedent for this in current international relations, and only the remoteness of the areas involved has served to conceal what appears to be Beijing's quite extraordinary territorial ambitions grounded as they are in the distant past and which contradict the basis of all the great independence movements of the 20th Century.

Nehru was generally extremely conciliatory to the Chinese and seems to have tried to reach a genuine agreement with them, for he sympathised with their suffering at the hands of a succession of colonial powers. Unfortunately this blinded him to the expansionist designs of a renascent China whose Marxist ideology had somehow become interwoven with a determination to achieve the territorial ambitions of ancient dynasties.³³⁰ On many occasions Nehru strove his utmost to reach some accommodation with the Chinese, even to the extent of seriously undermining India's security by sacrificing Tibet, but the Chinese did not respond to Nehru's conciliatory stance, merely using it to consolidate their hold upon Tibet. After the sharp defeat suffered by India in 1962 Nehru is reported as saying 'we have been living in a fool's paradise of our own making'.³³¹

It would be correct to say that Indian policy on Tibet is still suffering from the legacy of Nehru's tragic mistakes and it may be that the only way of restoring some consistency to the Indian position is to recognize the independence of Tibet and the legitimacy of the Dalai Lama's 'Government in Exile'. This would merely be reverting to the Indian stance adopted before 1954, and would give India a solid basis for regarding the demarcation of the McMahon Line as legitimate.³³² However much the Chinese might protest it would be consistent with the new Indian position to point out that in the Panchsheel Treaty of 1954 the Chinese promised to respect autonomy, but that the events of 1959 were in clear violation of this agreement, and therefore the Indian position *naturally* reverted to that which existed before the conclusion of the 1954 Treaty. Without arguing for or against Tibetan independence it is worth pointing

out that such a stance would give India's position on the McMahon Line a formidable basis in international law. At the present time the Chinese can step up pressure along the frontier whenever it suits them to do this. Such a determined move by India might escalate the tension across the border, but it might also defuse it since on the rare occasions when Nehru threatened to act forcefully the Chinese invariably reverted to a conciliatory posture, which they then changed when Nehru responded in similar vein. *This is characteristic Chinese policy.* It is also a fact that the Indian army is far better equipped to fight at high altitudes than was the case in 1962 as it has had to respond to the lesson of defeat and to the long Chinese buildup, and the Chinese are doubtless well aware of this and it is quite possible that in the face of a new and determined posture on the border question by the Indian government the Chinese would do little more than protest.³³³

It is also a fact, as Professor Sondhi has pointed out, that the 1954 Sino-Indian agreement on trade and commercial relations, which referred to Tibet as a 'region of China' and which recognised China's responsibility for Tibet's foreign relations, expired in June 1962.' Under these circumstances formidable arguments can be adduced in support of a basic reformulation of Indian foreign policy towards China inevitably involving a rethink of its border diplomacy.³³⁴

Another extraordinary piece of evidence has recently emerged suggesting that India's recognition of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet may have occurred as the result of an error or of deliberate intention. Nehru made it clear that he accepted the position inherited from the British that India was prepared to recognize some kind of general Chinese *suzerainty* over Tibet with the clear understanding that the Chinese would not interfere in Tibetan affairs. Neither Britain nor India had however recognized Chinese *sovereignty* over Tibet but it seems that the word *sovereignty* was used *by mistake* and was traced to inadvertance in the transmission of a coded message.³³⁵ A corrigendum did follow this mistake (or mischief) but the Indian ambassador to China, K.M. Pannikar, who was himself pro-


Chinese, did not inform the Chinese *formally* that a mistake had been spotted and corrected on the grounds that it would mean discomfort for the Indian Government. H.E. Richardson, analysing this incident, refers to Chinese claims that, in an aide memoire dated August 26th 1950, the Indian ambassador referred to Indian acknowledgement of Chinese sovereignty over Tibet, rather than the much more general appellation of suzerainty. He considers it unlikely that the Indian Government would have authorised the use of the word sovereignty and wonders if the Chinese themselves substituted one word for another as they appear to have done on a later occasion.³³⁶ It is still not possible to explain how this subtle, but extremely important, shift occurred. One wonders what the relationship was between the coded message referred to and the aide memoire. Did Pannikar use the word sovereignty in that aide memoire, or did the Chinese themselves insert this word? A mistake was certainly spotted but the key to the mystery may lie in the fact that Pannikar did not *formally* inform the Chinese that the mistake had been seen and corrected, which presumably means that he mentioned it casually or in passing? What is one to make of his explanation that a formal disclosure would cause embarrassment for the Indian Government when, as ambassador, he must have realised that lack of positive action on this matter would expose India to grave danger along the perilous northern borders?

It is difficult to avoid the impression that Pannikar's mistake, or miscalculation, may have been attributable to his pro-Chinese sentiments and the possibility of a deliberate distortion cannot be excluded. Whatever the explanation this critical incident resulted in a noiseless sundering of Indian and Tibetan destinies and at a stroke it consolidated China's hold on Tibet to an extent that the Chinese Government would probably have thought impossible a year earlier. There seems little doubt that K.M. Pannikar played a crucial role in facilitating the destruction of Tibet since in 1954, as a result of this paradox which undermined the Indian negotiating position, India relinquished certain rights in Tibet without receiving anything in return,



Gaden—Third largest Monastic University in Tibet and the World, before destruction. (Photo: OIIR, Dharamsala)


Gaden—After destruction by Chinese. Gold, silver and other precious image and relics stolen or destroyed. Countless books and paintings burnt. Since 1988 a part of it has now been rebuilt by Tibetans (Photo: Nawang Chophell)





THE CHANGING LANDSCAPE IN TIBET—Bare Hills in *Ba*, Eastern Tibet. As a result of massive deforestation by China during the past 30 years, vast tracts of rich forests have been completely wiped out. Beyond the immediate danger of flooding and landslides, it is feared that continued deforestation will drastically alter the fragile ecology of Tibet and affect the pattern of the Monsoon Winds. This can spell disaster for millions of people in South and South East Asia. Many rare species of plants and trees—some with medical properties—have already been lost.
(Photo Lakha Rinpoche)






Manganese Mining in Tibet. Exploitation of Tibet's vast mineral resources is high on China's priority list. In addition to gold, copper, coal, iron, tungsten etc., China has announced the discovery of the world's largest uranium deposits in Tibet.

"TIBETAN'S RIGHT - FREEDOM, DEMOCRACY"

Photo taken in front of the Beijing Hotel at the entrance to the Tiananmen Square during the Democracy Movement (Photo Phillip Colev)





Lhasa under Martial law. There is an overwhelming military presence in the city. There are check-posts at all roads leading into Lhasa and numerous check-posts within the old Tibetan quarters of Lhasa. Troops in trucks and armoured vehicles also regularly patrol Lhasa. (Photo TIN, London)



Chinese troops patrolling Lhasa. This method of displaying military strength is regularly used to intimidate the public before major events when the Chinese expect the Tibetans to demonstrate. Other methods of intimidating the public include mass show-trials and summary executions and arrest of suspected leaders. (Photo TIN, London)



Lhasa, October 1987. Tibetan pro-independence demonstrators burn Chinese vehicles and a police station where monks who had demonstrated on 27 September 1987 were being held. Since then a series of pro-independence demonstrations have rocked Lhasa and other parts of Tibet, including areas in Amdo and Kham. Demonstrations have increased in intensity with more and more Tibetans being shot and killed or imprisoned and subsequently tortured in prison. (Photo Int'l Campaign for Tibet, Washington)





Large crowd surrounding 3rd Fact Finding Delegation sent to Tibet by the Dalai Lama in June-September 1980. Chinese authorities were so shocked by the overwhelming display of enthusiasm by the people to the Dalai Lama's delegates that they terminated the tour of the Second Delegation.
(Photo OIIR, Dharamsala)

A Village in Tibet today: Contrary to Chinese propaganda, for these children there is no school and no future.





A Khampa, from Eastern Tibet, being arrested in the streets of Lhasa. Summary arrests and imprisonment occurs after every political unrest. After arrest the police severely beat up and torture victims to extract confessions or information (Photo TIN, London)



Chinese police interrogating a Tibetan nun. The length of her hair testifies to a long detention. Many reports of torture in prison have been submitted to Amnesty International, SOS Torture, Asia Watch and others. Methods regularly used include using electric cattle prodders on private parts; letting loose hungry dogs on naked nuns; hanging for long hours by the thumbs or upside down; being made to stand naked in cold rooms during winter etc. (Photo Tibet Information Network, London)

neither recognition of Tibet as a buffer zone, nor agreement on the border (still not reached some 35 years later) nor even Chinese goodwill.

If all this is true then it lies within India's power to rectify this mistake now because the Chinese violated the Panchsheel agreement of 1954 when they embarked upon a fullscale occupation after 1959 in clear violation of their promise to respect Tibetan autonomy. It seems likely that the Chinese consistently accused the Indians of harbouring aggressive designs on Tibet in order to justify their violation of the Panchsheel agreement, and their subsequent occupation of Tibet. Tibetans add that whatever various countries might have thought about it they were in fact independent from 1913-'50 and that they only lost their independence because they suffered a military defeat and that the occupation of Tibet violates the principle of self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter, and is an example of Chinese imperialism which contrasts strongly with the example of peoples who were given and achieved their independence during the break up of the European empires. Interestingly enough, Tibetans add that those arguing against Tibetan independence from China refer only to the obscure manoeuvrings of various countries decades ago and to semantic questions such as the aforementioned example. *They never mention the undoubted desire of the Tibetan people for independence as demonstrated by the 'Twenty Years War' and by the continuous pro-independence demonstrations of 1987, '88 and '89.* However, when these people discuss the question of (say) Namibian independence, they invariably refer to the legitimate aspirations of the Namibian people for independence from South Africa and if they draw attention to the attitudes of the various countries who were originally responsible for the creation of Namibia following the First World War, it is only to roundly condemn them for giving the territory to South Africa in the first place. They place enormous stress on the right of the oppressed Namibian people to independence, *but maintain a curious silence when such arguments are extended to encompass the right of the Tibetan people to independence from China,*

and only refer to obscure treaties made long ago thereby reducing the question of Tibetan independence to an historical abstraction.

Today many prominent Indian politicians and policy makers feel that Nehru's Tibetan policy was misguided from the very beginning. They point out that Nehru even allowed the Chinese Governor General of Tibet to enter that country through Yatung in India, add that the Chinese propaganda barrage which stated that western imperialists were about to invade Tibet or that India was harbouring aggressive intentions against China were absurd since India, still reeling from the convulsions of partition, and was preoccupied with what it considered to be the threat posed by Pakistan. They ask if it was really conceivable that Nehru was planning to create a huge army which would then march across the Himalayas on a thousand mile journey across innumerable and formidable mountain ranges to attack China? India only possessed a small army as distinct from the Chinese who had been fighting for nearly 20 years, and that is probably why he was so conciliatory to them. When, finally goaded beyond endurance by Chinese intransigence, he sent Indian troops into disputed territories in 1962, the Chinese were strong enough to inflict a sharp defeat upon the Indian armies. But it is likely that had Nehru acted in so decisive a fashion a few years earlier the Chinese would have done little or nothing as they were not strong enough to respond. As for the Chinese contention that western imperialists were in Tibet such critics of Nehru's policy add that there were only a handful of Westerners in Tibet in 1950, and all they wanted to do was to get out.

It is also a fact that Nehru prevented the outside world from learning the full truth about Tibet since he did not wish to embarrass the Chinese or to prejudice the possibility of some kind of rapprochement with them. K.M. Pannikar received many hundreds of telegrammes from Lhasa during the long crisis yet they did not see the light of day and Tibet's tragic plight went almost unreported. These actions were not those of an aggressor. Seminars have been organised during the last few years on the topic of India's Tibetan policy and many res-

pected figures such as A.P. Venkateshwaran, former Indian Foreign Secretary, P.N. Kaul, the last Indian Consul-General in Lhasa, Professor Sondhi of the Jawaharlal Nehru University, Col. R. Rama Rao of the Birla Institute of Scientific Research, and P.K. Thungon, former Chief Minister of Arunachal Pradesh and latterly deputy Education Minister in the Union Cabinet, have criticised India's past and present policy on Tibet and have stated that India should now recognize the independence of Tibet in order to restore some consistency to her policy.³³⁷

During his talk P.K. Thungon apologised for his silence when in office, adding that he had been obliged to follow the government line. As mentioned above the Chinese have laid claim to some 33,000 sq. miles of Arunachal Pradesh and have offered to relinquish this claim only if the Indian Government accepts the legitimacy of the Chinese occupation of some 14,500 sq. miles of the Aksai Chin. Arunachal Pradesh is a remote and almost inaccessible area of N.E. India close to the Burmese border and the Indian Government has reacted by conferring statehood upon it, thus consolidating its identity within India, to the accompaniment of a chorus of vituperative Chinese protests.

Morarji Desai, former Prime Minister of India, has stated that Nehru's position on Tibet was 'dubious' and has claimed that his policy while in power was to recognize Tibet as independent. "Tibet must not be with China and India should also have no ambition about it." He also added that if the Tibetans give up their demand for independence they 'will be nowhere.'³³⁸ These facts show that India's policy towards China is not without its critics and Rajiv Gandhi's visit to Beijing to discuss border issues, among other matters, gave rise to considerable fears and it was frequently pointed out in the Indian press that the diplomatic preparation necessary for such a visit was largely lacking and labelled the visit an invitation to disaster. The Indian Prime Minister was clearly well aware of the Tibetan situation and the problem it poses to his country as his policy over Arunachal Pradesh demonstrates. During a visit to the Tibetan Self-Help Centre in Darjeeling in February 1987 he

stated that 'Tibetan culture was not safe in Tibet' and asked Tibetan refugees to retain their own culture.

It is admittedly not easy to disentangle the threads of Indian foreign policy towards China and it would seem that Nehru's policy of Appeasement has encumbered successive Indian administrations. The Tibetans have found to their cost that the Chinese do not hesitate to break their promises and successive Indian administrations have suffered as a result of Chinese perfidiousness. While constantly accusing the Indian governments of aggressive intentions an enormous arms buildup is continuing in Tibet and the Chinese do not hesitate to supply insurgent groups in India, particularly the Naxalites in the north east and AK 47 Chinese rifles and other munitions have been unearthed in the Punjab and in the West Bengal district of Darjeeling.³³⁹ Consequently relations between these two great Asian states are becoming increasingly fraught and the border situation receives far less media coverage than its importance merits.

Rajiv Gandhi is undoubtedly aware of a point made by Mr. M. C. van Walt, legal advisor to the Tibetan 'Government in Exile' that not only the numbers of Chinese troops stationed in Tibet, but the numbers of settlers, probably in excess of 7 million, belie Chinese assertions about Tibet being an 'autonomous region'.³⁴⁰ He states that in the past the Chinese had to transport supplies to Tibet across huge desert, the Chang Thang, without any rail links or appreciable air transport, and had to contend with a potentially hostile Tibetan population (who had mounted a huge rebellion in Lhoka some 10 years after the Lhasa Uprising in 1959) and the possibility of armed insurgency or sabotage. Now, however, the situation is being transformed. Soon the Chinese government will be able to rely on millions, newly settled in the border regions adjacent to India, to act as a formidable counter-weight to local Tibetan pressure but, even more ominously for the Indian government, ease of communications and transport could result in an overflow of Chinese into the enormous empty wastes of northern India, some of which are difficult to defend and whose borders,

as pointed out above, are not clearly delineated.

The Chairman of the Tibet Society, UK, Mr. William Peters, C.M.G., L.V.O., MBE, who had a long and distinguished career in the British diplomatic service writes: “the pattern of encroachment and colonisation in Tibet conforms with the classical pattern of Chinese absorption followed for thousands of years, fuelled always by the rising tide of Han population. First advance groups of Chinese move into areas beyond their established line, frequently supported by official exhortation and subsidy; then claims begin to be made on the areas occupied by the Chinese settlers; next the boundaries are called into question leading to reshaping and carving up the disputed areas, with parts detached to be merged in areas where Han are already in the majority; the so-called Autonomous Regions which remain are designated by the name of the original people—Mongol, Manchu, Tibetan, Turkmeni—but continue to be infiltrated until they are more Chinese than autochthonous: finally the system of education and political control is brought into play to allow the most senior and sensitive jobs only to those who are fully qualified in the Chinese system, whether Han or non-Han. This last tends to ensure that a new political elite draws in the best of the indigenous people, thus reducing the strength of irredentism...”³⁴¹

An African delegate at the United Nations Human Rights Commission, Geneva, referred to the dangers for India of a ‘new Chinese lebensraum’ and it is certainly in India’s interest to use her influence to terminate the transfer of Chinese population into Tibet and to solve the Tibetan problem by having it designated as a ‘zone of peace’ as advocated by the Dalai Lama and supported in the US Tibet Bill of 1987.³⁴² This proposal has also been supported by a cross party section of 212 Indian MPs.

However, it has to be admitted that the Indian Government seems unlikely to secure this objective as long as it retains its present policy towards China and to the border question. Eight rounds of border talks between India and China since 1981 have achieved virtually nothing and the Chinese attitude

has sometimes been intransigent. For example, when the Chinese claimed part of Arunachal Pradesh and the Indian Government responded by granting it statehood, which was further consolidated by a visit of the Indian Prime Minister, the Chinese protested strongly. But when the Indian Government objected to the Chinese advance into the Sumdo rong-Chu valley the Chinese replied that the Indian attitude was 'not conducive to successful talks'. It was difficult to resist the conclusion that the visit of Rajiv Gandhi to Beijing was unlikely to be successful unless the Indians prepare their position with the extreme care and there was little indication that this was being done. It may be to India's advantage to point out that India's present recognition of Tibet as being part of the Chinese state has been unaccompanied by any reciprocal understanding from China in that China does not recognise Sikkim and Arunachal Pradesh as part of India, holds large chunks of Indian territory, and supports Pakistan on the Kashmir question. The Indian Government could also raise the question of Chinese military aid to Pakistan which may include nuclear expertise. It is believed that the Chinese conducted one of Pakistan's nuclear tests at Lop Nor and that they gave Pakistan the blueprint for an atomic bomb in return for Pakistan's expertise on modern uranium enriching technology.³⁴³ This issue should have been discussed and only when there was some progress should a full-scale summit be envisaged. The problem for Rajiv Gandhi was that if he visited Beijing under these conditions, with the little preparation and in an undoubtedly weak position vis-a-vis the border question, the Chinese would see him as a supplicant in accordance with their ancient view of the world, which still characterises their attitude in international relations, and supplicants gain little from the Chinese.³⁴⁴

It seems clear that the long and troubled question is probably the most serious external crisis faced by the Indian Government. Whatever the deficiencies of Indian foreign policy on this question it is possible to sympathise with the annoyance of members of the Government when they are confronted with international protests about the size of their armed forces,

expanded largely to meet the Chinese threat, and find those making such protests do not favour the enormous Chinese armed forces with their attentions too. Similarly Indian bewilderment is understandable on the question of Chinese membership of the UN Security Council. India is a country at least as powerful as China and its economy is arguably far stronger as it was not damaged by the convulsions of a 'Cultural Revolution' and Indians ask why their country should not also be a member of the Security Council. Indian external problems with China are also reflected on the home front. Whatever political defects the Indian political system possesses, it is nevertheless the world's largest democracy and it has both the strength and the weaknesses of the democratic system. It is far more open than the Chinese political system as a result the Chinese have not hesitated to avail themselves of opportunities for gaining support from among Indian politicians and businessmen. The India-China (Friendship) Society was founded in 1950 and it fosters close political and commercial links with China and there would seem to have been considerable corruption involving trade with China which resulted in one Chinese agent being executed. Some MP's who are closely associated with the Society visited China and became vociferous supporters of the Chinese in the Indian Parliament, particularly with regard to the Tibetan question, and Subramanian Swamy is probably the best known example. The Indo-China Society claims that 50 big industrialists are associated with it, and at a time when the Indian Government was denouncing Chinese 'cartographical aggression' reflected in recently produced maps showing large areas of India (and other neighbouring countries) as being part of China, and in which even Sikkim, Arunachal Pradesh, Jammu and Kashmir, were specifically separated from India, the India-China Society allowed Chinese ambassadors to India, such as Ju Ku Weil and Lei Linni, to voice Chinese claims to the Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. Though this allegation was later denied by the President of the Delhi section the speech itself caused a considerable stir in Delhi political circles at the time.³⁴⁵

The activities of such societies prove worrying to the Tibetan

'Government in Exile' and to Tibetans in India generally. Although the Indian Government has given great help to Tibetan refugees, some Tibetans point the almost casual way in which India sanctioned Chinese claims to their country and point out that they are sometimes used as political pawns in India's propaganda struggle with China. For example, the Indian Government made a public statement deploring the Dalai Lama's activities in October 1987, following his denouncement of Chinese oppression in Tibet, while in fact no expression of displeasure was made to him or to his entourage.³⁴⁶ Many other examples of similar behaviour could be cited.

It seems clear that the Chinese Government is putting considerable pressure on the Indian Government, both internally and externally, to resolve the Tibetan question on its own terms and as has been pointed out the Indian Government has allowed itself to be manoeuvred into a position where it is placed at an extreme disadvantage. Many Indian politicians and political analysts consider that India's only practical option, which will transform the complex border issue, is to recognise the Tibetan 'Government in Exile' and restore a consistency to its position which is almost entirely lacking at present. They ask why the Indian Government supports Palestinian claims to self-determination, but not similar claims advanced by the Tibetans. They add that some forty years dealing with the Chinese has proved almost entirely unproductive and that the Asian equivalent to 'fearing the Greeks bearing gifts' is 'never trust the Chinese smile' and it could be remarked that on this analogy there have been few if any gifts for India from China.

It seems possible that the Indian bargaining position vis-a-vis Tibet has been somewhat improved by the recent death of the Panchen Lama who was often used by the Chinese Government as a counterweight to the authority of the Dalai Lama.³⁴⁷ A somewhat bolder Indian diplomacy might entertain the suggestions made by Lord Avebury to the effect that the Tibetan question should be raised at the Security Council and a special UN Rapporteur on Tibet should be appointed, whose function would resemble the Rapporteur for Afghanistan.³⁴⁸

China's present internal convulsions, involving enormous country-wide protests, may ultimately result in a softening of their stance on the border question. At the present time the initiative may be said to lie with India and an opportunity may exist to redress the damaging effects of a misconceived policy.

As is well known a grave political miscalculation or a misguided and erroneous policy can often be reflected or crystallised or aptly expressed with one particular example and the mistakes of Indian policy on Tibet may be perfectly illustrated by the fact that the Dalai Lama, who still stands at the centre of the protracted Tibetan crisis, has never been invited to live in Delhi, the nerve centre of the Indian political scene, but has been effectively banished to Dharamsala which is a small town in N. India far from Delhi. Indian commentators, critical of their Government say that this symbolises perfectly the consistent wrong emphasis that has characterised Indian policy towards China since 1949.

PART 5

DETHRONING THE DRAGON— FACTS VERSUS MYTHS

A Comparison of the Achievements of the Chinese and Russian Revolutions

A comparison between the achievements of these two revolutions could be the subject of several volumes, but a number of very important facts fall within the ambit of this report and can give a valuable perspective upon this question. Without necessarily sympathising with communism as such, or identifying in most respects with the Soviet Union (or with any other great power) it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the achievements of the Chinese are considerably *less* than those of the Russians. The topicality of this analysis is heightened by the present convulsions in China caused by economic and political failures.

Lenin took power in 1917 and there followed some 4 years of civil war and only in 1922 could it be said that his power base was secure. Nineteen years later in 1941 the Soviet Union was fighting for its life against the Nazi war machine, and was able to oppose Hitler with huge and well-equipped armies as well as with extensive guerrilla warfare. During those 19 years an industrial base had been laid in Russia which had involved a frightful and probably unnecessary waste of life. Nevertheless, as Sir Winston Churchill remarked, 'it was the Russians who tore the guts out of the German army'. By 1957 some 35 years after the end of the Russian Civil War the Soviet Union had launched the first sputnik, much to the consternation of the

USA, and by the early 1960's it was clear that the Soviet Union was challenging the USA on the economic front and was well on the way to establishing a military equality with the USA.

Mao Tse Tung took power when the civil and interventionist war ended in 1949 and if one compares the Chinese example to that of the Russian there seems little doubt that China suffers considerably. Nearly 40 years after the establishment of a communist regime in China that country remains a middle ranking power whose people are still extremely poor, current average income only being around £180/- per year and taking economic factors into account it seems unlikely that China will count as a great power until well into the next century. This contrasts with the Soviet Union whose per capita income averages £2,739/-. These two figures surely speak for themselves.³⁴⁹ It is probably correct to say that the Chinese seemed to be on a promising path until the mid-1950's when Mao reversed Party Congress decisions and instituted the 'Great Leap Forward' which in fact came to be known as the 'Great Leap Backwards' and severely hampered attempts at systematic and large scale industrialisation as the communist correspondent Alan Winnington pointed out. The 'Cultural Revolution' (1966-1976) once again initiated by Mao, threw China into anarchy, bordering upon civil war for 10 years and it would probably be correct to say that the revolution in China has been set back by some two decades because of these events. *Had such indescribable chaos characterised conditions in the Soviet Union in the 1920's and 1930's there is no doubt that the Nazi invasion would have been successful and it seems most probable that if the Soviet Union, or any other great power had attacked China in 1969 during the 'Cultural Revolution' 19 years after the coming to power of the communists, with the intention of destroying China as a country, little effective resistance could have been mounted by the Chinese armed forces, other than guerrilla warfare.* The Chinese army was involved in sporadic border incidents with the Soviet forces during this period but it could not have sustained a gigantic invasion of the kind endured by the Soviet Union in 1941. This is because some two decades

were squandered in China as a result of policies which seemed to many observers to be little short of collective insanity.

This analysis is further reinforced by the degree of devastation suffered by the Soviet Union during the Second World War. An enormous area of over 300,000 square miles was destroyed and all the country west of a boundary marked by Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad was reduced to ruins. The extent of the devastation was conveyed in Stalin's Order of the Day (18/7/'42) and it is not surprising that it seems tinged with desperation, caused not only by the enormous losses of men and material, but by the fact that if the Germans had reached and cut the Volga supply line they would be in a position to defeat Russia, having squandered this opportunity in 1941. Yet the German armies were encircled and thrown back and less than twenty years later the factories and industrial bases had been reconstructed. If one compares this example with that of the establishment or reconstruction of Chinese industry there is no doubt that China suffers greatly. The Second World War ended in 1945, and the Chinese Civil and Interventionist War ended in 1949. Twenty years later China was in the profound chaos of the 'Cultural Revolution', yet the Soviet Union had rebuilt its industrial base and was challenging the USA in terms of economic progress. Of course, certain reservations have to be borne in mind when one considers the above. Russian industry was not totally destroyed, as Stalin had always suspected that the Germans would one day attack Russia, and therefore a great deal of heavy industry was moved behind the Ural mountains and there is no doubt that Russian industrial experience and expertise was far in advance of China. Yet the fact remains that the Soviet Union rebuilt its shattered industrial base west of Leningrad, Moscow and Stalingrad, while the Chinese inflicted grievous wounds upon themselves during the 'Cultural Revolution' and proceeded to destroy or immobilise such industries as had been created or re-established and the convulsions of China during this period can be likened to the self-destructive antics of multitudes of lemmings. Had the Russians behaved in a similar fashion in the twenty year period

after the War then it seems likely that they might have dwindled to 'a rustic people of cave and dell' to use the phrase of a Russian economist speculating on the consequences for the Soviet Union if Gorbachev's policies fail.

As a result of these events China is today a middle ranking power whose economic base is far less developed due to extraordinary policies which were pursued for 20 years.³⁵⁰ It could be pointed out that the Chinese are developing fast in the technological sphere, but so are many other countries such as India, Malaysia, Japan, Taiwan and Brazil, and whatever reservations one may entertain about the political systems of some of those countries it is surely worth pointing out that none of them have endured anything remotely approaching the excesses of the 'Cultural Revolution' and have progressed independently of any communist ideology. *It is worth remarking upon as a matter of general observation, without maintaining any ideological stance, that many non-communist developing countries are far ahead of China today or have at least equalled whatever economic progress the Chinese have made, but without enormous loss of life and years of anarchy and turmoil.*³⁵¹

As was pointed out in the introduction, Malawi, one of the poorest countries in Africa, has a per capita income equalling that of China (£180), and Burma, whose economy has virtually stagnated for decades, still has a substantially higher per capita income than China. Kenya has a per capita income three times that of China and a considerable number of African countries have made better economic progress than China and have frequently shown a greater capacity to organise their own affairs. Hong Kong and Taiwan are far ahead of China in terms of per capita income, and of course Japan has become a byword for efficiency and success.

Even today this kind of perspective is not generally applied to the Chinese example and there is no doubt that when other developing countries are compared to China one is left with a sense of bewilderment that so many years have been squandered and praise of the Chinese example can sound rather hollow. Just as a host of factors and extenuating circumstances have

been responsible for obscuring the appalling human-rights record of the Chinese, so it seems that Chinese poverty and economic backwardness often escape general attention and it would once again seem that a now fading infatuation with China is revealing decades of loss and inefficiency, allied to dogmatic ideology and a huge sprawling bureaucracy. One reason why the Chinese are experimenting with components of a capitalist economy is because their former communist economic policies have failed, in much the same way as Lenin introduced the New Economic Policy, which was designed to offset the defects of Marxist planning and 'army socialism'. Efforts have been made to blame a succession of catastrophes in China on the withdrawal of Soviet technicians and advisors at the outset of the long ideological dispute beginning in 1960, but it is difficult to resist the conclusion that this merely exacerbated an already deteriorating situation. In the ensuing ideological debate the Chinese generally fared worse and it is worth remembering the comment of the Indian historian Amir Jasbir Singh that 'the Chinese view communism as a means for making China great again but the Russian Revolution was based upon intellectual foundations which were European in origin'.³⁵² There does not seem to have been any question of the Chinese state 'withering away', and whatever debate there may have been about this Marxist tenet, seems to have been rather low key when compared to the bitter and prolonged controversy which was to be found in the Soviet Union, in the 1920's between Stalin and Trotsky. However, it cannot be said that communism has made China great but it has been harnessed to the cause of nationalism and has served to consolidate deep seated racism.³⁵³

There are many examples which could be cited illustrating that the Chinese are a gifted people possessing enormous organisational abilities and this is clear from the achievements of Chinese in Hong Kong, Taiwan and in the commercial activities of the Chinese communities in Malayasia, the Philippines and other parts of Asia. A recent programme dealing with Hong Kong compared the economic situation of a professional bank employee in Hong Kong and that of his counterpart in main-

land China. *The income of the Hong Kong employee was £3,000 per month and his Shanghai equivalent made £80 per month. This latter sum included the income of the wife who worked in an assembly plant which was mostly idle for lack of components. The income of the Hong Kong employee was over 37 times greater than his mainland counterpart.*³⁵⁴

The gifts and abilities of the Chinese people have scarcely been in evidence since the communist takeover and the current wide-spread protests invariably include denunciation of a stagnating economy, lack of economic opportunity and inflation caused mainly by the failure of the government's economic reforms and the corruption arising largely but not entirely from them. Enterprising initiatives still have to survive the attentions of a deeply entrenched Party bureaucracy at least as formidable as the Soviet example, and whose roots penetrate deeply into Chinese history to the age of Confucius, as do so many current attitudes of mind, particularly their outlook towards foreigners which is often condescending, their racism, and their contempt for 'minority nationalities', and their exploitation of them, and this is particularly the case with Tibet and with the Moslem peoples of E. Turkistan (Sinkiang).

A good example of the stifling effect of the Chinese bureaucracy was recently shown on Channel 4 in a programme entitled *Equinox 'Cold Spring'* which dealt with the experiences of Joan Hinton and Sid Ernst, two Westerners who had settled in China and were very critical of Chinese planning.³⁵⁵ They often used the phrase 'ding ching' which means that everything is decided at the top level and later modification is excluded. A good example of this was the manufacture of jeeps without winches in areas which were swampy and treacherous. Winches were necessary for jeeps operating in such areas, but lack of feedback and interaction denied the drivers equipment they needed. The two Westerners pointed out that this is an example of a centuries old Chinese mode of thought in which decisions are taken from afar by flawless rulers and not subject to modification in the light of changing circumstances. This helps explain much about the non-development of the Chinese economy

over a period of many years. Some people who were students in the mid-1960's and who enthusiastically supported the 'Cultural Revolution' when university campuses rang with the bold assertion 'just wait until you see what the Chinese will achieve in ten years!' could only sit back and gasp when they watched this programme for it was like reliving a previous incarnation (not necessarily a successful one). With a dawning sense of *deja vu* they beheld smiling Chinese workers improvising dairy equipment, together with various recent Chinese inventions whose counterparts had long existed in many other parts of the world. It was as though time had stood still in China, but these middle aged ex-students realised that time had certainly *not* stood still for them! To some of those watching this programme and remembering the passage of those years it somehow recalled the phrase 'forever amber', the green light seems never to have shone.

Equally stunning to those former admirers of the Chinese example was the disclosure made by Joan Hinton that in the 1950's Chinese scientists declared that because bacteria were too small to see they did not have to be taken into account in medical theory and practice. It was in these years and during the 1960's that supporters of China were praising Chinese medicine and its supposed advances but it is now known that the 'barefoot doctors' frequently had an appalling record of failure and it has become clear that a form of medical apartheid is being practised in Tibet (see section entitled *Health, Hospitals, Abortions and Sterilisations*).

All this stands in stark contrast to the Russian medical record of the 1920's and 1930's and it was during this period, as has been remarked, that the economic foundation was laid which played an important part in defeating Nazi Germany. No such strong economic foundation has yet been laid down in China.

It is a frequent complaint among those studying the Chinese example that it often takes an enormous amount of research in order to state the obvious and this is because it is necessary to dispossess oneself of so many deep preconceptions about Chinese progress and behaviour since the communist regime

came to power in 1949. One still encounters a deep resistance to criticism of China even when it is supported by facts and examples and even today some people are only too willing to applaud apparent Chinese successes in various spheres while far greater Russian successes in industry, medicine, or ecological preservation are belittled or ignored. Once again this does not necessarily mean that one is an admirer of Russian communism, or indeed of Russian culture generally, but it does illustrate the extent to which critical faculties are often suspended when the subject of China arises.

For example the Chinese economy is growing at about 10% a year which sounds impressive until one remembers that it is starting from a very low base. Such a growth rate would be stunning in the case of the USA or Britain but it is far less noteworthy in an economy which still has so far to go and which is, in most respects, still at a very basic level. Those who are loud in their support of this supposed economic progress would presumably object to a statement made by the British Government in 1987 to the effect that 'British manufacturing output is at its highest for nearly 8 years' which sounds impressive until one remembers that until a few weeks before such statements were made British manufacturing output had, for the previous 8 years, been *below* the level achieved in early 1979. Such a statistical wariness needs to be applied more frequently to the Chinese economy and its development.

When interviewed on the *News at Ten* programme during the hunger strike in Tiananmen Square Mr. Edward Heath, former Conservative Prime Minister, pointed out that the Chinese economic performance was better than that of the Soviet Union and that China had invested substantially abroad and had a far better agricultural performance than its huge neighbour. The latter point is true but he did not add that the Chinese had to import large quantities of grain from abroad and he did not contrast the per capita income in each country. Had he done so viewers would have learned that the Soviet Union has a per capita income fifteen times greater than that of China and this would have cast the question of respective

economic progress into a somewhat different perspective. Equally, Dr. David Owen, when interviewed on the *Today* programme during the hunger strike made it clear that he regarded the Chinese economic performance as better than that of the Soviet Union. A comparison of per capita income would have been relevant here too, together with a passing mention of the fact that during the last few years the Chinese have had increasing access to Western technology, management techniques and investment which have been denied the Russians until recently, but are nevertheless lagging behind Soviet performance in most sectors except for consumer products. Even today the Chinese still benefit from this kind of 'blind eye' analysis on the part of politicians who should know better.

It should be noted that the Chinese are now beginning to criticise themselves for shortcomings in their economic performance. It has been claimed that up to 30 million workers, nearly a quarter of the total urban workforce, have little or nothing to do and spend most of their time playing chess or poker, racing on bicycles or watching television. This army of under-employed costs the state up to £8.5 billions a year in wages and benefits, equal to half the revenue received by the Treasury from taxes and profits from state owned industries.³⁵⁶ China's top oilfield is also facing its first deficit as the Chinese themselves admit. The Daqing oilfield in China's most northerly province of Heilongjiang, produces half of China's crude oil and the forecast deficit has been caused by rising production costs and the state's low purchase price of crude oil. In particular, output from the old oil wells has been at the rate of 4 million tons annually, forcing those in charge to drill more wells to maintain its production level and adding to production costs. Since 1983 Daqing has obtained 1.087 billion dollars in loans from the World Bank and the Export Import Bank of Japan to drill for fresh oilfields in the area.³⁵⁷

It would also seem that China's economic reforms, caused by years of self-inflicted wounds, are producing disaffection in the army, with morale being particularly low in 'border

regions' such as Tibet, with many new recruits being more interested in economic advancement than in soldiering, and it has been claimed that when new recruits are enlisted the localities organising conscription often ensure that those with a criminal record and with only a rudimentary education are recruited in order to lessen their own local problems. Such recruits appear to impair discipline among the ranks.³⁵⁸ It is also evident that the new atmosphere of relative freedom is a perilous one and the Chinese Government frequently calls crack-downs on student protests and accuses them of spreading 'reactionary ideas'. Such statements are generally a response to demonstrations for democracy and freedom by students from Beijing university and there have been a considerable number of recent examples of this.³⁵⁹ The Tiananmen Massacre marked the culmination of these protests. The most recent and impressive example of such a demonstration is the student demonstration in favour of greater democracy which began at Beijing University on 13/5/89 and was joined during the following week by hundreds of thousands of protesters from all walks of life, including off-duty soldiers and policemen, People's Deputies, workers from the countryside who were given free trips on the trains by railway employees, magistrates and factory workers. It is too early to say what the long term effects of this unrest, which has now spread to some twenty cities, will ultimately be.³⁶⁰ If the reform movement is successful it could result in increased liberalisation *in Tibet* but if it is crushed Tibet will suffer further and the citizens of Hong Kong are likely to depart in even greater numbers than is the case at present and there will be less chance of release for Hong Kong citizens imprisoned in China on political charges.³⁶¹ Now the blood-bath of Tiananmen Square has shocked the world.

There is little doubt that the Chinese are now in an extremely difficult position in increasing the momentum of their reforms and in revitalising their economy. This is because they have lost some 20 years development as a result of the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'Cultural Revolution' during the period extending

from the mid-1950's—mid 1970's. Mr. Gorbachev is undoubtedly having problems in his efforts to awaken the intensely conservative and inward looking Russian bureaucracy but his country does at least have a formidable economy and the capacity to rejuvenate itself from a secure economic base. His efforts to liberalise the economy and encourage individual initiative seem more likely to succeed because there has been a continuity of Russian economic development, whereas the Chinese are not only having to develop an economy that until recently has been ossified and stagnating but they are also plagued by a pronounced lack of technical expertise in many sectors of the economy caused by a 20 year hiatus in education. They also lack the technical ability to fully exploit the economic potential of such remote areas as Tibet, whereas the Russians are steadily utilising the resources of Siberia and other remote regions, despite various mishaps.

From this general survey it would appear that, whatever one's opinions on communist revolutions and their after effects, the Chinese have achieved far less than their Russian counterparts, and it would also appear that until recently the Chinese have derived an enormous benefit from a wide-ranging constellation of factors which have invariably worked to their advantage in the sphere of propaganda. When these factors are identified and peeled away one by one and one begins to see the Chinese regime without a host of flattering preconceptions the result is startling, and it becomes clear how decades of illusions have been generated and to what causes they owe their historical origin. These factors still work in favour of the Chinese in that their terrible human-rights record, particularly in Tibet, is only now receiving the degree of exposure it merits, while Russian human-rights abuses, both previous and current are rightly condemned throughout many parts of the world. These abuses which are undoubtedly immense *are nevertheless dwarfed by the scale of such abuses which have occurred in China since 1950, with particular reference to Tibet, and which are still occurring now.* It should be widely understood, on the basis of available evidence, that the Chinese communist regime

is still one of the most repressive in the world, as its tragic 'minority nationalities' know to their cost, that the Chinese still maintain the most densely populated gulag on earth in the province of Qinghai, formerly Amdo in N.E. Tibet, at a time when the labour camps of Siberia appear to be gradually emptying, and that their revolutionary era has been characterised by two decades of near anarchy during which time China might have fallen apart, either through pressure or through external invasion and there do not appear to be any definite reasons, given the ramifications of Chinese politics, why the 'Cultural Revolution', or something similar to it, could not happen again. All these factors surely give reasonable grounds for expressing grave reservations concerning the achievements of the Chinese Revolution, and the words of the late Hu Yao Bang, Communist Party Secretary, are worth remembering in this context when he stated that China had '*wasted twenty years*' because of Mao Tsetung's '*radical leftist nonsense*'.³⁶² The Tiananmen Massacre, the internal government cover up and the spectacle of young people being hunted down like beasts only reinforces the above conclusion.

Why should China behave differently to other countries?

The spate of revelations about events in China during the last 40 years, and in particular the crimes against humanity perpetrated in Tibet, are still registering upon the the rest of the world.³⁶³ Material which has become available since about 1980/81 now entails a major reassessment of the achievements of the Chinese Revolution and a massive indictment of sustained and continuing human-rights abuses involving cultural genocide (and in some cases actual genocide) committed against 'minority peoples'. As has been pointed out the 'Cultural Revolution', which really amounted to an internal holocaust, was responsible for 100,000,000 (one hundred million) casualties and this extraordinary phenomenon has inevitably precipitated a major reassessment of Chinese culture, the Chinese Communist regime, and perhaps even, insofar as one can generalise,

Chinese national psychology, since the existence of what is probably the single most catastrophic events of the 20th Century (including the Jewish Holocaust), calls into question stereotypes of Chinese wisdom, inscrutability, impassivity, organisational ability, implacable pursuit of objectives, calmness, patience, reasonableness, refusal to sanction extremes etc. In the light of current evidence of the anarchy and terror that ran riot throughout China for 10 years (1966–76) entails a major rethink by Sinologists and attempts by the Chinese to ignore the ‘Cultural Revolution’ or to minimise its effects should be resisted. It should also be remembered that the Chinese admit to over 700,000 arrests in 1983 in the ‘crackdown on crime’.³⁶⁴

It is clear that the Chinese have benefitted immensely from an unusual combination of factors which have served to obscure the nature of their regime and its excesses from the rest of the world, and these have only recently been identified and the emotional attachment invested in them by so many peoples is only now being dissipated by a remorseless procession of facts and testimonies. Exactly the same processes have been observable with reference to Stalin’s excesses in the Ukraine during the 1920’s and 1930’s and the Jewish Holocaust which even the Jews were at first reluctant to believe was actually happening.

Now that the picture is so much clearer it is reasonable to ask why the Chinese, who are a middle ranking power with pretensions to achieving great power status, should behave in a different fashion to any other country, past or present. Once it really did seem that the Chinese ‘Social Experiment’ was a moderate and temperate one, devoid of the excesses of Stalin’s Russia, but it is no longer possible to sustain this illusion. Both Russia and China subscribe to the Marxist/Leninist interpretation of history with its supposed objective of social equality, but it is only fair to point out that both these countries have used slave labour to an extent that the Pharaohs and Caesars would have perfectly understood. Stalin’s Siberia is equalled and possibly surpassed by China’s Qinghai and it will never be

known how many millions have perished in these two areas. The Moscow Metro was the product of slave labour and the Chinese use forced or slave labour throughout the enormous Xining area as well as in many other locations such as the borax mines of Tibet where at least 20,000 Tibetans died (see footnote 43). During the period of the 'Cultural Revolution' many millions of people starved to death but an exact figure will probably never be available. Bearing the above in mind there does not seem to be any good reason why the Chinese *should* in some rather mystical fashion, be outside and above the pressures, and realities of power that characterise the international scene generally, either in their internal or external policies.

It is correct to say that the wealth of Europe was at a particular period of history, based mainly upon the brutal exploitation of African slaves and the oppression of their own labouring classes, 'wage slaves on the work treadmill' as H.G. Wells once expressed it. Spanish oppression in South America is in the same class as Chinese oppression in Tibet, and numberless thousands of indigenous people perished in Spain's Potosi silver mines, which formed the basis of Spanish power for several centuries. The Arab peoples were also ruthless slavers and large areas of West Africa suffered from their activities and millions of Africans were worked to death or transported over a period of many decades. The areas which the Arabs penetrated in Africa during forays, were invariably converted to Islam, often with huge slaughter. When Islam was carried to the East across the deserts and across Central Asia, even to Indonesia, many millions perished by fire and sword and the Buddhist culture of East Turkistan (now renamed Sinkiang and oppressed by the Chinese) was wiped out and replaced by Islam, whose penetration extended across N. India and once threatened even Tibet. It could be argued that this is a form of religious imperialism whose effects are still with us today, which fully matches the colonialism of the Crusades. It should also be remembered that but for the bastion provided by the Byzantine Empire and the victory of Charles Martell (The Hammer) at Tours in +732

most, if not all, of Europe might have been forcibly converted to Islam and Christianity could have been wiped out or vastly diminished in power.³⁶⁵

The power of the European empires was built largely upon the ruthless exploitation of other countries and continents and British oppression of Ireland which resulted in the death of millions over a period of some eight centuries was particularly appalling and its legacy is with us today. The power of South American states is founded largely upon the ruthless expropriation of the indigenous Indian peoples and today, as the Brundtland Report makes clear, the developed countries of the world still exploit those less fortunate countries and plunder their economies. Wars of genocide are being waged in various parts of the world today notably by the Bangladeshis in the Chittagong Hill Tracts and by the Indonesian regime in East Timor and in West Papua (West Irian). That there are vast inequalities in the world today is not particularly surprising when one considers the long legacy of White oppression in so many parts of the world, but what is surprising is the selectivity with which exploitation and oppression is often reported. As has been pointed out, Tibet until recently provided a particularly glaring example of this but it is puzzling that the Indian Untouchable system which condemns tens of millions of people, many of them now turned Buddhists, to lives of depredation and misery receives little mention in the mass media. In many respects the Untouchable system for so long an important part of the Hindu stratification of society, is arguably as bad or even worse than Apartheid in South Africa, not only because it penalises a far greater number of people but because its roots are deeply embodied in distant history and despite Indian legislation, which is often ignored or circumvented, it remains an integral feature of the Indian social system today. This point was recently made on television by the co-founder of a small Buddhist sect which is at present working amongst Untouchables. It could also be pointed out that the huge tribal massacres which occurred in recent years in central and northern Africa seem to have received considerably less publicity than such

slaughter surely demands. It is also strange that Mauritania, probably the only slave state in the world today, whose very institutions are based upon slavery, seldom has to defend itself in UN fora and receives virtually no coverage or exposure in the world's mass media.³⁶⁶

History also provides various examples of small neutral powers who have behaved in a questionable fashion and a particular example is provided by Sweden who allowed Nazi troops travel facilities en route to their invasion of Norway and who supplied enormous quantities of iron ore to Hitler's Germany which helped prolong the War, and resulted in the deaths of numberless Allied and Russian servicemen who might otherwise have survived a war against one of the most barbarous regimes ever known. This list could be indefinitely extended but the central point remains that there are 'skeletons in the cupboards' of most countries and it seems surprising that Communist China should for so long have been exempted from the judgements which are passed upon most other countries at one time or another or was thought in some not very clear fashion, to be *different* from all other countries as though it had in some way abstracted itself from the pressures and expedients and realities of power that confront all other countries and which make them act as they do, (without wishing to use this as a justification for the often barbarious expedients that often seem to characterise international relations).

Somehow the many question marks now being raised against the Chinese have become centred upon the issue of Tibet and Tibetans will point out that Chinese rule has been largely characterised by massacres, torture, starvation, medical apartheid, racism (the dimensions of which recall the Nazi 'Master Race' mentality), forced sterilisations and abortions, devastating psychological oppression, cultural obliteration and huge Chinese influx which has grown to such dimensions that the Tibetans are now threatened with cultural genocide within a generation or so. Until recently many writers were only too willing to cloak such a legacy in the most extenuating phraseology which referred to 'Chinese mistakes in Tibet', 'the shortcomings of

Chinese rule', 'inefficiency and muddle', 'bad Han cadres', 'Beijing's misguided zeal', 'undoubted difficulties faced by the Chinese in Tibet', 'various economic inequalities still detectable between Han Chinese and Tibetans', 'self-serving and disrespectful attitude of the cadres', '30 years of uneasy relations between the Tibetans and the Chinese', 'the depressing arrogance of some Chinese in Tibet' etc. The list is endless and when one recalls that the experience of the Tibetans at the hands of the Chinese is in some respects comparable to that of the Jews under Hitler such phraseology appears hollow and uninformative *and it would not be tolerated if it was employed to describe the experiences of the Jews during the Holocaust.*

The Soviet Union, with its many non-Russian peoples is often described as an empire, Greater Russians only comprise about 40% of the population, and this may be the reason why, with certain significant exceptions, the Russian treatment of their nationalities has in general been more civilised than Chinese treatment of their 'minority peoples'. Tibetans consider China to be a modern empire too and point out certain significant facts concerning China's 'minority peoples'. In Russia the many different nationalities comprise about 60% of the population whereas in China the figure of 6% is a generally accepted one. This means that the Chinese can simply submerge them in a huge influx and exterminate their cultures with relative ease. In Russia, given the above statistics, this would be far more difficult to accomplish.

A point that is still insufficiently appreciated is that the designation 'minority people' is itself an example of Chinese semantic imperialism for many of these peoples fought and resisted Chinese incursions into their territories for many centuries. Furthermore at the time the communists came to power in China these 'minority peoples' occupied about 60% of the territorial landmass that constitutes Communist China today. The largest 'minority areas' occupied by the Chinese were Sinkiang (E. Turkistan), Tibet, Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria. All these areas had at one time or another fiercely resisted *Chinese aggression and if the Communist Chinese had*

*not occupied these territories present day China would be approximately 60% smaller than it is today. That is to say its present area would be less than 1,200,000 sq. miles (3,000,000 sq. kms) instead of being over 3,000,000 sq. miles (7,500,000 sq. kms). Furthermore it would have no border contact with India, Nepal, Bhutan, Pakistan, Afghanistan and N. Korea, and its border contact with the Soviet Union would be non-existent, if Manchuria, Sinkiang (E. Turkitan), and Mongolia had not been incorporated into China. It is correct to say that conflicts of one kind or another, or severe tension, has occurred on almost every frontier area occupied and subjugated by Communist China since 1949.³⁶⁷ The present borders have taken China into central, western, and eastern Asia, southern, central and eastern Russia and Northern India. Without the present borders, deriving from the occupation of 'minority areas' the Chinese landmass would be confined almost entirely to an area in S.E. Asia and its influence upon neighbouring countries would be vastly less than is the case today. Tibetans consider themselves justified in calling Communist China an empire because all these areas have been occupied on the basis of claims made by remote imperial dynasties, and the occupation of these areas not only contradicts the spirit of the great independence struggles of the 20th Century, but runs contrary to the principle of self-determination enshrined in the UN Charter. When the Chinese seek to justify these claims in international fora they refer to ancient treaties signed long ago and whose historical origins and reality are often highly tendentious. It would be as though present day Britain had occupied S. Ireland on the basis of treaties supposedly concluded with the kings of Ireland 800 years ago or attempted to reoccupy the United States on the grounds that it had once been part of 'the one big Motherland' the 'great family of all the nationalities'. and the fact that the US is separated from Britain by the Atlantic Ocean does not alter the case since China claims Taiwan. If Britain were to make such claims, or to reclaim the French territories occupied nearly one thousand years ago the rest of the world would probably be dumbfounded. But statements in the *China Daily**

to the effect that 'Tibet has been part of China for more than 700 years' are still almost unremarked upon, and this is largely attributable to the remoteness of the territories involved and lack of knowledge concerning the growth of the Chinese state and the kind of claims it makes not only upon 'minority nationalities' but upon its neighbours.³⁶⁸ On the basis of the above facts formidable arguments can be advanced suggesting that China is not only an empire, but is also a belligerent expansionist power whose empire has been consolidated at a time when the European empires were breaking up and oppressed peoples had at last gained their freedom. This kind of a perspective upon China is only gradually gaining ground today.

Striking analogies between the British treatment of Ireland and Chinese behaviour in Tibet have often been made and a similarity of terminology used by both powers is noticeable. For example, those who fought for Irish independence were frequently referred to as 'traitors' by the British and executed and in exactly the same way the Chinese execute those fighting for Tibetan independence and refer to them as 'traitors to the Motherland'. Sir Roger Casement was termed a 'traitor' by the British and we read in W.B. Yeats prophetic poem that 'The Ghost of Roger Casement is beating on the door.' China is now discovering to its cost that 'the ghosts of a million dead Tibetans are beating on the door.'³⁶⁹ It could be said that at least S. Ireland fought for and gained its independence, whereas Tibet was crushed and the Chinese have not so far even acknowledged Tibetan independence as an option to be considered, but actually claim areas once controlled by Tibet which were separately delineated by the British.

The terrible suffering of other 'minority peoples' at the hands of the Chinese has only recently become clear. For example, the Chinese have long claimed the territory they refer to as Sinkiang, which means 'New Province'. This area was formerly inhabited largely by Turkic Moslems believed to number about 20 million who are now being swamped by a Chinese influx. Sinkiang (E. Turkistan) has a long and tragic

history of Chinese domination and two notable rebellions occurred in 1933 and 1944, both of which were defeated with Soviet assistance and it seems likely that Stalin feared the spread of unrest to oppressed Russian Moslems who share a common border with E. Turkistan.

Evidence now available strongly suggests that some 250,000 of these Moslem people have been killed by the Chinese since 1949, (the number may in fact be much higher), and that they have been subject to a form of oppression during these years fully comparable to that endured by the Tibetans.³⁷⁰ Not generally known is the fact that about 300,000 of these unfortunate people fled to the Soviet Union and that a further 100,000 are at present refugees in Turkey. Despite Chinese assertions to the contrary their culture, like that of Tibet, has been almost obliterated and Chinese attempts to rebuild parts of it, mainly for propaganda reasons, are a pale reflection of what it once was. In the late 1940's the Moslem peoples mounted a series of enormous rebellions against the Chinese which were repressed with great slaughter, yet a recent programme on BBC2 which dealt with some of the Chinese 'minority peoples' did not mention this rebellion, or give a clear insight into the continuing dimensions of oppression in this area.³⁷¹

It is undeniable that the world is full of examples of oppressed people or races or countries who have striven successfully or unsuccessfully for their independence and who have endured cruel oppression because of this. The Chinese, like many other countries, have not hesitated to act with utter ruthlessness and duplicity in order to stampout such independence movements in many parts of China, but particularly in Tibet and E. Turkistan (Sinkiang). Efforts to conceal the scale of human-rights abuses in these areas actually do a disservice not only to such oppressed peoples but to the reading public of many countries who are keen to learn the truth about China today. A recent programme on BBC TV1 acquainted viewers with the reality of Chinese oppression in Tibet today and included scenes of Chinese police brutally assaulting monks.³⁷²

There never was any reason to suppose that the Chinese would

behave differently to any other country when exercising their power, either internally or externally.

The Nuclear Option and the Arms Trade

The facts show quite clearly that China has behaved with great brutality towards her 'minority peoples' over a period of some 40 years and not merely during the period of the 'Cultural Revolution' (1966-'76). This inevitably provokes comparison with other wholesale atrocities, both past and present in other parts of the world, and provides evidence that China does not possess any special attributes which somehow emancipate it from the mainstream of international behaviour. It is a salutary fact that the bloodshed and carnage witnessed in China, particularly in Tibet, is comparable to that experienced by the Russian people under Stalin, or by those who suffered under Nazi rule. Far from the Chinese 'social experiment' commanding admiration, as it still does in certain quarters particularly among many sinologists, a formidable case could be made suggesting that *the efforts made by the Chinese communist rulers to organise their country since 1949 have resulted in a record of failure and destruction among the worst that the world has ever seen.* There are many other newly emergent countries who have organised themselves far more efficiently than Communist China and such examples are provided by Malaysia, Zimbabwe, Kenya, Egypt, Zambia, Malawi, etc. None of these countries have a record of human-rights abuses remotely approaching the excesses seen in Communist China, neither have they experienced the horrors of a 'Cultural Revolution'.

Record shows that in the international arena there is little to distinguish the Chinese from any other power who cherishes ambitions of reaching the status of a great power. Certain facts, which even now sometimes receive insufficient exposure, are worth commenting upon. For example, for many years the Chinese gave strong support to the Pinochet regime in Chile, providing it with much needed finance and political support. This policy was followed because the Chinese rulers seem to

have adopted the line that 'whoever is an enemy of the Soviet Union is a friend of China'. This policy was followed undeviatingly during the latter years of the Sino-Soviet split, particularly during the mid and late 1970's and was only re-evaluated during the early 1980's when relations between the Soviet Union and China became less hostile. Few if any supporters of China during these years mentioned the fact that China was aiding the Pinochet Junta, but they nevertheless loudly condemned the Chilean regime.

At the same time as it was lending this support China was engaged in a programme designed to give it a nuclear striking force. The Chinese, as has been pointed out, have a strong nuclear presence in Tibet, and during the past 30 years the Chinese have conducted some 34 nuclear tests and it is believed that the present Chinese inventory consists of about 1,245 fission and fusion weapons, and warhead boosters include short range, medium range, intermediate range and intercontinental range ballistic systems, including submarine launched systems. China has a newly operational three stage CSS-5 extended range multiple independent re-entry vehicle (MIRV), ICBM's which are believed to be capable of reaching Antarctica, the single stage, solid fuel, MIRN, Mod-CSS-2 IRBM and the liquid fuelled CSS-2/3 IRBM/ICBM systems and the CSS-N-3 two-stage solid fuel SLBM.³⁷³

Those supporting China's acquisition of a nuclear capability often respond that she has been threatened by the Soviet Union and by the USA and must therefore equip herself with such weapons. However, such people usually condemn the British nuclear deterrent saying that the British have armed themselves against the *perceived* threat from the Soviet Union, but the word *perceived* is not used when stating the Chinese position vis-a-vis the nuclear option. This is not to argue for or against the British nuclear deterrent, but simply to point out that those supporting China often employ a characteristic 'doublethink'. The fact that China has a nuclear weapons programme shows that she is acting in a similar way to other middle ranking powers such as Israel and Pakistan or South Africa that cherish similar ambitions.

Arms Exports

The export of Chinese armaments excites more comment in Asia than seems to be the case in Europe.³⁷⁴ The Chinese are now the fourth largest supplier of arms to the Third World and from 1984-1987 they received orders for an estimated \$5.2 billion. During recent years arms have been sold to Iran, Iraq, Syria, Saudi Arabia, Thailand, N. Korea and possibly to Afghan guerrillas. Silkworm missiles, exported to Iran, have also raised tension in the Gulf and a recent report of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Commission stated that China had provided \$1.4 billion worth of arms to Iraq and \$575 million to Iran. Pakistan is a major customer of the Chinese weapons industry and is engaged in an escalating arms race with India and so is Thailand, at present involved in a border conflict with Vietnam. So some of the Third World's trouble spots are being fuelled by the Chinese weapons exports. There is also evidence suggesting that the Chinese have supplied small amounts of arms to Libya.³⁷⁵

In the Middle East ballistic missiles such as the M-9 have been sold and they are capable of being easily adapted to carry poisonous gas and CSS-2 class surface to surface missiles with a range of about 2,200 miles have been sold to Saudi Arabia. At a time when the Western powers and Japan have placed an embargo on the export of ballistic missile technologies which was endorsed by the Soviet Union at the May 1987 summit, the Peoples Republic of China displays no such reservations. An estimated 40 Third World countries have been, are being, or have requested to be, supplied with cheap, reliable Chinese weapons, and at the same time the revenues from the arms export industry are being used to modernise China's already formidable armed forces. Tibet is China's nuclear cockpit and year by year China's nuclear technology is being improved and an increasing number of countries are being targeted with nuclear warheads.

In a sense there is nothing surprising that the Chinese are acting in such a fashion as an expanding arms trade is to their financial advantage and in this sphere, as in so many others,

the dynamics of international relations and internal pressures are inclining them towards certain policies and activities that characterise the international scene. What is surprising is the fact that supporters of China, including some sinologists, often gloss over these facts and still write and act as though there is something very special and unique about Chinese internal and external behaviour.³⁷⁶ Both communist and capitalist powers are subject to the expedients of international relations and there is no reason why China should be mystically exempt from such pressures or somehow beyond such patterns of conformity.

He Who Controls the Past Controls the Future

In this report an effort has been made to illustrate the extent to which the Chinese justify their policies, both at home and abroad *now* with reference to the past to an extent that other countries who deal with China are only just beginning to understand. There is no doubt that during the period of Western intervention culminating in the Boxer Rising and the fall of the Manchu Dynasty, the Chinese felt that in some sense their culture had failed them in that it had not prepared them to meet the challenge posed by the powerful countries who now intervened in their affairs with impunity.

To the intensely inward looking and conservative Chinese it undoubtedly seemed ironic that they had after all been compelled to import a foreign ideology in order to attempt to restore China's status in the world. But even the extremes of the Russian Revolution and the Civil War did not induce the Russian people to turn upon their own culture and destroy it, and neither did Lenin or any other leader advocate such a course. *The question has also been asked why, given the determined attempt to destroy almost every vestige of Chinese culture representing as it did a past legacy to be rejected, ancient attitudes of mind such as 'Tibet has always been part of China', deriving from the claims of ancient imperialist dynasties, were nevertheless retained.* If the past was indeed something to be rejected and

its cultural achievements obliterated, consistency would seem to demand that past claims on neighbouring territories should also be rejected as representing obsolete attitudes deriving from imperialism. In fact the opposite has happened and the communist regime has *justified* claims on areas such as Tibet with reference to the claims and assertions made by the imperial rulers of China, 'Sons of Heaven'.

Warren W. Smith has written lucidly about the reasons for this apparent paradox.³⁷⁷ Originally Chinese society was ethnically diverse and Chinese culture became the underlying unifying factor and displayed an enormous capacity to absorb foreign peoples with an amoeba-like thoroughness. But the Chinese could not employ this technique on peoples dwelling in areas beyond the fertile and easily cultivated loess soils which were the cradle of Chinese civilisation, and provided the agricultural basis for their society. These peoples of the Inner Asian steppes invariably defeated the Chinese in battle and they were forced to construct a system of alliances, and tribute leading to ultimate assimilation. As these peoples were ethnically different from the Chinese they were progressively submerged in Chinese culture and this ideology of cultural imperialism became part of Chinese national identity. Smith makes the point that because the Chinese were aware of no cultural rivals in East Asia this dogma became 'theoretically applicable as the political organising principle for the entire world' and the theory of the 'Mandate of Heaven' evolved by means of this theory 'Chinese culture became the very (and only) order of nature' and the hub upon which the world turned.

Inevitably China was seen as the centre of the world and these sino-centric attitudes of mind coloured foreign policy, as they do today. China's foreign relations were to be viewed as universal rule by China and only physical limitations set limits to this rule. But once the steppe peoples declined, communications links improved and communism was used as a philosophy to buttress Chinese state ideology, areas long claimed by China could at last be occupied.

While this process was continuing the Chinese often had to

impart a mythical or make-believe element in their foreign relations in order to convince themselves and others that their rule and their wishes always prevailed, even when this was not the case at all. When the steppe peoples defeated the Chinese in battle their good behaviour was bought by lavish gifts, usually silk. The nomads were 'allowed' to send trading missions, usually described as 'tribute'. Tribal rulers were able to gain rank and prestige by this arrangement but what they did not realise was that Chinese claims to sovereignty accompanied gifts to tribal leaders, and titles were bestowed upon them by which the Chinese then *and now* claimed authority over them.

Inevitably the Chinese are aware of the tendentious nature of their claims on so many areas and territories and this awareness is sometimes reflected in documents not intended for general scrutiny. For example, when the Chinese general Chao Erh Feng had subdued most of E. Tibet by 1911 his assistant took over after his death and drafted a document which was in transit to Peking when the revolution against the Manchu dynasty began. One paragraph states 'The frontier territory lies between Szechuan in the east and Tibet in the west, and bounded by the Kokonor Territory in the north and Yunnan Province in the south. It was formerly divided up into more than twenty native states and tribes, the inhabitants of which, while paying tribute to the Emperor *were not actually Chinese subjects....*' He then continues saying that this huge region, inhabited mainly by Tibetans,....'should be converted into a regular province which should be named Hsikang... By converting the frontier regions of Kham into a Chinese province we shall secure ourselves against territorial aggression.'³⁷⁸ Mao Tse Tung achieved this half a century later.

The Manchu dynasty (1644-1911) was disliked intensely by ethnic Chinese who had always looked upon the Manchurians as foreigners and barbarians. Warren W. Smith cites interesting evidence indicating Chinese wariness on this issue after the fall of the Manchu dynasty. Chinese officials of the former government undoubtedly realised that with the fall of the empress it would be difficult to maintain China as a state or composite

unit. Because of this the first President of the Republic, Yuan Shi-kai, requested in 1912 that a union be declared of the former *separate territories of the Manchu Empire : China, Mongolia, Turkistan and Tibet*, which these states should respect even though the Empire had ceased to exist.³⁷⁹ Tragically for the Manchurians they have today almost ceased to exist as a people due to the dimensions of the Chinese influx.

The two examples cited above could be supplemented by many similar ones, including Mao's writings on the right of 'minority peoples' to determine their own destinies and it is interesting to note the previously mentioned example of Geshe Lobsang Wangchuk, the Tibetan who was declared a Prisoner of Conscience by Amnesty International and who died recently due to ill treatment, actually argued for Tibetan independence using Mao Tse Tung's writings. Another interesting point is the fact that when 'minority peoples' remained outside the influence of Beijing they were often referred to as 'barbarians', 'savages', 'aggressors' and the Chinese phrase 'Shung Nu,' used to describe the Turkic peoples of E. Turkistan means 'barbarian slaves'. Once such peoples are ruled from Beijing such terms are usually discarded but racist attitudes remain and these attitudes are invariably expressed in a particular kind of condescending phraseology. A particular people then becomes the 'close relative' of the Chinese nation, or are 'protected' by their friends and 'helped', or they are 'taught the ways of civilisation', or the 'elder Chinese brother teaches his younger brother', a phrase particularly used in the case of Tibet. When such peoples were independent the Chinese emphasised their foreignness and outlandish qualities, but once subjugated, claims are made concerning their ethnic closeness to the Chinese, and they become part of the 'one big family of the Motherland'.

It is probably correct to say that most countries dealing with the Chinese have little or no comprehension of the deeply rooted nature of Chinese racism, probably far deeper than even that of the White Afrikaner, or of their firm conviction that all peoples wish to be civilised by Chinese culture regardless of

the origins, antiquity or the achievements of their own cultures in arts, literature or sciences. One of the most recent historical analogies would perhaps be the 'white man's burden, accompanied as it was by the fixed conviction that the culture of all colonised 'natives' was inferior and should yield to the benefits bestowed upon them by the largesse of the white man. At the same time these areas were drained of their economic wealth, much of which was transported to Europe. Tibetans complain that the Chinese have this attitude today and that Tibet too is being plundered economically.

H.E. Richardson writes that for the Chinese, history has... 'the features of a cult, akin to ancestor worship, with the ritual object of presenting the past, favourably amended and touched up, as a model for current political action. It had to conform also to the mystical view of China as the Centre of the World, the Universal Empire in which every other country had a natural urge to become a part.'³⁸⁰ However this attitude was severely undermined at the end of the 19th Century when the Chinese, suffered at the hands of the colonial powers, particularly the Japanese, and led to an 'obdurate irridentism' which led both Nationalists and Communists to claim, against all the facts, that Tibet had always been part of the Chinese fold and was longing to return to the 'one big Motherland'. This obsession with a doctored version of history was recently in evidence at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, during a conversation between Mr Tian Jin, the Chinese expert at the Sub-Commission and Tica Broch, the human-rights activist and translator. Mr Tian Jin....explained that "Tibet was a very remote place about which people knew very little" and proceeded to recount the now classical Chinese version of the history of Tibet. When he said it was the central Chinese government that had given the Dalai Lama's their title, I interrupted, saying everybody knew it was a Mongolian title. He calmly replied it had been 'given in Mongolian'! So I took the liberty of telling him that no one would believe that as even PRC publications before 1986 gave the correct version. 'He dismissed the issue saying, We'll leave that aside for now'. The fact is that the Chinese are invariably unwilling to admit *even now* that the

Mongols conquered them and that Chinese claims to Tibet derive from a time when both China and Tibet were part of the Mongol Empire, known as the Yuan Empire. Even though nearly one thousand years have passed since the incident described above, the full facts were still unacceptable to Mr. Tian Jin.

At a later time he refused to shake hands with another woman involved in the exposure of human-rights abuses in Tibet and ...One Chinese diplomat became furious seeing her card which bore the words "Why Not Independence?" "Why Not Independence?" he shrieked, "That's what you want isn't it? It should say International Campaign for Tibetan Independence!"³⁸¹ Having been on the receiving end of such attitudes for some 40 years it is not particularly surprising that the Tibetans regard them as prehistoric and completely out of place in today's modern world.

It is always important to remember that the Chinese adopted Marxism as a means of restoring China's greatness, not as a means of injecting a socialist component into their national psychology, whatever they may say to the contrary and the above examples give clear indications of this. Marxism has somehow coalesced with deeply ingrained Chinese attitudes towards other peoples and towards areas long claimed by China. It has frequently been observed that communist countries condemn imperialism as such but have frequently absorbed territories themselves using Marxist dialectics to rationalise their expansion and have then repeated mechanisms of class exploitation under the guise of 'liberation', which they have fiercely criticised as characterising capitalist behaviour. Communist China arguably has a far worse record in this respect than the Soviet Union and Tibet has provided the classic test case.

Tiananmen and Tibet : The end of Sinological illusions

It is worth pointing out that it is difficult, if not impossible, to find a single Sinologist who predicted that China would

crush the students in Tiananmen Square as a matter of certainty. Yet to 'old Tibet hands' the question was not *whether* the Chinese Government would crush the democracy movement, but *when* they would assault it with all the forces they could command. The great Sinologist Joseph Needham did not foresee this and declared '...I don't know what will happen to China now' and he has spent a lifetime studying Chinese culture. An article in the *Guardian* (10/6/89) summed it all up with the title *Accepted US Wisdom of US Sinologists Perished in Tiananmen*, and it would see that this conclusion could also be applied throughout Sinological disciplines generally.

A close analysis of the events leading to the Tiananmen Massacre, which began on the evening of Saturday 3rd June does not fall within the scope of this Report. However, its effects are likely to be so widespread and enduring, not only for the Chinese people, but in the way that China is perceived by the rest of the world, and possibly for the future of Tibet, that some observations must be made. While the point should not be over-stated it was Tibetan students who demonstrated in Tiananmen Square against police shootings in Lhasa in December 1988 and the constant riots in Tibet, many of which received considerable coverage in the Chinese media, may have played some part in generating a momentum and inducing an agitated and questioning state of mind on the part of some students and other Chinese people, making them more ready to question and to act. An interesting analogy is to be found in the fact that major disturbances in Ireland, which suffered so terribly under British rule in the 19th Century, frequently resulted in similar outbreaks among the exploited classes in Britain, and a similar parallel might be found between Tibet and China and it has probably occurred to some Chinese leaders that student appeals for democracy might easily have been expanded to include independence and self-determination for 'minority peoples' such as the Tibetans and Uighurs. (This seems to have happened when Chinese students confronted their embassy in Paris).

In the days before the Tiananmen Massacre many Chinese

students and people from other walks of life were interviewed on television and many times allegations of bribery, corruption, strongly entrenched nepotism.³⁸² Lack of democracy involving a government which did not represent the people and lack of press freedom and excessive bureaucracy were made.³⁸³ All these charges were graphically illustrated in a programme entitled 'We Love Rice, But We Love Democracy More', (Channel 4, 21/8/89, 9pm). People from all walks of life in China were interviewed, their faces blocked out for fear of reprisals, and a picture of extraordinarily widespread Party corruption emerged. One taxi driver stated 'the bureaucrats look after each other and taken all the perks for themselves', and 'life for them is heaven, for us it's hell!' The degree of nepotism now prevalent in China begins to suggest the creation of something tantamount to new dynasties and it seems possible that China is now ruled, or is likely to soon be ruled, by the equivalent of 'the 22 families' who largely control the destinies of Pakistan. It is difficult to see how a supposedly socialist system can be reconciled with such nepotistic practices, but it was quite clear from the interviews given by students that they were not challenging the idea of communism as such, but wished to see China working towards that objective untarnished by Party corruption and deeply entrenched nepotism.

Three important points concerning the tragic events in China are generally acknowledged. Firstly Deng Xiaoping and Li Peng and others, in power are evidently unable to see the enormous student protests, including the widespread support they received in many other parts of China, as anything other than *indiscipline* and they do not appear to be capable of understanding the fact that such demonstrations are the expression of grievances and represent articulate criticism of the way that Chinese society is being run. This seems to be because China's geriatric leaders identify *themselves* with the Revolution and a threat to *them* is seen as a threat to the Revolution.³⁸⁴ It was a salutary experience for those who believe, or once believed, in the Chinese 'social experiment' to see wide-ranging and spirited debates in the Soviet Union during the meeting of the Soviet

Congress of People's Deputies, while martial law was being reaffirmed in Beijing with the Long Marchers '...risen from their bath chairs to impose their will on would-be reformers' and returning '...like dinosaurs from the brink of apparent extinction to try to trample the democracy movement'.³⁸⁵ There is no doubt that Russia has forged ahead of China in this respect. Even President Marcos of the Phillipines did not fire upon demonstrators.

The second important point is the fact that some Chinese leaders simply use demonstrations as a means to remove liberals or liberal-minded people in the Government without paying any attention to the actual demands of the reformers. It now seems likely that Deng Xiaoping manipulated the Party apparatus in such a way that it hastened the departure of Zhao Ziyang, Party Secretary-General.³⁸⁶ And the prospect has to be faced that the formidable power of the 'Old Guard' and their younger and conservative minded supporters could result in a full-scale campaign against the liberal reformers throughout China which will inevitably jeopardise China's new economic reforms and it is known that prominent supporters of these new economic policies have already been arrested.

Inevitably the situation in Hong Kong has become extremely volatile since there is now a real possibility that China in 1997 may be in a state of political reaction with incalculable consequences for the people of Hong Kong where there have been mass demonstrations in support of those demonstrating in China.³⁸⁷ Even the British Foreign Office spoke sternly to the Chinese Government before the massacre on the dangers of repression, though their reaction after the massacre was predictably tepid and did not at first match the measures taken by President Bush, a former US ambassador to China.

The third important point lies in the extraordinary reassessment of China which is now occurring in many countries throughout the world. *One of the main points of this Report has been the fact that over a period of many years and for a variety of different reasons China has, until recently, received a most sympathetic media coverage both generally and with regard to Tibet and*

that this 'blind eye' coverage was not justified by the facts. Perhaps it is not too much to claim that the crimes against humanity perpetrated in Tibet, and what Neil Kinnock, Leader of the Opposition, also referred to as a 'crime against humanity' in Tiananmen Square has justified the evidence cited in this Report that China is an extremely repressive regime that has still not fully recovered from the massive self-inflicted wounds of the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'Cultural Revolution', and whose supposedly forward-looking policies were rooted more in illusions than in realities and always liable to be reversed at the stroke of a pen.

It is also noticeable that a sense of outrage is apparent among the public generally and this is probably because of the long and detailed reports made from Tiananmen Square by TV reporters. Night after night people returning home from work switched on their televisions to be confronted by restrained, earnest and articulate students making moderate requests to the Chinese Government. Placards such as 'we are tired of lies', 'you can't fool all the people all of the time', and 'thank you Deng and goodbye', undoubtedly struck deep chords among viewers all over the world, and then millions were suddenly confronted with pictures of the mangled bodies of young people crushed by tanks and pictures of massacres which resembled Warsaw in 1944, Budapest in 1956 and Lhasa in 1959. There was a general sense of numbness and outrage and it is not surprising that one sinologist recently on television, clearly upset by the recent events, was obviously close to tears since he must also have realised that some 15 years of extraordinary propaganda achievements had been blown away in 48 hours by a geriatric leader in hospital in Beijing.

World reaction has been predictably bitter, some of the criticism almost marked, it would seem, with a sense of betrayal among former supporters of China or those inclined to extend a certain indulgence towards the Chinese regime. The *Times* in an editorial stated that 'Except in Tibet, not even at the height of the Cultural Revolution, were the tanks of the PLA turned so decisively against those from which it took its name.'³⁸⁸ The

same editorial also declared 'Distrust should also henceforth, and publicly, mark the outside world's dealing with the Chinese Government. China has been given the benefit of the doubt by Western governments. This has been partly for geopolitical reasons, partly because of the lure of its huge market, and partly because, despite continued evidence of its leaders intolerance of dissent, respect for human-rights seemed to be making some progress. Such optimism can no longer be justified and it continued 'Some businessmen may think it wrong to deal with a Government which turns it guns on children; others may think twice about investing in a country whose leaders have rejected peaceful change.' The *Independent* declared in an editorial that 'A bunch of old men, as one on-the-spot observer commented, decided to kill the young to stay in power, and the People's Liberation Army was finally unleashed on China's own people, rather than on Tibetans. It mattered not to the leadership that many of the dead and wounded were not protesting students but innocent bystanders.'³⁸⁹

On the diplomatic front protests have been voluminous. President Bush said that he 'deeply deplored' the decision to use force against peaceful demonstrators and added 'I can only hope that China can rapidly return to the path of political and economic reforms so that our relationship can continue to grow.'³⁹⁰ The sheltering of the leading Chinese dissident Fang Lizhi and his wife in the US embassy has infuriated the Chinese Government and is likely to accelerate the deteriorating relations between Beijing and Washington. Fang Lizhi has been called 'the Chinese Sakharov'. Mrs Thatcher, speaking from Downing Street, said she had been appalled by the indiscriminate shooting of unarmed people.³⁹¹ The French President M. Mitterand, described the Chinese regime as one which had been 'reduced to firing on young people whom it has educated and who now rise against it in the name of freedom' and he added that such a regime had 'no future'.³⁹² France and the Netherlands have frozen their diplomatic relations with China, the USA and Britain have banned arms sales, New Zealand's Prime Minister Mr. David Lange, condemned the massacre and is likely to

drastically reduce his country's trade with China.

Japanese reaction was at first mild, but shortly after the Tiananmen Massacre talks on a \$6 billion loan programme were suspended, to the evident dismay of the Chinese. Japan is China's largest aid donor and a \$3.3 billions seven years aid programme has recently expired. President Bush announced that he would support international economic measures against Beijing, and it is likely that projected loans from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank will be affected totalling perhaps \$1.3 billions. It seems that some \$800. million, frozen by the World Bank, was earmarked to have been used for improvements in public transport in China and 'technical difficulties' were given as the reason for the delay. The Soviet Union, having only recently normalised its relations with China after some thirty years of tension along a 4,000 mile border, has given a restrained and uneasy coverage, perhaps aware that if Glasnost backfired, such scenes, might occur in Russia at some future time. Protests have also come from Norway, Thailand, Hungary, and Australia and more are pouring in at present. The Australian Prime Minister Bob Hawke wept publicly and declared that by shooting its young people down 'China was crushing its future'. The Hong Kong talks have been suspended and Dame Lydia Dunn, Hong Kong's most senior politician, has demanded that Hong Kong people be granted right of abode in Britain and flew to London for talks with Mrs Thatcher in June 1989.

The executions in the wake of the Tiananmen Massacre have provoked a universal condemnation from many countries including the USA, Britain, France, and the Netherlands and on 22/6/89 Amnesty International issued a deathlist, giving details of those who have already been executed and those who face imminent execution. On 28th June European Common Market leaders issued a communique condemning China for its 'brutal repression'.

Major disturbances have been reported all over China, Shanghai, Nanjing, Changsha, Wuhan, Guangzhou, Xian, Tianjin and Qingdao. In Chengdu, capital of Sichuan which is

China's most populous province, some 3000 people are believed to have been killed in the rioting and martial law has been declared and it is significant that students in many provinces appear to have been totally alienated from the Government when some 500 million people are reported to be under 25 years of age. Equally significant is the fact that students have reportedly been joined by workers and people from many other walks of life as the full enormity of the Tiananmen Square massacre became apparent, (the Chinese Red Cross reported at least 2,600 dead and some reports said some 10,000 people had been wounded'.³⁹³ However, Western intelligence sources now believe that some 7,000 people were killed and upwards of 10,000 wounded, perhaps 1,000 of these being soldiers who were wrongly fired on by their comrades and those trapped inside burning vehicles set on fire by the students after the shootings had begun.³⁹⁴

John Timpson, BBC correspondent, described the Chinese army as resembling a conquering army invading its own capital and several western correspondents were beaten up by Chinese soldiers, notably Michael Fathers, Asian Editor of the *Independent*, Jonathan Mirsky of the *Observer*, and a photographer with *Agence France Press* was shot though apparently not seriously wounded and other photographers were reportedly attacked by police with electric cattle prods.³⁹⁵ The BBC reporter Brian Barron was assaulted and Kate Adie, also from the BBC, narrowly escaped death when troops fired a volley which killed people close to her and there is no doubt that the courageous coverage provided by such reporters and journalists has largely been responsible for the deep sympathy expressed for the Beijing students all over the world, and the sense of outrage felt by the public in numerous countries and for the forthright diplomatic reactions following the massacre.

The world community was stunned when a Chinese spokesman announced that 'although there had been a certain amount of conflict in Tiananmen Square *no one had been killed*'. They claimed that 100 troops and 100 civilians were killed, but none in the Square itself, Mr. Yuan Mu made this bold assertion on

7th June, and it is likely that such pleasingly rounded and balanced figures will only meet with approval from the dwindling band of 'Sinophants'. In fact eye-witness reports and video-recordings, some of them shown on Western television, clearly show people being shot down in Tiananmen Square itself. It seems that in some respects the Government has a 'medieval' view of truth in that if they do not wish to admit an event they simply deny that it ever occurred, even when others have witnessed that event. This statement was greeted with incredulity all over the world. A similar emotion must have been felt by diplomats when Chinese soldiers opened fire on their homes saying 'Hey, you up in that building. If we shoot you it's not our fault' and not surprisingly the exodus of foreign nationals gained impetus.³⁹⁶

It does not fall within the scope of this Report to predict in detail the international consequences of the Tiananmen Massacre, or the effect of the internal turmoil on the Chinese economy, new economic initiatives, progress in industry or technology or the effects in the sphere of human-rights except as far as Tibetans are likely to be affected. It is likely that any prolonged power struggle in China will encourage moves towards Tibetan independence both on the part of the Tibetan people and possibly by various members of the international community since skeletons in the Chinese cupboard will be rattling more loudly now. Also, reticence once displayed by many countries on the Tibetan issue is redundant now since China is being widely criticised not only for the massacre but for the Government reaction following it when the army were thanked and praised, a reaction that left many observers speechless. The issue of Tibet seems certain to emerge with renewed force and there is no doubt that if civil war broke out or China entered some kind of a warlord phase Tibetans would be presented with an opportunity to rise against occupying Chinese forces. It is significant that Chinese refugees who escaped in the aftermath of the Tiananmen Massacre have now established a Chinese Government in Exile.

What is most significant as far as Tibet is concerned is the

extent to which many ordinary Chinese people appear to have been alienated from their own government as protests and demonstrations all over China show. Also significant is the fact that the strong bond between the Chinese people and its army, deriving from its long stand against Japanese aggression, appears to have been severed or greatly weakened. It now seems that the massacre was carried out mainly by the 27th Army from Hebei province, south of Beijing and by highly disciplined troops from the Shenyang military region in the north east, though very recent evidence suggests that many other units, drawn from all over China were also involved. It seems likely that Deng Xiaoping travelled widely canvassing for support and only succeeded with the help of the 'Old Guard', whom he originally ousted, which inevitably places a large question mark over China's so-called 'reformist' policies. Deng Xiaoping has become known as the *Butcher of Beijing*. Various Beijing residents have been scathing in their criticisms and one remarked that "This is worse than the Rape of Nanking. That time, it was foreign troops. This time it was our own People's Army killing Chinese people. It is unbelievable". A Chinese woman likened Deng Xiaoping to Hitler and another resident stated, "Before this happened we loved the Party. Now we oppose the Party. We deeply oppose the Party".³⁹⁷

The Tiananmen Massacre and its aftermath provoked a protest from the participants in the seven nation summit held in Paris in July 1989 and in a separate declaration the Seven condemned the bloody repression of the Chinese students in Tiananmen and elsewhere in China following their democracy protest and urged the authorities to "cease action against those who have done no more than to claim their legitimate rights to democracy and liberty" (*Independent* 17/7/89, p. 6). The Chinese leaders rejected this protest saying that it constituted interference in China's internal affairs and a delegation of foreign diplomats in Beijing received summary treatment from the Chinese authorities when they attempted to protest about Tiananmen. (BBC News Radio 4, 21/7/89, 8am).

Chai Ling, one of the student leaders gave a graphic descrip-

tion of the dimensions of massacre in Tiananmen (BBC 2 'Awaiting Our Executioners 8/8/89, 11.15pm presented by Kate Adie) and this was followed on August 13 by the first full account of his experiences by the young student leader Wuer Kaixi, which appeared in the Sunday Express (13/8/89) in which he stated that more than 120,000 people have been arrested or executed since Tiananmen and he believes that the Democracy Movement will erupt again in greater strength. Interestingly enough he referred to rumours that the leadership of China had smuggled £50 millions in overseas banks as an 'escape fund' in case they were overthrown, recalling the similar tactics used by the late Shah of Persia or many a corrupt South American president. In June 1989 Amnesty International observed that "human rights violations on the scale of the past few weeks will not be forgotten" and its concern at events in China was voiced in its Newsletter (August 1989). The Chinese Government has undoubtedly been extremely irritated by world reaction after the Tiananmen Massacre and by the formation of an opposition movement in exile called the Front for Democracy in China which plans to start a newspaper and a radio station.

A Tibetan remarked "Now the Empire is striking back—at its own people", and his words underlie the fact that it scarcely makes sense for the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, or the British ambassador to China, Sir Alan Donald, to express the hope that conditions in China will "soon return to some kind of normality" when a formidable case can be advanced *indicating that such normality existed more in the minds of pro-Chinese politicians and some journalists than in the realities of the existing situation*. 'Normality' for Tibetans has meant forty years of starvation, torture, massacres and colonial brutality and the very concept of normality, when applied to China can only be entertained if one ignores enormous human-rights violations which are increasingly drawing the fire of such organisations as Amnesty International. Understandably enough a representative of the Hong Kong based company Jardine-Matthieson said on *Newsnight* (7/6/89) that

“Sir Geoffrey Howe is following Neville Chamberlain’s path of Appeasement towards China, and the Foreign Office has the vision of a bat”.

It seems clear that after the Tiananmen Massacre nothing can ever be the same again. Indulgent attitudes to China have changed overnight and forthright condemnations are ringing around the world. The Chinese leadership seems to believe that once a clampdown has been successfully completed in China then normal relations can be restored with the rest of the world indicating that they have perceptions of diplomacy which are unique in their naivety but apologists for China are already trying to forget what has happened. One such person, recently in Peking, using the kind of extenuating phraseology he usually reserves for Tibet, stated that the “people of Peking *felt* they had been wronged” and after identifying various factors responsible for the crisis he also included the element of ‘*sheer bad luck*’. The mindless slaughter of nearly 10,000 unarmed young people cannot be glossed over in such a fashion, neither can its effects upon the rest of the world. Attempts to minimise or to ignore this watershed in history should be resisted and the comments of one sinologist, recently interviewed on television are worth bearing in mind in this context since he stated that the “present leadership in China is *perhaps too old* to successfully implement the new economic reforms”. At the present time it seems likely that the army will re-establish order throughout China by brute force but they will have to contend with an increasingly rebellious population and an economic situation which seems bound to deteriorate owing to the loss of the tourist trade, a return to centralisation, lack of Western and Japanese investment and flow of technology, power struggles in the hierarchy and many other factors. Nothing can ever be the same again and legitimate doubt can now be expressed as to the ability of Communist China to run its own affairs in the light of the failure of the ‘Great Leap Forward’ during which time some 20 million people died of starvation, the internal Holocaust of the ‘Cultural Revolution’ which Chinese sources state caused 100,000,000 casualties (one hundred million) and

the Tiananmen Massacre. *For the third time in forty years China has lurched off course and one is entitled to wonder to what extent the country has ever been 'on course' or ever will be.* In a very real sense China may have 'blown it' for the last time, not only in the eyes of its increasingly alienated people, particularly large parts of its youth, but in the eyes of the rest of the world. At the very least none but dogmatic 'sinophants' will extend the indulgence towards China from which that country has benefitted for so many years and a huge question mark now hangs over the Chinese economy, a fact that will not be lost upon large companies and multi-national corporations as well as individual investors. It seems that China's tourist trade has dwindled drastically, sounding the death-knell of hopes that it would earn much needed foreign currency. Bo Xichen, head of Beijing's municipal tourist bureau said that China is losing a million US dollars a day in income. *Daily Telegraph*, (13/7/89) in an article by Tim Luard, (p. 13).

Jonathan Mirsky, the China specialist, when interviewed on the *Today programme* BBC Radio 4 (7/7/89) stated that China was run by a 'bunch of murderers' and that China's economic reforms were unlikely to continue since Deng Xiaoping, in order to keep his position, had been forced to recall members of the 'Old Guard' who had originally opposed such reforms and who regarded the Tiananmen demonstrations as the direct result of Western influences arising from such reforms. He further added that the Chinese economy was a shambles and that it was futile for Western businessmen to return to China as though nothing had changed since the circumstances which had facilitated their operations has now drastically altered. However, Britain's shadowy '48 Group' members visited China in October 1989 to tie up details of the Sino-British £3 billion trade deal. The group which has about 100 members is composed of British companies that originally broke the embargo on trade with China in the 1950's. *The Independent*, (28/7/89, p. 13.) quotes the *Beijing Review*, which called the deal the 'biggest ever economic agreement' between China and the Group. Members evidently refuse to declare themselves as

such but Racal, Hawker Siddeley, Marconi, Barclays and BAT are all on the management committee.

As the Chinese state undergoes increasing strains these will be subjected to a merciless scrutiny by the rest of the world and such strains are certain to be reflected in Tibet and upon India's long northern border and the issue of Tibetan independence can only be enhanced by recent events since, whatever happens in Tibet, the rest of the world will be far more receptive to the voice of this oppressed people and perhaps to their aspirations. At the very least China seems destined to endure enormous adverse publicity in the human-rights sector, together with the persistent and unwelcome attentions of organisations who concern themselves with such important questions, and the Chinese are likely to be forced to defend themselves afresh at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva.

The End of Sinological Illusions

Sinology is an old and respected discipline and has played a considerable part in the Western fascination with China and Chinese culture generally. There are many sinologists whose works command respect, but like many devotees of their subject, some of them have been inclined to gloss over material which contradicts the image of China as a wise, benign and ancient culture, and there is a powerful case to be made suggesting that those qualities which they considered the West to lack have, at varying periods of sinological study, been projected on to the Chinese model. As this process has been continuing steadily for many decades, deeply ingrained myths have proved difficult to dislodge. It is difficult even today to find a satisfying explanation of the internal holocaust of the 'Cultural Revolution'. In the main it would be correct to say that some portraits of China given by sinologists over a very long period of time give little or no indication how such an extraordinarily catastrophic event, more serious than even the Jewish Holocaust, could overwhelm for a period of ten years (1966–1976) 'this wise and ancient people'. China abandoned itself to collective madness

in which vast numbers of people willingly participated and almost the only historical parallel which can be cited is the religious persecutions and witch burnings which terrorised medieval Europe. The Chinese people destroyed so much of their own culture that it is unlikely to command the respect and admiration it once did and inevitably a series of question marks hang over the Chinese 'social experiment'. While Chinese culture was very severely damaged, the culture of many 'minority peoples' was either wiped out or damaged to such an extent that it has been condemned to a slow demise, and Tibetan culture seems destined to fall into the latter category. Indian culture is fully as ancient as the Chinese and its artistic and creative achievements equal the finest examples of pre-'Cultural Revolution' Chinese culture. Post 'Cultural Revolution' Chinese culture is now a shadow of what it once was, but Indian culture survives despite the wars and chances of history, since it has spared itself the 'wounds of madness'.

What is deeply disturbing today are the efforts of various sinologists to minimise the effects of the 'Cultural Revolution' or to give obviously specious explanations of how it ever came to occur or how it persisted for such a long time together with misleading accounts of its effects upon 'minority peoples', and one wonders if similar means may be used to justify or explain away the slaughter in Tiananmen Square, together with the nation-wide repression and deception which followed. Even today it is possible to read passages similar to this following one. On arriving in China one wrote, "You leave Watergate, the energy crisis, crime, privacy, dirty movies, cynicism and sex at the border and step into safety, stability, enthusiasm, cleanstreets, clean and positive thinking".³⁹⁸ Given the spate of disclosures about China such a statement leaves one gasping and one asks what the inmates of the huge Sining (Xining) labour complex or victims of the 'Cultural Revolution' would have to say. One of the greatest sinologists of all time is Joseph Needham, F.R.S. F.B.A. whose epic work *science and civilisation in china* is probably the greatest single example of comparative scientific research and historical analysis of modern times. But

his support of the 'Cultural Revolution' is to be found in the following words when referring to China's problems after the Revolution. "But a way out was found in the 'Cultural Revolution', that tremendous educational up-heaval out of which a new China is again emerging".³⁹⁹ Joseph Needham still expresses almost unqualified support for the 'Cultural Revolution' and one is tempted to add that on the basis of evidence now available one could similarly regard the First World War as 'the rebaptism of mankind'. We further learn that he has spent four summers in China since the revolution. After reading the following passage one could legitimately enquire what he was doing there during this period of time. "If I were to be asked to summarise the meaning of the Chinese revolution in two sentences I should say, first that it was an irrevocable decision of the Chinese people not to follow the way of capitalism through the whole weary path of the 'dark Satanic mills' but to move straight from their age old bureaucratic society to modern scientific socialism. Secondly I should say that, with complete clarity and determination, knowing this will take a revolution of hearts and minds not easily to be won, and needing, perhaps, perpetual renovation. But *hsin min* (renewing the people) was an ancient Confucian watchword, and it is now being practised as never before".⁴⁰⁰ When one recalls that this era was characterised mainly by mob slaughter and cultural extermination, the rift between fact and fantasy assumes enormous dimensions.

During the period of the 'Cultural Revolution' a great deal of material was sent to Needham from China to facilitate his researches and writings in Cambridge and sinologists may be thankful for this, since had it remained in China it might have been destroyed. Despite his greatness Needham's work has to be treated with reservation as the above quoted passages indicate and for many years he was co-founding President of the Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding, which is intensely sympathetic towards China, generally. Little indication is found in Needham's work of the carnage and destruction in Tibet, and he sees Tibet as an 'inalienable part of China' and rarely, if

ever, suggests a perspective in which Tibet could be envisaged as having long been independent of China, whatever the Chinese themselves might say on the matter.

In recent years, whenever the Chinese Revolution has been discussed in the media, the question of Tibet has inevitably been raised. It is probably correct to say that Tibet is the rock upon which all illusions about China are being broken today and it is for this reason that so many sinologists often seem to collude in either ignoring the issue or placing it in a perspective which is far less damaging to the Chinese. For example during the early years of the 'Cultural Revolution' the Chinese themselves and some respected sinologists suggested that this 'great movement' was as a result of an upsurge among the Chinese people aroused, encouraged and guided by Mao but when its terrible legacy became clear various attempts were made to exonerate Mao and to blame its excesses on the Red Guards alone. When the Red Guards entered Tibet one report referred to them as coming from 'elsewhere' without mentioning China⁴⁰¹ which is rather similar to referring to the Nazi SS in Poland as coming from 'elsewhere' without troubling to mention the fact that they came from Hitler's Germany. As it became clear that the devastation in China was far exceeded by the destruction of 'minority peoples' cultures such as Tibet, an effort was made by the Chinese to blame the excesses of the 'Cultural Revolution' solely upon the 'Gang of Four' and in this way they hoped to minimise the criticism levelled at China, as they could maintain that it was an aberration in their history. As has been remarked, the Chinese have been attempting to destroy Tibetan culture since 1949 and the 'Cultural Revolution' marked the *climax* of their policies in Tibet and not a departure from them. The Turkish Government has employed a similar policy when confronted with irrefutable evidence of the Armenian Massacres in that they have tried to place responsibility for them on a small clique and have not so far acknowledged the responsibility of the then Turkish Government.

The Chinese now appear to be quietly understanding Mao's legacy and the part he played in the 'Cultural Revolution' but

at the same time there is observably less emphasis on some of his past achievements and one gains the impression that the present Chinese leadership would like to forget this period in their history. However, the continuing Tibetan issue makes this extremely difficult and it is not surprising that the Chinese Government frequently displays great irritation whenever the question of Tibet is raised. A number of sinologists have written about the effects of the 'Cultural Revolution' in Tibet and have generally followed the Chinese propaganda line. One of the best known of these is A. Tom Grunfeld, a Canadian sinologist whose recent book is in many respects extraordinarily misleading and somehow contrives to leave the impression that the Tibetan people themselves played a part almost equal to that of the Chinese in the destruction of their own Tibetan culture. He overstates the role of Tibetan cadres indoctrinated by the Chinese communist teachings in the burnings and lootings and some people, on reading this book, may find it necessary to remind themselves that had the *Chinese* not entered Tibet in 1949 *Tibetan culture would still be intact*. Not surprisingly, throughout his book he sees Tibet as being an 'integral part of China' and the alternative perspective which raises questions as to what extent Tibet had ever been part of China before 1949 receives biased and one-sided treatment. Some Sinologists deal much more justly with this question and genuinely feature both points of view, but it is fair to comment that a considerable number tend to consolidate the Chinese propaganda stance on the Tibetan issue by means of their writings.

As has been seen, various political groupings have had their own reasons for maintaining illusions about the nature of the Chinese Communist regime and this has been compounded by the writings of some sinologists who have tended to act as apologists for crimes against humanity committed by Chinese governments since 1949. There is no doubt that such illusions have to some extent been compounded by the Chinese tendency to display reluctance to 'call a spade a spade'. Anyone who deals with the Chinese or meets them frequently swiftly becomes aware of this fact. For example, the imperial Chinese

army which suffered frequent defeats by the colonial powers in the 19th Century was referred to as the 'ever victorious army', when many Tibetans died as a result of being forced to dig canals the Chinese termed these 'happiness canals', and similarly, famished Tibetans were compelled to give most of their grain to the Chinese for 'love of nation tax' or their produce was 'offered to the State'. A kind of beer sold in Beijing, which the brewer must have known was toxic, was called 'beer of a thousand joys' but scores of people died after drinking it. The convulsions of the 'Cultural Revolution' created the existence of large numbers of unemployed for whom no work was available and the Chinese seldom referred to these people as unemployed but said that they were 'waiting for work'.

An impressive example of this tendency is to be found in the account of Dr. Choedak who was imprisoned in the infamous Xining labour complex.⁴⁰² Prisoners had been regularly beaten to death by guards for various offences, real or imagined, but following a change in the political climate in China, the guards were then advised by those in charge that it was wrong to beat prisoners, without any reference to the fact that such beatings had been customary for years, neither did any of the guards appear to question the dramatic change in approach, or to apparently register the discrepancy between past and present policies.

Michael Fathers, Asian Editor of the *Independent*, recently encountered a notable example of this characteristic Chinese tendency of ignoring unpalatable facts when it suits them or explaining them away with a few well chosen words. He was badly beaten up by Chinese soliders, being repeatedly kicked and hit. When he eventually confronted a suave Chinese official of the Chinese Communist establishment he was badly bruised, had bootmarks and bloodstains on his shirt from a baton blow, his right knee was swollen, his hips were aching and his trousers were torn. While confiscating his notebook the official remarked, "you fell over didn't you? That's why you have that bruise on your arm".⁴⁰³ In many other countries there would have been an embarrassed silence, or perhaps a brusque formality, but in

typical Chinese fashion the official simply *had* to make some effort to doctor reality in order to divest it of some unwanted aspects.

Even a British minister, when dealing with the Tibetan question in the years before the Chinese communist takeover, referred to 'the infinite Chinese capacity for misrepresentation' and 'doublethink' is a tactic which the Chinese constantly apply to the current Tibetan situation. The following incident, which played a part in moulding the consciousness of the generation that grew up in Britain in the 1960's and proved to be very sympathetic to Communist China must now, on the basis of present evidence, be considered false. As the Chinese civil war was reaching its final stages and Beijing itself faced a siege, Fitzgerald writes that the Chinese High Command, mindful of the likely destruction to the city, consulted an expert and enquired which section of the city wall was of ancient origin and therefore to be preserved. The information was given to them and they blew up a recently built part of the wall in their final assault.⁴⁰⁴ It is stories like this which have played such an important part in perpetuating so many myths about China and can be seen in a different perspective today when one recalls Chinese efforts to destroy their cultural heritage during the 'Cultural Revolution' (1966–1976).

Many of these anomalies and contradictions can probably be explained by the Chinese emphasis on 'face' and a reluctance to admit their mistakes. There seems to be some component in Chinese national psychology which favours minimising past failure or contradictions caused by changing circumstances or changing policies, in favour of the demands of the present moment, a process often accelerated by the triumph of one particular faction or another. This trait is of course not confined to the Chinese but it seems to be applied with a great and almost unconscious facility. Arthur H. Smith states that "the question is never of facts but of form" and may partly derive from the strong dramatic instinct of the Chinese people.⁴⁰⁵

A book such as *Behind the Wall* by Colin Thubron⁴⁰⁶ gives a brilliant, if cheerless portrait of China today, depicting a land

of sterility, uniformity, lifelessness and deliberate ugliness. Thubron's anti-communism has to be borne in mind but his account of China is not an ideological one and represents a new and more realistic appraisal of China now, and like other similar narratives it shatters the myths and breaks the spells woven by some sinologists and the many writers and reporters once sympathetic to China.

Given the current disclosure about China, the discrepancy between the imposing picture of an ancient and formidable civilisation, much respected throughout Asia and other parts of the world, and decades of slaughter and barbarism, has been highlighted; and explanation has understandably been sought. There does not appear to be an immediate explanation and perhaps the answer lies in the illusions about China and the Chinese national character spread by generations of infatuated sinologists whose subject matter is understandably remote and therefore difficult to check. Even a cursory reading of the convulsions of Chinese history, fearful oppression and peasant rebellions against cruel landlords seems to display many similarities to the iniquities characterising (say) European history. Chinese culture is in many respects utterly different to any other culture on earth, but one wonders to what degree its more remote and inaccessible aspects, its supposed restraint, its wisdom, unwillingness to sanction extremes of any kind, patience, thoroughness, endemic politeness and courteousness, its calmness and even-temperedness etc. give a greatly idealised version of reality on the part of many sinologists or represent the attributes possessed (or allegedly possessed) by a tiny milieu in bygone ages. No explanation is being offered here but the question is increasingly being asked how the people of an ancient and sophisticated culture could inflict such wounds upon themselves and upon those unfortunate enough to live in proximity with them and whose territories were for one reason or another claimed by them.

Having identified many of the factors responsible for a distorted picture of China, which often bore little or no resemblance to reality, it would be correct to say that most of them

have been weakened and dissipated by the disclosures of the last decade or so and revelations from Tibet have played an important part in this transformation of consciousness. There are many terrible parallels between the Nazi tyranny in Poland and Russia and Chinese rule in Tibet involving 'Master Race' policies, settlement programmes, medical experiments on helpless victims, sterilisations, fearful tortures, huge labour camps and extermination and massacres. One recalls the previous sentiment voiced by a Tibetan who had seen her parents shot down by the Chinese to the effect that virtually the only main difference between Nazism and Communism was that the communists have killed more people. The Dalai Lama has remarked that one of the reasons why communist regimes have often behaved in such a brutal fashion is because communism is based upon hatred for oppressors and not primarily upon sympathy for those it is supposedly trying to help.

His words recall the poem of W.B. Yeats in which he wrote that "the best lack all conviction but the worst are filled with a passionate intensity". Tibet provides a perfect example of this, but it has to be remarked that in some cases whatever reservations may be entertained about communism, it has eventually benefitted some people, at least in the economic sphere, and allowed them to improve the standard and perhaps the quality of their lives. But in Tibet this has not happened and *Chinese* communism has degraded, brutalised and decimated an ancient people and an extraordinary culture. As the dimensions of Chinese atrocities and war crimes became clear so 'the doors of perception' have been cleansed, myths and spells have been broken and as infatuation ebbs away and media coverage of Tibet increases, it has become clear that the People's Republic of China is still an extremely repressive regime that uses tactics of terror and torture against hapless 'minority nationalities' culminating in the continuing and still dangerous Tibetan tragedy.

CONCLUSION

What can one say about the tragedy of Tibet during the last forty years except to echo Macduff's words: "O horror, horror, horror! Tongue nor heart cannot conceive nor name thee". If there is a name synonymous with the very worst horrors of 20th Century oppression that name is *Tibet*, a country whose people have been dragged to the depths of human misery. In the case of Tibet we are dealing with events of the tragic magnitude encountered during the Nazi oppression of Poland during the Second World War, or the suffering of the Chinese people during the Japanese invasion of the 1930's and 1940's. It need never have happened. An eminent Tibetologist once remarked that irrespective of arguments for or against Tibetan independence or the question of the lost eastern provinces, the Chinese were ideally placed to bring Tibet gently into the 20th Century. Instead, what has been called "the only ancient culture to survive intact into modern times" has been wiped off the face of the earth with a fearful Nazi-like brutality.

It is evident that the impact of these tragic events was greater for Tibetans than is the case with many other people who have suffered similarly at the hands of destroying powers. This is because many Tibetans seem to have been living in a state of innocence, judging by pictures taken and accounts recorded before 1949. The dirty devices of 'civilisation' were beyond their comprehension. Whatever defects there may have been in Tibetan society Tibetans had no experience of mechanised slaughter, systematic and wide-scale torture, mass deportations to labour and concentration camps, the institutionalised hatred of the one class towards another, political dogma and

bigotry used to slay multitudes of human beings, alien thought patterns and incomprehensible rules and edicts brutally enforced, often dealing with matters outside their comprehension, whose transgression provoked an extreme form of cruelty that was beyond their experience or understandings. The kind of shock experienced by the people of Europe as a result of the First World War and its aftermath may not be in the same class as the trauma experienced by the Tibetans. They had no words for what was happening, it was inconceivable, there was nothing to compare it to, and there was no understanding of why their lives had been shattered and why their robust and easy going way of life had been ripped up by the roots and destroyed. It must have seemed as though elemental forces had leaped from the bowels of the earth and descended upon them without cause or reason.

The following points emerge from this report:

(1) Over one million Tibetans have perished at the hands of the Communist Chinese since 1949. Such brutality is unacceptable. It emerges that there has been far more armed resistance, execution, deaths in labour-camps and prisons, starvation and torture than is generally admitted. All this constitutes a horrendous indictment of the Chinese human rights record in Tibet, and the abuses suffered by the Tibetans are in many respects comparable in their scope to those endured by subject populations in Hitler's Empire. It has also become clear that the sum total of human rights abuses in Tibet since 1949 is far greater than that experienced by Turks, Chileans or black South Africans and that in practice the Chinese are operating an Apartheid system in Tibet and practise rigid and systematic discrimination against Tibetans at every level. This inevitably disqualifies them from a position of supposed leadership of Third World countries, many of whom have emancipated themselves from similarly suffocating legacies. The evidence also strongly suggests that whatever improvements there may have been in Chinese rule since 1979 are likely to prove cosmetic and temporary. Given the extent of Chinese power in Tibet it is quite understandable that the Tibetans should have decided

to embark on a path of non-violence for which the Dalai Lama has been given the 1989 Nobel Peace Prize. However, it seems that a case can be made suggesting that the Tibetans, both inside and outside Tibet, could nevertheless have a certain degree of military preparedness, since China seems destined to undergo major internal convulsions after the death of Deng Xiaoping, and the Tibetans may be provided with an opportunity to rise and declare their independence. Many people feel that the Tibetan Government in Exile would be well advised to disassociate itself from various initiatives, seemingly emanating primarily from the British Foreign Office, and supposedly intended to facilitate a motion of Tibetan independence at the UN General Assembly in 1992, and to terminate its efforts to seek some kind of dialogue with the Chinese. It seems quite clear that the British Foreign Office is as much an enemy of Tibetan independence as is the Chinese Government, and the point has been made in this Report that various people serving in the Tibet Society, UK, still maintain strong links with the Foreign Office and may act as advisors to the Tibetan Government in Exile.

It may be that a more promising course for the Tibetan Government in Exile would be to suspend all contacts with the Chinese and to use every opportunity at the UN and other international fora to mercilessly condemn Chinese human rights abuses in Tibet. The near hysterical reaction this provokes indicates increasing Chinese sensitivity on this question and if, as seems likely, more progressive leaders come to power in China then they may be induced to make major concessions on Tibet, in an effort to lessen the criticism directed at them. Little if anything ever seems to be gained by being pleasant to the Chinese. They only seem to understand trouble and the Tibetans may be well advised to give them the kind of language they understand.

It may be argued that this will only result in more oppression in Tibet, but there is terrible oppression there now, even though the Dalai Lama has been flexible and has indicated that he bears no enmity towards the Chinese. Perhaps a persistent

and intense campaign aimed at exposing Chinese human-rights abuses in Tibet, utilising all media facilities, and international fora, and carried out in many countries throughout the world, would result in a softening of Chinese rule and a greater flexibility on Tibet. The real problem is that the Chinese always seem to associate friendliness and flexibility with weakness. When one studies the long Tibetan crisis and analyses its various phases, it is noticeable that the Chinese have generally retreated or modified their stance when they have encountered determined opposition, or it had been made clear that trouble awaited them if they wanted it. The Sino-Indian war of 1962 might never have happened had Nehru stood up to the Chinese in the early 1950's. When he did it was too late.

(2) It is perfectly clear that Tibet is not allowed to operate as an 'Autonomous Region' even though it is officially designed as such. The administration is dominated at all levels by the Chinese and the two most important bodies in the Government of Tibet are the Communist Party Committee and the People's Government, which are both controlled by the Chinese. Administrative authority and power of political appointment is entirely in the hands of the Chinese, however much they may contrive to give the contrary impression. Tibetan officials in the government may have important sounding titles, but their actual power is very limited. The arch Tibetan collaborator over the last four decades has been Nagbo Ngawang Jigme who has proved invaluable to the Chinese in a variety of political posts. The Tibetans regard him as a traitor of the calibre of Pierre Laval of France or Vidkun Quisling of Norway during the years of the Second World War. He is arguably worse since it is unlikely that even Laval or Quisling would have acquiesced in the wholesale destruction of their country's culture.

About half a million Chinese troops are stationed in Tibet, presenting a particularly strong argument against Tibetan autonomy, and these are supported by a highly developed and increasingly sophisticated network of military bases and communications facilities which seem to have been established in anticipation of a conflict with India. The Chinese are believed

to have nuclear bases in areas outside the 'Autonomous Region of Tibet' and Nagchukha, situated in the 'ART' is likely have a formidable array of missiles. There is strong evidence suggesting that Chinese nuclear weaponry is targetted upon the Indian subcontinent, the southern parts of the Soviet Union and upon Pacific areas, including US bases.

Had Tibet genuinely been allowed a considerable measure of autonomy from 1950 onwards all the terrible blood letting could probably have been avoided and slow and careful changes could have brought Tibet into the 20th Century. Today many Tibetans feel that the appalling legacy of Chinese rule precludes a moderate stance on independence and insist that whatever the nuances of current or recent negotiations, a plebiscite should be held under UN supervision, in which indigenous Tibetans could vote on the issue of their independence from China.

(3) The persecution of Tibetan Buddhists is one of almost inconceivable dimensions and they have suffered a depth of scientifically contrived psychological oppression that in many respects bears an uncanny resemblance to Orwell's 'Nineteen Eighty Four'. Yet all this happened when the Chinese constitution is supposed to allow a measure of religious freedom and when Tibetans were promised this under the now infamous '17 Point Agreement' which they were compelled to sign, the recollection of which has provoked understandable unease in Hong Kong today. Furthermore, China signed the UN Convention Against Torture in December 1986, yet Chinese rule in Tibet is still characterised by this odious expedient.

(4) Tibet's rich cultural heritage has been practically destroyed in a sustained attempt to erase Tibetan national identity. As a result of this the Tibetans are now facing cultural genocide. They will soon be bereft of everything that distinguished them from the Chinese and are being swamped by an influx of Chinese military personnel and civilian settlers. Similar tragedies have happened to the peoples of E. Turkistan (Sinkiang), Inner Mongolia, and Manchuria. Their cultures are being physically exterminated too.⁴⁰⁷ These crimes of cultural genocide are being perpetrated by a government which

supposedly champions the right of oppressed peoples throughout the world and poses as the leader of Third World countries, many of whom have freed themselves from forms of colonial oppression which they would be the first to recognise as still existing in Tibet. Various exchanges at UN fora, particularly the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, clearly illustrate this fact.

(5) There has been a criminal mismanagement of Tibet's natural resources with an utter disregard for the ecological balance, reminding us of capitalism at its most rampant and barbaric stage. The famines of the last forty years and the utter disruption of the economy inevitably provoke comparisons with the sufferings of the *Irish* under British colonial rule in the mid-19th Century. And just as the colonial powers drained their prey dry of natural resources, so the Chinese are extracting minerals, timber, etc. and sending them to other parts of China. There is now clear evidence that the ecological devastation, caused primarily by large scale deforestation, about which little has so far been said in the West and elsewhere, is producing serious climatic destabilisation in large parts of Asia and is interfering with the monsoon cycle. It is difficult to see how this can possibly represent any kind of 'liberation' any more than the present South African regime somehow represents 'liberation' for the oppressed black peoples and it is difficult to believe that Marx, whose doctrines the Chinese supposedly follow, would have approved of the slaughter and brutality that has characterised Chinese rule in Tibet. Whatever one's opinions of his writings, or of his explanation of history there is no support for racism, cultural genocide and imperialism that has been Tibet's unhappy lot under Chinese rule. It seems likely that if Marx returned today he would disown the Chinese legacy in Tibet and support the Tibetan people's right to self-determination.

(6) Despite Chinese efforts the Tibetan issue has been internationalised to a degree which would have been unimaginable less than a decade ago. Resolutions condemning Chinese human-rights abuses have been passed in the West German

Bundestag, the European Parliament, and in the US 'Tibet Bill' of December 1987 which tied the sale of arms to China to the respect of human-rights in Tibet. Both the US Houses have supported the Dalai Lama's 'Five Point Peace Proposal' and they have also championed the Strasbourg Initiative containing the proposal that any agreement reached by the Tibetan 'Government in Exile' and the Chinese Government should be referred to a referendum of the Tibetan people. The shooting of unarmed Tibetan demonstrators in Lhasa in March 1988 and '89 provoked an outcry in many parts of the world and the slaughter in Tiananmen Square has not only irreparably tarnished China's international image, but has made doubters listen afresh to the tragic Tibetan saga with a far more receptive ear.

The media exposure which greeted the Dalai Lama's visit to Britain in April 1988 further heightened a general awareness of the Tibetan crisis and these and other factors, including the general dissipation of romantic illusions once held about the nature of Communist China, for which the long Tibetan crisis is primarily responsible, seems likely to have injected a new element into the Tibetan situation. It is still too early to judge the Strasbourg Initiative, but since the ultimate decision is to be left to the Tibetan people little of any substance has been conceded since the Tibetan people will not vote for anything less than full independence from China. If a full plebiscite is held under UN or internationally accredited supervision and it is confined only to indigenous Tibetans, important developments might follow. If however, the Chinese refuse to allow such supervision and attempt to unfairly influence the verdict (and it seems that measures are being taken to facilitate this) then the Tibetan 'Government in Exile' might be well advised to discontinue such negotiations, whatever pressures are exerted upon it by representatives of the British Foreign Office or by the Indian Government *since large tracts of Asia are littered with the debris of broken Chinese promises, leaving the carnage of murdered people, the bones of slaughtered wildlife, landscapes of ruined monasteries resembling a nuclear aftermath,*

silent deserts of tree-stumps and arid wildernesses of leached soil and ecological ruin. Should the talks collapse the Tibetans could easily revert to their demand for full independence, since no retreat from this position was contained in the Strasbourg Initiative, leaving as it did the ultimate verdict on negotiations to the Tibetan people. In the light of intense media exposure and the internationalisation of the Tibetan question, the likely failure of such talks would certainly result in a new tempo to such demands and many new problems for the Chinese.

(7) Whenever Tibet receives media exposure the issue of Tibetan independence is either brought to the forefront and discussed or it sometimes lurks uneasily in the background. No case for or against Tibetan independence has been made in this analysis but contradictions in the Chinese position have been exposed, without any new material being added, and the basis of Chinese claims has been examined and considered with reference to this era in which so many peoples and countries have fought for and finally gained their independence. Anyone pondering upon this issue would do well to remember that the Chinese justify their occupation of Tibet with references to claims made by ancient imperial dynasties which directly contradict the basis of all 20th Century liberation struggles in Asia and Africa and which, if taken seriously would justify the *re-establishment of all the European empires on the basis of previous control, real or imagined, and such arguments if pursued by Mrs Thatcher's Government, would justify the British re-occupation of N. France, S. Ireland and the USA, all of which were once ruled from London. Tibetans point out that over a period of many centuries they fought for and maintained their independence and ejected invading Chinese troops in 1912 and declared their independence shortly afterward and remained independent until 1950. They further add that they were one of the first countries to declare their independence in the 20th Century and that they have never been controlled by China until the communist occupation whatever Emperors 'Sons of Heaven' or Communist Party General Secretaries might say to the contrary.*

It may be that Third World countries may wish to reconsider their present attitude vis-a-vis Tibet being a part of China given the nature of Chinese claims which seem to be quite extraordinary, rooted as they are in an imperial and imperialist past, and the fact that many thousands of Tibetans fought and died in an effort to resist Chinese domination and maintain their independence, and in the light of the fact that within the last year independence riots have occurred in Tibet and have been the focus of media attention. The Tibetan people obviously desire their independence just as the Namibian people do, and given the above facts it seems unpardonable when considering the question of Tibetan independence from China to refer to highly tendentious Chinese versions of history deriving from an imperial past while ignoring the fact that the Tibetans proclaimed their independence from China in 1912 and were absorbed into China in 1950 at a time when so many other peoples and countries were at last gaining their independence. *Why should a different scale of values be applied to Tibet in contrast to Namibia and why should claims made by China on so many neighbouring territories and countries not be generally challenged in the light of the fact that if the Soviet Union or the USA or France or Britain made similar claims the international community would react with amazement and disbelief and utter incredulity?*

Tibetans point out that they have fought for their independence for some four decades and their efforts in terms of lives lost equal or even surpass, the example set by the African National Congress, SWAPO, the Mujahiddin or the Palestine Liberation organisation . Tibetans ask why, when these other struggles seem to be within a measurable distance of ending successfully, should Tibet alone be wiped off the map of the world, particularly when the excesses of guerrilla struggles such as the killing of innocent civilians and the destruction of aircraft have not disfigured the campaign for an independent Tibet? Others express the view that it is precisely *because* Tibetans have avoided violence at an international level that their cause is so perilously balanced today.

(8) The unresolved question of Tibet is heightening the tension between India and China, the two Asian giants and actual conflict occurred in 1962 when the Chinese declared that they would 'teach India a lesson'. This conflict broke out despite (or perhaps because of) Nehru's policy of conciliation and moderation towards China which was pursued for over a decade during which time he acquiesced in the destruction of an entire civilisation. The Chinese seldom if ever responded to his conciliatory stance, but generally used it to undermine India's security at tactical points all along the frontier. It is important to remember that before 1950 the frontier between India and Tibet was peaceful and contained only the occasional border policeman. Now it seems with hundreds of thousands of soldiers on both sides and has become one of the flash-points of the world. It contains the potential for limited border incidents such as the Chinese occupation of the Sumdo-rong-chu area in the disputed eastern frontier of Arunachal Pradesh in June 1986, or for a full-scale military clash as happened in 1962, or even a nuclear exchange. Under these circumstances one of the elements of the Dalai Lama's recent proposals, particularly as outlined in the 'Five Point Peace Plan', has met with considerable acclaim from the international community. This includes withdrawal of all Chinese military forces and the establishment of Tibet as a demilitarised 'Zone of Peace', the termination of a military occupation which has destabilised Asia for nearly 40 years, (as was pointed in the US 'Tibet Bill' of 1987), the removal of the ever present possibility of war between India and China, and it would bring peace at last to the Tibetan people and would end the tension along a 2,500 mile (4,000 km) border which is the longest disputed border in the world.

(9) While these larger possibilities are at present aired in the international community the situation in Tibet could be materially improved at present by a full and genuine policy of Liberalisation and an end to the current spate of oppression which, far from solving the problem, has only intensified it since it is clear that whatever Nazi like measures are used against the Tibetan people they will not be cowed, and the

accelerating internationalisation of the Tibetan issue has ensured that the Chinese cannot escape the consequences of their 40 years legacy of colonial brutality and exploitation. In the meantime the present situation in Tibet would also be improved if the Chinese allow full access to journalists and tourists instead of restricting their movements, (they did reverse their refusal to allow members of the US Congressional Human Rights Caucus to visit Tibet). Much of the current troubles have arisen because the Chinese have only allowed limited and cosmetic improvements in the conditions of the Tibetan people and full and unrestricted access would demonstrate to the international community that genuine Liberalisation was a real possibility and that the Chinese were working towards this end. We would argue that in view of the widespread and continuing denial of basic human-rights to the Tibetan people, a UN Rapporteur be allowed to visit Tibet and to travel freely around the towns, country districts, prisons, labour camps etc, and to report on his or her findings, and it is to be hoped that the Chinese will also allow fact-finding delegations from Amnesty International and other organisations concerned with human-rights and religious freedom who have voiced concern over the current Tibetan situation at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva and elsewhere.

(10) This Report has not taken any stance for or against Tibetan independence but the question has been placed in the context of the 20th Century movements towards liberation and national emancipation. Whatever the intricate nuances of negotiations between the Tibetan 'Government in Exile' and the Chinese Government, and however protracted these negotiations are there is no doubt that the question of Tibetan independence stands in the background 'shaking its bloody locks' like Banquo's ghost at Macbeth's feast, and the ghost of over one million dead Tibetans 'are beating on the door'. But the question far from being a ghostly one and 'verging on the theological' is proving increasingly solid and intractable to the Chinese given the imperial origins of their claims and the dissipation of a host of extenuating circumstances which until

recently have favoured them and have often obscured or obstructed a realistic appraisal of the issues involved on the part of many people.

However, it has to be admitted that many Tibetans find it difficult to understand why an agreement was concluded in Geneva in November 1988 which facilitates Namibian independence when other negotiations, perhaps in Hong Kong under British Foreign Office influence, could, they fear, result in the extinguishing of the issue of Tibetan independence as an international issue. Their fears derive principally from Chinese duplicity and their long history of broken promises, together with the possibility of external political pressures, perhaps involving India and Britain, being exerted upon the Tibetan negotiators. It seems likely that Tibetan fears may be justified and if the cause of Tibetan independence is abandoned then condemnation of Chinese human rights abuses in the 'Autonomous Region' of Tibet' will simply become *an internal matter concerning shortcomings in Chinese governmental administration*. There is no doubt that a rousing call for Tibetan independence at the UN General Assembly in 1992 would achieve a great deal, but such efforts seem to be primarily in the hands of the British Foreign Office, Perfidious Albion, and those who favour a policy of Appeasement towards China. Efforts coming from such quarters would be likely to result in a general resolution criticising the Chinese human rights record in Tibet but simultaneously legitimising their occupation of Tibet and sanctioning it as permanent. It is up to *Tibetans* and their supporters to either put a stop to this initiative or take charge of it and get the kind of Resolution passed that they want. An indication of the kind of initiative that could be taken is provided by the UN General Assembly Resolution on Tibet (Sixteenth Session, 1961). The issue of human rights abuses was specifically linked to the right to self-determination of the Tibetan people. This point could be restated with the request that the UN conduct a plebiscite among indigenous Tibetans who would be given the opportunity of voting on the issue of their independence. To some extent this would dovetail with

the options voiced in the Strasbourg speech, but the Tibetans could legitimately insist that they should be responsible for the conduct of their international relations and security. This insistence on complete independence would certainly be understood by most of the delegates since the vast majority of them would be representing countries who achieved their independence during the last two or three decades. Such a procedure could be an important transitional stage in Tibet becoming a demilitarised 'Zone of Peace' ensuring that Tibet became a 'buffer zone' between India and China as was the case before 1950, and drastically reducing the possibility of war, nuclear or otherwise, between these two Asian giants. The Indian policy of appeasement and the present refusal of the Indian Government to recognize the Tibetan 'Government in Exile', will almost certainly result in a worsening of the Sino-Indian crisis and the corresponding elevation of the unresolved Tibetan issue to the forefront as one of the world's most dangerous and intractable international problems. However fraught the Tibetan issue may be there is no doubt that the present unstable and contradictory Indian position would be rectified and, given an internal self-consistency, if India recognized the Tibetan 'Government in Exile', this alone would provide a solid basis for the Indian position vis-a-vis the long northern border.

In the meantime it is clear that the terrible prophecies made by the 13th Dalai Lama just before he died in 1933 have come to pass, but there still exists a real possibility that Tibet may be spared the final extinction marking the consumption of a 40 year Holocaust. The Tibetan people surely deserve this.⁴⁰⁸

Appendix

THE MAKING OF MODERN TIBET

by A. Tom Grunfeld

A. Tom Grunfeld's book *The Making of Modern Tibet*, Zed Books Ltd, 1987 has the appearance of an academic survey of Tibetan history, and of the Chinese legacy in Tibet. It may be expected that a book which attains a respectable academic standard gives a reasonably balanced survey of the subject with which it is dealing and if a particular thesis or point of view is being proposed the demands of academic integrity require that material which contradicts or at least weakens that thesis should be mentioned or referred to and should not be ignored. Yet there are many cases in this book where this standard is not complied with. Mr Grunfeld is an advocate of 'disinterested scholarship' *Tibetan Review*, July 1982, Letters 'Illogical Generalisation', a reply to a letter written by P. Ingram *Tibetan Review*, May 1982 Letters 'Tibet Today'. He also appears to assume the role of the 'honest broker', impartially adjudicating between the Tibetan and Chinese points of view, yet there are good grounds for believing that he is generally pro-Chinese and anti-Tibetan and that this affiliation is reflected in his writings and sometimes concealed by an ingeniously selective use of source materials.

Mr Grunfeld's analysis is in most significant respects a Marxist one and his Sinocentric sentiments can be clearly noted. A Marxist analysis may on certain occasions have a considerable amount to recommend it but it may be that a pro-Chinese Marxist is likely to overstate his case and examples of this may be frequently seen in this book. A detailed critique

of this book could quite easily be half as long but certain key points can be remarked upon.

Mr Grunfeld is a Canadian Sinologist and currently Assistant Professor of History at Empire State College of the State University of New York, but it may be said that his treatment of the Chinese agricultural legacy in Tibet displays a remarkable selectivity. He states, "In sum it is probably safe to say that for the average Tibetan peasant living in a small village, the availability of food has increased only slightly since 1950", (p. 172). The demands of academic consistency surely require that he should have mentioned the statement made by the then General Secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Hu Yaobang to restore the Tibetan economy to the 'pre-1959 level', (*Hindustan Times*, 23/3/81). This Chinese statement shows quite clearly that Mr. Grunfeld's conclusion is in error since the Chinese themselves have admitted that their rule has reduced living standards to a level below that which existed before their occupation. Mr. Grunfeld knew about this statement since it was drawn to his attention in a letter in the *Tibetan Review*, (May 1982) and he was asked for his comments, but he did not mention this quotation in his reply (*Tibetan Review*, July 1982). Since his book was published in 1987 Mr. Grunfeld has had ample time to reflect upon this matter. It is possible that to some extent he did since he does quote Yin Fatang, head of the CCP in Tibet, as saying that "the greatest reality in Tibet is its poverty" (*Radio Lhasa*, FBIS, 2/6/81 p. 21/22) and refers to tendentious figures on grain production to the effect that it had increased 2½ times in Tibet, but was still at least one-third below the rest of China in 1976. However, no mention has been made of Hu Yaobang's words to the effect that Tibetan living standards had *declined* under Chinese communist rule.

In footnote 47, p. 172 Mr. Grunfeld states that the Tibetan 'government in exile' disagrees with his conclusion that "...the availability of food has increased only slightly since 1959" (See *Tibet Under Chinese Communist Rule*, Dharamsala 1976, p. 119).

The source to which he refers consists of the harrowing

testimony of Tibetan refugees, one of whom is Lama Karma Tenzin who stated “Over two-thirds of Tibetans in his area had died of starvation and in many regions, there are hardly any Tibetans left”. So Mr Grunfeld is referring to a statement made by a Tibetan *refugee* and thousands of such statements have been made over a period of decades. Once again Hu Yaobang’s admission of decline in living standards is not mentioned, only a book published by the ‘Tibetan Government in Exile’ is cited and no mention is made that this source is refugee testimony, and he does not quote the statement of Lama Tenzin.

An example of selective quotation can be found in the following passage. Mr. Grunfeld writes: “One refugee reports that when his family lived in Tibet at a level that could be considered lower middle class in Tibetan terms, they regularly suffered ‘two food crises a year’” (p. 14). However, the full quotation reads as follows, “In the old Tibet, an average family such as ours faced at most two food crises a year,” and then directly continues, “*We stored enough provisions for the whole year, and we were not worried every week as to where our next meal would come from.*” (*Red Star Over Tibet*, by Dawa Norbu, London, William Collins Sons & Co. Ltd 1974, p. 244). In fact the full quotation directly contradicts the impression that Mr. Grunfeld seeks to convey in his truncated version of this passage. Attention was first drawn to this point in the *Tibetan Review*, July 1989 in a critique of Grunfeld’s book entitled ‘The Making of Modern Propaganda’, by Adrian Moon, (p. 13–17).

Another example of what may be called ‘bias by omission’ is to be found in this section. In 1984, some three years before the appearance of Mr. Grunfeld’s book, the ‘Tibetan Government in Exile’ published a casualty list of Tibetans who had perished under Chinese rule since 1949. This list was meticulously compiled from refugee testimony as well as other sources which have become accessible since about 1980 and was widely quoted (see *News Tibet*, Jan-August 1984. Volume 19 #1. p. 5) and it revealed that over 1,200,000 Tibetans had died and included

the total of 342,970 Tibetans *who had died of starvation as a direct result of Chinese policies in Tibet.* (See *Tibet: The Facts*, Footnote 39).

Mr. Grunfeld did not mention these statistics in his book. 'Honest Brokerage' and academic consistency would surely demand that at least *some* space be given to these statistics, even if Mr. Grunfeld disputes them. They seem likely to be substantially accurate and are given credence by widespread refugee testimony, most selectively used by Mr. Grunfeld, many hundreds of deserted villages whose occupants wandered off in search of food and starved to death, and the known failure of the crops due to the Chinese insistence that Tibetans grow wheat (a crop favoured by them) not barley. This resulted in enormous crop failures in areas previously known for their abundant harvests such as Kanze and Drayab (See *Tibet: The Facts*, 'Famine Caused by Chinese Policies') Mr. Grunfeld gives almost no space to this extraordinarily destructive aspect of Chinese rule and it would be correct to say that such hints of it as there are evaporate in a cloud of statistics which serve to conceal the fearful mass starvation caused by Chinese policies. Little if any indication is given of the fact that the Chinese appropriated grain and foodstuffs produced by Tibetans. Evidence of this can be found in material *cited* by Grunfeld, but which contain accounts mostly not used in his book or selectively abstracted. The former source used by Grunfeld *Tibet Under Chinese Communist Rule* (p. 119) contains an example of this. Lama Karma Tenzin stated: "The produce of the commune, grains, meat, butter, etc are mostly siphoned off to meet the needs of the 'State Grain Reserve, War Preparation Reserve', etc and only a small fraction is left for the consumption of the commune members. The best workers receive two measures of tsampa per day." The passage then continues with the words quoted above in this critique that two-thirds of Tibetans in Lama Tenzin's area had died of starvation. *Neither of these statements are quoted by Grunfeld, he simply gives the source in footnote 47 as being Tibet Under Communist Rule, Dharamsala, 1976, p. 119.* So in this, as in so many other instances, though

Grunfeld mentions material which contradicts his point of view he rarely, if ever, freely quotes from it so that readers can form clear mental pictures arising from a different account. In order to do this a considerable amount of material would have to be obtained from abroad, but sympathetic quotes seemingly designed to cushion the effects of Chinese rule in the reader's mind, abound throughout the book. One such example is to be found on p. 145. "In a word, in the past eight years, the political, social and religious customs in Tibet remained as they were before the peaceful liberation..." (Commentary on the so-called statement of the Dalai Lama') Footnote 71 Chapter 7. These words were written when Tibetans were being slaughtered in their thousands in many parts of Tibet, when monasteries were being demolished as a matter of policy and in the fighting, and when 'democratic reforms' were causing mass starvation and destroyed the basis of Tibetan society. When such footnotes are dissected and carefully analysed and the text and source material is followed up paragraph by paragraph, Mr. Grunfeld's dubious obscurative technique becomes apparent and all this partiality is concealed by a seemingly balanced and academic approach. Surely, considerable space should be given to testimony stating that *Tibetans starved to death because the Chinese took the food they had produced*. More evidence of this, among other sources, can be found in *Life in the Red Flag People's Commune* (Dharamsala 1978, p. 37— p. 39). After recounting the deaths of Tibetans through starvation (p. 36) Mrs. Choedon continues, "Then after the harvest the figures are cross checked and investigations are made if there is too much discrepancy. Afterwards you can see the Chinese carting away our grains in lorries on various sweet-sounding pretexts". After this the Tibetans starved. Even Mr. C. Mullin, found Mrs. Choedon's account 'wholly credible' (*The Tibetans*, Minority Rights Group, London 1981, p. 9).

It is to be hoped that the above facts indicate the bias in Mr. Grunfeld's account of agriculture in Tibet. An area of this most inadequate section is rendered confusing because footnote 38, though listed in Chapter 9 footnotes, does not actually

appear in the text and as a result the material cited in footnote 38 does not appear to have an immediate application to whatever material it supposedly deals with.

The War

It would be correct to say that little impression is conveyed by Mr. Grunfeld of the overwhelming amount of evidence indicating the dimensions of the 'Twenty Years War', or the depths of Chinese brutality. There is now convincing evidence that the Chinese massacred 87,000 Tibetans in Central Tibet from March 1959-October 1960. (See *Tibet: The Facts* Footnote 319.) Evidence for this massacre was cited by John Avedon in his book *In Exile From the Land of Snows*, p. 124, now published by Wisdom, London. It consisted of a document captured by Tibetan freedom fighters when they annihilated a PLA convoy on the Xinjiang-Lhasa road in 1966. *Mr. Grunfeld has not mentioned the existence of this documents in the Making of Modern Tibet.* Even if Mr. Grunfeld disputes its authenticity the demands of academia surely require that he mention the existence of this document, which Mr. John Gittings, *Guardian* Asian Editor, said 'looked genuine enough' (4/7/85) well over a year before Mr. Grunfeld's book was published. Like Mr. Grunfeld he did not mention this document when reviewing Avedon's book. *Tibet: The Facts*, (Footnote 319 Op. cit). The subject would appear to be taboo.

This is surely inexcusable in the light of the fact that the document is almost certainly authentic and such a massacre would compare with a long series of massacres perpetrated by the Turks against the Armenians in 1915. Would Mr. Grunfeld have displayed such a reticence if a similar document had emerged from Namibia concerning the activities of the South African army, or from the period of US intervention in Vietnam? One somehow doubts it. But when formidable evidence suggests that the *Chinese* are guilty of such a massacre in Tibet the subject is clearly taboo for Mr. Grunfeld and disinterested scholarship will have nothing to do with it.

It is in the material dealing with the War that Mr. Grunfeld's Marxist affiliations become particularly apparent. He simply *cannot* bring himself to admit in any clear and sustained fashion that ordinary Tibetan people, peasants, farmers, nomads, woodcutters, etc. rose up and fought the Chinese in a War which lasted for some twenty years. The scenario for Mr. Grunfeld consists a ruling class which the Chinese strove to win over to their policies as they progressively destroyed Tibetan culture in the name of 'liberation'. The implication is of course that most ordinary Tibetans were relatively well disposed towards the Chinese or mainly neutral. Mr. Gurnfeld cannot admit, despite a great deal of evidence to the contrary, that Tibetans were governed, particularly around Central Tibet, at least with a certain degree of efficiency by a *Tibetan Government*. His terminology here often mirrors that of the Chinese and clearly betrays his Marxist affiliations. Instead of referring to the Tibetan Government he uses phrases such as the '...Tibetan elite' (p. 93), the 'Lhasa oligarchy', (p. 103) 'upper strata dissidents', (p. 113). All these phrases have frequently been used by the Communist Chinese. Much evidence suggests that many of them did not have to be 'won over' and a considerable number of Tibetan aristocrats served the Chinese faithfully or were neutral at best. But Mr. Grunfeld finds it necessary to invert reality in Tibet in order to safeguard his essentially Marxist analysis.

As he himself admits, the Dalai Lama strove to work with the Chinese. He did this when they were pouring troops into E. Tibet and destroyed hundreds of monasteries. It is also known that the Dalai Lama appeared lukewarm towards the revolt as he himself admits, (p. 128) and there were several later occasions when the Dalai Lama indicated that he did not approve of the Tibetan rebellion. Minimising the part played by ordinary Tibetans who fought in defence of their religion and way of life, Mr. Grunfeld states: "I believe that, had the Dalai Lama been able to contain the more aggressive of his officials, the opportunity existed for the Beijing-Lhasa tie to revert to earlier forms", (p. 231). Again he quotes, most selec-

tively from *Horseman in the Snow*, Dharamsala 1979, (p. 94/95) stating that the revolt ‘...was initiated and led by chiefs of the clans and wealthy traders’. This may be so but had such a rebellion not had the support of large numbers of Tibetans it would not have lasted for such a long time.

Equally deplorable in Mr. Grunfeld’s analysis is the lack of coverage devoted to Chinese crimes against humanity in Tibet, such as the above-mentioned massacre, the shootings, bombings, tortures, and deaths in labour camps. Evidence for these, together, with source material may be found in *Tibet: The Facts* (see section entitled ‘The Twenty Years War’, ‘Massacres’, ‘Population Displacement and Demographic Imbalance’ etc.). It is also correct to say that virtually no idea is given of the horror of the ‘Thamzing sessions’ in which so many thousands of Tibetans died lingering deaths.

The omission of so much relevant and well-authenticated material allows him to make balanced sounding judgement. “It is fruitless to look for villains in this historical drama. The Chinese leadership had difficulties in containing ‘Great Hanism’ and was unable or unwilling to understand the error of their policies in eastern Tibet”. Meanwhile we see the graveyard of a culture and over one million dead Tibetans. The scope and duration of the rebellion can be found in refugee testimony cited in *Tibet: The Facts*, the destruction of monasteries during the Twenty Years War, numerous villages destroyed in the fighting, and the demographic imbalance between men and women in E. Tibet caused by the scale of the fighting and the fearful aftermath of Chinese repression. This imbalance has been noted in *The Population Atlas of China* (Map 40) ‘Sex Ratio’, OUP, 1987 cited in *Tibet: The Facts* Footnote 42.

From 1980 onwards an enormous amount of information has emerged from Tibet giving detailed information on the legacy of Chinese rule there. In general Mr. Grunfeld has ignored or minimised or used such material highly selectively as already indicated. A general impression of relative balance and impartiality can be maintained by ignoring important evi-

dence such as the document referring to the massacre of 87,000 Tibetans. This scarcely counts as 'disinterested scholarship'.

Interestingly enough Mr. Grunfeld states that "John F. Avedon's recent book *In Exile From the Land of Snows* can be considered the 'official' version of the Dalai Lama view of history...". But it is Mr. Avedon not Mr Grunfeld who conveys the depths of the Tibetan tragedy, either using source material which Mr. Grunfeld ignores, or rarifies and Grunfeld's book could quite easily be condemned as being pro-Chinese while masquerading as an impartial presentation of the facts.

Various examples of this occurred in an article entitled: "Tibetans seek curbs on powerful cadres and bloated budgets". (*Guardian* 8/10/88). This article was written at a time when riots taking place in Lhasa and when Tibetans were undergoing tortures similar to those inflicted upon their victims by the Gestapo or the Japanese Kempeitai. However, one would have difficulty inferring this from the vague and general title of the article or from extenuating phraseology such as: "Most of the Tibetans who took part in the disturbances did so because of a long simmering anger over the capricious and arbitrary behaviour of public security officers and the lack of response from local cadres, both Chinese and Tibetan". The violent passions and issues involved are pleasingly fudged by such vague statements. The article was by no means entirely misleading but it came as no surprise to those acquainted with Mr. Grunfeld's work on Tibet to read that "A prominent Tibetan who has no love for the Chinese said, 'Forget independence, show me Tibetans who are well fed, with an education, with jobs'". A footnote at the end of the article announced that Mr. Grunfeld "recently spent a month in China under the auspices of the China Tibetology Research Centre. Two weeks of travel in central Tibet were sponsored by the Tibet Academy of Social Sciences." It would be surprising if the Chinese were not very grateful to Mr. Grunfeld for his writings on Tibet.

Human Rights

Little indication is given by Mr. Grunfeld of the enormous human-rights abuses in Tibet between 1949–79. Formidable evidence, mostly not used by Grunfeld, despite the fact that it was available at least three years before his book was published, indicates that well over one million Tibetans have died under Chinese rule and that torture has been tragically wide-spread.

One of the first indications that all was not well in Tibet came from two Reports issued by the International Commission of Jurists, the first appeared some thirty years ago in 1959, and the second in 1960. Grunfeld cites some evidence suggesting that the ICJ was an organisation originally funded by the CIA, but is unable to cite any evidence that it actually influenced the Report as the then ICJ Secretary General, Niall Macdermot pointed out in a letter to Grunfeld (p. 142, Footnote 62) and it would appear that the connection if any, was tenuous one. When this link was pointed out many years ago the very mention of the CIA was sufficient to close many people's minds to evidence which supported the dire conclusions of the Report. Added to this was the fact that Tibetans who were attempting to present their case often did not understand the realities of the media world or the criteria by which their assertions would be judged. For many reasons large numbers of people were sceptical about their descriptions of Chinese atrocities and massacres and at this time, though to a far lesser degree now, some Left-wingers were inclined to grant an almost unlimited indulgence to Chinese assertions that they had liberated a cruel feudal regime. (See section entitled; *China: The Honeymoon Era and its End*). In particular Grunfeld points out that the ICJ did not provide a single example of sterilisation of Tibetans by the Chinese despite Tibetan assertions that this was occurring. In fact much evidence of sterilisations has been submitted to Amnesty International, London and Western doctors such as Dr. Diana Gibb have actually examined Tibetan women who have been sterilised. (See section entitled *Health, Hospitals, Abortions and Sterilisations*.) Anyone reading

the section on the ICJ Report, and who was unfamiliar with recent Tibetan history, would probably conclude that reports of Chinese atrocities had been grossly exaggerated or at least that the Tibetans had been unable to effectively present their case.

The central point is that the ICJ Reports were compiled some thirty years ago and their conclusions on such questions as the threat of cultural genocide faced by the Tibetan people, the existence of torture, deportations, deaths in labour-camps, mass executions and starvation have been largely substantiated by evidence which has emerged since about 1980, but which Grunfeld has largely ignored even though his book was published in 1987. He is in effect re-fighting yesterday's battles even though they have already been lost. Even more curious is the fact that most of the footnotes in his book do not extend beyond 1982, yet the book was published some five years later, giving ample time for much new material to be incorporated as demanded by 'disinterested scholarship'.

During the last 7–8 years Amnesty International has become increasingly concerned at reports emanating from Tibet as information and eye-witness testimonies have become increasingly available. This concern has become reflected in their *Urgent Action Bulletins*, many of which have been cited in this Report. A severe bout of Chinese repression occurred mainly in Lhasa in the summer 1983 and AI issued an *Urgent Action Bulletin* dated 12/10/83 (AI Index ASA 17/14/83 Distr: UA/SC) which dealt with executions in the Tibetan capital. Mr. Grunfeld did not mention this or reports on oppression in Tibet which appeared in *AI Newsletter* (February 1984, p. 2). He did not mention Amnesty International's *China Briefing* which cited instances of repression in Tibet on p. 2 and p. 4, and which was published three years before his book. He did not mention *China: Violations of Human-Rights, Prisoners of Conscience & The Death Penalty in the People's Republic of China* which mentions the existence of prison camps in Tibet and Qinghai (the Xining Complex) on p. 6 and gives details of oppression in Tibet and Tibetans suffering human-rights abuses

on p's. 15/16/30/31/32/48/49. This Report also appeared some three years before Mr. Grunfeld's book was published. The most recent AI Report on China entitled *China: Torture and Ill-Treatment of Prisoners*, which mentions Tibet, appeared in 1987, mercifully too late for inclusion in Mr. Grunfeld's book. When one scans the Index it comes as no surprise to see that Amnesty International is not included.

Concern with major and continuing human-rights abuses in Tibet has been reflected at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva. (See section entitled *The UN, The US and Europe*). Major presentations were made in December 1984, August 1985, February/March 1986, February/March 1987. *Needless to say Mr. Grunfeld did not mention any of them.* Most of the presentations at the UN have dealt specifically with lack of religious freedom, the threat posed to Tibetans by the Chinese influx, and human-rights abuses suffered by Tibetans. It is difficult, if not impossible, to understand why at least some of these presentations were not mentioned, since their effects have been far ranging and they have had the great advantage of associated UN syndication, which, taken with Amnesty International's media facilities and circulation network, has resulted in an upsurge of interest in the Tibetan issue in many countries. It seems reasonable that a balanced and thorough analysis of human-rights abuses in Tibet should have made some reference to the fact that this issue is being aired at the UN. The Tiananmen Massacre has ensured that this process is already gaining an observably greater momentum.

Human-rights abuses must surely be condemned in whatever part of the world they occur, whether in Capitalist or Communist countries. But it seems that Mr. Grunfeld's undoubted Marxist affinities have resulted in a determined effort on his part to conceal the extent of human rights abuses in Tibet. A clue to his attitude to this question may perhaps be found in a correspondence with Mr. Van Walt, Legal Advisor to the 'Tibetan Government in Exile' which was featured in the *Tibetan Review*, June 1981, 'A Reply to Grunfeld's Paper', Mr. Van Walt wrote, "Here in India and Nepal I constantly am con-

fronted with the tragic tales of Tibetans who have spent the best part of 22 years in prisons, concentrations camps, or forced labour camps where they were maltreated physically and mentally tortured, beaten, literally starved and permanently injured. These are obviously the prisoners who survived the ordeal, but the majority did not”... In his reply featured in the *Tibetan Review* August 1981 ‘An Apologists Comment’, (p. 21) Mr. Grunfeld did not respond to this point. This point, which included the above quotation, was reiterated in a successive correspondence in the *Tibetan Review*, May 1982, p. 23 by P. Ingram and Mr. Grunfeld was asked to comment on it once again. In his reply *Tibetan Review*, July 1982 ‘Illogical Generalisation’, (p. 27) Grunfeld, once again did not reply directly to this point, stating “I have no way of knowing whether individual cases of imprisonment and alleged torture are true or not—I’ll leave that to Amnesty International, who I trust implicitly. But Mr. Ingram, by bringing up these cases seems to be making some form of equation between individual instances and society as a whole...” The reply to Grunfeld *Tibetan Review*, August 1982, stressed that far from being generalised from a few instances, many sources, particularly ones which had recently emerged, showed the misery of Buddhists *all over Tibet* caused by poverty, starvation, torture, forced labour, etc. Mr. Grunfeld did not reply to this letter. It was further pointed out in this letter that writing in the *Tibetan Review* (Feb/March 1982) Mr. Grunfeld stated “...there have indeed been major material gains and mass education for the first time...” (in Tibet) but in the *Tibetan Review*, June 1982 he admitted, “poor education and minimal literacy” provoking the rejoinder that “If Mr. Grunfeld does not know what he believes about Tibet I’m sure I don’t know what he believes either”.

The fact is that despite saying that instances of imprisonment and alleged torture should be ‘protested and condemned’, this is scarcely done in Mr. Grunfeld’s book. Not only has he certainly been content to leave such investigations to Amnesty International, *he has also neglected to report the results of such*

investigations when they have appeared.

It is difficult not to taste the flavour of profound dishonesty in this book, particularly in this vital area of human-rights abuses and this section could fittingly conclude with an investigation of Grunfeld's selectivity in the use of source materials which are often replete with tales of horror but such instances are scarcely used by Grunfeld, while more innocuous reports, eminently acceptable to Grunfeld, are featured. Surely a balanced analysis should feature equally both kinds of accounts.

The section entitled, 'The Great Proletarian Revolution' does at least give some idea of what might be called a latter day 'reign of terror' in Tibet which lasted some ten years. One gains some idea of the extent of the cultural destruction and the anarchy and chaos that attended it but the text does not contain any account of the executions and the tortures that characterised this period. Mr. Grunfeld quotes from *Life in the Red Flag People's Commune* by D. Choedon (p. 64/65) which contains instances of cultural desecration, the killing of dogs and relentless sinocisation. But by the standards of the time and other material included in the book, these incidents though disturbing, are relatively innocuous. He might perhaps have included instances of starvation caused by Chinese policies, (p. 36.) the beating to death of a minor government official in a Thamzing, which she personally witnessed (p. 66) deaths of other people in Thamzings, (p. 67) family suicides caused by Chinese brutality, (p. 67) deaths in prison and three public executions, (p. 67). If Mr. Grunfeld wished to bring home to the reader the realities of Chinese rule in Tibet he might also have mentioned the incident in which a famished Tibetan mother made a soup of her own blood to feed her starving children when her husband was in prison. *From Liberation to Liberalisation* p. 119. (This report has been included in *Tibet: The Facts*, see 'Famine Caused by Chinese Policies'). This, then is the other side of the picture barely hinted at Mr. Grunfeld.

Mr. Grunfeld makes use of other relatively innocuous incidents illustrating Chinese behaviour. For example he refers to an incident in which Chinese soldiers arrived at a monastery,

searched it, found nothing and released the monks unharmed (p. 167). Perhaps he might have balanced this with more vigorous accounts contained in source material which he cites. *From Liberation to Liberalisation* reports killings of two monks in Lhasa's Drapchi prison, (p. 94). 200 monks chained and manacled, an abbot whose ears were torn so that his face was soaked in blood which was also pouring out of his nose and ears, and the severe torture of an oracle of a monastery, (p. 131). These incidents are characteristic of what was happening all over Tibet and probably the most comprehensive account of the decimation of the religious community in Tibet is to be found in the testimony of Dr. Tenzin Choedak in John Avedon's book *In Exile from the Land of Snows*. Dr. Choedak has been interviewed by Amnesty International, London, and the section of the book entitled 'Tibet Enslaved' gives an unforgettable picture of hundreds, many of them monks, dying of beatings, Thamzings, starvation and forced labour.

For example, only two monks out of three hundred from Labrang Tashikiel monastery survived through the period 1956–1959: Ominously enough, when a propaganda play was staged at the camp it was noticed that the maroon curtain used for a backdrop had been fabricated from the robes of monks, (p. 249). Mr. Grunfeld simply equated this book with 'the Dalai Lama's view of history', but did not mention Dr. Choedak's testimony in his book, perhaps not altogether surprisingly.

Under these circumstances statements such as the following do not appear to have any meaning because they are so rarified. 'The greatest area of misunderstanding between the Tibetans and the Han was religion' (p. 166/167), which really seems rather like saying that the 'greatest area of misunderstanding between the Jews and Hitler was the latter's racial policy'. Having refrained from mentioning testimony such as that of Dr. Choedak the way is then clear for Mr. Grunfeld to declare in seemingly measured and balanced academic language, "Several factors were at work in the diminution of the role of the clerical community". (p. 167). Several times Mr. Grunfeld asserts that religion in Tibet was scarcely altered in any way

before 1959 and yet this ignores the dimensions of the rebellion in E. Tibet, though he does at least mention the bombing of Lihang monastery.

There is little doubt that, in the main, Chinese applied their policies at first only warily in many parts of Central Tibet but how is such an assertion possible in the light of the rebellion which assumed serious proportions in 1956. (See *Tibet: The Facts*, 'The Twenty Years War' which includes the testimony of the Chinese Colonel Cheng Ho Ching, who deserted to the Tibetans, and recorded full scale fighting in Kham long before the Lhasa rebellion).

Finally, Mr. Grunfeld writes about Tibetan cadres picked from the poorer Tibetans. "But this segment of the population had the least formal education and lacked even the most basic literacy and may have been a factor in the poor administration of policies at the local level", (p. 165). Once again this seems a balanced judgement until strong evidence for the massacre of 87,000 Tibetans is recalled from March 1959/October 1960 which, as has been pointed out, Mr. Grunfeld did not mention. At the time Tibetan cadres were being trained the above massacre was probably taking place. One recalls the testimony of a Tibetan monk featured in *Dispatches* who described deathpits full of Tibetan corpses with arms and legs sticking out of the ground and who described himself as 'a leftover from death'. (*Tibet: The Facts*, Footnote 48). This account emerged after Mr. Grunfeld's book had been published but given the above analysis it surely requires something akin to an act of faith to believe that Mr. Grunfeld would ever have included it.

Tibetan Independence

This Report *Tibet: The Facts* has not attempted to argue for or against Tibetan independence but has attempted to set the issue within a 20th Century context in an era which has seen scores of countries achieve their independence from colonial rule. Inevitably Tibetans ask the question why Tibet should in some way be set apart from considerations which have

influenced the destinies of countries who have gained independence, such as India, Nigeria, Malawi, Zaire, Algeria, Gambia, Tunisia, Burma, Vietnam, Jamaica, Egypt, the Sudan, Indonesia, and laterly Namibia. Why, they ask, should Tibet in some way be considered mysterically exempt from the mainstream of independence movements which have played a large part in determining the political landscape of the 20th Century. The answer is of course that China claims Tibet and has acted upon that claim and a good case could be made out suggesting that the Chinese occupation of Tibet is a clear example of Communist imperialism which should be condemned along with Western and Capitalist imperialism. It could also be added that the UN Charter enshrines the right to independence and *Article 1* reads: "All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development". It would be a bold person who claimed that the Tibetan people gave little or no indication that they wish to be independent from China when strong evidence, quoted in this Report, suggests that over 400,000 of them died in an effort to stop the Chinese occupation and when they were shot down in the streets of Lhasa demonstrating for independence as recently as late 1987 and early 1988 and 1989. Surely, an academically balanced report should at least pay *some* attention to the above considerations, even if only to reject them for whatever reason.

It is correct to say that Mr. Grunfeld gives virtually no consideration to the above reasoning and his analysis of this question has only a semblance of credibility because it largely ignores this perspective, looks to the past, not to the present or to the future, and sets the entire question within a strictly limited context, largely confined to past relation between China and Tibet, tri-partite agreements concluded nearly eighty years ago between Tibet, China and British India, and ends with a conclusion which legitimises the present status quo in Tibet with an ingenious appearance of impartiality.

In 1903–4 the British sent a small force, led by Colonel Younghusband, into Tibet with the main object of countering

suspected Russian designs which might have imperilled British India. Grunfeld refers to this as a 'British Invasion' but does not refer to the Chinese entry into Tibet in 1949 as a 'Chinese Invasion' and this shows where his true affinities lie. The British action was an imperialistic one but by the standards of the Chinese occupation it was a restrained affair. Several hundred Tibetans were killed, the force reached Lhasa, and somewhat bemusedly, withdrew. The result of the Chinese occupation has been to devastate Tibetan culture, but this does not constitute, in Mr. Grunfeld's eyes, a Chinese invasion, and Grunfeld certainly does not condemn this communist expansionism as imperialistic. An impartial analysis should condemn both or neither of the armed intrusions, *not merely one of them*.

Alarmed by the 'British Invasion' the Chinese moved into E. Tibet in 1909/10. Shortly afterwards the Dalai Lama fled to British India and the Chinese occupied Lhasa. However, the overthrow of the Manchu Dynasty in 1911 resulted in fighting in many parts of Tibet, aided by dissension amongst the Chinese. The Dalai Lama returned to Lhasa in 1912, whereupon he and the Tibetan National Assembly, proclaimed Tibetan independence. The Simla Conference began in October 1913 and was signed in April 1914, Tibetan independence was confirmed and the reluctance of the Chinese to abandon recent territorial acquisitions in E. Tibet resulted in the abrogation of all their rights and privileges. Until 1949 Tibet was independent and was one of the first, if not the very first country, to proclaim its independence from what it considered to be an oppressive colonial ruler.

Not surprisingly this episode is anathema to Mr. Grunfeld and he refuses to recognise the reality of Tibetan independence. (For example, on p. 74 he writes, "While World War II was raging the Tibetans saw an opportunity to further demonstrate their 'independence', creating a Bureau of Foreign Affairs in 1942 or 1943".) There is no doubt that imperial British India was the main partner in the Simla Conference and Mr. Grunfeld writes, "British officials managed to achieve some legality for

their imperialist intentions, but were compelled to do so by resorting to the most underhand means”, (p. 65). The British gained the right of direct negotiation with the Tibetans, and the MacMahan Line was roughly delineated. Tibetan independence was confirmed and Chinese claims were dismissed. There is no doubt that Britain largely gained what it wanted and Mr. Grunfeld sees Tibet, not unreasonably, as falling under the influence of Britain and declared the Treaty of Simla to be “...blatantly illegal...”.

Such strictures from Mr. Grunfeld are noticeably lacking when he deals with the ‘17 Point Agreement’ imposed by the Communist Chinese upon the Tibetans in May 1951. Consistency and impartiality would seem to demand that this Agreement be condemned with the same vigour as the Treaty of Simla. If this treaty was imposed upon the Tibetans by the British as Mr. Grunfeld states then how can he possibly deny that the ‘17 Point Agreement’ was imposed upon the Tibetans by the Chinese? And how can one agreement be condemned but not the other? Apparently British imperialism can be vigorously condemned but great indulgence must be displayed to what appears to be Communist Chinese imperialism. This is evidently a very different matter indeed. On p. 65 Mr. Grunfeld writes: “The (Simla) Conference provided facade for the pursuit of British interests in Tibet.” In May 1951 the Communist Chinese informed the Tibetan delegates that they must sign the ‘17 Point Agreement’ or face war, (the word ‘agreement’ was presumably used as ‘Treaty’ would imply an understanding between two countries.) The Tibetans signed under duress but Mr. Grunfeld does *not* declare that the ‘17 Point Agreement’ provided a convenient facade for the pursuit of Chinese interests in Tibet. Rather, he declares, “The Dalai Lama and his followers outside of Tibet have contended since 1959 that the ‘17 Point Agreement’ was of dubious legality” (p. 108) and further adds, “They believe that the delegates themselves were compelled to sign the document, using facsimilies of Tibetan seals manufactured in Beijing (when the Tibetans refused to use the originals.)” The word *believe* implies a somewhat extenuating

perspective since this is now known to be the case (see *The Tibetans: Two Perspectives on Tibetan-Chinese Relations*, MRG 1983, pt 11, P. Wangyal Footnote 24) for confirmation of this fact in a written statement submitted to the author by Dzasak Khemey Sonam Wangdi, one of the signatories. There is no doubt that facsimilies were manufactured in Beijing.

By any internationally accepted standards the '17 Point Agreement' is at least as dubious as Mr. Grunfeld considers the Treaty of Simla to be, and his comment is a stunning one. "In any case, the Dalai Lama and his court did return to Lhasa and worked with the Han, *thereby confirming the legality of the '17 Point Agreement'*" (*our italics*). The unmistakable implication is that if British delegates and armed forces had escorted the Dalai Lama back to Tibet pending the conclusion of the Treaty of Simla and he had returned to Lhasa to work with them, then this would have confirmed the legality of the Treaty. Using Mr. Grunfeld's 'logic' this case could in fact be argued since the British did allow the Dalai Lama to return to Tibet and for a considerable while relations were very cordial. The above surely makes it clear that this is not an impartial book, meticulously adjudicating between opposing points of view. Rather, it would appear to be in essence a subtle legitimisation of the Chinese occupation of Tibet, which in many respects conceal their legacy of death and destruction while apparently scrutinising it in a searching and scholarly analysis.

The text of this book, excluding Appendix A and B, consists of 217 pages and nearly forty of these pages are devoted to two sections entitled: *Foreign Intrigues I* and *Foreign Intrigues II*, constituting almost 20% of the text. It is a long and convoluted description of the interests of the US, Britain, India and Taiwan in the Tibetan question from the years before and during the Second World War until the end of the Tibetan War in Nepal in 1974. He goes to considerable lengths to describe what was clearly a late and marginal CIA operation in Tibet and states, "Understanding the involvement of the CIA is really the key to understanding the rebellion" (p. 149). This is a highly tendentious statement given the fact that severe

fighting took place in E. Tibet quite independently of any CIA influence both during the Chinese occupation in 1949 and in the mid 1950's in remote areas of Kham. Whatever one feels about the CIA it is worth remembering that the Tibetans were seeing their culture being destroyed before their eyes and they were desperate for any help they could get. There is no doubt that the Tibetans saw CIA agents as foreigners *but they saw the Chinese as foreigners too*. But for Mr. Grunfeld only agents of the four previously mentioned countries, India, Britain, Taiwan and the US count as foreigners and this fact surely destroys claims to impartiality. Once again, if CIA operatives are to be condemned as representatives of US imperialism then surely the machinations of the Chinese in Tibet should also be condemned as the manifestations of Chinese Communist imperialism. It is here that his Marxist perspective is strikingly apparent. The Chinese in Tibet are certainly not foreigners to *him*.

While the operations of foreign agents in Tibet are meticulously and exhaustively documented, even though these operations were very restricted in their scope and only increased in the latter stages of the Twenty Years War when Tibetan forces were fighting in Mustang, Nepal, Mr. Grunfeld gives only a most limited coverage in various other parts of the book, to Chinese penetration of E. Tibet. Little impression is given of the large numbers of troops who stealthily infiltrated large tracts of land and after the end of the Korean War in July 1953, escalated their tactics into a reign of terror. Sources used most selectively by Grunfeld, such as George Patterson, Jamyang Norbu, and refugee accounts contained in Tibetan publications, furnish material for a separate section on Chinese 'Foreign Intrigues' at least as long as the other two sections and the justification for Chinese troops being in Tibet at all could be lengthily questioned as could the legitimacy of their claim to Tibet in the light of all the great independence movements of the 20th Century. No such analysis informs these pages, even though the Chinese commitment was vastly greater than that of any other country in Tibet and ultimately resulted in the

near destruction of Tibetan culture.

There is now formidable evidence suggesting that the Chinese planned to assassinate the Dalai Lama, but Mr. Grunfeld has remained silent about this. John Avedon deals with the circumstances surrounding the proposed assassination. The Dalai Lama's brother, Takster Rinpoche, having been detained by the new Chinese Communist Governor of Xining, agreed to a scheme proposed by the Governor, that he would persuade the Dalai Lama not to offer any resistance to the Chinese armies as they occupied Kham. He also agreed that if the Dalai Lama proved unco-operative he would kill him and was told that he would be rewarded with the governorship of all Tibet. However, when Takster Rinpoche reached Lhasa in November 1950 he informed the Dalai Lama of the Chinese plan and made a detailed report to the Tibetan Cabinet. This surely constitutes a foreign intrigue far more serious than any of the others mentioned by Mr. Grunfeld and it is difficult to see how 'disinterested scholarship' can justify such an outstanding omission.

A balanced analysis might have mentioned the testimony of the previously mentioned Colonel Cheng Ho Ching who deserted to the Tibetans and who had seen very detailed papers on how Tibetan resistance would be overcome and how the country would be taken over through policies of infiltration and coercion and who stated that *Chinese* sources gave the figure of 40,000 Tibetans killed. The Colonel also stated that to prevent further revolts food rations were decreased, control intensified, and people were forced to work longer hours (See *Tibet: The Facts*, 'The Twenty Years War'). On p. 129 Grunfeld does state that 'casualty figures for the Han alone run as high as 40,000 and for Tibetans up to 65,000. One source claims that 65,000 Tibetans were killed in Kham, alone, in the single year of 1956' (p. 127), *but he does not quote that source* and the passage ends in some obscure conjectures. Mr. Grunfeld could also have mentioned wholesale Chinese atrocities referred to by Patterson and vividly conveyed in *Horseman in the Snow*, a source which he mentions, but whose terrible insights he manages to avoid. Although Mr. Grunfeld refers to the des-

truction of Lithang monastery, he does not mention that the local governor of Lithang was publicly tortured to death and that hundreds of monks were slaughtered.

Under these circumstances it is hardly surprising that, given Mr. Grunfeld's refusal to classify Chinese machinations in Tibet as the result of 'foreign intrigues' (while castigating the operations of other countries under this category,) he actually appears to have pre-judged the issue of Tibetan independence at the outset. His analysis constantly looks to the past, often concentrating largely or entirely on the vicissitudes of Tibetan-Chinese relations virtually without references to changes in the outside world, or to the UN Charter, or to independence movements that have so characterised the 20th Century. It is this enlarged perspective which serves to emphasise what seems to be Mr. Grunfeld's myopic treatment of this question and his undoubted Sinocentrism. Most revealingly Mr. Grunfeld states on p. 3 of the Introduction. "Absolute objectivity, however admirable, is unattainable; the reader will undoubtedly be able to identify my ideological biases. But the impossibility of being objective does not necessarily invalidate the search for a middle ground. By that I do not mean a sterile non-committal middle ground, but a point of view that allows the author to be aware of his or her prejudices and compensate for them. I have made every effort to use materials from most, if not all, contending points of view. I therefore choose to call this book 'disinterested and dispassionate history'".

However, Mr. Grunfeld's failure to convey the dimensions of the Tibetan struggle for independence and the obvious desire of the Tibetan people for this goal, is one of the many factors in this book which contradicts the impression given by this former statement. Perhaps the greatest impression of impartiality is given in Appendix B 'Independence'. This consists of a section entitled 'The Dalai Lama's Views', 'The Chinese Government's View', and 'Third Party's Views'. The first two sections contain eighteen points reflecting the Tibetan and Chinese stances on this matter. This seems quite admirable until one realises that the desire of the Tibetan people for

independence is not mentioned and the reader is confronted largely by historical abstractions that constantly harken to the past. For example, the section entitled 'The Chinese Government's View' is prefaced with the statement, "The view of the government of China—whether Mongol, Manchu or Han—has remained constant for centuries. 1. Tibet's continuous central government was a local one, not a national one." This terminology largely conceals the fact the Chinese inherited their claim to Tibet from a Mongolian Dynasty which conquered them and that a Communist Government has inherited this imperialistic legacy and fulfilled it while simultaneously denouncing imperialism in many other parts of the world. As has been pointed out, if other countries adopted the Chinese outlook then serious arguments could be advanced for the reconstitution of the British, French, Dutch, Spanish, Portuguese and Japanese Empires on the grounds of previous control, real or imagined, perceived strategic necessity and the claims of remote imperial and imperialist dynasties. One wonders what Mr. Grunfeld would have to say if Britain laid claim to S. Ireland on the basis of claims made by the English Plantagenet Kings of the 13th Century, or, following the Chinese example based on the Mongolian inheritance, India laid claim to Burma on the grounds that they were once both parts of the British Empire, or the French to Algeria etc. One searches in vain for a paragraph which embraces modern day realities of protracted independence struggles in Africa and Asia and UN principles of self-determination amidst this cloud of historical abstractions.

Point 7 in 'The Dalai Lama's Views' states, "In 1912 the Lhasa government evicted all Han residents and soldiers from Tibet, while the Dalai Lama simultaneously declared independence." The terminology may be considered somewhat suspect and this passage could also run, "In 1912 the *Tibetan Government* ejected all Chinese nationals and soldiers from Tibet while the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan National Assembly simultaneously declared independence." The phraseology used by Grunfeld betrays his pro-Chinese affinities. He refers to the 'Lhasa government' not the 'Tibetan Government'. The use of

the word Han rather than Chinese is eminently acceptable to some sinologists since it minimises the undoubted racial differences between the Chinese and Tibetan peoples, making differences between the two peoples somewhat resemble a family dispute. The use of the word 'evict' tends to give the impression of a tenant evicting a landlord, and both the Dalai Lama and the Tibetan National Assembly declared independence.

Point 7 here is 'balanced' if one may use that word, by Point 7 in 'The Chinese government's View' and runs: "The Chinese Government indeed, had no influence over Tibet in the years 1912–1951, but neither did it have any influence over many areas of China where local warlords ruled as virtual dictators. This condition alone does not represent independence". Every Tibetan claim to independence is thus countered by the Chinese viewpoint in an appearance of impartiality and at the end of this section many readers might well feel that the question of Tibetan independence has evaporated into trackless relativity.

The way has then been opened for 'Third Party Views' which do not mention the desire of the Tibetan people for independence, or the way in which they fought to maintain it, or the possibility that this question could be aired at the United Nations and this section is more or less devoid of a 20th Century perspective which, among other questions, might ask what special conditions qualify Tibet to remain within China when so many other countries have gained their independence. Had this particular section been as neutral as it appears to be it would have discussed the possibility of Tibetans being allowed to vote on the question of their independence under UN supervision. However, this possibility is not even raised. Following 'An Historical Look at China's View' (pre-1949 and post-1949), Mr. Grunfeld writes a short conclusion that legitimises the status quo in Tibet while in fact appearing to reach a balanced and disinterested conclusion. He writes, "Tibet has always had a special relationship with China—a relationship that never demonstrated 'independence' (as we use the term now,) but nor did it demonstrate Tibet to be 'an integral part of China'".

He then adds, "China is again speaking of a realistic interpretation of regional autonomy. The possible return of the Dalai Lama and China's emergence as an accepted and respected member of the world community have set the stage for the forging of a new Beijing-Lhasa link, in which Beijing would continue to control Tibet's security and external relations, but the Dalai Lama would lead a truly secular, regional government and once again head the church in Tibet. It remains to be seen just how far along the path to this goal the two parties are willing to travel." (p. 231).

This statement has little meaning since the dimensions of the Chinese influx into Tibet are such that the Tibetan people face the extinction of their culture and 'cultural genocide' or 'ethnocide' and, as pointed out in the conclusion of this Report, the presence of about half a million Chinese troops in Tibet renders the term 'autonomy' meaningless. In his Strasbourg speech the Dalai Lama called for a halt to the Chinese immigration into Tibet and the goal of Tibetan independence was not abandoned since the Tibetan people, if the plan was implemented, would have the opportunity of voting on the issue of their independence and this is an option which Mr. Grunfeld refused to consider. One wonders what Mr. Grunfeld's reaction would be if white South African settlers were pouring into Namibia which had been granted the status of an 'Autonomous Region' by the South African Government, having destroyed black culture there, and he encountered 'disinterested scholarship' which advocated 'a genuinely autonomous region' and an end to the struggle for Namibian independence. It is just this kind of modern day perspective which is virtually absent from this book.

On various occasions Mr. Grunfeld emphasises the point that no government has recognized the 'Tibetan Government in Exile', and uses this to cast doubts on Tibetan aspirations to independence. If one employs a modern comparative perspective one can recall that at various times when some of the great liberation struggles of the 20th Century went unrecognized by governments, particularly when bitter anonymous battles

were being fought. This was particularly the case at certain periods during the Indian struggle for independence and there were occasions when Nehru almost despaired. At times the Algerians had few or no friends, yet they ultimately prevailed. Many of the African countries fought against enormous odds and had little or no recognition of their aspirations at various times. However, they fought on and eventually prevailed. It may be asked what reason there is to sanctify the present status quo in Tibet on the grounds of lack of recognition by governments when similar arguments *if applied to dozens of liberation struggles in the world during the last fifty years could have been used to legitimise a widespread imperial status quo in which case the world would still be under the control of the European empires and the white races would still be in physical possession of large parts of the world.* Seen in this context Mr. Grunfeld's arguments, far from being neutral and disinterested, are in fact deeply slanted towards legitimising the Chinese occupation of Tibet and to belittling and minimising prospects for Tibetan independence. When Mr. Grunfeld's rather claustrophobic treatment of Tibet is subjected to cold 20th Century winds bringing with them UN Charter's, the fall or diminution of empires and wide-spread independence struggles, his analysis can seem brittle, inward-looking and somewhat superficial, particularly when so many modern perspectives are excluded from this book. It also has to be remarked that the Tiananmen Massacre is likely to result in many people lending a more sympathetic ears to Tibetan aspirations and to diminish the factors which once worked in favour of books such as this one and resulted in them being accorded more esteem than they were perhaps entitled to receive.

The *Tibetan Review*, June 1981 stated in 'Notes on Contributors', that "Mr. A. Tom Grunfeld has just completed a book-length study reappraising Tibetan history which is scheduled to be published in the near future". Presumably it was this book which did not in fact appear until some five years later in 1987. For this reason the book has a somewhat antiquated air and it is curious to note that very few of the footnotes

extend beyond 1982. As the book did not appear until five years had elapsed then surely a great deal of new material could have been included? But this is not the case at all and as we have seen presentations at the UN Human Rights Commission on Tibet have not been featured and neither has Amnesty International's frequently voiced concern at human-rights abuses in Tibet.

When the book appeared, Larry Jagan, editor of *Inside Asia*, stated in a review entitled 'Whodunit Saga of Tibet', "At last an authoritative 'disinterested and dispassionate' history of modern Tibet. In this timely book, Tom Grunfeld incisively describes the cultural, philosophical and historical origins of Tibet within the framework of its relations with the Chinese capital." Although Mr. Jagan has frequently espoused various independence struggles in parts of the world, the Tibetan question evidently presents no problems of perspective for him. The matter may be said to be comfortably settled. One may speculate that Mr. Jagan knows 'whodunit' in Namibia and Central America.

Mr. C. Mullin, when reviewing the book wrote, "At last a history of Tibet by someone who has no axe to grind". This statement seems to more or less stand in opposition to the facts and explains why his first Report issued by the Minority Rights Group and entitled 'The Tibetans', was ultimately supplemented by another Report after a major campaign had been waged by the (then) Scientific Buddhist Association. It is to the credit of the Minority Rights Group that they published another Report and that their representative is making hard-hitting presentations on Tibet at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, the latest of them occurring in March 1989. It is perhaps worth remarking that quotation on the back cover of Mr. Grunfeld's book does not mention anything about the new MRG Report which appeared some four years before Mr. Grunfeld's book and which was widely reviewed.

This critique could easily be far longer. Much space could have been given to analysing Grunfeld's unsympathetic portrait of the old Tibet and his description of cruelties that supposedly

existed, something which is noticeably absent when he deals with the Chinese occupation. Whatever the defects of the old regime may have been they pale into insignificance when compared with crimes against humanity committed by the Chinese. It is also worth mentioning that the reforms of the 13th Dalai Lama (1876–1933) resulted in a drastic reduction of cruel punishments, even though they did not entirely disappear. One could also raise questions about Mr. Grunfeld's frequently unsympathetic treatment of the efforts of the 'Tibetan Government in Exile' to cope with the refugee problem and the trauma of having been hurled out of their homeland, and it is quite unfortunate that the kind of criticisms he makes here are not generally of the same order when he describes the Chinese legacy in Tibet. His treatment of Tibetan history and his understanding of Tibetan Buddhism could also be severely criticised.

Perhaps it is fitting to conclude this critique with a selective quotation which might be considered tantamount to downright distortion. Mr. Grunfeld writes: "In 20th Century Tibet, the practice of human sacrifice evolved into animal sacrifice and the self-infliction of wounds for religious purposes", (p. 27) and the first paragraph on p. 28 is carefully weighted in favour of the existence of some form of human sacrifice. "In 1915 a British visitor to Gyantse was told that in certain rituals in previous times, babies had been sacrificed in the monastery there, indicating that this practice was not totally alien to Buddhists in Tibet". This passage is then followed up by the report of an American missionary who was born in China and spent at least eight years of his life in areas inhabited by Tibetans and who stated that 'although animal sacrifices were common, there were some instances of human sacrifices'. So far we have been given hearsay and reports but the time scale is uncertain. Is Grunfeld talking about human sacrifices that supposedly occurred in the 20th century or at some earlier date and if so how much earlier? If read carefully it can be seen that the two quotations incline to the past, rather than to the present, but the contrary impression could easily be received. Mr. Grunfeld then states, "The most convincing clue we have comes from Sir

Charles Bell. Bell wrote that he once visited a spot on the Tibet-Bhutan border where he saw a stupa called *Bang-ka Bi-tse cho-ten* that contained the bodies of an eight year old boy and girl 'who had been slain for the purpose' of some *religious ritual*." Mr. Grunfeld ends his quotation here but he does not include Bell's observations which follow directly after this passage. "*It is some twelve hundred years since Buddhism came to Tibet, but the fierce beliefs and savage practices that preceded it still speak to the people. This chapter may fittingly conclude with an example of the newer truer spirit, the spirit of Buddha himself*" (our italics). This passage entirely alters the effect of Grunfeld's quotation as it is clear that Bell was referring to the *Bon* or some other ancient beliefs that preceded Buddhism. He was not referring to Buddhism. Such selectivity in quotation is surely inexcusable and the fact that Grunfeld admits that such evidence is 'circumstantial at best' does not exonerate him from the implications of the above distortion. He concludes by saying, "I would venture to say that in the more remote areas, human sacrifice probably did occur. However, it could not have been practised with great frequency, for an extensive search for accounts by travellers and foreign residents of Tibet, turned up only the examples cited above" (p. 28).

However, Grunfeld's truncated quotation of Bell ensures that the damage is done in the mind of the reader for the distinct impression is given that at some past date or perhaps nearer to present times, Tibetan Buddhism sacrificed human beings in religious rituals when there is no evidence of this and when such evidence as can be examined applies not to Buddhism but to a circumstance which occurred long before Buddhism had entered Tibet. Once again, having slanted the evidence in a fashion which might be called disgraceful, the way is then open for Grunfeld to make what appears to be a scholarly and judicious appraisal of the evidence when it is in fact nothing of the sort. The secretary of the (then) Scientific Buddhist Association wrote a letter to Mr. Grunfeld (9/5/82) following the appearance of this truncated quotation in an article he wrote which appeared in the *Tibetan Review*, March 1982,

which registered the above objection to Mr. Grunfeld's use of sources, but no reply was ever received. Now it has appeared in his book.

This critique has hopefully identified various sophisticated methods by which Mr. Grunfeld, while giving the appearance of relative impartiality, has in fact weighted his material in favour of the Chinese to the detriment of balanced and accurate analysis of the Tibetan tragedy. He uses sources most selectively, employs a great deal of extenuating phraseology when examining the Chinese legacy in Tibet which while appearing to be balanced, is in fact prejudiced, rarely gives insights into the suffering of the Tibetan people or if he does, he generally refers to footnotes which in turn refer to a particular page in a book which the reader would himself have to obtain if he was to follow the matter up. Yet the book is replete with instances recording supposed Chinese benevolence, or the difficulties faced by them or simply refers to the 'shortcomings' of their rule, textual detail is then the order of the day, not merely footnotes. When instances of Chinese destruction and desecration are recorded they invariably come neat, that is to say Mr. Grunfeld seldom comments on them or amplifies the often horrific consequences of their rule. He usually leaves the passage alone or employs a multitude of stylistic devices, often extremely effectively, which tend to minimise the impact of Chinese destructiveness or brutality in the mind of the reader.

Unless these and other techniques of evasion, omission and extenuation are separately identified their cumulative effect is immense and it is difficult, if not impossible to understand how such a book could be regarded as 'disinterested scholarship'. Perhaps the best that may be said about this book is that Mr. Grunfeld frequently suffers from the kind of blindness displayed by the League of Nations when it managed to wind up its proceedings in 1945 without noticing that the Second World War had taken place.

Paul Ingram

NOTES

1. H.E. Richardson, *A Short History of Tibet*, E.P. Dutton & Co., New York 1962, p. 5.

2. Robert Turman, *An Outline of Tibetan Culture*, Cultural Survival Quarterly, 1988, No. p. 65. Beckwith writes: "...anyone with a knowledge of both comparative-historical linguistics and the Tibetan and Chinese languages has great difficulty imagining that two such radically different tongues could be genetically related". *The Tibetan Empire in Central Asia*, Princeton, 1987, p. 5.

3. Research indicates that Tibetans have lived at high altitudes for far longer than Indians in South America as they have developed a genetic factor which allows them to utilise oxygen more efficiently than other high-altitude dwellers who as yet lack such a mechanism. *Nature* Vol. 287, p. 486.

4. D. Choedon, *Life in the Red Flag People's Commune*, Central Tibetan Secretariat, Dharamsala, p. iii (The full address for books published by the Tibetan Secretariat is: Office of Information & International Relations, Gangchen Kyishong, Dharamsala-176215, Himachal Pradesh, India).

5. C. Mullin, *The Tibetans*, Minority Rights Group, London 1981, p. 9. (This Report was considered by Buddhists all over the world to have grave short-comings and to be sympathetic to Chinese rule in Tibet). An eight month campaign was spearheaded by Paul Ingram (Secretary, Scientific Buddhist Association) and Gerald du Pre (Chairperson, Scientific Buddhist Association) involving a private and public correspondence with Mr. Mullin following publication of an SBA campaign report in the *Tibetan Review*, April 1982 'Minority Rights Gone; A Campaign for Withdrawal of MRG Report on Tibetans', P Ingram. Correspondence arising from this campaign may be found in the *Tibetan Review*, p. 23, June 1982. p. 23, July

1982. .p. 27 August 1982 p. 24/25. An SBA sub-committee spent several months compiling a 25,000 word critique of the original MRG Report and copies of this critique were sent to all MRG council members and sponsors late in 1981 which gave rise to a lively correspondence. On 12/3/'82 Gerald Dupré and Paul Ingram had a meeting with Ben Whitaker, the then Executive Director of the Minority Rights Group at their headquarters, which was frank and constructive.

The new Report ultimately appeared in September 1983 and was entitled *The Tibetans: Two Perspectives on Tibetan-Chinese Relations*. This new edition also contained a Report written by a Tibetan, Mr. P. Wangyal. During the long campaign the Scientific Buddhist Association made it quite clear that it is a non-political organisation, simply being concerned to ensure that major human-rights abuses in Tibet were fairly reported.

The new Report was extensively reviewed. *New Society*, 29/9/83 'Two Tibets', which concluded that the new Report, for which the SBA had fought 'had the edge in terms of up-to-date information'. Other reviews included the *Irish Times*, 3/10/83, 'Chinese Dragon Cools Fire on Tibet, Cal McCrystal, *Peace News*, 11/1/85, 'Persecution in Tibet', *New Internationalist*, November 1983, 'Country Profile', etc. While appreciating the review the SBA wrote to the *New Internationalist*, 22/11/83, pointing out that unfortunately it gave almost no idea of the major human-rights abuses referred to in the new Report. An unproductive correspondence followed. The new Report was also reviewed in *Amnesty!*, the magazine of Amnesty International in August/September 1984, by Andrew Dilworth and a letter arising from this review written by SBA Secretary was printed in *Amnesty!* December/January 1985. Although the letter was headed "Tibet: 'Genocide' Claim," its content made it clear that the Tibetans were facing *cultural genocide* at the hands of the Chinese, rather than actual physical extermination.

Over a period of some eight years the Scientific Buddhist Association (now renamed OPTIMUS, non-religious organisation) has fought many campaigns in an effort to correct what it considered to be inaccurate or distorted reporting of conditions in Tibet. Another campaign, lasting some 8 months, was mounted against the *National Geographic* magazine. An article entitled 'Peoples of China's Far Provinces' by Wong How-Man appeared in the March 1984 edition. Almost no insight was given into the tragic plight of the Tibetan people and their suffering since 1949. After a long and inconclusive

correspondence with Mr. William Graves, Senior Assistant Editor, involving among other things, the compilation of a 10,000 word critique of Wong How-Man's article by a SBA sub-committee, copies of the critique, together with additional appended material, were circulated to *National Geographic* Officers and to members of the Board of Trustees. A letter written by Alex Houseman, CBE, correcting the impression given by Wong How-Man, was printed in the February 1985 edition of the *National Geographic*. Other such campaigns waged by the (then) SBA contributed to a greater awareness of the dimensions of the Tibetan tragedy on the part of the media and of the general public. Further action was taken in 1987 following a misleading introduction written by David Bonavia to *A Guide to Tibet*: Elizabeth B. Booz, Collins, 1986. Bonavia's Introduction seemed to differ little from Chinese propaganda statements about Tibet, gave little or no idea that Tibetan culture has been virtually wiped out and concluded with the words, "For all the exotic character of Tibetan culture, it has one simple, fundamental goal: to seek man's proper adjustment to the natural world. If the people of Tibet hold fast to this orientation, no amount of modernisation will in the long run be in conflict with their nature and their purposes". These words were written at a time when it was well known that Tibetans were suffering from the effects of an enormous and prolonged Chinese influx, and are facing cultural genocide or 'ethnocide'. A ten page letter was sent to Mr. Bonavia (3/7/87) but further correspondence with Mr. Bonavia, who lives in Hong Kong and works for the *South China Morning Post* resulted in short abrasive letters from him which did not address themselves to any of the main points raised. Following an unhelpful correspondence with the (then) Publicity Director of Collins, the matter was taken to Mr. F.I. Chapman, Chairman and Chief Executive, and was in some degree resolved. Copies of the correspondence were sent to the author of the book, but no acknowledgement or reply was ever received.

Similar action was taken over a book entitled *Tibet* by Kevin Kling, (Thames and Hudson 1985) which once again gave almost no idea of the suffering of the Tibetan people since 1949 and conveyed the impression that Tibetan culture was more or less intact. For example, photo 11 had the caption, "A young lama (a rare sight now in Tibet) in the Barkhor procession around the Jokhang temple, Lhasa." A letter dated 13/10/86 was written to Mrs Kling, pointing out, among other things, that, "Lamas generally are quite a rare sight, at least compared

with the throngs there once were. This is because some 600,000 monks and nuns were either massacred, tortured to death, worked to death, or simply disappeared from 1950–76". A considerable amount of appended material was also sent to the author, including an earlier edition of *Tibet: The Facts*, but no reply was received from the author. After a correspondence with Collins it seems that the book is no longer available.

Over a period of many years the SBA (now OPTIMUS) has been in collision with many correspondents who have reported, or at least attempted to report, the situation in Tibet and the activities of the Tibetan Government in Exile. An article written by David Hewson appeared in the *Times* (19/10/83). Spectrum 'Buddha and Bullets', and followed a new bout of repression in Tibet which began in August 1983. The article revealed little understanding of the situation in Tibet, or of the realities of Chinese rule there. Hewson appeared to accept that the Chinese were executing 'criminals' and did not voice the alternative perspective (now confirmed) that political activists are labelled as criminals. He seemed to detect discrepancies in the Tibetan Government in Exile's reporting of executions in Lhasa and Shigatse (discrepancies which were resolved in an SBA letter to Mr. Hewson, with reference to sources dated 16/3/84), and referred to Chinese 'mistakes' in Tibet. In a later article entitled 'Perplexed by Prayer Wheels and Poverty', *Times*, 'Travel I' 25/2/84–2/3/84 which arose, one assumes, as a result of a visit to Tibet after new bout of repression, he gave no idea of the continuing persecution of Tibetans and lamented the facts that tourism would result in the destruction of their culture, evidently unaware of the fact that Tibetan culture was already facing its demise as a result of three decades of Chinese rule.

In his reply dated 20/3/84 Hewson accused the SBA of demanding a political component to what was simply a travelogue and added, "both sides refuse to accept that the matter may be anything but pure black and white". An SBA letter dated 24/3/84 pointed out that all we were requesting was honest reporting and to have mentioned the existence of human-rights abuses, including torture and beatings, is not to espouse any political cause any more than Amnesty International does when it deals with such matters. The letter asked whether Mr. Hewson accepted that there were two points of view concerning the massacre of 87,000 Tibetans and if so then he would have to agree 'that there are two points of view to the Baltic massacres carried out by the Nazis, or Stalin's barbarous actions in the Ukraine'. It was

added that by not giving any idea of the extent of Chinese repression in Tibet it could be said that his article was in fact pro-Chinese and therefore political, whereas balanced reporting would have exonerated him from this charge. When referring to executions in Tibet, Hewson stated, "They are undoubtedly barbaric in proportion by our standards, but they are not political, unless one counts the execution of a thief political on the grounds that he seeks capitalist rewards". *This comment indicated that it had not occurred to Hewson to even question the Chinese explanation* and he was referred to material in AI's Newsletter which contradicted the statements issued by the New China News Agency concerning the wave of repression in Tibet. The SBA secretary felt 'justified in asking whether any member of your profession should not display the greatest wariness and scepticism towards bulletins of national news agencies.' The letter to Hewson continued, "I am sure that the Chinese allowed you to wander around Lhasa or Shigatse with guides or on your own, but by what yardstick did you judge what you saw, when with all due respect, you were observing a people just about as different from Westerners as it is possible to be, whose language you do not speak, whose ancient culture you did not know and almost certainly do not understand" ... "whose religion and its various manifestations you understandably know very little about and whose way of life prior to 1950 you have not witnessed". It was further added that if a reporter went to Northern Ireland knowing only a little about the events of the last thirty years, and perhaps very little indeed about the last few centuries, some quite serious mistakes could be made when reporting since any such reporter would have no real historical or political perspective in which to place the scenes or events he witnessed, however accurately he reported them.

An offer was made to meet Mr. Hewson and to discuss this matter, but no response was received and Mr. Hewson did not reply to this letter. 'The SBA address (now OPTIMUS) is 30 Hollingbourne Gardens, Ealing, London W13 8EN GB (01-998-8368).

6. See, Mme. David-Neel, *Magic and Mystery in Tibet*, Sphere Books, London, 1977. H. Harrer, *Seven Years in Tibet*, Pan Books Ltd., London, 1956.

G.N. Patterson, *Tibet in Revolt* Faber and Faber, 1960. Also by Patterson: *Tragic Destiny*, Faber and Faber, 1959. *Tibetan Journey*, Faber and Faber 1962. All these books, particularly the latter, give a good idea of the nature of Tibetan society before the coming of the Chinese in 1950.

See also John Avedon's masterly work entitled *In Exile From the Land of Snows* (Knopf 1984 USA and Wisdom, London). This is one of the most comprehensive works on Tibet to appear during the last twenty years and graphically depicts the atrocities of the Chinese rule as well as presenting a most sensitive picture of old Tibet, now exterminated. One of the few books which gives insights of an anthropological and sociological nature into the old Tibet is *To Lhasa and Beyond* by Giuseppe Tucci, Snow Lion Publications, New York, 1983.

7. H.E. Richardson, Op. cit. p. 37.

8. Prof. D. Snellgrove in a written critique of the draft form of original MRG Report *The Tibetans*, forwarded to SBA. Mr. Frank Aiken, Irish delegate to the UN condemned Chinese actions in Tibet during the UN debate on Tibet in October 1959. It was recently pointed out at the UN Human Rights Commission that the Chinese statement 'Tibet has always been a part of China' could be matched with a parallel statement that 'Ireland has always been a part of Britain'. Tibet declared its independence in 1913 and S. Ireland fought for and gained its independence from Britain in 1921. Tibetans ask how the Southern Irish would feel if Britain had occupied their country in 1950 on the basis of claims made by the English Plantagenet kings of the 13th Century.

9. H.E. Richardson, Op. cit. p. 184.

10. Confirmed by the written statement of Dzasak Khemey Sonam Wangdi, one of the signatories. Quoted in new MRG Report, Op. cit. p. 16

11. In this case the word 'enlightenment' is used in a specifically Buddhist sense, meaning one who has reached the state of nirvana. Modern scientific research is at present being carried out on Tibetan meditation practices. See *Nature* Vol. 295, 21st January 1982. Also a symposium was held at the Harvard Medical School 6th April 1982 entitled: 'Meditation in the Himalayas: Physiologic Correlates and the Brain'. Dr. Herbert Benson presented a paper on 'The Control of Peripheral Temperature in Advanced Meditation Practices in Tibetan Monks'. Dr. Norman Geschwind discussed 'Lateralisation in the Brain for Emotion and Autonomic Function'. Further researches will be carried out in Europe on a Tibetan meditation practice known as the Dream Yoga.

12. The figure of 250,000 monks given in the original SBA Report

was a provisional one and has been amended by detailed research compiled and analysed by the Council for Religious and Cultural Affairs of H.H. the Dalai Lama. Some of the sources used in this research—in which the monasteries have been listed by name, location, sect, name of the founder and the number of monks or nuns—have become available only recently. This research indicates that there were in fact some 600,094 monks, nuns and Nagpas (Tantric practitioners). Most of these are now dead or have disappeared without trace. While several hundred monks can be seen these days in the few monasteries that remain, at the peak of the 'Cultural Revolution' not a single monk in robes could be seen any where in Tibet. The incarnate Lama and the monk who were part of the Third Fact-Finding Delegation sent to Tibet by the Dalai Lama in 1980 were the first monks that many children across Tibet had ever seen.

The Council for Religious and Cultural Affairs (Dharamsala, N. India) has stated that before the Chinese occupation there were 6,259 monasteries and nuneries. Only 5 remain and these have been damaged. They are: Drepung, Sera, Tashi Lungpo, Kubum, and Tashi Gomang. Such destruction has seldom been equalled in human history.

13. J. Norbu. *Horseman in the Snow—The Story of Aten, an Old Khampa Warrior* Dharamsala, 1979. p. 75. (Also published by Wisdom, London 1987).

14. *Three Months in Tibet*, the findings of the Third Fact-Finding delegation sent to Tibet. *From Liberation to Liberalisation*, Dharamsala. p. 118.

15. T.D. Gashi, *New Tibet*, Central Tibetan Secretariat, Dharamsala, 1980. Sale by the Chinese of Tibetan religious artifacts undoubtedly earned a considerable amount of foreign currency. Various estimates have been given but the exact total remains a matter for speculation.

16. P. Wangyal, *Tibet News Review* Vol. 1 No. 3/4 Winter 1980/81. C. Mullin, *The Tibetans: Two Perspectives on Tibetan-Chinese Relations* MRG, London 1983. *Tibet Under Chinese Communist Rule—A Compilation of Refugee Statements 1958–1975*. Statement No. 22 (Kunsang). Dharamsala 1976.

17. Rinbur Tulku, 'Human Rights Abuses in Tibet', Central Tibetan Secretariat, *Tibetan Review* September 1988.

18. P. Wangyal *Tibet News Review* p. 19 Op. cit. An SBA letter on the destruction of Tibetan culture and Chinese attempts to conceal it was printed in the *Times* 29/8/85, 'Talkback, The Dalai Lama and the Truth About Tibet'.

19. Details of this incident were narrated to me by George N. Patterson (Paul Ingram).

20. Dr. M. Peissei *Cavaliers of Kham* Heinemann, London 1972 p. 55. Other accounts of the war in Tibet are: G.N. Patterson, *Tibet in Revolt*. J. Norbu, *Horseman in the Snow* (Dharamsala). Also the autobiographical work by the resistance leader G.T. Andrugtsang *Four Rivers, Six Ranges*. This book deals mainly with the War fought in the southern and central provinces of Tibet ignited by the Khampa rebellion which had began in the eastern regions of Tibet. For further details of the Sino-Tibetan War see the series *War in Peace*, Orbis Publications, London. Included in Vol. No's 15 and 40. *Captured in Tibet*, Robert Ford (London 1957) gives a valuable insight into Chinese prison life as Mr. Ford was one of the few Europeans to have first hand experience of this. He served for many years in the British Foreign Office and is now a member of the Council of the Tibet Society, UK.

21. Dr M. Peissel, Op cit. p. 109. In the concluding section Peissel speculates on evidence suggesting that both the Khampa and Moslem rebellions in E. Turkistan (Sinkiang) may have linked up to some degree and played a part in precipitating the Sino-Soviet split in 1960. The case is not proved though.

22. See both Patterson and Peissel, *ibid*. Patterson spoke fluent Tibetan and travelled widely in the Kham region of the old Tibet. He knew the leaders of the Khampa Rebellion Ragpa and Topgay Pandatsang and interviewed many guerrilla fighters who slipped across the Indian border while smuggling weapons back into Tibet. He accompanied Khampa guerrilla fighters back into Tibet and filmed an engagement which was later shown on Western television. Dr. Michel Peissel has led several scientific expeditions to the Himalayas. He interviewed many guerrilla fighters who were then attacking the Chinese from bases in Mustang (N. Nepal). He spent some ten years researching for *Cavaliers of Kham* and speaks fluent Tibetan.

23. G.N. Patterson, *ibid*, this particular event described in the

section dealing with the first stages of the War. Mr. C. Mullin, admitted the existence of a 'huge revolt'. *Sunday Times Colour Supplement*, 'The Buddha Lives'. 7/9/80, p. 40.

24. *Ibid*, p. 27–28. See also Appendix 1.

25. G.N. Patterson *Tragic Destiny*, Faber and Faber p. 179.

26. An interview with the late Col. Chen Ho-Ching who lived for many years as a refugee with Tibetans in India, appeared in the *Tibetan Review* October 1979, see also 'A Chinese Colonel Who Fought for Tibet's Freedom' *Tibetan Bulletin* May-June 1987. The Tibetan Information Office will shortly be publishing his memories.

27. Noel Barber *From The Land of Lost Content*. Houghton Mifflin Co, Boston 1970. While this book is considered by some to have certain defects, it nevertheless contains an extremely detailed and valuable account of the Lhasa Uprising, March 10th 1959.

28. *Tibetan Review* March 1984, p. 14. This is an independent magazine published by Tibetan exiles. Its considerable value, widely acknowledged in many parts of the world, lies in the fact that for many years under various editors it has not hesitated to take an independent line and has sometimes even found itself at odds with the Tibetan authorities in Dharamsala, N. India. It contains much valuable information and gives space to those sympathetic to the Chinese presence in Tibet as well as giving the Tibetan outlook on a wide variety of matters connected with Tibet. The address is: Mr Tsering Wangyal, Editor, *Tibetan Review*, D-11, East of Kailash, New Delhi 110 065, India.

29. *From Liberation to Liberalisation*, *Op cit*. See Mrs. Pema Thonden for accounts of those who lived in Tibet during the period of the 'Cultural Revolution'.

30. *Ibid*. p. 92.

31. *Ibid*. See account of Harrison E. Salisbury, p: 184.

32. *Tibet Under Communist Rule*, *Op. cit*. Statement of Pema Lhundup, p. 103.

33. *Tibet: The Undying Flame*, Kunsang Paljor (Dharamsala) 1970 p. 57.

34. *Ibid*. p. 58/59.

35. *Tibet Under Communist Rule*, Op. cit. Statement of Wangdu Dorji, p. 110–112.

36. *Tibet: The Undying Flame*, Kunsang Paljor, Dharamsala, 1979. Op. cit. This book provides one of the most revealing eye-witness testimonies of the tragic and wide-spread effects of the ‘Cultural Revolution’, including compulsory blood donations, p. 47–49. Further evidence for enforced blood transfusions carried out by the Chinese upon starving or enervated Tibetan prisoners, in this case women, may be found in the testimony of Adhi. She records that blood was taken from a number of Tibetan women causing the deaths of Chatring Rinchen Dolma, Kanze Tsering Lhamo and Nyarong Yundrung Pelmo in 1966. Another woman named Tikho from Nagchukha became very weak and even today (1989) she cannot work. Testimony of Adhi, Office of Information and International Relations, (Dharamsala) *Information Material No. 20*.

37. Interesting insights into the Chinese mistrust of foreigners and accompanying racist overtones were to be seen in a programme entitled *The Long Ride—From Wall Street to the Great Wall*, Channel 4, 8.15 pm, 26/2/89, which consisted of an account given by Jim Rogers, an American, of a 5,000 motor cycle ride across China.

38. See *Tibet: A Case of Eradication of Religion Leading to Genocide*. A paper presented at the International Conference of Holocaust and Genocide, Tel Aviv, Israel June 20–24, 1982.

39. Figures published by the Information Office of the Central Tibetan Secretariat (Dharamsala, N. India) in 1984 reveal that Tibetan deaths as a result of ‘liberation’ are even higher than the losses of the French army in the First World War. Detailed research indicates that over 1,200,000 people died under Chinese rule since 1950. The figures for the three Tibetan provinces of U-Tsang, Kham and Amdo are:

Torture	92,731
Battles/Uprisings	432,705
Execution	156,758
Starvation	342,970
Suicide	9,002
Prisons and labour camps	<u>173,221</u>
TOTAL	<u>1,207,387</u>

The scale of losses is even admitted explicitly and implicitly in material

published by Beijing. A notable example of this occurred in *China Reconstructs* (April 1984). In what seems to be a heavily censored article, written by Tarthang Tulku, a Tibetan who returned to his homeland after an absence of twenty-five years, various references to the horrific legacy of Chinese rule have been allowed. For example, the author points out that most of the people he saw when travelling in Tibet were mainly under forty years of age and that 90% of the people in his village had disappeared. Such a severe demographic imbalance is a lasting consequence of Chinese rule.

40. Dr J. Anderson *Tibetan Review* October 1981 presents a long and extremely detailed analysis of Tibetan population statistics. Recent Chinese assertions of substantial increase in the 'Autonomous Region of Tibet' (the figure of 3.87 million was given in March 1985) supposedly due to their benevolent policies are clearly contradicted by facts adduced in the SBA Report. Such efforts undoubtedly represent an attempt to draw attention away from the severe demographic effects of their rule in Tibet and from the existence of several million Tibetans in other provinces of China outside 'ART'.

41. A 25,000 word dossier was compiled by a sub-committee of the then Scientific Buddhist Association (now retitled OPTIMUS) during which time the Sino-Tibetan War was researched in considerable depth. It is now known that over 400,000 Tibetans died in the 'Twenty Years War'. (see footnote 39).

42. *The Population Atlas of China* (Map 40) 'Sex Ratio', OUP 1987.

43. Chinese controlled Radio Lhasa (October 1, 1960). See footnote 319. Confirmation is also to be found in documents captured by Tibetan guerrillas in 1966 when they destroyed a Chinese convoy on the Xinjiang-Lhasa road and killed the head of the PLA's western command in Tibet together with his entire staff. The captured document is *Political Situation in Tibet and Basic Education Document* and refers to the elimination of 87,000 enemies in the rebellion during 1959 and 1960. Details of 1966 massacre in MRG Report, Op. cit. p. 21, note 90 for details concerning the deaths of 23,419 Tibetans on Gansu railway project and Qinghai borax mines before 1980.

44. Ibid. p. 21

45. *Tibetan Review*, September 1988, 'Human Rights Abuses' International Office, Central Tibetan Secretariat.

46. *Tibetan Review*, March 1981. The testimony of Dr. Tenzin Choedak, who has been interviewed by Amnesty International, London in 1983.

47. 'Human Rights Abuses', *Tibetan Review* September 1988
Op. cit. p. 16–18.

48. *Tibet: A Case to Answer* filmed by Vanya Kewley, 'Dispatches' Channel 4, 9/11/88. This programme was compiled from film taken secretly by Vanya Kewley in Tibet and included various items of material from 160 Tibetans who were interviewed without permission from the Chinese authorities. The programme gave clear evidence of wide-spread torture, sterilisations, enforced abortions, deaths in labour camps, continuing religious persecution, deforestation, ecological destruction and showed viewers the effects of the enormous and continuing Chinese influx. It was widely reviewed in the press, see *Daily Mail* 'Bloodstained Bamboo Curtain' Peter Paterson, *Daily Telegraph*, 'The Tragedy of Tibet', Richard Last, etc. Material such as this renders dubious former writings on Tibet by such people as Felix Greene, the Gelders, Israel Epstein, C. Mullin, David Bonavia, etc.

49. *News Tibet* January/April 1983, New York, 'A Visit to My Homeland, Tibet; Not a Socialist Paradise'. (Transl. by editor Tinley Nyandak).

50. *Tibetan Review* April 1979, 'Indian Citizen in Chinese Prison for Twenty Years', the testimony of L. Thupten. A similar testimony, recently received, states that some 10–15 thousand Tibetans worked as slaves in lead mines in the Chagjam district area in 1960, known as the Gathok mines. In 1962 the prison supervisor Ma-Ku-trang was replaced by Be-Ku-Trang and according to a list given by the Chinese doctor to a Tibetan, Tenzin Sangpo, 2,318 prisoners died during a two year period in Dhartse-Do prison. In 1963 only 30 of the original 300 Tibetan prisoners were alive and it is reported that in one year some 10,000 prisoners died in the lead mines and factories. The testimony also states that 96 out of 100 prisoners died in Dhartse-Do prison, the 4 exceptions being those who worked on a vegetable farm. It evidently afforded the Chinese guards considerable amusement seeing starving Tibetans fighting over scraps of food and tealeaves, and one is inevitably reminded of the amusement of Nazi camp guards watching starving Jews fighting over potato peelings. Office of Information and International Relations (Dharamsala) *Information Material No. 20*. This

information, the testimony of Adhi, was read out at the Bonn Hearing in April 1989. This hearing was organised by George Fernandes from India, and was attended by members of the European Parliament and by many politicians including Lord Ennals, President of the Tibet Society, UK and former Foreign Office Minister and by Chris Mullin, MP for Sunderland South (House of Commons).

51. *Time Magazine* 26/11/1979 'The Gulag That Mao Built'.

52. *A Prisoner of Mao* by Jean Pasqualini (pseud Bao Ruowang) published by Coward, McCann and Geophegon, New York 1973. Pasqualini was imprisoned in this gulag from 1957-'64 and he estimated that the Xining labour complex contained some 15 million prisoners and there seems little reason to believe that this number has been substantially reduced today. Xining is undoubtedly the most densely populated gulag on earth and it seems that no human-rights organisation has carried out any substantial research on prison conditions in this area. However, Amnesty International, London, is now addressing itself to this question.

53. *Tibetan Review* Sept-Oct 1986, 'On the Brink' by Jamyang Norbu. Mr. Norbu has been particularly active in exile and did fine work as the Director of the Tibetan Institute of Performing Arts. His enforced departure is greatly regretted by many Tibetans and Westerners alike.

54. *Tibetan Bulletin* Dharamsala, Vol. XI. No. 4, Oct/December 1979.

55. *The World About Us*, BBC 2—a two part documentary on Tibet produced by Simon Normanton (April 1982). This documentary resulted in protests to the BBC from the Chinese Government and played an important part in spreading knowledge of the Tibetan tragedy among the general public. It contains material which is arguably among the greatest documentary shots ever filmed, one of which consists of a Tibetan woman who had sunk to her knees, her face contorted with strain and despair (this was used as the cover for the second edition of *Tibet: The Facts*). This was equalled by a long and unforgettable scene of a young woman and a large group of ragged children running through a ruined monastery, reminiscent of a lunar landscape, their voices echoing in the still air. A third shot consisted of a grubby boy, looking like a chimney sweep in Dickensian London,

having a large stone strapped across his back by a Chinese overseer. Amidst rising clouds of dust the boy gazed curiously into the camera, dwarfed by the ruins around him. This remarkable documentary which is still worth seeing, was reviewed in the *Tibetan Review*, May 1982, p. 6/7. Video copies can be obtained from: Head of Home Video, BBC 5th Floor, Bilton House, 54–58 Uxbridge Road, Ealing, London W5. Great Britain, or from: *The Secretary, The Tibet Society of the UK, Olympia Bridge Quay, Russell Rd, (Westside) Kensington, London W14. (Tel. 071-6037764).*

56. *Natural People's News* No. 6. July/August 1981, 'China Syndrome' by Stephen Corry, now Director of Survival International, London. See also *Tibetan Review* November 1981, "Minority Rights Groups and "The Tibetans""—a critique of Mr. Chris Mullin's original report.

57. *Tibet Under Chinese Communist Rule*, Op. cit. p. 113. Statement of Wangdu Dorji.

58. From *Liberation to Liberalisation*, Op. cit. Mrs Pema Gyalpo, p. 118.

59. *Life in the Red Flag People's Commune* by Mrs D. Choedon Op. cit. p. 36.

60. Reported to members of the three fact-finding delegations who visited Tibet 1979–'83 and recounted to SBA by Mr. P. Wangyal.

61. *Tibetan Review*, July 1987, p. 6. From a statement made by Tashi, a Tibetan refugee living in India, who visited his homeland in May 1987.

62. *Nikkai Business*, Tokyo (29/11/82).

63. From *Liberation to Liberalisation*, Op. cit. 'Tibet: A Chinese Province?' C. Jansen Ickiving and S.T. Cooke, P. 192. For more recent information on the dimensions of the Chinese influx see an Interview given by the Dalai Lama which appeared in *The Times* (London) Spectrum 19/8/85 and 20/8/85. See also *Tibet Newsletter* Summer 1987, 'Common Voice' by Lodi Gyari Rinpoche. The admission that there are about one million Chinese immigrants in the 'ART' was made by Mao Rubai, Vice Chairman of the 'ART' during an interview which appeared in the *Times of India* 27/9/88.

A helpful discussion of population figures in Lhasa may be found in

Lungta, a journal published by the Tibet Support Group, Switzerland, Editor, Christopher Besuchet. 'March 7th: Military Rule Returns to Tibet' and 'Demonstrations—The Will to Survive.'

64. *Sanity*, CND magazine July 1988. An Interview with Charlie Ching, Minister of the Tshatshat Provisional Government.

65. Admirable work has been done by the Health Department of what is called the 'Tibetan Government in Exile' in Dharamsala, N. India in the sphere of health care and the provision of medical facilities. However, most of the revenue comes from sponsors or various voluntary relief agencies. Unfortunately, it seems that little if any assistance is given to the refugees by the UN despite the fact that some 30,000 have no medical facilities whatever and well over 3,000 are suffering from TB and the incidence of this disease is about two and a half times that found elsewhere in India and possibly more than this. Given the size of the Tibetan population in India it is *one of the highest rates to be found in the world*. Good work is being done by the Delek hospital in Dharamsala but the situation among Tibetans refugees is still grave and one Tibetan doctor remarked that TB is causing the same kind of havoc among Tibetans as it did among Europeans in the 18th Century, and that if Robert Koch, discoverer of the Tubercle Bacillus, were alive today he would indeed be horrified to learn of the proportions this disease has assumed throughout the Tibetan communities in India. This point was particularly reinforced by the results of a survey carried out in the Tibetan camp in Jawalakhel which found that in 1985 10% of Tibetans had a history of TB. Considerable numbers of adults suffer from other diseases such as Malaria, Dysentery, as well as from gastro intestinal disorders and diarrhoea and many children have TB, measles, or polio and large numbers of them suffer from various kinds of fevers, ring worm, anaemia, impetigo and sores. These conditions are often exacerbated by malnutrition and insanitary conditions.

Recently there have been some considerable improvements in certain areas and primary health services for Tibetan refugees in India and Nepal now consist of 6 hospitals and 51 health centres in the 41 settlements. Nearly 50% of Tibetan children at remote settlements in Himachal Pradesh have been immunised against the World Health Organisation's six targetted preventable childhood diseases and plans are afoot for a new health centre for the Jhangthang Tibetans who live in N. Ladakh, bordering on Tibet. For the first time the 1,200

residents of the Tibetan refugee camp at Majnu-Ka-Tilla on the outskirts of Delhi have safe drinking water and a sanitary environment and immunization camps are being organised in isolated Tibetan settlements in the State of Arunachal Pradesh, which is claimed by China. There is running tap water though it is rationed to one hour in the morning and evening, and this has given rise to cases of diarrhoea and skin infections, particularly among small children, and some of the housing conditions are pathetic and some roofs leak during the rainy season. As these latter settlements are in Restricted Areas no foreign aid agencies or individual donors can visit these project areas and some projects have been funded by the Tibetan Emergency Medical Fund and by the Tibet Relief Society, UK writes Mrs Kesang Takla, retiring Director at the Department of Health.

Except for the case of the Restricted Areas it is difficult to understand the lack of involvement by the United Nations relief agencies. Save the Children Fund is giving financial assistance for the Delhi and Orrisa Primary Health Care Programme and are also working with the Chinese in Tibet in association with the Chinese inspired 'Tibet Development Fund.'

Sources : *Tibetan Health Newsletter* of Department of Health, Central Tibetan Secretariat, Winter 1987, Winter 1988 Vol 2. No's 1-2. 'Tuberculosis—Scourge for Tibetans' by Dr. Dorji Sadutshang. *Tibetan Review* December 1983:

66. Professor Wang Yao, described as China's leading Tibetologist, gave an interview in the Austrian Buddhist magazine *Bodhi Baum* (4/82). Unfortunately little if any impression emerged of the terrible sufferings of Buddhists in Tibet during the last thirty years at the hands of the Chinese. A SBA reply was printed in *Bodhi Baum* (3/84) which mentioned a number of grave omissions of human-rights abuses perpetrated by the Chinese authorities. Professor Wang Yao's interview was printed in full in the *Tibetan Review* December 1983, together with the SBA reply. As far as is known the Professor has not replied yet to the SBA's letter. Many of the facts contained in the SBA open letter to Professor Wang Yao are included in this report.

67. *Tibetan News Review* Op. cit. p. 14. MRG Report, Op. cit. P. Wangyal, p. 18.

68. Radio Lhasa, 14/4/82. Dawa Tsering's account is to be found in the *Tibetan Review*, July 1981. 'Tibet and China's Policy of

Liberalisation', p. 17–19. As will be seen from the section on Health there is little or no indication of improved medical facilities for Tibetans.

69. *Tibetan Bulletin* July-August 1987 p. 17.

70. *Ibid* p. 6.

71. *Tibet Newsletter*, Summer 1985. 'News of Tibet' p. 5–7.

72. *Tibetan Review*, December 1988. 'US Senate Delegation's Report from Tibet', p. 12–14.

73. *Tibetan Review*, April 1987 'Observations on a Fact Finding Visit to Tibet' by Michael C. Van Walt. p. 12–14.

74. Extracts from 'A Journey to Tibet', a report by Adel Thobe, a school-teacher from Western Germany who visited Tibet in 1986. *Tibetan Bulletin*, Vol. XVIII No. 1 May/June 1987.

75. *Tibet Newsletter* Summer 1987. 'Report on a Visit to Tibet' by William Peters C.M.G., LVO., MBE. former diplomat and now Chairman of the Tibet Society, UK. having assumed this post in 1984, replacing Lady Stockdale.

Sir Algernon Rumbold K.C.M.G. retired as President of the Tibet Society in 1988 after long service, having accepted this position after distinguished career in the British Diplomatic Service. His successor, Lord Ennals, is a former British Foreign Office Minister. At the same meeting the Hon. Treasurer, Sir Cyril Packard, K.C.M.G. stood down after loyal service to the Tibet Society and he too was a former member of the British Diplomatic Service. His successor Mr. John A.B. Stewart C.M.G., O.B.E. had a long career in the British Diplomatic Service. Sir Bernard Braine 'Father of the House' is joint Chairman of the All Party Parliamentary Group for Tibet. Sir Bernard is a well known conservative MP and served with distinction as Conservative Foreign Affairs Minister.

A considerable number of people are questioning the wisdom of such important positions being held by such people, some of whom it is believed, still maintain strong links with the Foreign Office, which has never supported the goal of an independent Tibet. The point is reinforced by the fact that the first objective of the Tibet Society is to work for 'the independence of Tibet by non-party political action.' Yet rarely, if ever, have any of the above-mentioned Officers clearly and unambiguously stated that Tibet should be independent.

Mr William Peters has in fact written a paper which specifically excludes this objective from any consideration and does not entertain it as an option. (see footnote 174).

76. *Independent* 1/4/88. Julie Brittain, 'Aid and Discomfort in Tibet's Showcase'. *Tibetan Review* April 1988, p 11–17 *Tibetan Bulletin* Oct/Nov 1988 Vol. XIX, No. 4. p. 18.

77. *News Time* 25/6/'85 (Hydrabad) quoting Chinese sources.

78. *MRG Report*, Op. cit. C. Mullin p. 12.

79. *Tibetan Review*, July 1981. Dawa Tsering, p. 17–19 Op. cit.

80. *Tibet Newsletter*. Spring 1983, quoted as a statement from the Central Tibetan Secretariat 1/2/83. 'Statements of Tibetans Coming from Tibet', p. 12.

81. *Tibetan Review*, April 1988 Op. cit. *Tibetan Bulletin* Oct/Nov 1988 Vol. XIX, No. 4. Op. cit. Accounts written by Julie Brittain.

82. *From Liberation to Liberalisation*, Op. cit. p. 91.

83. Julie Brittain, Op. cit.

84. *Tibetan Review*, July 1988, 'Health Problems in Tibet Today' by Tseten Samdup.

85. *Tibetan Review*, July 1988. 'Health Problems in Tibet Today'. T. Samdup. Ibid.

86. Thirteen confidential testimonies, giving evidence of numerous human-rights abuses and forced abortions and sterilisations were submitted to Amnesty International, London in January 1987, having been obtained from Tibetan Offices in India. More detailed accounts of these testimonies may be found in the well-researched report written by W.P. Ledger entitled 'The Chinese and Human Rights in Tibet', commissioned by the Parliamentary Human Rights Group (1988) £3.85 incl. p/p. 244–5 Upper Street, London N1.

While evidence for enforced abortions and sterilisations does not at present fall within Amnesty International's mandate, these testimonies contained detailed reports of torture and human-rights abuses in Chinese prisons in Tibet which are central to AI's mandate. A great deal of detailed information on human-rights abuses in Tibet was received by the (then) Scientific Buddhist Association from

Tibetan offices in India and elsewhere after prolonged efforts to obtain it on a regular basis. For the last 7 years this has been forwarded to AI, London, following a visit of the SBA secretary to AI early in 1982. Information on Tibet which obtained from many parts of Asia has also been forwarded by the SBA (now OPTIMUS) to AI and has helped to facilitate an increased coverage of human-rights abuses in Tibet by Amnesty International.

87. *Tibetan Review*, September 1988, 'Human Rights Abuses in Tibet', Office of Information & International Relations, Central Tibetan Secretariat, Dharamsala, N. India. Op. cit.

88. *Dispatches* filmed by Vanya Kewley, Channel 4, 9/11/88, 8.30 pm, Op. cit.

89. *Tibetan Review*, September 1988 'Human Rights Abuses in Tibet', Op. cit. *Tibetan Review*, August 1989, 'Refugee Accounts of Human Rights Violations in Tibet' p. 9–12, Dr. Blake Kerr.

90. *Daily Telegraph*, 12/3/88, 'Tibetan Monks Held in Sterilisation Protest', Tim Luard.

91. *Tibetan Review*, July 1988 'Health problems in Tibet Today', Testimony of G.L. Tenzin Op. cit.

92. *Asiawatch* 'Evading Scrutiny: Violations of Human Rights After the Closing of Tibet', Supplement to the Asiawatch Report on Human Rights in Tibet, July 1988. p. 26–27. Asiawatch 739 Eighth Street, S.E. Washington, DC 20003, USA.

Details of the Mayor of Lhasa's speech are to be found in Information Sheet No. 21, Office of Information and International Relations, Dharamsala, (10/7/89). The Report of the US Congressional staff who visited India and Nepal can be found in the *Tibetan Review*, June 1989 'Tibetan Refugee Settlements in India and Nepal', pages 8–17. The testimony concerning enforced sterilisations and abortions is featured on p. 13.

93. *Tibetan Review*, July 1988, 'Health Problems in Tibet Today', Op. cit.

94. *Rangzen*, Vol. XIII. No. 2/3. April-September 1988, 'Massacre of the Innocents' D. Bao Fu. This article first appeared in *China Spring Digest*, Jan/Feb. 1987.

95. *Hindustan Times*, New Delhi 23/3/81, Reported by K. Gopalakrishnan.

96. *Tibetan Review*, April 1987, 'Observations on a Fact Finding Visit to Tibet' by Michael C. Van Walt. Op. cit. Prof. Robert Roaf's observations on the poverty of Tibetans today may be found in the *Tibetan Review*, 'From Ladakh to Tibet Across 50 Years', p. 10-15.

97. *Himalayan Research Bulletin*, Vol VIII, November 1988, 'Tibet Today: Propaganda, Record and Policy', by Graham E. Clarke.

98. *Tibetan Review*, Sept. 1988. 'People, Policies and Economic Strategies in Tibet' by Robbie Barnett.

99. *The Poverty of Plenty* (Furao de Pinkun) Wang Xiaoqiang and Bai Nanfeng p. 80-84. Also *Financial Times*, 3/6/89 'Economic Inequalities Test Power of Centre'. Colina MacDougall.

100. *News Tibet* Vol. XV, No. 3. September/December 1980 'What The Future Holds For Them' by Pema Thonden. Much of this article may still be relevant since some communes in Tibet do not appear to have been dismantled according to refugee testimony, and political changes in Beijing could easily result in their large scale re-introduction as happened in Ceausescu's Rumania.

101. *Breakfast With Mao*, by Alan Winnington, Lawrence and Wishart 1986.

102. *From Liberation to Liberalisation*, Op. cit. p. 124. A fact-finding delegation visited a cold storage centre in Marchu, Tibet, and learned that some 3,000 sheep and 7,300 yaks are slaughtered annually, the meat being sent abroad. In Dholen Zhong 40,000 sheep and yaks are slaughtered to supply wool, fur, leather, etc. *The Tibetan Bulletin*, (October 1987) reports that in the town of Chabtsa, near Lake Kokonor, the Chinese kill 1,500-2,000 sheep daily and nomads and herdsmen are paid only a minimal sum. In the Tibetan area of 'Khanlho Tibetan Autonomous Prefecture' the Chinese have killed over three and a half million sheep and yaks between 1949-'83 and taken some 201,400 kgs of wool (about 440,000 lbs), 2,250,000 kgs of leather (about 500,000 lbs), and 50 million kgs of milk (about 110,000 gallons). Some of these were collected as tax and others were bought at a give-away price. This extract also states that some 55,000 tons of yak meat is exported annually from Amdo (Qinghai) to Hong Kong.

103. *Dispatches*, Op. cit. Channel 4 Television 9/11/88.

104. *Information Material No. 10*, 17/1/89 'A Brief Report on Indirect Taxation in the Toe area of Tibet.' Office of Information and International Relations, Central Tibetan Secretariat, Dharamsala, N. India.

105. *Interview with Guardian correspondent, Jasper Becker* BBC Radio 4, 3/2/89. In early June 1989 China bought 2 million tonnes of grain from the USA, *Guardian* 15/6/89 'Troops get in the Harvest', William Sexton.

106. Sources are *China Daily* (Beijing) 14/2/88 and 15/2/88, *Mainichi Daily News* (Japan) 16/2/88, *Shanghai World Economic Journal* January 1988, February 1988.

107. An estimate of Mr. T.N. Tethong, a member of a second fact-finding delegation, 1980, Quoted in '*News Tibet*' Sept/Dec. 1980. Op. cit. The figures for average per capita income in India come from *Indian Economy* by R. Datt and K.P.M. Sundharam, published by S. Chand & Co. Ltd, New Delhi, 1981 edition. These figures were quoted in an unpublished report entitled *Tibet Under Chinese Rule* by S. Dawe and C. Cantwell.

108. This economic information comes from a source in Tibet whose identity cannot be disclosed. The material has been forwarded to Amnesty International, London.

109. *The Times*, (London) 19/1/83. Editorial.

110. *Guardian*, 9/9/81 'Tibetans' Struggle for Identity' by John Gittings (now Asian Editor of the *Guardian*). See also *New York Times* 9/8/85 for an interview given by the Dalai Lama, 'A Vast Sea of Chinese Threatens Tibet'. Op. cit.

111. *Independent*, 3/1/89, 'African Students Say Chinese Police Beat Them Up', Andrew Higgins. Also 'Racial Antagonism Belies China's Third World Rhetoric' (p. 8) Andrew Higgins. See also *Independent*, 10/1/89, 'Deng Urged to Grant Amnesty', Andrew Higgins. Following the recent manifestations of racism and anti-African sentiments a student from Uganda committed suicide by jumping from his hostel in Canton 7/1/89. The New China News Agency said on 9/1/89 that David Mugwanya Nsubuga, a medical student was depressed over failure in his examinations and financial

difficulties. A Ugandan embassy official said that anti-African demonstrations were not a factor in his death. The enormous amount of technical aid given to African countries by the Chinese is probably responsible for the generally low-key response to anti-black demonstrations in China on the part of many African countries. However, the silence of some African countries on the dimensions of Chinese racism arguably displays a capacity for hypocrisy rivalling that of the British Foreign Office.

112. *Dispatches*. Op. cit. Channel 4. 9/11/88.

113. *Observer*, 26/4/87. Jonathan Mirsky. *Hong Kong Drenlong* (April 1988) 'I Discovered The truth After A Visit to Tibet', Yong Ying, also *Tibetan Review*, (March 1989) Transl. from Chinese into Tibetan by Tsering Wangchuk and then into English by Pema Tsering.

114. *Tibetan Review*, July 1987.

115. Information Office, Tibetan Secretariat, 19/10/88. Further details of enormous and continuing Chinese deforestation schemes in these and other areas may be found in Information Material No. 19, Office of Information and International Relations. Statement of Rinchen Samdup, a witness from Tibet.

116. *Tibetan Review*, December 1986. An extract from a letter written by A. Savioz.

117. *Dispatches*, Channel 4, 9/11/88. Op. cit.

118. *The Times*, 20/4/82 'Tibetan Deforestation' SBA Secretary P. Ingram. (Letters).

119. *Tibetan Review*, April 1982 'How Tibet's Climate Affects Other Countries' by Dr. Elmar R. Reiter. This article first appeared in *Natural History* Vol. 90. No. 9. In this article Dr. Reiter concluded that deep snowfalls on the Tibetan plateau with consequent albedo (reflectivity), diminish rainfall over India, and that deforestation has inevitably increased the amount of reflectivity since a deforested plateau will reflect more sunlight than a densely forested area. There is some evidence to suggest forests only reflect about 5% of the sun's heat whereas plateaus, consisting mainly of grasslands and bare rock, reflect about four times this amount. Dr. E. Reiter blames the Tibetans for this and seems quite unaware of vast Chinese deforestation schemes. The SBA (now OPTIMUS) wrote twice to Dr. Reiter pointing this

out, but did not receive any reply. In this connection it is worth quoting an article entitled 'A Tibetan Tragedy', written by George B. Schaller, Director of Wildlife Conservation International, a division of the New York Zoological Society, which appeared in *Animal Kingdom*, July/August 1986, (the journal of the NYZS). Schaller gives a horrifying picture of the consequences of wholesale deforestation in Tibet and of the looming danger involving the destruction of an entire ecosystem. But he fails to indicate that this destruction of the environment is primarily due to the effects of Chinese policies carried out over a period of many years and he seems to blame the Tibetans for such policies. Some Tibetans speculate that such ignorance of the truth helps to facilitate a Chinese renewal of research permits in Tibet, an area which holds great fascination for people of many scientific disciplines.

Further useful background information on this subject may be found in the researches of Professor Matthias Kuhle of the University of Gottingen, aspects of which were summarised in the *Tibetan Review*, March 1986. Much valuable information on deforestation in China and Tibet can also be found in *Deforestation in West China and Tibet*, a report written by Bradley Rowe of the Tibet Environmental Group, 27 Chadwick Road, London SE 15 (732-7212), which is a branch of the Tibet Support Group, UK. While it is difficult to give an exact estimate of the total area of deforestation the report points out that Landsat images are giving grave cause for concern and large numbers of dense forests have disappeared leaving only barren soil and the bare bones of mountains. More evidence of deforestation in the provinces mentioned will be found in *Information Material no. 19*, issued by the Office of Information and International Relations (Dharamsala). This document points out that although the Chinese have engaged in relentless deforestation schemes in Tibet they are unwilling to give Tibetans permission to use timber to maintain housing conditions. At the best permission to cut down one tree may be given and those found guilty of cutting down trees without permission are automatically imprisoned.

A stunningly different impression was given on a BBC 2 programme entitled 'Red Dynasty' 7/10/89, 8.15-9.05. The programme dealt with changes in the lives of Chinese farmers and part of it described deforestation in the Sichuan province. The impression was clearly given that Tibetans, 'who had entered this region several centuries ago', were primarily responsible for the 'deforestation occurring in this area which was threatening the habitat of the giant panda'. How-

ever, the Chinese authorities were doing their best to 'educate' them etc. etc. Little if any impression was given that the Chinese are responsible for a significant deterioration in their environment as a result of their enormous deforestation programmes. In this case the blame was put almost entirely upon the Tibetans. This kind of entenuating perspective is still applied even after Tiananmen and a letter has been sent to the producer drawing his attention to the above facts. The programme was produced by Howard Reid, Series Producer Peter Firstbrook, written and narrated by Edward Behr. A British Tabloid 13/10/89, showed a picture of a rare Chinese tiger trussed up and waiting to be skinned alive. Only about fifty of these animals remain, yet the Chinese authorities are making little effort to preserve them. When international efforts are made to save the giant pandas it is often overlooked that Chinese destruction of their environment is responsible for their precarious position today. The Chinese tiger seems destined to disappear within a few years. It seems particularly tragic as this beautiful animal has often featured in Chinese art and literature. (3) 'Year of the Dragon'. BBC-2.

120. See US Bill HR 4570 introduced 11/5/85 (for further details see footnote 126).

121. *Impact*, Vol. 22. No. 10. October 1987.

122. *Tibetan News Review*, p. 13. Op. cit. See also SBA letter to *The Times*, (20/4/82).

123. *Times of India*, 25/9/87.

124. Details of this curious and revealing incident were contained in the *Tibetan Bulletin*, November/December 1987. 'Chinese Vent Their Anger on Cows'.

125. *PTI Moscow*, Quoted in the Indian journal *Statesman*, 4/7/82.

Sanity, magazine of CND printed a letter from Paul Ingram, SBA Secretary, entitled 'Nuclear Pollution in Tibet' (June 1986). In fact it took a year of correspondence and phone calls for this letter to be printed, even though items about US, French and Japanese nuclear pollution appeared to be automatically included. There seemed to be a definite resistance to criticising China and to including anything about Tibet, though matters seem to have improved considerably now. (See section entitled 'China The Honeymoon Era and its End' for examples of the indulgence that was once extended towards China

by the media and by various organisations). The Tiananmen Massacre has already greatly diminished such behaviour.

Peace News, 16/3/84, also included an SBA letter dealing with the destruction of Tibetan culture and the nuclearisation of Tibet.

126. This US Bill introduced 11/5/88 (HR 4570) was sponsored by Congressmen Rose, Gilman, Conyers, Lantos, Dornan and Porter. This provides an indication of the increasing gravity with which Chinese destruction of complex eco-systems in Tibet is being viewed in the United States.

127. *Voice of East Turkistan*, December/January 1987. See also IWGIA Yearbook 1987 (International Working Group for Indigenous Peoples).

128. Press Release (22/11/88) issued by the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies, 'Protest in Tibet Against Uranium Mining'.

129. *Daily Telegraph*, 24/11/88. 'Thatcher to Host Ozone Summit'. It is nevertheless a fact that most CFC pollution is caused by the industrialised countries of the West and that India has not yet signed the Montreal Convention.

130. An extract from T.L. Danlock's report made to the Tibetan Affairs Co-ordinating Committee, 1985. Featured in the *Tibetan Review*, June 1985.

131. *Breakfast With Mao*, by Alan Winnington, Lawrence and Wishart, 1986 Op. cit. In this book the communist correspondent Alan Winnington, voiced his outrage at the destruction of Tibetan culture that he witnessed and lamented that a unique culture which would have proved a treasure trove to anthropologists, sociologists, ethnologists, and to students of art and culture, was being exterminated. While he mentioned cruel behaviour on the part of Tibetan aristocrats in central Tibet, it is difficult to know whether he personally witnessed such displays or whether he was repeating the accusations of his Chinese hosts. If such cruelties did still exist in the 1950's it is certain that their incidence was far less than before the humanitarian reforms of the 13th Dalai Lama. It should also be remembered that whatever inequalities there were in Central Tibet were scarcely mirrored in East Tibet where the society to be found was of a wilder and more 'free-booting' nature.

132. *The Bad Earth* by W. Smil, Zed Press, London 1984.

133. *Impact*, May/June 1987, 'Concern Over Daya Bay Nuclear Power Plant', p. 9/10. As is the case with so many other countries the Chinese seem to be increasingly attracted to the prospect of nuclear energy and it seems possible that this form of energy, with all its attendant hazards, will one day be used in Tibet. One wonders if the Chinese have examined the arguments favouring the harnessing of wave power for the generation of electricity, and there is no doubt that Tibet's great lakes would provide an ideal environment for this source of power which is virtually pollution free. Professor Stephen Salter, head of engineering design at Edinburgh University, has produced an invention designed to use wave-power in the production of electricity known as 'Salter's Duck' and there is considerable evidence to suggest that had this programme been expanded from about 1982 the case for increasing Britain's nuclear energy programme would have been severely undermined. Perhaps for this reason a report of Mr. Gordon Senior MSc, a chartered engineer and fellow of the Institute of Civil Engineers was altered when submitted to Rendel, Palmer and Triton, one of Britain's foremost firms of consulting engineers. In his report Mr. Senior stated that 'Salter's Duck' was a viable engineering and financial propositions, but his report was partly rewritten before being submitted to the Department of Energy *and its conclusions reversed*.

When he protested to Rendel, Palmer and Triton he was told to be silent in the interests of client confidentiality. Mr. Senior's story appears in *Alternative Energy Sources* published by the House of Lords Select Committee on the European Community (1986) after he complained to them. After wrecking this project the British Government is now trying to catch up with the Norwegians whose research once lagged far behind that of Britain during the late 1970's. The Norwegians are now selling two different types of wave power stations all over the world which produce cheap electricity, and Norway's first wave power station was launched on November 13th 1985 from the shore of an island near Bergen. However, one such station was destroyed during a storm recently, but will be replaced.

Given the history of Chinese industrialisation and widespread pollution it seems likely that the Chinese Government will be as immune to arguments rejecting nuclear power as is the case with several countries, particularly Britain. (*Alternative Energy Sources* published

by the house of Lords Select Committee on the European Community, 'Sanity' magazine of CND October 1988 'Making Waves' by David Ross):

134. An extract from a letter sent to Tibetans in Canada by the Embassy of the People's Republic of China, 9/3/85.

135. *Tibetan Bulletin*, July/August 1987, 'Mineral Resources of Tibet' by Tenzin P. Atisha. For more detailed information see his source material 'An Estimate of the Mineral Resources of China', by A.C. Clark, James P. Dorian and Pow Foog Fan, presented to the Resource System Institute, East-West Centre, Hawaii, 1985. For more recent material see the *Tibetan Review*, January 1989 'The Mineral Resources of Tibet' p. 19/20 largely compiled from material researched by the Tibetan Office of Information and International Relations, Dharamsala, N. India. Large amounts of gold are at present being mined in the Kokonor area, formerly part of E. Tibet. In October 1984 the Director of the 'ART's' Geological Department stated that Chinese scientists have found 90 mineral deposits in Tibet, 60 of which accounted for 40% of the entire mineral wealth of China. On 4/8/87 Radio Lhasa announced that 63 types of minerals have already been prospected in E. Tibet. On 11/8/87 Radio Lhasa stated that 40 tonnes of borax had been extracted from Gongkar mine in just 10 days. Charhan lake is thought to contain about 60 billion tonnes of sodium and potash.

136. Radio Lhasa 13/11/81.

137. 'India and Tibet: Geographical Considerations on Interdependence' by Professor Nirmal C. Sinha, taken from a synopsis of three lectures given in Calcutta in July 1977 and featured in the *Tibetan Review*, November 1977. One of the most serious consequences of deforestation is the dramatic increase in silt levels. 'Silt levels on all the major rivers have risen dramatically, affecting not only China but also Bangladesh and much of the South East Asia. On the Yangtse the Gezhoubi dam project was built assuming that the river carried 525 million tons of suspended matter but 1981 studies showed this level was 640 million tons and it has doubtless risen since. In 1988 the *China Daily* was reporting floods in Sichuan despite a water flow no higher than normal and the cost of silt protection measures has been largely responsible for the postponement of a huge new hydro-electric scheme'. *Deforestation in West China and Tibet*. p. 8. Op. cit. The

scheme to which the above extract refers is the proposal to build a huge dam at the mouth of the three gorges on the Changjiang (Yangtse River). It would cost an estimated US \$4 billion and would be about 155 metres (approximately 170 yards) in height. The Yangtse is the third largest river in the world and has its source in the snowy plateau of Tibet. It has provoked a considerable controversy owing to detrimental ecological effects as deforestation, over-fishing, pollution, salination and loss of wild-life habitat are already reaching critical levels in the area as Professor Qian Jiaju, a noted economist and member of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference pointed out in April 1986. Escalating costs projections and silt problems with the Gezhoubi dam have already caused many to doubt the feasibility of such an immense project. It seems likely that the dam will be financed, inevitably, by the World Bank, China being the third largest recipient of World Bank financing after India and Brazil. (*Impact*, Vol 24. No. 29. March 1989). This issue contains an informative article on the Three Gorges Project and the unforeseen effects of such dam projects. 'China: The Yangtse Flowing into Troubled Waters', p. 7-9, and 'The Hidden Costs of Large Dams', p. 9-10.

138. *Tibet Newsletters*, Summer 1985.

139. *The Red Flag*, 16/6/83, the ideological organ of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party. The editorial states: '...under the guise of protecting freedom of religious belief, we greatly develop the socialist economy, culture, science and technology... so as to gradually eliminate the social and cognitive sources that have given rise to religion and enable it to exist.'

This duplicitous attitude towards religious freedom on the part of the Chinese authorities in Tibet was also reflected in the accounts of visitors to Tibet, even during the period known as 'Liberalisation'. See *Tibetan Review*, Feb. 1985 'Religious Freedom in Tibet—A Closer Look' by Paula de Wys-Koolkin; also *Tibetan Review*, March 1987, 'Experiencing the 'Religious Freedom in Tibet Today'' by Ngawang Chojo.

140. *Amnesty International Report*, 1983, p. 193.

141. *China Daily*, 19/1/81.

142. Executions and arrest all over Tibet were widely reported in the world's press, see *The Times*, 27/9/83, *New York Times*, 3/10/83,

Observer, 2/10/83, etc. Amnesty International also reported these events, specifically mentioning executions in Lhasa (AI Index ASA 17-14-83: Distr: UA/SC). Mr. Qi Huai-Yuan, Director of the Informations Department of the Chinese Foreign Ministry, admitted to executions in Lhasa, (PTI 6/10/83).

143. *Tibetan Review*, October and November 1983.

144. *Ibid.*

145. Amnesty International *Newsletter*, February 1984. AI is also concerned about the fate of Karma Dhorong, a 44 year old hermit who was reportedly arrested in Lhasa in December 1980 for preaching Buddhism. A considerable amount of information on Tibetans reportedly arrested by the Chinese authorities was forwarded to AI during this period.

146. Two bulletins issued by the Tibet Office, London, October/November 1983.

147. *Tibet Newsletter*, Summer 1987. 'A Report on a Visit to Tibet' by Mr. William Peters C.M.G., L.V.O., M.B.E. Chairman of the Tibet Society, UK.

148. *Tibetan Review*, May 1988. 'Details on September Execution', p. 4-5.

149. This material consisted of a Report from Lhasa and was signed by Robert Barnett and dated 18th November 1987, Kathmandu (IMQQMIUXMS No. 1905). It was also summarised in a report by Robert Barnett and Nicholas Meysztowicz featured in the *Tibetan Review*, January 1988. It contains two detailed examples of innate Chinese racism which were widely reported in the UK press. Amnesty International has expressed its concern at the extent of the repression by the Chinese, see Urgent Action, AI index: ASA 17/4/88 Distr: UA/SC, 14/3/88. 'Fear of Execution', PRC.

150. These names are among those known to have been arrested
ven. Jangpay Jhangchup, Ven. Japey Lezang, Ven. Ngawang Gyaltzen,
Ven. Ngawang Khetsun, Ven. Ngawang Pulbung, Ven. Ngawang
Penbar, Ven. Ngawang Tsognyi, Ven. Ngawang Obar, Ven. Ngawang
Rinchen, Ven. Ngawang Tashi, Ven. Ngawang Tardo, Ven. Jampey
Tseten, Ven. Jampey Tsering, Ven. Dorjee Trinley, Ven. Ngawang
Chodra, Ven. Ngawang Osel, Ven. Jampey, Ven. Jampey Monlam,

Ven Jampey Losel, Ven Ngawang Domsung, Ven. Ngawang Palzang, Ven Kesang Donyo, Ven Jampey Senge, Ven. Tashi Tsering, Ven Kesang Tsering, Ven Dawa Tsering, Ven Phuntsok Dhondup, Ven Jampey, Ven Lobsang Sheras, Ven Gelong Lobsang Kungga, Ven Lobsang Dawa and Ven Thubten Tsering. Although some of these monks were released others were detained and many of those released were recently rearrested.

151. *Daily Telegraph*, 16/11/87. 'The Rude Awakening of an Idealist', Rupert Wolfe Murray. All the major British newspapers carried reports about the riots during the first and second weeks of October 1987. The demonstrations also received major coverage in the USA in such newspapers as the *Washington Post*, 11/10/87 and the *New York Times*, 8/10/87, etc.

152. *Amnesty International*, 'People's Republic of China: Summary of AI Concerns', January 1987-April 1988. AI Index ASA 17/07/88.

153. AI Urgent Action ASA 17/4/88, dated 14/3/88 Op. cit. citing cases of Yula Dawa Tsering, Tenpa Tsering and Jigme Gyatso.

154. *Tibetan Review*, November 1987. 'Westerners Accounts of Lhasa Demonstrations', p. 7-9.

155. *Tibetan Review*, January 1988. 'Tibetan Diplomat Recalled to Peking', p. 4.

156. *Guardian*, 7/10/87. 'Tibetan Monks Defy Armed Police', Jasper Becker.

157. *Tibetan Bulletin*, XIX. No. 1. January-April 1988. 'Monks Boycot Great Prayer Festival', p. 8.

158. *Tibetan Review*, May 1988 'A First Hand Account of the March Riot in Lhasa' by Tsering Dhondup. p. 6-7.

159. *Observer*, 8/5/88 'Tibet: Murder in the Temple', by Jonathan Mirsky.

160. Bulletin issued by Lhasang Tsering, President of the Tibetan Youth Congress, 'Tibet's Holiest Temple Turned into Death Trap', Press Release dated (4/5/88).

161. *Observer*, 8/5/88, Jonathan Mirsky Op. cit.

162. *Tibetan Review*, May 1988. 'PSB Men in Jail', p. 5.

163. *Liberation*, (March 1988), M. Patrick Lescot. Reports also appeared in major British newspapers such as the *Guardian*, (7/3/88 and 8/3/88) etc. A comprehensive news report was given by Brian Barron on BBC 1 7/3/88, and a report written by Mr. Ron Schwartz, a Canadian university professor who was in Tibet during the recent troubles, has proved to be very helpful. This report circulated to many organisations who are concerned with the human-rights situation in Tibet.

164. *Tibetan Review*, May 1988, p. 4. Op. cit.

165. Amnesty International, Urgent Action. AI Index ASA 17/06/88, Distr: UA/SC, 22/4/88. PRC. Fear of Execution: Lobsang Tenzin, Tsering Dhondup, Sonam Wangdu, Gyaltzen Chopel.

166. *Guardian*, 27/1/89. 'Goal Term for Lhasa Rebel' by Robbie Barnett.

167. Amnesty International, Urgent Action ASA 17/3/89. People's Republic of China. 'Fear of Mass Arrests/Torture/Summary Executions in Tibet.' AI estimates that about 100 people are still in prison as a result of the protests. Many more have been arrested in the new wave of disturbances. Tibetan sources put the number at about 1,000.

168. *Tibetan Review*, June 1988. '144 Monks Missing Since March Riot', p. 4.

169. *Tibetan Review*, June 1988. Op. cit. 'A Women Prisoner', p. 4.

170. See *New York Times* 9/3/88, *San Francisco Chronicle*, 11/3/88, *Statesman* (New Delhi) 9/3/88, *Free Press Journal* 15/3/88, and in all major British newspapers including editorial comment in the *Independent*, *Times*, *Telegraph* and *Guardian*.

171. *AI Newsletter*, December 1987, March 1988, July 1988. See also AI's Journal *Amnesty!* December 1988. AI also issued 'People's Republic of China: Summary of Amnesty International's Concern's', (January 1987-April 1988). AI Index ASA 17/07/88 Distr: SC/CO/GR. This dealt with China as a whole but includes a section on Tibet.

172. *Asian Wall Street Journal*, 14/4/88. 'Forbidden Tibet Looks Outward' by William McGurn. This was a particularly informative article.

173. Press Release of the Tibetan Youth Congress dated 20/4/88.

174. *Tibetan Review*, July 1988. 'An Informal Fact Finding Visit to Tibet', Lord Ennals and Frederick Hyde-Chambers, p. 9-14. The full report is to be found in 'Tibet In China', issued by International Alert, an organisation concerned with peace and human rights. Its Secretary General is Martin Ennals, brother of Lord Ennals, President of the Tibet Society and former Foreign Office Minister. The Tibet and China Committee has recently been formed following the appearance of the International Alert Report. This organisation intends to mount a major Tibetan seminar and workshop in London in July 1990. It also has the aim of promoting an 'effective Resolution' on Tibet at the UN General Assembly in 1992, in co-operation with various Tibetan groups. The stated Aim of the Committee is to 'promote the SELF DETERMINATION of the Tibetan people' but there would already appear to be some doubt that this issue will be raised in any meaningful fashion at the UN when such a Resolution is proposed. A Resolution which neglects to pursue this objective in a forceful fashion would not be acceptable to most Tibetans, or to their supporters. A certain division of opinion on this matter seemed to emerge at a meeting held at London University Students Union 24/9/89. The meeting was chaired by Mr. William Peters, former diplomat and Chairman of the Tibet Society, UK.

The section of this Report entitled 'The Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Speech and the Tibet Society, UK' presents evidence suggesting that Tibetans are justified in believing that the British Foreign Office is interfering in the formulation of foreign policy by the Tibetan 'Government in Exile'. It is very likely that the Foreign Office is deeply involved in the preparation of such a UN Resolution and it is likely that such a Resolution will reflect British interests rather than the interests of the people in Tibet, who have demonstrated their yearning for independence. The Chinese would implacably oppose any such Resolution at the UN and the British policy of Appeasement followed over the Hong Kong issue gives Tibetans and their supporters reasons to fear that a similar policy may be followed at the United Nations in 1992. The issue is a rather fraught one at present.

The minutes of this meeting proved to be so controversial that the SBA (now OPTIMUS) compiled a three page critique pointing out, among other things, that representations on the subject of Tibetan independence had been much under-stated by the Minutes Secretary. A promise was given by the Secretary of the Tibet and China Committee to circularise the 25 or so participating groups, and incorporate the

reservations into a new set of Minutes, which also reflected other criticisms. Two promises were made to this effect by the secretary of the Tibet and China Committee who spoke to the OPTIMUS secretary who twice confirmed these conversations in writing. Two dates were given for receipt of the amended Minutes by all participating groups, but this agreement was twice reneged upon by the secretary of the Tibet and China Committee. Accordingly OPTIMUS sent around its original critique, together with a covering letter.

An article written by Mr. William Peters, Chairman of the Tibet Society, UK, did not refer to the possibility of Tibetan independence as an option to be considered. (See section entitled *The Dalai Lama's Strasbourg Speech and the Tibet Society, UK*). The article appeared in 'Asian Affairs' Vol XIX. Pt. 2. and is entitled 'The Unresolved Problem of Tibet'. Mr. Peters displays a thorough understanding of the background to the Tibetan problem and he states that 'My purpose is not to attack or criticise the Tibet policies of the CPR' ...but is '...to analyse the way in which it is viewed by the principal parties... to offer some idea for a re-examination of the problem.' As will be gathered from the foregoing the approach is a low-key one and though one may disagree with various elements in his analysis, it is in the main, a level and competent assessment which though short obviously draws on wide reading and Mr. Peters fought with the Gurkhas and was, so to speak, on the very doorstep of the problem, and he has travelled widely in Tibet and China. He acknowledges weighty arguments in favour of Tibetan independence and expresses sharp disagreement with Neville Maxwell who stated that 'Tibet was independent of China only from 1911-'50, therefore it is a waste of time to question Chinese claims to the sovereignty of Tibet based on preceding centuries of Chinese influence.' One scarcely knows where to begin with such a statement except to remark that if Britain chose to reclaim India on now on the basis of some two hundred years control, the fact that India has been independent for forty years would evidently count for nothing at all in Mr. Maxwell's eyes. Peters deals most effectively with Maxwell.

However, as one continues reading a sense of unreality begins to arise. Certainly William Peters mentions the destruction of most of the monasteries and it would be clear to an uninformed reader that *something* rather unpleasant happened in Tibet over a period of several decades, but with a little effort and goodwill from both sides a disturbing legacy could at least be greatly mitigated. A few statistics,

frequently quoted in *Tibet: The Facts* would not only have sharpened the analysis but would also have made most readers doubtful about the wisdom or justice of the solution Peters proposes. It is known that over one million Tibetans have perished, often horribly, and that at least one sixth of the population has been wiped out. In fact it is probably more than this and represents the same proportion of dead as suffered by Poland during the Second World War. The facts contained in this Report surely make it clear that events in Tibet since 1949 are among the bloodiest and most violent in human history, and include full-scale exterminations and massacres, including the slaughter or disappearance of over half a million monks and nuns. Only those of the Buddhist religion can really understand what all this means and what has been lost, and as far as I know Mr. Peters is not a Buddhist. But reticence on these points inevitably means that the reader, lacking a clear understanding of the dimensions of the Chinese legacy will have little or no understanding of the hatred felt towards them by most Tibetans inside Tibet, or of the kind of force necessary for the Chinese to employ against the Tibetan people in order to prevent them from rising. Peters does not mention the existence of about half a million Chinese troops in Tibet, though his writing makes it clear that there is a considerable military presence.

It is on p. 151 that some extremely questionable statements are made which are most sympathetic towards the Chinese presence in Tibet. 'It is obvious that in the circumstances which existed in 1950 the prime need of the Chinese rulers was to ensure that the Tibetan plateau, an area of the highest importance from a strategic point of view, which had always been a buffer between China, India, and first the Mongols, then the Russians, should not be taken over by alien hostile or potentially hostile forces'. It is here that Peters has nailed his, and presumably British Foreign office colours, to the mast. It should have posed no problems at all for the Chinese to have extracted a guarantee of neutrality from the Tibetan Government, and Tibet could have been left alone, with perhaps a minimal Chinese presence. One can legitimately ask which country was at that or indeed any other time, likely to occupy Tibet, march across innumerable mountain ranges and attack or threaten China. Certainly not Russia, who as Peters points out, was well disposed at that time. India had severe internal problems following independence and was more concerned about Pakistan than about Tibet. Tibet could easily have remained a neutral zone and none of the major powers need have troubled about it.

Any doubts raised by Peter's former statement are likely to be consolidated by the following. 'The speed with which the Chinese opened up Tibet to its far western and southern borders by building roads, airports and other logistic requirements of the PLA indicates how urgent for them was the need to absorb Tibet into the Chinese defence system, (p. 151). The Indian debacle of 1962, Peters points out, was only possible because of the swift Chinese penetration of Tibet. Other facts can be adduced which support an opposite conclusion. The Chinese occupation of Tibet began in 1949 and was only relatively secure in 1969, some twenty years later, and even then there was a major rebellion in S. Tibet. The brief Sino-Indian war occurred some 13 years after the Chinese began occupying Tibet and as Peters must surely know a well-armed Chinese force of some 3-5000 men was wiped out in Tsetang by the Kampa freedom fighters. Some 13 years of Chinese penetration, both stealthy and brutal, was necessary before the Chinese were in a position to defeat the Indian forces. If any other power had begun a similar penetration of Tibet the Chinese would have had ample time to react to prevent an enemy from securing anything remotely resembling the kind of logistic facilities they enjoyed in 1962. As it was the Kampa achieved considerable successes and had they been supplied to any appreciable extent by any foreign power the outcome of the Twenty Years War (*which Peters does not mention in his analysis*) may have been different, or at least substantial parts of Tibet may have been denied to the Chinese. Peters does not refer to India's extraordinarily accommodating stance on Tibet, and had he done so many readers would have struggled in vain to understand why it was that the Chinese ever found it necessary to begin their occupation of Tibet. Peters then adds: 'It would be unrealistic to expect the PLA to withdraw from all this in Tibet and leave a vacuum.'

One could argue that according to this analysis it would be equally unrealistic to expect South Africa to withdraw from Namibia and 'leave a vacuum'. In fact what he terms a vacuum would be transformed into a Zone of Peace in accordance with the 'Five Point Peace Proposal' made by the Dalai Lama in the USA in September 1987. Tibet was a 'vacuum' throughout most of its history when it was ruled by kings and by the Dalai Lamas and had it retained its neutral status and not been occupied it would *not* now be one of the flash-point of the world, and India would not have to contend with a long and troubled northern border. It is not easy to understand why Peters referred to the 'Five Point Peace Proposal' as 'an important and well constructed

plan' (p. 146) and yet states that the PLA cannot be expected to leave Tibet, since the first proposal of the Dalai Lama refers to the 'Transformation of the whole of Tibet into a zone of peace' and is amplified in the Dalai Lama's address and with the words 'The establishment of peace zone in Tibet would require withdrawal of Chinese troops and military installations from the Country, which would enable India also to withdraw troops and military installations from the Himalayan regions bordering Tibet'. So Peters must be perfectly well aware of the fact that the Dalai Lama *does* envisage the withdrawal of Chinese forces from Tibet, the more so since the former quotation was taken from the *Newsletter* of the Tibet Society (of which Peters is the Chairman), Winter 1987, p. 4/5. What then is one to take of this apparent contradiction? One explanation may be that it is certainly the case that the *British Foreign Office* does not envisage the withdrawal of the Chinese forces from Tibet, but the Dalai Lama does, and as has been remarked, some Tibetans have cited evidence suggesting that the British Foreign Office is exerting influence upon the Dalai Lama and his Government in Exile through the counsels of various people in the Tibet Society UK such as Mr. Peters.

Interestingly enough the Tibet Newsletter has been renamed *The Voice of Tibet* (Autumn 1989) and it has been remarked elsewhere that a more apt title would be *Voice of the Foreign Office*. It seems strange and presumptuous that an organisation, which is not in fact run by Tibetans, should arrogate such a title for its publication. This does not of course detract from its fine work for Tibetan refugees, but quite a few eyebrows have already been raised, not least in Dharamsala, according to some accounts. Any doubts entertained on this matter seem to be confirmed by William Peters in his 'Chairman's Letter'. Any apprehensive reader might perhaps have wondered in what fashion Peters would avoid trespassing upon the issue of Tibetan independence. While stressing commendable efforts to obtain more assistance for Tibetan refugees he pointed out that the British Government and the E.E.C. do not accede to such requests. He then asks 'Why is this'? I think that the same motives which prevent the British, U.S. and Indian Governments from giving any form of recognition, even informal and private, to the Dalai Lama, his Kalons, and other Tibetan officials prevent them from supporting projects to help Tibetan refugees', namely the huge potential of the Chinese market.

Very deftly Peters avoids pointing out that the British, U.S. and Indian Governments not only give no recognition to the Dalai Lama,

his Kalons and other Tibetan officials, *but they do not recognise the political legitimacy of the Tibetan Government in Exile, and give no support to the Tibetan people's struggle for independence.* The entire issue of Tibetan independence is ingeniously avoided, it is not even mentioned. It is as though a noiseless sundering is taking place between the issue of assistance to Tibetan refugees, human-rights abuses in Tibet and the central issue of Tibetan independence which underlies both these two questions. The procedure being followed resembles removing the foundations of a house while leaving its superstructure intact. Only the Dalai Lama has the power to unconditionally terminate Tibetan efforts to achieve independence, but a good case can be made indicating that formidable efforts to facilitate this objective are being made on the other side of the world.

Perhaps not surprisingly the article, which was originally given as a lecture to the Society for Asian Studies, concludes with the words, 'I believe Mr. Chairman, that there are senior people in Beijing today who wish both to secure Tibet as a bastion of Chinese defence and to erase what may increasingly appear as a blot on the good name of China. It is in that belief that I have spoken today.' These words indicate quite clearly that Peters sees Tibet as an enduring part of China, and despite his previous observations, there is not the shadowiest degree of support for any kind of Tibetan independence and the entire question is laid into its grave. Some concern is expressed about Tibet, but mainly because Chinese actions there 'appear as a blot on the good name of China'. No doubt the sentiments were well meant but the Tiananmen Massacre has shown their hollowness and Jonathan Mirsky, has described the Chinese leadership as a 'bunch of murderers'. Anyone who argues that the quality of Chinese leadership will improve has to explain why, over the last forty years, 'Tiananmen was Tibet and Tibet was Tiananmen' and is in the light of the 'Great Leap Forward', the massacres that followed Mao's coming to power, the 'Cultural Revolution' and now Tiananmen, really making such an assertion as an 'Act of Faith', and the communist legacy in Tibet and in mainland China renders such a statement highly tendentious. So it is proposed that Tibetans should be abandoned to their fate and the question of why Tibet should disappear in an age when so many countries and people have gained their independence is never even broached. In essence this article, which by no means lacks its finer points, is sanctifying the status quo in Tibet, and there is a long echo as the coffin lid is slammed down.

As has been pointed out it is not entirely surprising that Left-wing writers such as A. Tom Grunfeld have proposed more or less the same solution for Tibet, namely its disappearance forever as part of China and the end of its long independence struggle and a curious dialectic is at work as has been remarked. Another notable fact is that both Peters and Grunfeld balk at mentioning the fact that China was conquered by the Mongols (see Footnote 407) presumably because this fact still upsets the Chinese. Interestingly enough both writers point out that Tibet sought an understanding with Genghis Khan, without mentioning the fact that Tibet was *not* conquered, so the impression is given that the Tibetans had in some sense been bested by the Mongols even though they had not actually fought each other. But neither writer points out that China *was* militarily conquered by the Mongol armies, unlike Tibet. Neither does Peters make it explicitly clear that the Yuan Dynasty was the ruling Mongol Dynasty. The word Yuan leaps from the page without any explanation at all of its origin or derivation, and it would not be difficult to believe that this was referring to an indigenous Chinese dynasty *rather than a conquering foreign one*. Both men obviously understand the Chinese mentality very well indeed, but it is correct to say that Peters writings on Tibet are far more accurate and less unacceptable than those of Grunfeld.

However, one is left with evidence suggesting that Peters and others in the Tibet Society may have advised the Dalai Lama and his Government in Exile, with the result that the issue of Tibetan independence is not quite as clear as it was and in doing so it may as some Tibetans have pointed out, that they are articulating the interests of the British Foreign Office, who have never hesitated to betray Tibet or to insult the Dalai Lama by refusing to allow him to meet members of the British Royal Family or senior government ministers while he was in Britain, even though he is a man of peace. It would seem that it is most unwise to consider abandoning the Tibetan independence struggle at this time since there is a very real possibility that China may undergo major internal convulsions when Dena Xioping dies and the Chinese economy is in an extremely perilous state at present. The authority of the Party has been gravely weakened in the eyes of the people both by corruption and by the slaughter in Tiananmen Square (despite Government attempts to conceal the massacre). Furthermore, Buddhism insists on *the total impermanence* of all things in this world and there is no reason to believe that Chinese rule

in Tibet is exempt from such processes. China is embarking upon a very unstable era and it is impossible to foretell what the future may bring for Tibet.

Obviously it is for *Tibetans* to resolve this matter and any confusion arising from it. The exact genesis of the Strasbourg speech is still a matter for some speculation, but when one considers it a sense of wonder arises and it seems possible that there are other aspects of this matter which are not yet immediately clear. One fact shines like a star above all this uncertainty and is as correspondingly remote—namely the possibility of the Tibet and China Committee raising the issue of Tibetan independence at the United Nations General Assembly in 1992, in any significant or substantial sense. Indeed it is likely that efforts will be made by the British Foreign Office for it to be permanently extinguished and for the Chinese presence to be publicly and internationally legitimised and endorsed. The Tibetan people will be consigned to their tragic fate in the counsels of the world.

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that Tibetan organisations have been reluctant to co-operate with International Alert and its newly formed Tibet and China Committee. Some have already ceased to participate and almost the only two organisations helping at present are the Tibet Society and the Dzogchen Community, UK, and one or two private individuals. (See footnote 288, for a discussion of Foreign Office attitude towards China and Tibet as revealed in a correspondence with the SBA (now OPTIMUS). The question of possible British Foreign Office involvement in the Strasbourg Proposal and interference with the formulation of Tibet foreign policy has been uncompromisingly dealt with by Patricia Simmons in the *Tibetan Review*, November 1989, Letters p. 21/22, 'Who Influenced the Strasbourg Proposal.' (See subsequent correspondence).

175. Press Release (19/5/88) issued by His Holiness, The Dalai Lama.

176. See *Tibetan Bulletin*, Vol. XIX. No. 1. Jan-April 1988. Murray Spence gives a particularly graphic account of the violence used by the Chinese and the extent of their military presence in Lhasa.

177. *Asiawatch*, 'Human Rights in Tibet: A Preliminary Report of the Asia Watch Committee', February, 1988. A further report was issued in July 1988, entitled 'Evading Scrutiny: Violations of Human Rights After the Closing of Tibet'.

178. *Tibetan Review*, October 1988. 'Asiawatch Publishes Second Report on Tibet', p. 9.

179. Press Release (3/6/88) issued by the Bureau of His Holiness The Dalai Lama, Delhi (Tsering Tashi).

180. *Tibetan Review*, July 1988, p. 4.

181. *Tibetan Bulletin*, Vol. XIX. No. 1. January-April 1988. p. 27.

182. Press Release (3/6/88) from the Bureau of His Holiness, The Dalai Lama, Op. cit.

183. *Tibetan Review*, July 1988, 'More Demonstrations Despite Heavy Clampdown', p. 4.

184. *Tibetan Review*, October 1988, p. 4.

185. *Tibetan Review*, p. 4. *ibid.*

186. *Guardian*, 14/9/88, 'Tibetan Police Crack Down on Rebel Monks', by Jasper Becker. Amnesty International *Newsletter*, PRC. 'Public Trial Marks New Crackdown in Tibet.' October 1988 Vol. XVIII. No. 10.

187. *Guardian*, 12/12/89. 'Tibetans Killed by China Police', Danny Gittings. See also *Guardian*, 13/12/88, 'Chinese Get Tough With Protesters', Danny Gittings. Press Release (December 1988) issued by the Bureau of His Holiness The Dalai Lama, 'Demonstrations in Lhasa on Human Rights Day, December 10th 1988'.

188. This information was given to the Tibetan Youth Congress by a Tibetan refugee who had recently escaped and who had seen a confidential report on the casualty figures compiled in the Lhasa Police HQ. This report was forwarded to Beijing. The identity of the refugee cannot be divulged, but the information was forwarded to Amnesty International, London. The Letter sent by the TYC to the SBA (now OPTIMUS) was dated 25/1/89. See *Tibetan Review*, February 1988. p. 4.

189. Amnesty International *Newsletter*, February 1989 PRC 'Tibetans Killed By Police'.

190. *Guardian*, 13/12/88 'Chinese Get Tough With Protesters' by Danny Gittings Op. cit.

191. Press Release, Bureau of His Holiness The Dalai Lama, (December 1988) 'Demonstration in Lhasa on Human Rights Day, (December 10th 1988). Op. cit.

192. *Guardian*, 2/1/89. 'New Protest by Tibet Students'.

193. *Guardian*, 19/12/89, 'Tibetans on Rights March in Peking,' Jasper Becker.

194. Press Release, 24/8/88, Office of Information and International Relations, Dharamsala, N. India. More details were also contained in a Press Release dated 19/10/88.

195. Press Release (22/11/89) issued by the Assembly of Tibetan People's Deputies, 'Protest in Tibet Against Uranium Mining'.

196. *Guardian*, 7/12/88 'China Drops Party Leader in Tibet' John Gittings.

197. *Times*, 25/3/88. 'Tibetan Toll 600 over 18 Months'.

198. *Le Monde*, 15/3/89. Amnesty International Urgent Action Appeal 16/3/89. See basis for this Appeal issued 8/3/89. PRC 'Fear of Mass Arrests/Torture/Summary Executions'. See also *Amnesty!* June/July 1989 'Tibetan Children Dragged from Their Homes'.

199. 'Eye Witness account of Events in Lhasa, Tibet, on and after 5th March 1989', compiled by S. Fawl, Garden House, 132 Alderney Street, London SW1V 4HA (01-834-4874).

200. Amnesty International, Urgent Action 8/3/89 PRC: Fear of Mass Arrests/Torture/Summary Executions.

201. *Independent*, 9/3/89. 'Chinese Troops Round Up Dozens of Tibetan Rebels' Andrew Higgins.

202. These incidents are quoted by Amnesty International, Urgent Action 8/3/89, PRC 'Fear of Mass Arrests/Torture/Summary Execution in Tibet' Op. cit. 'Eye Witness Accounts of Events in Lhasa, Tibet, on and after March 5th 1989' Op. cit. *Guardian*, 7/3/89 'Bloody Rioting Sweeps Lhasa'. The stone throwing incident involving the deaths of two Tibetan families is to be found in the Hong Kong magazine *Hong Kong Cheng Ming* 1/3/89, No. 139, p. 24. 'Visitor Claims 256 Deaths in Tibetan Massacre' 'Reference News' column 'Massacre in Lhasa', Huang Min. The writer (Huang Min) had a

meeting in Beijing with a Chinese cadre who narrated the above incident to him, and who also gave the figure of 256 Tibetan dead during a massacre in Lhasa in March 1989. This information was kindly provided by a Tibetan, Mr. Tsering Shakya.

203. *Guardian*, 10/3/89, 'Fear Closes in on Tibetans as Foreigners are Expelled' Jasper Becker. A letter in the *Guardian*, 18/3/89, written by a former English teacher in Tibet emphasises this point, 'Foreign Eye Needed in Tibet', Rupert Wolfe Murray.

204. *Guardian*, 16/3/89 'Tibet Crackdown Was Warning to Chinese Against Dissent' Jasper Becker.

205. *Guardian*, 20/3/89. 'Beijing Outraged by US Calls on Tibet'.

206. *Times*, 7/3/89, 'Tibetans Take Revenge for Shootings', Emma Wilkins.

207. *Guardian*, 8/3/89. Editorial. 'Thunder in Tibet'.

208. *Independent*, 9/3/89, Editorial 'No Longer A Blind Eye to China'.

209. An extract from a letter written by the then British Foreign Secretary, Sir Geoffrey Howe, to the Tibet support Group, UK in January 1989. Another and more detailed letter was sent by Sir Geoffrey Howe to Lord Ennals, former Foreign Office Minister and now President of the Tibet Society, UK (13/3/89) in which he pointed out that 'The Government has publicly expressed its dismay that there has been further violence and loss of life in Lhasa'.

210. *Guardian*, 20/3/89. 'Beijing Outraged by US Calls on Tibet' Op. cit. The all party resolution issued by the European Parliament on March 15th also deplored the loss of life, called for the lifting of martial law and among other things expressed sympathy with the affected families, and requested the foreign ministers of the 12 member European Community to use their good offices to promote a just solution to the problems of Tibet. A full round up of international reaction may be found in the *Tibetan Review*, April 1989 'All Deplore Lhasa Violence', p. 6/7.

211. *Tibetan Review*, April 1989 'All Deplore Lhasa Violence' Op. cit.

212. *Albuquerque Tribune*, 8/3/89. 'Tibetans Have Rights Too'.

For further comment on the March riots see *New York Times*, 10/3/89, *Washington Post*, 12/3/89. 'Repression in Tibet', *Times of India*, New Delhi, 9/3/89 'Unrest in Lhasa', *Tribune*, (Chandigarh) 9/3/89, 'Turmoil in Tibet' etc.

213. *Guardian*, 8/3/89 Editorial, 'Thunder in Tibet'. Op. cit. The 'West Bank' analogy has also been used by Jonathan Mirsky 'Chinese Face Their Own West Bank in Tibet'.

214. *Independent*, 9/3/89. Editorial, 'No Longer a Blind Eye to China'.

215. *People's Daily*, 10/3/89. Front page editorial.

216. Amnesty International basis of Urgent Action Appeal 16/3/89. PRC Further Information on an appeal of 8/3/89: 'Fear of Mass Arrests/Torture/Summary Executions', Op. cit. AI is concerned that some of those arrested in the March riots may have been executed after summary trials and has telexed Premier Li Peng. *Urgent Action* 26/5/89.

217. Video recordings showing Chinese police firing indiscriminately on unarmed Tibetan demonstrators were shown on BBC 1 'Six O'Clock News' 6/3/89 and on 'Channel 4 News' 6/3/89.

218. *Guardian*, 23/3/89. 'Dalai Lama Rejects China Talks Claim', Derek Brown.

219. This statement was contained in a handwritten circular 'Statements on the Situation in Lhasa, as Observed by Foreign Tourists' and was signed by 16 tourists who were in Lhasa at the time of the shootings. This statement has been widely circulated to the media and was sent out by Mr. Paljor Tsering of the Tibet Office, Nepal, in a letter dated 17/3/89.

220. S. Fawl 'Eye witness Account of Events in Lhasa, Tibet, on and after 5th March 1989', p. 5. Op. cit.

221. Amnesty International: Basis of Urgent Action Appeal 16/3/89 PRC. Further Information on an Appeal of the 8th March 1989 'Fear of Mass Arrests/Torture/Summary Executions'. Op. cit. See also *AI Newsletter*, May 1989, PRC 'Fear of Increased Repression Under Martial Law in Lhasa'.

222. 'Eye witness Account of Events in Lhasa, Tibet, on and after

5th March 1989', Op. cit. 'Big Things Have No Shape', Mark Turner, p. 1.

223. *Guardian*, 8/3/89. 'Thunder in Tibet' Op. cit. Tibetans consider that Leaders in the *Guardian*, are now more balanced and less pro-Chinese than in the past. Feature articles usually provide a balanced picture of conditions in Tibet today, but there are occasional exceptions to be found which veer towards a pro-Chinese point of view. However, letters from Tibetans or their sympathisers, criticising such articles are often printed. The above mentioned Leader stated that recent events in Lhasa were '...not the inarticulate mass-uprising of 1959 by a semi-feudal society...' The *Independent*, 9/3/89, referred in a Leader to the '...failure of the popular uprising of March 1959...' and was in most respects a far more hard hitting Leader than that in the *Guardian*, whose coverage of events in Tibet sometimes seems to reflect internal strains. The *Independent* is generally far less sympathetic to China and more vocal in its support of Tibetans who are suffering under Chinese rule.

224. *People's Daily*, 10/3/89, Op. cit.

225. 'Statements of the Situation in Lhasa, as Observed by Foreign Tourists', para 5. Op. cit. It is impossible to ascertain the exact number of Tibetans who have been killed in the riots of March 5th, 6th and 7th. Government figures gave the numbers as 12 dead and more than 100 injured and Tibetans gave a provisional figure of 60 dead and hundreds injured, while foreign tourists who were in Lhasa fear that the total could be much higher. Tibetans estimate that about 1,000 people were arrested in Lhasa and it is likely that many of them will be shot or will disappear or be tortured to death and the final death toll could well be considerable.

Information about recent disturbances in Lhasa may be found in *Tibet Information Network* (TIN News Update) September 15th 1989 which also contains details of other recent occurrences in Tibet. Amnesty International issued Urgent Action Bulletin, AI Index 17/8/89. Distr: UA/SC, 18/9/89 'People's Republic of China: Arrests of Dagwa, Namga, Cering Ngoizu, aged 57, Passang, Danzim Puncog, Ngawang Gyainsing, Ngoizhou, Dagwa (2), Dingling, and Gaisang, together with details of their prison sentences. The names of the prisoners were given in Chinese transliteration following an AFP report (13/9/89). Amnesty International usually gives the Tibetan not Chinese

version of the names of those arrested. The *New China News Agency* (Xinhua) 6/8/89 referred to the sentencing of Pemba (Tsering) and Lhakpa Dhondup. Amnesty International's Annual Report (1989) contains detailed references to human rights abuses in Tibet (see particularly pages 168 to 171). References to Tibet can also be found in the Introduction (p. 13 and 23).

226. The names and sources for this section on Prison Conditions must remain confidential and the material is at present in the hands of Amnesty International, London. Most of the testimonies were received from the Tibet Offices in Dharamsala and Delhi during the latter part of 1988 and consist mainly of statements from both monks and laymen who were detained in some of Lhasa's main prisons such as Gutsa, Sangyip and Drapchi. More confidential testimonies have been received from Tibetans in India who have since returned to Tibet having been told by the Chinese that their relatives in Tibet would be killed if they did not return by a certain specified date. The testimony of nuns who were beaten and subjected to electric shock treatment was featured on '*Tibet: A Case to Answer*' by Vanya Kewley in the 'Dispatches' series on Channel 4, 9/11/88, 8.30 pm. Op. cit.

Evidence of the sexual molestation of female prisoners by Chinese guards has been passed to Amnesty International, London, by the Scientific Buddhist Association (now OPTIMUS). Testimony cited in Information Materials, No. 20 (Office of Information and International Relations, Dharamsala), suggests that such practices have been taking place for many years. The following incidents were recorded by a Tibetan woman shortly after the Lhasa Uprising of March 1959. 'In prison younger women and more attractive ones were called by prison warden Trang Tsong for cleaning his own quarters and doing laundry.' These women included: Ngangtso Wangmo (Lithang), Dolkar Chatring, Yangchen Chatring, and the narrator Adhi from Nyarong, E. Tibet.

'We were all called in rotation and raped. As a precaution against getting pregnant, we were forced to drink soaked musk immediately after sexual intercourse. If we resisted there was every possibility of either being executed or sentenced to death. There was no other way than to keep silent'. Such testimonies recall similar incidents related by the women who had been raped or subjected to enforced prostitution in subject territories occupied by the Nazis during the Second World War. More reports are at present being assembled and would

seem to indicate that the Chinese have been subjecting Tibetan women to such treatment for many years.

227. *Tibet Newsletter*, Summer 1988. An extract from 'An Appeal to the Members of Parliament and the People of Great Britain.' Many more have disappeared since the riots of March 1989 and an estimated 1,000 arrests have taken place.

228. *New York State Journal of Medicine*, June 1988. Dr. C.C. Beyer of East Islip, NY.

229. Bulletin issued by the Office of Information and International Relations, Dharamsala, N. India (19/10/88) Op. cit.

230. *Tibetan Review*, October 1988 p. 4. Op. cit. These figures do not include the wave of new arrests following the riots of March 1989. Ten documents appended in 'Tibet in China', Published by International Alert, August 1988 give the names of some of those arrested in the March 1988 riots and give a graphic portrayal of conditions in Tibet following these disturbances.

231. *Financial Times*, 20/7/89. 'Breaking the Back of Tibetan Protest', Robert Thomson. This was a particularly perceptive and well written article.

232. Radio Lhasa 29/9/88.

233. Amnesty International *Newsletter*, October 1988.

234. A list of demonstrations from September 1987 to March 1989 is to be found in an April 1989 Bulletin of the Office of Information and International Relations, Dharamsala. There are persistent reports that Tibetans in Lhasa and elsewhere are being poisoned as a result of Chinese policy. Chinese have been observed to drop white powder on vegetables being sold in the street and Tibetans have died as a result of eating such food. Chinese policemen do not seem to have pressed charges against people accused of poisoning Tibetan food. It is difficult to know what to make of these rumours and such reports have not been authenticated. It is possible that the Chinese would consider such a policy as a way of increasing the terrors of day to day existence for the Tibetan people. (See *Tibetan Review*, October 1989).

235. After a prolonged correspondence with the Scientific Buddhist Association, Mr. René Wadlow, an officer of the Christian Inter-

national Fellowship of Reconciliation (which has NGO status at the UN) made a presentation on Tibet at the Human Rights Commission, Geneva. The first presentation, which used the first edition of *Tibet: The Facts* as its basis, was made verbally at the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Working Group on Indigenous Populations in August 1984. Another Presentation was made at a seminar of the Commission on the Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination based on Religion or Belief, in early December 1984 for consideration in committee in January 1985. The SBA forwarded many copies of the report to embassies of countries on the Human Rights Commission. Further presentations were made by Mr. Wadlow to UN fora in August 1985, February/March 1986, and February/March 1987. Joint presentations were also made by NGO's in August 1988 and February/March 1989, Feb. '90.

236. The sources for the above section may be found in UN Commission on Human Rights, Forty Fourth Session, 1st February to 11th March, Item 9 'The Rights of Peoples to Self-Determination and its Application to Peoples Under Colonial or Alien Domination or Foreign Occupation'. Item 10 'Question of the Human Rights of All Persons Subjected to Any Form of Detention or Imprisonment'. Item 23 'Implementation of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief'. Item 12 'Question of the Violation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms in Any Part of the World With Particular Reference to Colonial and Other Dependent Countries and Territories'. A Statement issued by IFOR 'China Admits Police Shootings' Geneva, 5/3/88, Press Release from The Tibet Office, London 8/3/88, Statement by Robert Barnett of IFOR (21d) 'Summary of Arbitrary Executions', UN Press Release HR/2145. Corr. 1. 26/2/88 'Corrigendum'. Text in Translation—'PRC Right of Reply on Religion', Extemporaneous notes made by Robert Barnett, Economic and Social Council Document E/CN. 4/1988/NGO/58 1/3/88. Statement by Amnesty International 24/2/88. Some later translations were amended, and some recensions were expanded or amplified but all sources, together with modifications and their implications, have been included in the above list which provides an accurate account of the proceedings of the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, in February and March 1988, concerning the question of Tibet.

237. *Tibetan Bulletin*, October/November 1988. 'NGO's Appeal on Tibet', Tica Broch. This Appeal was signed by Pax Christy International, International Fellowship of Reconciliation, International Organisations for the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Internationale des Droits de l'Homme, Anti-Slavery Society, Minority Rights Group, Human Rights Advocates, Disabled People's International, International League for the Rights and Liberation of Peoples and the International Indian Treaty Council.

238. *News Update*, Tibet Support Group, UK, February 1989 (100 Axminster Road, London N7 6BS).

239. Copies of Mr. Frank Steele's speech may be obtained from the Foreign Office Press Office. This important omission was mentioned by Lord Avebury during his speech at the Tibet Commemoration 11/3/89. Mr. Frank Steele is a member of the newly constituted, but long existing All Party Parliamentary Group for Tibet. His silence on Tibet at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, is inexplicable, and raises all kinds of fraught possibilities and questions in the minds of many Tibetans and their supporters.

240. *Tibetan Review*, December 1982. The Documents are 'Foreign Assistance Legislation for Fiscal Year 1984 (Parts 4/5). News item by Dawa Norbu, a former editor of the *Tibetan Review*.

241. *Xinhua* (New China News Agency), Report dated 22/9/86, Radio Lhasa 24/10/86. This caused a considerable amount of US press comment at the time.

242. Statement issued in Beijing 16/10/87, quoted in *Tibetan Bulletin*, Vol. XVIII, No. 3. September/October 1987. p. 22.

243. Guo Shan writing in the '*Beijing Review*' Vol. 30 No. 5/6 Feb. 1987. Rather judiciously he adds 'But China also believes that in the field of human rights, as with other things, the way one country handles its human rights issues should not be held up as a model for all other countries to follow.... China opposes any external interference in a country's internal affairs on the pretext of safeguarding human rights'. Presumably the proposed visit of the US human rights delegation fell into this category and was accordingly denied entry into Tibet. But this was later granted.

244. This point was made to a Chinese Press Secretary at the

Chinese embassy in London in March 1987 by a delegation who had delivered a note prior to the commemoration of the 1959 Lhasa Uprising. The Press Secretary was unable to formulate a coherent reply when faced with this historical analogy, neither was he able to dispute the statement that the European empires had virtually disappeared and that 'the Chinese were the new Imperialists with their Empire'.

245. Many prominent American politicians played an important part in formulating the US Tibet Bill and guiding it through the Committee stages, among them Congressman Charlie Rose, Senator Clairborne Pell, Congressman Frank McCloskey. The Governor of New York, Mario M. Cuomo, has also proved sympathetic to the Tibetan cause and has spoken at several rallies as has the NY Mayor Edward Koch.

246. (A.P.) Beijing 13/12/87.

247. *Tibetan Review*, June 1988. \$132,792 has been donated by the United States Information Agency for the period of the first year, channelled through the Fulbright Scholarship Programme and the sum of \$11,066 has come from the Tibet Fund of New York.

248. *Tibetan Review*, July 1985, 'In Search of the Poorest Tibetans—A Personal Journey', K. Dhondup.

249. *Tibetan Review*, January 1989, 'US Delegation to Settlements'. The visit took place 15th-30th November 1988 and its proposals to be made to the US Congress include: Funding for development projects in Tibetan refugee settlements, the inclusion of Tibet in the Declaration of the United Nations Decade of Anti-Colonialism, refugee status for Tibetans in Nepal, together with the request that the United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR) declare Tibetans in Nepal to be refugees in international law and to officially designate Tibetans as refugees, (the fact that UNHCR has not yet done this has often caused controversy in the past), Voice of America broadcasts in Tibetan, increasing numbers of scholarships available to Tibetan refugees, limitations on the sale of arms to China, (this issue has already been linked to the Presidential perception of human-rights in Tibet and has been further consolidated by the banning of US arms sales to China following the slaughter in Tiananmen Square), and human-rights conditionality on aid and sales to China,

(Section 502B of the International Development and Security Cooperation Act). A comprehensive summary of the report compiled by US Congressional Aides is to be found in the *Tibetan Review*, June 1989 'Tibetan Refugee Settlements in India and Nepal', p. 8-17.

250. *Tibetan Review*, March, 1988, 'Australian ICJ Chief Commends US Congress Stand on Tibet'. p. 5.

251. *Tibetan Bulletin*, Vol. XIX No. 1, January/April 1988. 'American Officials in Tibet', p. 25

252. *Guardian*, 19/4/88.

253. *Tibetan Review*, October 1988. This statement was made by the (then) Vice President, George Bush in a letter to Mr. T. Miller dated 9/9/88

254. *Tibetan Bulletin*, August/September 1988.

255. *Tibetan Review*, October 1988, p. 9.

256. *Tibetan Bulletin*, October/November 1988. 'Senators Call For More Backing For Tibetans', p. 11.

257. *Tibetan Review*, December 1988, p. 6.

258. *Tibetan Review*, February 1989, p. 7/8. The signatories included Dante Fascell Chairman of the Committee on Foreign Affairs, William Broomfield, Ranking Republican of the Committee, Gus Yatron, Chairman of the Sub Committee on Human Rights and International Organisations, and Gerald Solomon, Ranking Republican of HRIO.

259. *Tibetan Review*, February 1989, 'German 'Greens' Adopt Motion on Tibet', p. 9.

260. *Tibetan Bulletin*, October/November 1988, 'Euro Council Members Back Tibet', p. 11. Thirteen members signed on 5/10/88 and several others followed later.

261. *Times*, Editorial, 6/4/88.

262. *Stait's Times*, 6/4/88.

263. *Times*, 19/8/85, 20/8/85. *Spectrum*, Op. cit. The Dalai Lama was interviewed by Amir Jasbir Singh. For more details of the Chinese immigration into Tibet see *Tibet Newsletter*, Summer 1987,

'Common Voice' by Lodi Gyari, a prominent member of the Dalai Lama's 'Government in Exile' being minister of Information and International relations.

264. *Times*, 12/10/85 Letters 'Tibet and China', Sir Jack Longland. The Tibetan question frequently provokes a vigorous correspondence in British news-papers and the *Times* recently contained a striking example of this. (See the *Times* December 28th and January 3rd 1989). In the first letter Dr. Marshall praised Foreign Office 'pragmatism' when he recalled being advised by the Foreign Office, while preparing a World at War map in December 1942, to shade Tibet in colours which implied acceptance of China's claim to sovereignty at least partly on the argument that our map was more likely to be seen by the Chinese than by the Tibetan authorities. In his reply Mr. Timothy Elphick asked 'What has to happen to what is left of what was once Tibet before this official 'pragmatism' is replaced by something that looks less like political and moral cowardice.' He also pointed out that it was 'this pragmatism which has left the Tibetans alone in their plight since the Chinese invasion of 1949'.

265. *Independent*, 12/4/88, 'Shameful Silence Over Tibet'.

266. *Independent*, 5/4/88, 'Tories Attack Gag on Dalai Lama', Sara Helm. See also *Independent*, 12/4/88. Op. cit.

267. *Daily Telegraph*, 11/4/88 'China Told to Call Off Thugs Based in Tibet', G. Hutchings *Financial Times*, 14/4/88, 'Peking Faces Growing Human Rights Pressure', Colina McDougal.

268. *Scotsman*, 7/4/88. 'Tibet: A Land of Tragedy', Alexander Norman. This was a particularly informative and well-researched article.

269. *Times*, 12/4/88, 'Chinese View of Conditions in Tibet', a letter from the Chinese ambassador to the UK.

270. *Times*, 19/4/88. 'Chinese Attitude on Tibet', a letter from the former President of The Tibet Society, UK, who retired in November 1988 who includes distinguished Foreign Office service among his many accomplishments. He was succeeded by Lord Ennals, himself a former Foreign Office Minister.

271. *Times*, 19/4/88. Letter from Mr. Peter Somerville-Large of Carrickmires, Republic of Ireland. Britain's legacy to Ireland has

often been compared with the Chinese legacy in Tibet.

272. *Scotsman*, 5/4/88.

273. *Daily Telegraph* 14/4/88. 'Dalai Lama Fails to Sway Heath'.

274. See 'Seven Days' Channel 4, 23/4/88, Thames Television, 25/4/88, BBC 2 24/4/88, in which The Dalai Lama was interviewed for thirty minutes by Bernard Levin.

275. Letter in the *Tibetan Review*, September 1988. p. 21.

276. *Financial Times*, 14/4/88, 'Peking Faces Growing Human Rights Pressure', Colina Mcdougall.

277. *Times*, 6/4/88. Editorial. *Independent*, 12/4/88. Editorial.

278. See *South China Morning Post*, 15/7/88. 'Slaving Away at the Fine Print of Tibet's Recent History', Frank Ching, Hong Kong Bureau Chief of 'Triple A' incorporating Asiabank. *Asian Wall St Journal*, 14/4/88, 'The Tibetan Example'. Other perceptive articles on the future of Hong Kong by Frank Ching may be found in the *South China Morning Post*, 25/5/88 and 8/7/88. Fears have been expressed in correspondence about the future of Hong Kong after 1997, *South China Morning Post*, 7/5/88, letter to the Editor, 'Tibet Could Serve as an Accurate Pointer to the Real Meaning of 'One Country, Two Systems', Linda Rose

279. 'Amnesty!' Oct/Nov 1988 'Hong Kong, Insufficient Protection', p. 4.

280. *Today*, Radio 4. 9/3/87. In this interview Lord Ennals also suggested that the Soviet Union should make representations to China on human-rights abuses in Tibet.

281. Speech made by Lord Avebury, 11/3/89 at the Tibet Commemoration meeting. Lord Avebury is joint Chairman of the All Party Parliamentary Group and has done fine work as Chairman of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group facilitating two memorable reports, namely *China: The Human Rights Exception* by Roberta Cohen and *The Chinese and Human Rights in Tibet*, by W.P. Ledger. The other two joint Chairmen of the All Party Parliamentary Group are Lord Ennals, President of the Tibet Society, UK, and a prominent member of International Alert of which his brother Martin is Secretary General. Lord Ennals is a former Foreign Office Minister. Sir Bernard

Braine is the other joint Chairman, of the All Party Parliamentary group for Tibet.

282. *Independent*, 20/4/88. 'Hong Kong Lawyers Put Case for British Rights.

283. *Independent*, 24/3/89. 'Britain Will Not Take HK Chinese', Michael Fathers, Asia Editor.

284. *Times*, 30/3/89, 'Seizure in Peking of Rights Petition Adds to Hong Kong Fears'. Catherine Sampson, Peking, and Chris Pomery, Hong Kong.

285. *Sing Tao*, 7/5/88 (Hong Kong), *Time*, 11/7/88 'Migration Fever', M. Jolson

286. *Economist*, 5-11 November 1988, 'In China's Shadow.'

287. After India achieved independence in 1947 the representative of the British Government in Lhasa, Hugh Richardson, was instructed to assure the Tibetan Government that HM Government would continue to take a friendly interest in the welfare and autonomy of their country. On November 6th 1950 Mr Ernest Davies, speaking in Parliament for the Foreign Office, recalled that assurance and described Tibetan autonomy since 1911 as amounting to de facto independence. A succinct analysis of these events may be found in '*A Short History of Tibet*,' by H.E. Richardson, Published by E.P. Dutton & Co, NY 1962, p. 183-189 Op. cit.

288. *Spectator*, 19/4/88, 'Silent Tears for Tibet', Michael Trend. This was a moving and perceptive article. The attitude of the Foreign Office towards China and Tibetan issue was illustrated in a correspondence with the SBA (now OPTIMUS). On 23/5/85, SBA Secretary Paul Ingram wrote to Trevor Mound, British Consul in Shanghai, following an article which had appeared in the '*Mail on Sunday*.' Much information about Chinese oppression in Tibet was sent to Mr. Mound, including presentations made by the International Fellowship of Reconciliation at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, and reference was made to Amnesty International's Report entitled '*China: Violations of Human Rights, Prisoners of Conscience and the Death Penalty in the Republic of China (1984)*.' It was pointed out that some 800,000 arrests had occurred and that large numbers of people had since been shot. Reference was also made to

politically motivated arrests in Tibet and Mr. Mound was asked to bring lack of religious freedom in Tibet and continuing human-rights violations there to the attention of the Chinese leaders, as this would result in a worthwhile reduction of human suffering. An acknowledgement was received from Mr. Mound (7/6/85), and the letter was passed to Mr. Peter Thomson of the British Embassy in Beijing.

A letter was received from Mr. John Ashton (9/7/85) of the Far Eastern Department of the Foreign Office and it provided a good example of Foreign Office wariness on the issue of Tibet and the kind of extenuating perspective that is still applied to China, even after Tiananmen. Mr. Ashton apologised for his lateness in replying and remarked, somewhat acerbically that 'Responsibility for British foreign policy lies with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office here in London rather than with our overseas missions', and the letter had inevitably taken some time to reach him.

While understanding SBA concern about the situation in Tibet he remarked that 'there is little scope for the British, or indeed any other foreign government, to influence the future of Tibet. This can only be worked out between the people of Tibet and the Chinese government. Indeed any representations by Mr. Mound would be regarded by the Chinese as unwarranted interference in China's internal affairs and, given China's historical suspicions about British interest in Tibet, might be counter-productive'. Such sentiments might perhaps be understandable if India had still been part of the British Empire and the British were still in a position to mount military expeditions which they could send into Tibet but otherwise they are quite meaningless. The letter continued by pointing out that reliable information on conditions in Tibet was difficult to obtain, but that conditions seemed to have improved there. 'The present Chinese Constitution guarantees freedom of religion and the government have taken steps to relax some of the restrictions previously imposed on the people of Tibet. There is every reason to believe that these and more generally China's current outward-looking political and economic policies will continue. Certainly it is in the British interest that they should. We believe that we are most likely to be able to influence Chinese policies in the long term by encouraging contact and mutually beneficial exchanges at all levels with present and future Chinese decision makers and opinion formers.'

The letter made it quite clear that nothing could be done about the situation in Tibet, the Chinese authorities would not be approached,

many improvements were taking place in China and nothing would be gained by rocking the boat. An SBA reply, which dealt in some detail with Mr. Ashton's points was written (19/9/85), his letter having been acknowledged (12/8/85). The letter pointed out that when we wrote to the Consul, Mr. Mound, we were not asking him to try to influence the future of Tibet, and neither we attempting to ask the Foreign Office to make any attempt to do so. The SBA pointed out that 'it was merely requesting that you display the same concern over human-rights abuses perpetrated by the Chinese authorities in Tibet, as you do when similar uncivilised behaviour occurs in the Soviet Union'. This was surely a moderate and reasonable request and could not 'be construed as interference in China's internal affairs'.

References were then made in the SBA letter which indicated that much material had emerged over the past six years suggesting that over a million Tibetans had perished under Chinese rule. Reference was made to Mr. Ashton's statement concerning 'China's historical suspicions about British interests in Tibet', and it was pointed out the the Younghusband expedition of 1904 was a tentative and restrained affair, bearing 'no similarity to the conquering armies of Communist China who swept into Tibet in 1950 and devastated its culture'. It is significant that a member of the Foreign Office should refer to an expedition into Tibet which had occurred some eighty years ago but made no reference to the mass slaughter carried out by the Chinese armies well into the 1970's. It was also pointed out in the SBA letter that Tibet had a good claim to independence and had been incorporated into China at a time when the European empires were breaking up. This kind of perspective was entirely absent from Ashton's letter.

The SBA pointed out that improvements in Tibet may only be temporary (current events have confirmed this and Tiananmen has contradicted the misplaced optimism concerning political and economic progress in China made in the concluding paragraph of Ashton's letter). Concerning the apparent improvements in religious freedom in Tibet, which Ashton had noted, it was pointed out that the 'Chinese Constitution only guarantees freedom to believe or not to believe. Furthermore religious policy in Tibet is implemented by Party members who are not allowed to practise religion and have a duty to propagate atheism. No corresponding right to propagate religion exists under the present Chinese Constitution'. The conclusion was that although freedom of belief is guaranteed the propagation of such religious belief is prohibited, while Communist Party members

cannot practise any form of religion and had a duty to propagate atheism. The SBA letter added that this 'casts a somewhat different light on religious policy in the PRC as does the Editorial in the *'Red Flag'* (16/6/83) which is quoted in footnote 67 of the SBA Report, (a previous edition of which was forwarded to Mr. Ashton and the *'Red Flag'* Editorial is quoted in footnote 139 of this new updated edition of *'Tibet: The Facts'*). "The Editorial states '...under the guise of protecting the freedom of religious *belief*, we greatly develop the socialist economy, culture, science and technology...so as to gradually eliminate the social and cognitive sources that have given rise to religion and enable it to exist' (my italics)." Presumably Mr. Ashton was aware of the above points in which case his optimistic sentiments on improvements in religious freedom in mainland China or Tibet were, to put it mildly, somewhat short of the mark.

A considerable amount of background material was included in the SBA letter and anxiety was expressed that 'such a brutal and dogmatic regime' (as China) 'is being countenanced and indulged to such an extent by the West'. The letter pointed out that such contacts with the Chinese as were advocated by Mr. Ashton would probably not exert any great effect on their policies in Tibet 'any more than trade links with South Africa have helped the oppressed peoples there. In fact the reverse seems to have been the case and more trade has ensured a flow of arms to South Africa to be used for purposes of repression and an arms deal recently concluded between China and the USA has resulted in the delivery of helicopters which can fly at a very high altitude and could therefore be used to quell any uprising in Tibet'. (The revolts in Lhasa and the Tiananmen Massacre have now resulted in an American embargo on arms sales to China, though there are some indications that this may shortly be applied somewhat less rigorously).

The above point was emphasized with reference to the fact that cogent arguments could be presented suggesting that only the communist powers have retained their empires, and are indeed empires themselves, comprising a wide variety of subject peoples who are systematically exploited and that such a perspective would apply not only to China, but also to the Soviet Union...'

The SBA letter concluded with the request that the Foreign Office 'display the same concern over human rights abuses in China, in whatever part they occur (including Tibet) in exactly the same way as concern is so eloquently expressed when similar abuses occur in the Soviet Union.'

Mr. Ashton's reply (23/10/85) was quite revealing. Throughout the SBA letter Mr. Ashton had been plied with facts supported by clear reference to sources and this was also the case with the earlier edition of *'Tibet: The Facts'* which was forwarded to him. He replied 'I have taken careful note of the views in your letter and in the SBA Report for the UN Commission on Human Rights. There is however little I can add to my letter of 9 July.' When clear *facts* are cited a way of avoiding any reference to them is of course to refer to them as '*views.*' Presumably it is a '*view*' that Tibetan culture has been destroyed, a '*view*' that some 6,000 monasteries are in ruins and a '*view*' that there is an enormous labour camp complex located in Xining and a '*view*' that 87,000 Tibetans were massacred, even when this is confirmed by Chinese sources. Mr. Ashton thanked the SBA for our 'very detailed letter' but evidently did not consider it at all necessary to answer any of its main points, and simply stated that the 'Chinese Government is well aware of our views on human rights issues, which we have expressed clearly in the United Nations and other international fora'. He further stated that 'we do not believe it would serve any constructive purpose to make representations to the Chinese government about Tibet'. However, he did not provide any reasons as to why such representations were made to the Soviet Union, but '*not to China.*' With a clear reference to the point made in the SBA letter, that strong arguments could be given supporting the position that both Russia and China were empires with large numbers of subject peoples he made the bold assertion that 'The situation' (in Tibet) 'is not analogous to that in the Soviet Union'. This statement was presumably suggesting that 'minorities' in China were not oppressed as were their equivalents in the Soviet Union. If this is what the statement means then it is more or less the opposite of the truth since evidence cited in this report and which is available from many different sources, clearly indicates that, with certain notable exceptions, the Soviet Union has generally treated its 'minorities' in a more civilised fashion than is the case with China. It is difficult to know what to make of such a statement, coming as it does from a member of the Foreign Office, but it surely indicates a quite extraordinary attitude of support for any sympathy towards the People's Republic of China.

An SBA letter (16/11/85) was sent to Mr. Ashton which strongly disputed his last statement. In fact that was every indication that the situation in Tibet could indeed be likened to that which existed in the

Soviet Union and a particular reference was made to the Ukraine which has been plundered by the communists and whose people have been slaughtered and decimated and the letter added that 'the Ukraine has been used to buttress the Soviet economy and over a period of decades many non-Ukrainians have been settled in this area', (as is the case in Tibet). As the analogy between Tibet and the Ukraine was a valid one it seemed reasonable to request that the Foreign Office should not only protest about human-rights abuses in the Ukraine, but should logically do so in the case of *Tibet*.

No reply was received from Mr. Ashton and more material, consisting principally of presentations made at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva, was forwarded to him (9/2/86). This material was acknowledged by P.T. Rouse, Far Eastern, Department of the Foreign Office and he expressed his thanks for the letter dated 9/2/86 addressed to Mr. Ashton. However, he made no mention of the previously mentioned letter dated 16/11/85 sent to Mr. Ashton which dealt with the analogy between Russia and the Ukraine and China and Tibet. P.T. Rouse's short letter ended with the words 'We continue to take a keen interest in human rights issues in Tibet and are grateful for the papers you have provided'. More material was sent to Mr. Rouse, together with letter dated 12/5/86 and 20/5/86, but no acknowledgement was forthcoming from the Foreign Office.

Although this correspondence has been reviewed at some length here it seems worthwhile to have devoted so much space to it since it is extremely revealing. The Foreign Office cannot really defend their position on Tibet and when they attempt to do so it would seem that logic is not one of their strong points. In fact their position vis-a-vis China and Tibet is dictated by what they perceive to be in Britain's interest and it will probably matter little to these people whether their defence of their position is logical or consistent with policies followed towards other countries, such as Soviet Union. It does not seem to have occurred to the Foreign Office that the policy of Appeasement that it follows towards China, largely because of the Hong Kong issue, may be to Britain's detriment, as was the case with the policies which led to the Munich debacle.

It now seems likely that the Foreign Office is attempting to influence the policies of the Dalai Lama's Government in Exile via people who are serving on the Execution Body and Council of the Tibet Society, UK. It also seems possible that efforts to promote an 'effective resolution' on Tibet, at the UN General Assembly may have their roots in

a Foreign Office initiative (See Footnote 174). The review of SBA correspondence with the Foreign Office makes it clear that the issue of self-determination for the Tibetan people will not be raised in any significant way. Rather Tibet is likely to be abandoned to its fate if the Tibetan Government in Exile continues to use the 'good offices' of those serving in the Tibet Society. Ironically enough, the Tibet Society is supposed to be working for the independence of Tibet, and International Alert, boldly declares that it is in favour of the self-determination of the Tibetan people.

289. Mr. Frank Steele is Head of the UK Human Rights delegation to the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva. See Footnote 239.

290. The well-known scholar Roy Medvedev puts the total number of Stalin's victims at over 30 million dead. In November 1988 the weekly '*Moscow News*' carried an 8 page supplement dedicated to the current 'week of conscience' in honour of Stalin's victims. Mr. Gorbachov's reforms are beginning to open the floodgates and the rough breakdown compiled by Medvedev whose work was banned until recently, and featured in the *Moscow News* is as follows:

(1) Tens of thousands of bourgeois nationalists, Left-wing anti Bolsheviks, intellectuals and technical specials and others were sent to the camps in the 1920's.

(2) Ten million peasants were 'dekulakised' and forcibly resettled in remote regions after the 1929 collectivisation: the numbers of dead are unknown, but millions undoubtedly died.

(3) Six million died in the deliberate famine of 1933.

(4) One million were arrested and killed in the first wave of terror in 1934, mainly from Moscow, Leningrad and the big cities.

(5) By 1937 17-18 million had been sent to the labour camps of which about ten million died.

(6) By 1939 another 5-7 million were 'repressed' of which one million were shot, and millions died in the camps.

(7) The occupation in 1940 of the Baltic States, Bessarabia and parts of Bukovina led to another two million people being deported, most of them to die.

(8) In 1941 the deportation of Germans, Chechen-Ingush, Crimean Tartars and others considered treacherous amounted to three million, of which about one million died.

(9) Between 1944-'46 the 'screening' of people who had been under the German occupation led to another ten million people being

sent to the camps of which 5–6 million died.

(10) During the years 1947–'53 another one million perished in general purges and repression. The total comprises some 30–40 million dead. This excludes the official war total of some twenty million dead. The source for these Russian compilations is the *Daily Telegraph*, 24/11/88. 'Stalinist Terror Left Over 30 Million Dead' by Xan Smiley.

Terrible though these events were it seems likely that the Chinese 'Cultural Revolution' was even worse in terms of numbers of people who starved to death, died in the labour camps or simply disappeared. As pointed out Chinese internal sources give the figure of 100,000,000 casualties. These figures do not include the tens of millions who starved to death as a result of prolonged economic dislocation. It is also generally accepted that about 20 million people starved to death in China as a result of the 'Great Leap Forward'. Given these facts and statistics it is not surprising that many communists seem to be undergoing a painful reappraisal of their beliefs and doctrines and a considerable case could be made that, given the many tens of millions of people who have died as the result of communist inefficiency, dogmatism, and the bigotry engendered by 'personality cults', this movement has now failed after some seventy years of experimentation. It could be said that to continue to believe in this doctrine somewhat resembles an 'act of faith', and it is likely that although some countries will still be labelled 'communist', the reality will be different.

It is interesting to note that a book review of '*In Exile From the Land of Snows*,' by John Avedon which chronicled in detail the destruction of Tibetan culture referred to the Chinese record in Tibet as 'Yet another Stalinist catastrophe'. '*Tribune*', (26/10/84). A subtle, but extremely important shift of emphasis would have been to rephrase it as 'Yet another *communist* catastrophe'. By using the word 'Stalinist' the door is left open for future communist developments and communism as such is not censored or condemned in the way which such writers habitually condemn capitalism. Without being necessarily enamoured of capitalism the communist record, recounted in the above statistics, arguably provides much material which can now be used to question its basic value or worth as we approach the 21st Century.

291. This scramble for markets in China was reflected in an article in the *Times*, 25/3/89, 'Peking Tour to Promote Business', Richard

Ford. Ninety-five British solicitors and barristers travelled to Peking on a mission aimed at promoting their skills in commercial law and targetting the business community in China that wishes to trade with the West. Both the President of the Law Society and Sir Patrick Mayhew, the Attorney General were on the mission indicating the importance which the British legal profession attaches to commercial opportunities in China. The British face strong competition in this field from the USA, Australia and other European countries.

292. The *Independent* (7/1/89) contains a letter by Professor A. Bolagi Akinyemi, Nigerian Foreign Minister 1985–'87 entitled 'Price of African Support for China' which acknowledges racism displayed towards African students in China, following previous reports in the *Independent*. He further points out that China has received a great deal from African states at the United Nations since from the mid-1960's to the mid-1970's. African states represented the most solid and persistent advocates for the representation of Red China in the United Nations. He adds that this policy proved costly to the African states since in 1981, when most international observers expected the post of the UN Secretary General to go to an African candidate, Ambassador Salim Salim, the Tanzanian representative, it was vetoed by the United States on the grounds that not only did he play a prominent role in organising the successful struggle for Chinese entry into the United Nations, but danced for joy when the votes showed that China had won. Thus the price 'Africa paid for supporting China was to lose its first and only opportunity at occupying the office of the United Nations Secretary Generalship.' Professor Akinyemi now at Clare Hall Cambridge further added that perhaps the Chinese are unaware of this fact and hoped that the *Independent* is read in China.

Although there is some improvement today (1990) it is still a fact that the major Western news agencies have a near stranglehold on the gathering and dissemination of information among many Third World countries with the unfortunate result that the immediate problems of such countries are sometimes seen 'through Western eyes'.

293. *People's Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception*, by Roberta Cohen, published by the Parliamentary Human Rights Group 1986. p. 7. footnote 4. This classic analysis has exerted a great influence on informed opinion generally and upon those who are particularly concerned with human-rights issues. It has played an

important part in alerting people to the scale of human-rights abuses in China. See also Index on Censorship 1/88, London.

294. The Scientific Buddhist Association (now OPTIMUS) undertook many campaigns against what it considered to be biased reporting of the plight of the Tibetan people. Many people who received comprehensive information from the SBA illustrating Chinese brutality in Tibet took notice of it and this was reflected in their later writings and reports. Others who were unable to disprove the information they received were either silent or abrasive or tried to classify the SBA adversely as right-wingers or fascists. In fact the SBA was (and OPTIMUS is), non-political and we always made it clear during the course of our campaigns that we were not arguing for or against Tibetan independence from China and that we condemned human-rights abuses in whatever countries they occurred whether capitalist or communist, East or West, North or South. One particular campaign caused a considerable amount of comment and concerned an exhibition mounted by the British Museum in 1985 entitled 'Buddhism Art and Faith' which exhibited many Tibetan artifacts and gave the impression that Tibetan culture was intact in its homeland. In order to convey this impression it showed pictures of Tibetans participating in Buddhist rituals outside Tibet but neglected to mention that Tibetan culture had practically been exterminated in Tibet itself. Also it did not mention the 'Cultural Revolution' but simply showed pictures of ruins which to the uninformed might have appeared to be centuries old and the result of some remote upheaval. It is to be hoped that such exhibitions will be characterised by a more frank approach in the future.

295. Roberta Cohen provides a vivid example of British reticence on the question of human-rights violations in China. At a Chatham House meeting in 1986 the Honorary Secretary of the Parliamentary Human Rights Group asked Hu Yaobang questions about three political prisoners held in China, the moderator James Callaghan, former Labour Prime Minister, interrupted the questioner twice. Roberta Cohen was Honorary Secretary at this time. *People's Republic of China: The Human Rights Exception*, p. 73 Op. cit.

296. *New Internationalist*, August 1988. This item first appeared in the *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 16/6/88, a magazine whose China coverage is generally of a high standard.

297. *New Internationalist*, June 1988. 'Stop the Chainsaw Massacre'.

298. *Sanity*, Feb/March 1989, 'The State of the Environmentalist', an interview with Jonathon Porrit of Friends of the Earth. In this interview Mr. Porrit referred to the effects of deforestation in Brazil, Malaysia, but did not mention similar programmes in China. Although he was talking principally about rainforests he did nevertheless refer to environmental groups in Eastern Bloc countries and a reference to China would not have been amiss.

299. *New Statesman*, 29/4/88. The *New Statesman's* deputy editor Jolyon Jenkins wrote a long review article on Tibet relying mainly on sources which are now at least 5 years out of date and have been largely discredited by an enormous amount of information about conditions in Tibet and the legacy of Chinese rule, which has reached the West during the last few years. The question of Tibetan independence '...is unresolvable and verges on the theological' and W.P. Ledger's report entitled *The Chinese and Human Rights in Tibet* issued by the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, received a biased and inadequate treatment. He did not mention that Mr. Ledger cited many pro-Chinese sources, included a considerable amount of new information on Chinese persecution, and Jenkins ridiculed the ICJ Reports of 1959 and 1960 most of whose main conclusions including compulsory sterilisation, have stood the test of time. A letter written by Mr. Ledger which attempted to set the record right was not printed by the *New Statesman*, which, a few weeks later, was inveighing against censorship. However, the *New Statesman* did print a perceptive piece on Tibet and the Dalai Lama's visit to Britain in April 1988 written by Jane Dibbin, 'The Dalai Lama: Smile Freedom' 8/4/88.

300. *New World*, Sept/Oct. 1988 (magazine of the United Nations Association, UK), 'Great Wall is Really There', by Malcolm Harper UNA President. *New World*, March/April 1987, 'Why the UN is More Important Than Ever Before', Malcolm Harper.

301. This series is edited by Darcus Howe and Tariq Ali. Many efforts were made to contact Darcus Howe while he was in Britain but these were ultimately unsuccessful. A letter has been sent to the Controller of Channel 4 pointing out that the programme claims, among other areas, to cover S. Asia, which, according to the Phillips New World Atlas, includes Tibet. This point was made in an earlier letter to Darcus Howe but no reply was ever received. However, a

helpful reply was received from Michael Grade, Channel 4 Controller.

302. Many 'minority peoples' seem to have vanished completely indicating that something far worse than colonialism has occurred. The virtual extermination of the Lolos was referred to in *Horseman in the Snow—The Story of Aten*, Dharamsala Op. cit. (now published by Wisdom, UK). Dr. Mark Tatz writing in the *Tibetan Review*, April 1987 points out that directly after the communists took power in China there were some 500 peoples designated as 'minority nationalities', but today the Chinese Government's 'Affirmative action list' only refers to some 53 such peoples. These peoples once occupied over half the Chinese landmass and now about 90% of them seem to have disappeared or to have been wiped out, or perhaps reclassified.

303. *The Yellow River*, as series compiled by Mr. Stephen Jessel which appeared on BBC TV2 summer, 1988. Four letters have been sent to the Controller of BBC TV2, Mr. Alan Yentob, together with a detailed 6 page critique of the series, with particular reference to Tibet, with a copy to be sent to Mr. Jessel for comment. Paul Ingram, Secretary of OPTIMUS (formerly Scientific Buddhist Association) has requested that another programme about Tibet be compiled and screened so that the impression given by the programmes on the current state of Tibetan culture in the areas of the Yellow River could be corrected by pointing out that it has practically ceased to exist. Constructive letters were received from Mr. Alan Yentob, Controller BBC 2 Television, (27/1/89, 19/4/89) and the material was passed to Mr. Willy Wyatt who was Head of Documentary Features at the time when the programmes were made. Two letters were received from Mr. Wyatt, (27/1/89, 21/3/89), who is now Assistant Managing Director of BBC Television and Mr. Yentob wrote: 'I think you can see that your response to the programmes has been given a great deal of attention in the BBC...' It was learned that BBC Wales is producing a series of programmes which should address themselves to some of the questions raised in the OPTIMUS critique. One such programme has now appeared on BBC Wales TV in the form of an hour long documentary entitled *The Last Dalai Lama: Thirty Years in Exile*.

In a letter to Mr. Jessel it was pointed out that while mentioning the 'Cultural Revolution' he did not add that internal Chinese sources refer to the figure of 100,000,000 casualties (one hundred million). See *China: The Human Rights Exception*, Roberta Cohen,

p. 7. footnote 4. No reply was ever received from Mr. Stephen Jessel.

304. *Martin Chuzzlewit* by Charles Dickens OUP 1975 Chapter 21. The scene described by Dickens calls to mind an incident in George Orwell's *Nineteen Eighty Four* and it seems possible that Orwell had been influenced by Dickens in this respect. Oceania, Eastasia and Eurasia were permanently at war, each forming an unstable alliance with the other at different times. A large rally was held in London (Oceania) in order to denounce the enemy, Eurasia, and this rally had been preceded by an enormous amount of work erecting banners and placards vilifying Eurasia. During a long oration directed against Eurasia the speaker was handed a note which he read and then began to denounce *Eastasia*, Eurasia was now an ally. No formal announcement was made concerning this new alliance and in an act of collective amnesia the crowd tore apart all the placards condemning Eurasia and attributed them to the work of enemy agents and by 'doublethink' confirmed the Party's declaration that Oceania had *always* been at war with Eastasia, the erstwhile ally. Comparable examples of 'doublethink' can sometimes be found among supporters of China who condemn human-rights abuses in South Africa, Chile, Central America etc. but do not condemn the Chinese for similar human-rights violations in Tibet, even when they are on a far greater scale.

305. Roberta Cohen concludes that the Chinese are increasingly responding to pressure from human-rights organisations. See *China: The Human Rights Exception*, p. 76/77 Op. cit. This conclusion is supported by the recent release of Yang Wei, a Chinese student. See Amnesty International *Newsletter*, March 1989 'PRC Prisoner Freed'. This point was made with reference to Tibetans in *Amnesty! 'Life in Death's Shadow'*, p. 18/19.

306. This fact has been quite widely commented on in the international press, one example being the *New York Times*, 9.3.88, 'Who Will Cry for Tibet?'

307. Zheng Wanzhen 22/6/88, a Chinese embassy spokesman quoted NCNA (Hsinhua). Also Zhao Ziyang, General Secretary of the CCP used this phrase and was quoted by a French TV reporter in Beijing 11/7/88. See *Tibetan Review*, August 1988.

308. The full text of the Strasbourg Speech may be found in the *Tibetan Review*, September 1988.

309. *Standard* (Hong Kong 4/5/88).

310. *Japan Times*, 26/1/89. 'Japan Officials to Monitor Election in Namibia this Fall'. Some 30 prefectural government officials will be flying to Namibia and the elections there are being held under the UN sponsored independence plan for the nation and the local officials will receive intensive training in electoral processes. In 1988 one foreign ministry official went to Afghanistan to monitor the withdrawal of Soviet troops and two other government officials were dispatched to monitor the cease-fire in the Iran-Iraq war.

311. Soka Gakkai International President Ikeda regularly meets Chinese Leaders, including the late Zhou Enlai, who he referred to an 'outstanding statesmen' (*Soka Gakkai News*, January 1989, p. 6). It should be noted that Zhou Enlai played a prominent part in Chinese policies designed to annex Tibet and erase its culture. The communist correspondent Alan Winnington called him the 'vicar of Bray of the Chinese Revolution'. President Ikeda also meets Chinese goodwill missions such as the one which visited Japan in January 1989, and the Chinese ambassador to Japan in July 1988, as well as visiting China and meeting top leaders. But it is safe to say that he does not mention the existence of religious persecution in Tibet. Soka Gakkai is deeply concerned with the existence of nuclear weapons and the threat they pose to the world and with the increasingly urgent problem of damage to the environment-caused by radiation. Two letters were sent to Soka Gakkai by the (then) Scientific Buddhist Association, now OPTIMUS on the subject of nuclear pollution in Tibet caused by Chinese policies (3/12/86, 21/1/87), together with an earlier edition of *Tibet: The Facts*. However, no direct acknowledgement or specific reply to these points was ever received. It is to be hoped that Soka Gakkai, in the interests of consistency, will be more active in this area in the future, *as it seems unreasonable to voice concern over nuclear pollution in some parts of the world, though not in others*. It is also to be hoped that at some future date President Ikeda will raise the question of the destruction of Buddhists who are persecuted for their religious beliefs. His intervention could have an important effect upon the Chinese leadership. President Ikeda met Chinese Premier Li Peng shortly before the Tiananmen Massacre. *U K Express*, June 1989. p. 18.

312. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Jean

Pierre Hocke expressed appreciation for Soka Gakkai 'continuing invaluable support' for refugee relief programmes. (*Soka Gakkai News*, March 1989, p. 8). But Tibetans, themselves fellow Buddhists, do not appear to receive any assistance from Soka Gakkai International, even though many of them are still in a desperate plight. It does not seem unreasonable to suggest that at the very least SGI could provide medical supplies and hospital facilities for the benefit of Tibetan refugees. (It seems strange that other Buddhist countries such as Burma, Thailand or Sri Lanka do nothing to help Tibet or Tibetan refugees.)

This is particularly the case since Soka Gakkai has been registered as a Non Governmental Organisation with the United Nations High Commission for Refugees since 1980 and has recently been registered as an NGO with UNESCO. *NSUK Bulletin* 32, 11/8/89.

313. Press release (11/11/88) issued by the Information Office, Central Tibetan Secretariat.

314. Radio Lhasa (20/9/88) gave information about the opinion, survey.

315. *Tibetan Bulletin*, October/November 1988. p.4.

316. *Tibetan Review*, October 1988. This statement was made in Leh, Ladakh.

317. The Chinese drew back from discussions at Geneva and evidently prefer to hold talks in secret which are far less open to the scrutiny of the world's media. The venue may be Hong Kong, a location undoubtedly favoured by the British Foreign Office.

318. *Japan Times*, 17/6/88. See also the *Independent* 17/6/88 'Golden Offer from the Dalai Lama'. *Scotsman*, 17/6/88 'Lhasa Retreat'.

319. *Guardian*, 15/4/88. 'Dalai Lama Counts on Peking to Guarantee Tibet's Autonomy', John Gittings. The SBA (now OPTIMUS) has, in the past, had its differences with Mr. Gittings, now *Guardian* Asian Editor in that despite being sent a considerable amount of material about human rights abuses in Tibet he took little or no account of it, and generally wrote sympathetically about China. The SBA began to write to him 16/9/83 and sent 11 letters, together with a considerable amount of appended material over a period of 14 months and an acknowledgement was only received

29/11/84. The SBA made it quite clear to Mr. Gittings that no special concessions were being sought vis-a-vis coverage of Tibet, the request was made that human rights abuses in Tibet be treated *on an equal par with human rights abuses in the rest of the world*.

Matters came to a head with a review/article prompted by John Avedon's book *In Exile from the Land of Snows* written by Mr. Gittings and entitled 'The Living Budha Thinks Again,' 22/6/84. Avedon's book has exerted an enormous influence on public opinion in many countries not least because of its meticulous research facilitated by a flow of information from Tibet that had only recently become accessible. A long letter dated 22/12/84 was written to John Gittings by the SBA pointing out that the selectivity he constantly displayed towards Chinese human rights abuses in Tibet was at odds with the *Guardian's* liberal and tolerant attitude' and asking him if he would be kind enough to answer a number of points, the concluding one being 'Do you think your membership of the Society For Anglo-Chinese Understanding makes you unduly sympathetic to China and inclined to soft pedal on Chinese human-rights abuses in Tibet?' A copy of this letter, together with additional appended material, was sent to Mr. Peter Preston, *Guardian Editor*. This letter was prompted by the fact that Mr. Gittings review/article arising from Avedon's book because, in the opinion of the SBA it was biased, selective and inadequate, and gave little or no idea of the suffering of the Tibetan people since 1949.

A protracted correspondence followed and the SBA discovered that Mr. Gittings was not only a member of the Society For Anglo-Chinese Understanding, but was a Trustee and in a letter dated 17/2/85 SBA Secretary P. Ingram wrote saying 'We feel that your enthusiasm for the achievements of the Chinese Government and for the ideals of Chinese society at the expense of less pleasant realities may be attributable to the fact that you are a Trustee of SACU. However, once again we ask only for balance and accuracy in reports dealing with Tibet and the condition of Buddhists there'. The SBA also offered to bring into Mr. Gittings office a Tibetan who fought in the latter stages of the 'Twenty Years War' and whose mother was tortured to death in an effort to convince Mr. Gittings of the realities of Chinese rule in Tibet. Mr. Gittings said that he would 'bear in mind' this offer but it was never taken up.

Much of the correspondence became centred on the reported massacre of 87,000 Tibetans executed in Central Tibet following the

failure of the Lhasa Uprising in March 1959 and the SBA quoted Chinese controlled Radio Lhasa, October 1st 1960 as the source of this information in a letter dated 17/2/85. Another source was also quoted by John Avedon on p. 124 of his book. In 1966 Tibetan freedom fighters annihilated a Chinese convoy on the Xinjiang-Lhasa road, killing the head of the PLA's western command in Tibet and his entire staff. One of the many captured documents revealed that 87,000 Tibetans had been killed in the 1959 revolt. The SBA asked Mr. Gittings why this important fact had been omitted in his review/article. In a letter dated 9/3/85 Mr. Gittings drew attention to an apparent discrepancy between the two sources which was resolved in an SBA letter dated 13/4/85, when it was agreed that the massacre covered Central Tibet (not merely the Lhasa region).

After much time and effort the SBA managed to obtain from the Tibet Office, Dharamsala a photocopy of the captured document entitled 'Political Situation in Tibet and Basic Education Document' People's Liberation Army (PLA) Political Bureau (dated 1/10/1960) Top Secret (Confidential). The following was to be found on pages 6-7. '1959-60. Accordingly People's Liberation Army activists under Party control with local resident Tibetan people eliminated 87,000 enemies in the rebellion from March 1959 to the beginning of October 1960'.

The SBA pointed out that we were not seeking to 'score points' off Mr. Gittings, but to simply draw his attention to a lot of evidence suggesting horrendous aspects of Chinese rule in Tibet and enclosed a photocopy of the document obtained from India which referred to the massacre. In a letter dated 4/7/85 Mr. Gittings stated that he did not wish to 'argue polemically', and said he would 'bear in mind' the material he had been sent. He then stated 'The army document which you sent me looks genuine enough. There is a problem with the word 'xiaomie', 'eliminate' which doesn't necessarily mean to kill. In any case the PLA is trying to make the best possible impression of efficiency'. However, it is now known through eye-witness testimony that such massacres have taken place in Tibet and one wonders, given the record of Chinese slaughter, that Mr. Gittings could introduce such a reservation. One could also wonder if he would have raised such a reservation had a similar US army document been unearthed in Vietnam or Central America today, or if a South African army document had recently come to light in Namibia or Angola?

A full transcription of the Radio Lhasa broadcast proved unobtain-

able but extemporised notes were received from a former member of the 'Tibetan Government in Exile' who said he had heard the broadcast. In any event the army document tells its own ugly tale. Mr. Gittings did at least admit that '...there was an uprising and I have no doubt that many people were killed'. Mr. Gittings reacted strongly against the Tiananmen Massacre saying that 'It has shocked to the point of an alienating numbness almost every single 'foreign friend' or sympathetic observer'. *Guardian*, 15/6/89. 'Tasting Gall'. Gittings gives a good analysis of the consequences of Tiananmen for Tibet, *Guardian*, 30/9/89 'China Tightens Rule of Iron Discipline on Tibetans'. He states that 'In retrospect, the March 5-7 demonstration in Lhasa has much in common with that in Tiananmen Square. A peaceful movement was answered with extreme force'. He concludes 'The dilemma of the Chinese authorities in Lhasa and Beijing is much the same. Martial law offends their version of normality—the maintenance of party rule without big public protests. It cannot last forever yet its ending is likely to bring protesters back to the front of Jokhang Temple—and into Tiananmen Square'.

320. *Guardian*, 18/4/88. Letter written by Sean Jones, 'Tibet's Struggle Goes On'.

321. *Nikkai Business*, (Tokyo 29/11/82) Op. cit. PTI. Moscow 3/7/82 Op. cit. *Tibetan Bulletin*, Vol. XIII No. 3 p. 23. Detailed report of the Tibetan Youth Congress featured in the *Tibetan Review*, May 1982, *Shih Bao*, 6/2/80 (a Hong Kong newspaper). *News Times*, (Hydrabad) 31/7/85. *Sanity*, Fact File 13, Chinese Nuclear Weapons, p. 39 *Briefing Materials on Should Rajiv Gandhi Visit China*, Professor M.L. Sondhi, p. 15. *PTI* 26/8/87, *Wall St Journal*, 25/8/87, *News Time*, 31/5/85.

322. Dr. Subramanian, writing in the *Hindustan Times* (11/4/82) cited evidence, now confirmed, of a large Chinese nuclear base at Nagchukha in the central region of Tibet with missiles directed at the USSR. Dr. Subramanian, who is attached to the Institute for Defence Studies and Analysis, New Delhi, considers there is a strong likelihood that the Chinese have opted for missiles operating on a Launch on Warning (LOW) system in an effort to compensate for undoubted Soviet missile superiority in the event of a Soviet first strike. The Chinese also have missiles in the Gomo region of Tibet where they are hidden deep in mountain valleys and are almost certainly aimed at

the Shary Shagan area of the USSR. The Dalai Lama has suggested that in order to resolve the long and dangerous crisis caused by the Chinese occupation of Tibet all troops could be withdrawn and the entire country designated a 'zone of peace'—neutral and unaligned. It is sometimes overlooked that any war between India and China would involve half the human race and to declare Tibet a 'zone of peace' would drastically reduce the possibility of war between two Asian giants.

323. Many Indian statesmen warned Prime Minister Nehru about the dangers of the Chinese extending their influence into all parts of Tibet. In particular Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel, first Home Minister, wrote a long letter to Nehru pointing out the danger to India's long and largely undefended border (7/11/50). See *Tibetan Review*, November 1977. During the Non Aligned Summit held in New Delhi in 1983, 118 Indian MPs supported Tibetan self rule. Other demonstrations of support for Tibetan independence have been forthcoming, notably the one in March 1987, together with support for the Dalai Lama's Strasbourg initiative.

324. *Tibetan Review*, August 1987, p. 5 *Indian Express*, (Bombay) 3/7/87, Reuter report by Stephen Nisbet featured in the *Tibetan Review*, July 1987, *New York Times*, 2/6/87. This buildup has been accompanied by considerable brutality. On 25/5/87 a group of Tibetan peasants were returning by lorry from Phari to Gyantse and were gunned down in their lorry by members of a PLA convoy. Nineteen of them were killed and their truck was pushed over a cliff. A similar incident occurred a few days later. Two Tibetans were carrying provisions for sale in their tractor when a PLA column shot them and their tractor was thrown into a valley. The Tibetan Youth Congress alleges that the Chinese pinned a note on the bodies stating that anyone objecting to the acts of the PLA should lodge complaints to the PLA headquarters in Lhasa. The Chinese have denied the charge.

325. Bulletin issued by The Office of Information and International Relations, Dharamsala, N. India (Information Material No. 9. January 1989).

326. *Tibetan Bulletin*, Vol. XIX No. 1. Jan/April 1988 p. 8 Op. cit.

327. Bulletin of the Office of His Holiness The Dalai Lama, Delhi, 20/9/88, and a Press Release (October 1989). *Tibetan Review*, De-

ember 1988. Lord Ennals, former British Foreign Office Minister and President of the Tibet Society, UK revealed at the AGM of the Tibet Society, that he had received verbal assurances from the Nepalese ambassador that the escapees had not been returned to the Chinese, but this statement was clearly contradicted by the facts, and Lord Ennals stated that he would be seeking an early explanation from the ambassador to the UK. While the Nepalese authorities have a long standing tradition of handing Tibetan refugees over to the Chinese, the Indian authorities have rarely, if ever, acted in a similar fashion. However, there is evidence that five Tibetan refugees were handed back to the Chinese between the months of April and June 1989. One was named as Wandgi who stated that he had fled from Tibet in order to tell the Dalai Lama about the March uprising there. The five Tibetans who have been returned were originally part of a party of 25 Tibetans who crossed into Sikkim, which is under Indian control. It is possible that more than five have now been returned and no reason has been given for this apparent change of policy by India. *Indian Press Agency UNI 18/8/89* quoted in *Tibet Information Network TIN News Update* September 15th 1989.

328. *The Nuclear Age* (Part 8), Channel 4 20/2/89. The programme made the point that China refused to sign the Test Ban Treaty of 1963 and conducted its first nuclear test on October 16th 1965, some 9 years before the first Indian nuclear test.

329. *A Short History of Tibet*, by H.E. Richardson, E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc New York 1962. P. 195–199. Op. cit.

330. In his masterly analysis *The Fulcrum of Asia-Relations Among China, India, Pakistan and the USSR* (Pegasus, New York 1974) Bhabani Sen Gupta points out that Nehru's 'concern was not with Chinese *communism* but with resurgent Chinese *nationalism*, which, as a student of history, he had noticed an imperial imperative'. Gupta further points out that there is 'little difference between the territorial perspectives of Sun Yat-sen, Chiang Kai-shek and Mao Tse-tung...'

331. *In Exile From the Land of Snows*, John Avedon Op. cit. p. 121.

332. Nehru declared in the Indian Parliament: 'The McMahon Line is our border, pact or no pact'. Jawaharlal Nehru's *Speeches 1957-'59* (September 10th 1959), Publications Division, Delhi. p. 206.

333. Recent reports indicate that the Chinese are carrying out chemical warfare exercises in Tibet. See Beijing newspaper *Jiefangjun Bao*, (16/9/88), Den Garou and Zhen Jun. These manoeuvres were carried out at a high altitude and involved the use of chemical shells. It was stated that over 1000 pieces of information of great value emerged from the exercises which would contribute to the future development of new chemical defence equipment. It was stated that measures were taken to detoxify the countryside, but legitimate doubt could be expressed about this in view of the slovenly Chinese attitude to the environment and towards pollution generally.

334. *Briefing Materials on Should Rajiv Gandhi Visit China*, Professor M.L. Sondhi, 1988. Op. cit. This booklet more or less sees matters from the Indian point of view, but nevertheless contains some interesting facts and insights.

335. *Statesman*, (New Delhi) (24/1/88) editorial page featuring an article by Editor, Sunnanda K. Datta Ray.

336. *A Short History of Tibet*, H.E. Richardson, E.P. Dutton & Co., Inc. New York 1962. p. 181/182 Op. cit. In his book *The Fulcrum of Asia*, B.S. Gupta makes the point that Nehru used the word 'suzerainty' in his speeches on Tibet in 1951, changed to 'sovereignty' during the period 1954-58 and reverted to 'suzerainty' in '1959'. The use of the word 'sovereignty' may have been as a result of the confusion or duplicity. His reversion to the word 'suzerainty' could imply that he was never happy that the other word had been used. There is much about this entire episode that still remains unclear and it is to be hoped that further research will one day uncover the truth.

337. *Tibetan Review*, August 1985, p. 12, March 1987. 'India's Tibet Policy Critics', p. 6.

338. *Tibetan Bulletin*, Vol. XIX. Jan/April 1988, an interview given by Morarji Desai, former Prime Minister of India.

339. *Briefing Materials on Should Rajiv Gandhi Visit China*, Professor, M.L. Sondhi, 1988, p. 9. Op. cit.

340. For various arguments supporting the Tibetan right to self-determination see *Tibet and the Right to Self-determination*, M.C. van Walt, Central Tibetan Secretariat, Dharamsala, 1979. This booklet has now been replaced by an extremely comprehensive and

well researched work entitled *The Status of Tibet: History, Rights and Prospects in International Law*, 450 pp, tables, notes, appendices, bibliography and index. Hardcover, Boulder, Westview Press, 1987 \$32.50; London, Wisdom Publications £19.95. This book is likely to be the definitive work on this subject for many years. Mr van Walt played a prominent part in the passage of the US 'Tibet Bill' 1987. He is also an advisor to the Tibetan 'Government in Exile' and his knowledge of the question is such that the Chinese have sought to prevent him from advising the Tibetans during 'talks about talks'.

341. Tibet Society *Newsletter*, Summer 1988, Letter by Mr. William Peters, formerly of the British Diplomatic Service and now Chairman of the Tibet Society, UK.

342. See 'Five Point Peace Proposal' of the Dalai Lama, made in the USA on 21 September 1987.

343. *New York Times*, 6/3/88. H. Smith. This question is also examined by Professor Sondhi in *Briefing Materials on Should Rajiv Gandhi Visit China*, p. 14. in the context of dangers posed to India by the China/Pakistan axis.

344. This proved to be the case. The visit took place in December 1988 and the Indians did not gain any concessions on the border question. Once again Tibet was recognized as an 'autonomous province of China' and Mr. Gandhi promised to curtail the anti-Chinese activities of Tibetan refugees in India. However, this promise has been made on past occasions but little has been done to restrict such activities. It may suit the Indian Government to allow the Tibetans a certain scope since it embarrasses the Chinese. If this is the case it may be pointed out that India has done little or nothing internationally to play such an important trump card. Atal Behari Vajpayee, Foreign Minister under the former Janata government voiced concern over human-rights violation in Tibet and stated that Rajiv Gandhi should have raised this matter with the Chinese leadership during his visit. *Tibetan Review* March 1989, p. 7/8.

345. A disturbing insight is found in 'The True Face of Indo-China Societies' *Onlooker* (Bombay) 31/1/88 which refers to the Indian policy of Appeasement towards China. This theme was echoed in an 'Appeal for Immediate Halting of all Planning and Activities Concerning Rajiv Gandhi's Projected Visit to China', an advert widely

circulated in India and signed by Major General Niranjan Prasad, J.P. Mathur, ex M.P., R. Puri (journalist), Professor P. Das, New Delhi, Professor M. Pradhan, Bombay.

346. *Statesman*, (New Delhi) 'Dalai Lama's Proposal, Challenge to India and China', S.K. Datta Ray, 19/6/88.

347. The Panchen Lama died 28/1/89 after suffering an apparent heart attack. He was regarded by some as a 'Chinese chopstick' but this judgement does not seem to be entirely true as he spent many years in prison and was tortured by the Chinese after criticising their policies in Tibet. He frequently acted as a mouthpiece for the Chinese, but often seemed to be acting under duress. At the 6th meeting of the 'Autonomous Region's Fourth People's Congress' held on 19/2/88 he stated that he did not subscribe to the view that only merciless repression and the introduction of a more severe policy towards Tibet would resolve the present crisis, (Office of Information and International Relations, Central Tibetan Secretariat, Dharamsala, N. India, Information Material No. 4, 5/1/89). Shortly before his death he stated that 'Since liberation, there has certainly been development, but the price paid for this development has been greater than the gains'. This statement was reported by the official China News Service at a speech in Xigaze (Shigatse). His speech amounted to a serious indictment of Chinese rule and some Tibetans suspect that he may have been poisoned by the Chinese shortly after making this speech, as parts of his body were apparently observed to turn blue. The question may be considered to be an open one since the Chinese required his moderating influence given the deteriorating situation in Tibet. Furthermore he was grossly overweight and unfit. There may be some mystery associated with the circumstances of the Pachen Lama's death since his wife (who is believed to have acted as his private secretary) was reportedly arrested in Beijing on his return from Shigatse. No reason for his arrest was given by the Chinese. *Independent*, 26/1/89, 'Pachen Lama Speaks Out Against Peking', Andrew Higgins, *Guardian*, 7/2/89, 'Tibet Festival Banned After Death of Panchen Lama', Jasper Becker. Office of Information and International Relations (Dharamsala) Information Material No. 18. p. 2,

348. These suggestions were made by Lord Avebury during his speech at the Tibet Commemoration, 11/3/89.

349. There are considerable regional variations in per capita in-

come in China and the sum of 276 Yuan or about £49 Sterling has been given. (See footnote 97). The suspension of an enormous amount of foreign credit facilities, particularly by Japan in the wake of the Tianamen Massacre has already caused observable economic dislocation in China and indicates how vulnerable China is to such action. At present the Chinese economy seems to be exhibiting an increased instability in several important sectors.

350. Roberta Cohen points out that the economic progress of other Asian countries is more substantial in most cases than that of China. *China: The Human Rights Exception*, Op. cit. p. 76.

351. See Forward of *Tibet: The Facts* for references on per capita income and the means by which it was calculated. Other sources give a total far below £185.

352. This comment was made by the Indian historian Amir Jasbir Singh on the two part programme 'Land of the God King' compiled by John Key, BBC Radio 4, 1/2/89, 8/2/89.

353. The specific charge of racial discrimination in Tibet was made very recently (March 1989) at the 45th Session of the UN Commission on Human Rights. The International Movement for the Fraternal Union Among Races and Peoples (UFER) levelled this charge at the Chinese and Eya Nchama, the UFER delegate made a forceful presentation. *Tibetan Review*, May 1989 p. 11/12.

354. 'Hong Kong: The Countdown' 12/4/89, a programme compiled by Simon Winchester.

355. *Equinox*, 'Cold Spring' Joan Hinton and Sid Ernst, Channel 4, 28/8/88.

356. *People's Daily*, (Beijing) 13/6/89.

357. *China Daily*, 22/5/88.

358. *Nineteen*, June 1988 (A Hong Kong magazine).

359. *People's Daily*, 12/6/88.

360. The 'China Spring' demonstrations have been given an almost unprecedented media coverage. The 'Today Programme' on BBC Radio 4 has featured reports from James Miles in Beijing and Brian Barron has reported regularly on BBC 1 News. 'News at Ten'

has featured reports from Gavin Esler and distinguished panelists have frequently been called in to give their assessment of the current situation in China. All the major British newspapers have given in depth coverage to the demonstrations and to the hunger strike, which has served as a rallying point throughout China and has become a symbol of rejection of the 'Old Guard' and of bribery, nepotism, inefficiency, inflation and the failure of the economic reforms which were introduced in 1978. The growth of corruption seems to have been greatly accelerated by these reforms and often foodstuffs and grain would be bought at the low artificially maintained government price and eventually sold at a huge profit. The first major reports in the British press began on or about 20/4/89 with student protests in memory of the late Hu Yaobang and these began on 15/4/89. A tremendous momentum built up from 13/5/89 and it was from this date that a more widespread and sustained press coverage began. A report in the *Independent* 20/4/89 'Dangerous Dilemma for Deng', Andrew Higgins, was probably one of the first which gave some idea that this crisis was unlikely to dissipate and the reporting and in depth analysis of the *Independent* seems superior to that of other British papers.

361. *Times*, 30/3/89, 'Seizure in Peking of Rights Petition Adds to Hong Kong Fears', Catherine Sampson and Chris Pomery, Op. cit. Hong Kong citizens have also been imprisoned in Taiwan (Republic of China) on political charges.

362. *International Herald Tribune*, 'A Chinese Lesson: Interest Can Overcome Ideology', W. Christopher, 12/10/85. This remark was made openly.

363. Material very recently received indicates that about 800 Tibetans were killed during the March 1989 riots and in their aftermath of house arrests and torture in prison. *Tibetan Review*, May 1989 'Lhasa Prisons Becoming Overcrowded', p. 4. It seems that Chinese soldiers enter houses at random and fire indiscriminately. More material recently received indicates that some 60 sky burials have taken place in the traditional Tibetan Buddhist manner, the dead being victims of the March riots. (The Office of Information and International Relations, Bulletin 17/4/89).

364. Amnesty International, 'China: Violations of Human Rights, Prisoners of Conscience & the Death Penalty in the People's Republic of China' p. 5. AI gives the figure of 748,000 arrests (New

China News Agency 12/6/83). See also AI's *China Briefing*, 1984. Amnesty International has also voiced its concern over the frequency and prevalence of torture throughout China. *China: Torture and Ill Treatment of Prisoners*, AI Index ASA 17/10/87. However it has to be remarked that Amnesty International appears to accept some Chinese explanations that torture is not officially sanctioned by the State but generally occurs as a result of orders being ignored or exceeded and it describes such case histories in detail. While this may or may not be the case in mainland China, the widespread and persistent use of torture in Tibet and other 'frontier areas' inhabited by 'minority peoples', indicates that such extenuating reservation cannot be extended to such territories. The Tiananmen Massacre has provoked wide coverage and strong condemnation from Amnesty International. For recent material see AI's Newsletter (September 1989) Advice to Editors ASA 17/8/89 (30/8/89) and the very comprehensive 49 page document entitled *People's Republic of China: Preliminary Findings of Killings of Unarmed Civilians, Arbitrary Arrests and Summary Executions since June 3rd 1989*. AI Newsletter (October 1989) reports that the Chinese have rejected UN and AI findings on abuses reported in the previously mentioned 49 page document compiled by AI. This was made available to the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities meeting in Geneva and on 31/8/89 an important resolution was passed. (See section of this Report entitled the UN, the US and Europe). The Resolution expressed concern about the events in China and for the first time ever asked the UN Secretary General to transmit information about the situation in China to the UN Human Rights Commission. This opens up the possibility of China being a focus of debate at the Commission in 1990. The Chinese Government's spokes-person said that AI's Report was 'unreasonable and without foundation', AI has stated that the Chinese Government's response was 'totally inadequate'.

365. Until fairly recently historical scholarship inclined towards the view that Charles Martell's victory saved Europe from a Moslem invasion but it is now considered that the Moslems were only engaged in a major raid, not a full scale invasion. However, had Charles Martell been defeated it seems possible that the Moslems might have continued their foray and mounted more serious offensives at a later date with incalculable consequences for Europe.

366. In fact the Anti-Slavery Society made a powerful protest about slavery in Mauritania at the UN Human Rights Commission, Geneva (Working Group on Slavery) in August 1989 and other presentations have also been made on this subject.

367. In a searching analysis Dr. Gerald Segal concludes that in general the Chinese bear only limited responsibility for the trouble along their borders since 1949. *Defending China*, Dr. G. Segal, O.U.P. 1985.

368. *China Daily*, 6/10/87.

369. 'The Ghost of Roger Casement', *The Collected Poems of W.B. Yeats*, Macmillian, 1967.

370. Although some scholarly monographs have been published on the Turkic Moslems and on the history of E. Turkistan it is surprising that this fraught area receives so little attention from the world's media. The Moslems of E. Turkistan remember a time when the Moslem areas of Western Turkistan, now part of the Soviet Union, and E. Turkistan were part of the Ottoman Empire. During the 18th Century Imperial Russia extended its borders southward into these Moslem areas and claimed them by right of conquest over the Turks of the Ottoman Empire. By the end of the 19th Century this expansion had given Russia a common border with Persia, Afghanistan, E. Turkistan (Sinkiang) (and later Pakistan). During the mid-18th Century the Chinese began to infiltrate E. Turkistan but their rule precipitated an unending series of rebellions, the most serious of which was that mounted by Yaqub Khan during the 1860's and 1870's, which came very close to success on several occasions and was only defeated with the help of Russian forces. Then, as now, the Russians fear that any Moslem disturbances in E. Turkistan could easily spread to their own Moslem provinces such as Kazakhstan, Kirghizstan, or Tadzhikstan, etc. and their fear are understandable in the light of the fact that *Moslems of the Soviet Union number over 50 million and constitute nearly 25% of the population of the USSR*. Even today (1989) the long border is a troubled one, but both Russia and China have a vested interest in cowering their own Moslem populations and quelling unrest. As ever this legacy derives from distant dynastic conquests which were *consolidated not relinquished by Communist regimes*, in clear contradiction to the tenets of Marxist theory.

There is some evidence to suggest that Khrushchev favoured the

auto-determination of Sinkiang, but fears of the Moslem rebellion explain why Stalin helped crush revolts in E. Turkistan in 1933 and 1944 and gave active assistance to the Chinese just as the forces of Imperial Russia did. Obviously Soviet actions in Afghanistan cannot be divorced from their perceptions of this entire Moslem question and their preoccupation with their long southern borders adjoining Moslem countries. It is unfortunate for the Moslems that they 'declared war in all directions' in 1944 because Stalin, preoccupied as he was with the German War and with the threat posed by the Japanese in China, might possibly have been prepared to come to an at least temporary accommodation with the leaders of the revolt had they been less insistent on uniting with their Moslem brethren in the Soviet Union.

According to Erkin Alptekin, son of Isa Alptekin former General Secretary of the short-lived Provisional Government of East Turkistan, there have been 58 major revolts against the Chinese Communists in the years 1949-51, 1954-1958, 1959-1963, and 1965-1968. (See letter written to Paul Ingram dated 7/6/'85). The Moslem world in general virtually ignores the existence of oppressed Moslems, numbering perhaps as many as 65 million, in China and the Soviet Union, as they are pre-occupied with the Palestinian question, the Lebanon and with the Iran-Iraq war, and the question of E. Turkistan is seldom if ever mentioned at major international Moslem conferences. As is well known the Moslem world is beset by numerous internal problems and many Islamic countries are poor and have social, economic and political difficulties of one form or another. There is little unity amongst them and the Islamic world is in general split into pro-West and pro-East. Some of these countries rely on one or both of the super-powers for many different kinds of aid and those receiving assistance from the Soviet Union do not draw attention to the condition of the Moslems in that country. Other Islamic countries, wary of excessive reliance upon either of the two superpowers, are cultivating good relations with China and do not therefore register any protest against Chinese treatment of Moslems. Many Islamic leaders also appear to believe that they are vulnerable to the consequences of Soviet or Chinese destabilisation and maintain a discreet silence on the subject of Moslem oppression in these two countries, and until recently they had little to say about the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. It is rather difficult to avoid the impression that some Moslems would not relish the prospect of some 65 million of their Turkic brethren united and

constituting an enormous Moslem power in much the same way that many Europeans would not relish the prospect of a re-united Germany, whatever they might say to the contrary. It also seems that some Moslems still remember the legacy of the Ottoman Empire and the cruelty that characterised its rule.

At present, even though Moslems are cruelly oppressed, particularly in China, the USA is condemned as an imperialist power meddling in Middle Eastern affairs with the Palestinian question occupying a central position. One wonders if architects of Chinese foreign policy in the Middle East give fervent thanks for the existence of the lengthy Palestinian crisis, for without it E. Turkistan might well have been a rallying cry for large sections of the Moslem world.

It is probably correct to say that the Soviet Union has had far more success in handling its Moslem minority than has been the case with the Chinese, but this may well be attributable to the fact that Moslems constitute nearly one quarter of the Soviet population with the result that the Kremlin has, in general, not displayed the kind of contempt and systematic brutality towards Moslems as has Beijing. The Chinese do not have the same constraints placed upon them in their handling of Moslems numbering about 20 million, some 2% of the population of China.

Although the Turkic Moslems in China understandably remember a time when they were united with other Moslem peoples and look forward to regaining their independence from China, those with longer memories will recall that much of the area which they designate as E. Turkistan once contained a rich Buddhist culture. This was virtually wiped out during the Islamic invasions of the 10th Century when the blessings of Islam were conferred on these Buddhist peoples by fire and sword.

Reliable literature on this subject is surprisingly scarce. One of the best analysis of the Sinkiang questions is *The Turkic Moslem Problem in Sinkiang* by Fu-hsiang Lee, a Ph. D. thesis submitted to the graduate school of Rutgers University, 1973. A better known book which nevertheless contains strong pro-Chinese bias is *The Sinkiang Story* by Jack Chen, Macmillan 1977. Mr Chen is a Hong Kong based Chinese journalist who refers to the 'peaceful liberation' of Sinkiang by the forces of Communist China and whose book provides almost no insight into the history of Sinkiang or to the legacy of oppression suffered by its people over a period of some two centuries. As is still the case with some writers on Tibet the standard Chinese propaganda

line is endlessly repeated and in many respects this book reads like a Chinese propaganda compilation. A good insight into the condition of Moslems in the Soviet Union is to be found in *Islamic peoples of the Soviet Union* by Shirin Akmer, Kegan Paul International 1983, London. A short summary of the modern history of East Turkistan is to be found in the exiles journal *The Voice of East Turkistan* 'Turks of East Turkistan' by Dr. Mehmet Saray, *Voice of East Turkistan* Jan. 1984, September 1984. For a good analysis of the strategic importance of the area to China and a critical assessment of the effects of Chinese policies see, *The Urumaqui Military Region: Defense and Security in China's West*, Donald H. McMillen, the Regent of the University of California, 1982. This article was based on a paper given by the author at the Asian Association of Australia Fourth National Conference (1982) in Melbourne.

371. *The Yellow River*, a six part series compiled by Mr. Stephen Jessel, BBC TV2, Summer 1988. See footnote 303 Op. cit.

372. *Everyman, Tibet: The Lost Nation*, BBC1. 24/4/89. Film editor John Richards, Producer Jeffrey Iverson, *Everyman* Editor, Jane Drabble. This film exerted a considerable effect not least because it showed scenes of monks being beaten to death by Chinese soldiers during and after the raid on the Jokhang Temple. One particular scene showed a Chinese policeman, armed with a long club, pursuing a monk. The monk, although encumbered by his robes, ran with extreme speed as he knew what was in store for him. When the Chinese policeman eventually caught up with him a pulverising blow hit the monk on the back of the head and he collapsed and lay ominously still.

373. *Sanity*, May 1985, (the magazine of CND) Factfile 13. *Briefing Material on Should Rajiv Gandhi visit China?* Professor M.L. Sondhi, p. Op. cit.

374. *Impact*, February 1988. Vol. 23. No. 2.

375. *Guardian*, 4/5/87.

376. A very recent report issued by Amnesty International entitled '*Death Penalty Report Summary (Regional Summary of AI's Report)*' states that 'Many thousands of prisoners have been executed in China in the past decade-unofficial sources have put the number of executions as high as 30,000 in the five years after a nationwide anticrime

campaign began in 1983'. It should be remembered that such campaigns were often somewhat euphemistically titled and included the arrests of a political nature throughout many parts of China. (*AllIndex ACT 51/21/89, Distr SC/PO, 25/4/89 p 8/9*).

377. Warren W. Smith, 'The Ideological Basis for China's Tibet Policy', a paper presented to the North American Conference on the Five Point Peace Plan for Tibet held at the University of California, Berkeley, 23rd-25th September 1988, published in the *Tibetan Review*, November, 1988.

378. *Tibet in Revolt*, George M. Patterson, 'Racial Antagonism to China', p. 39. More details about this document would be welcome at the present time.

379. Derived from Mongolian documents and cited by Friters in *Outer Mongolia and Its International Position*, John Hopkins. p. 163. This work repays investigation and was quoted by Warren W. Smith in 'The Ideological Basis of China's Tibet Policy', *Tibetan Review*, November 1988.

380. *A Short History of Tibet*, H.R. Richardson E.P. Dutton & Co Inc. NY 1962. p. 188.

381. The 40th meeting of the *UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities*, Geneva 8/8/88, compiled by Tica Broch, p. 5.

382. The charge of nepotism was made by a Chinese Roman Catholic Bishop some weeks before the major disturbances. *Sword and Spirit* BBC 2, 5/3/89, part 4 of a 6 part documentary series. This charge is supported by evidence. For example, the 27th Army, which played a prominent part in massacring the students, is believed to be commanded by a nephew of President Yang Shangkun and the President's brother and son-in-law are respectively head of the army's political department and Chief of the General Staff. It is likely that such family ties play a crucial part in the struggle for power. *Times*, 7/6/89, 'Western experts Say Civil War a Long way Off', Michael Evans, Andrew McEwen and Charles Bremner, p. 8.

383. Chen Li, Editor of *China Daily*, appeared on Channel 4 News 17/5/89 and complained about the lack of press freedom and broke censorship during the hunger strike. What was probably

China's finest newspaper the *World Economic Herald*, based in Shanghai was closed on 15/5/89 after its Editor Qin Penli was sacked in mid-April for arguing that the dismissal of Hu Yaobang should be re-examined.

384. A good analysis of this tendency is to be found in the *Independent*, (5/6/89), 'A Victory for Oppression', Robert Cottrell. p. 21.

385. *Daily Telegraph*, 27/5/89. 'Chinese Old Guard Victorious in Power Struggle' Graham Hutchings.

386. An up-to-date analysis of this manoeuvring can be found in the *Guardian*, 27/5/89, 'Not Very Smart at Politics' John Gittings, Asian Editor.

387. An estimated 200,000 people demonstrated in favour of the Tiananmen Square protesters. The *Guardian*, 27/5/89, carried a poignant photograph of one such supporters. After the massacre a demonstration of some half a million people took place.

388. *Times*, 5/6/89 Editorial, 'Message from the Square'.

389. *Independent*, 5/6/89, Editorial, 'Their Deaths Must Not Be In Vain'.

390. *Observer*, 4/6/89. 'Bloodbath in Tiananmen' Jonathan Mirsky.

391. *Independent*, 5/6/89. 'The West Condemns But Moscow Remains Silent', Rupert Cornwell. p. 10

392. *Independent*, *ibid*, p. 10. Other sources for the international reaction following the Tiananmen Massacre are the *Independent* 22/6/89, 'China Ignores Pleas and Executes Three Men in Public', Tony Allen-Mills. *Daily Telegraph*, 'US Cuts Top Level Links With China in Fresh Protest', Patricia Wilson. *International Herald Tribune*, 22/6/89 'China Executes Three Students; 45 Sentenced as Sweep Goes On', and 'Japan Cautiously Mutes Its Criticism of Crackdown in China'. One of the most comprehensive accounts of the Tiananmen Massacre, together with a detailed analysis of its probable effects is to be found in *India Today* (International Edition), 29/6/89, 'The War Within' p. 14–29, Shekhar Gupta, Features Editor. A deeply pessimistic assessment of the effect of Tiananmen on the Arts in China, particularly upon literature and the cinema, is to be found in *Time Out* 20/20 September 1989 No. 6. 'Guards of Honour', Tony Rayns.

On 25/6/89 the SBA Secretary (now OPTIMUS) wrote to the Japan Olympic Committee requesting that China no longer be allowed to host the forthcoming Asian Games scheduled to be held in 1990 on the grounds that the 'Tiananmen Massacre renders China ineligible to act as the host country to such an important event...One would scarcely ask the South African Government to host such an event, yet the Tiananmen Massacre is even worse than Sharpsville'. No reply was received to this letter and another letter was sent on 22/9/89, reiterating and amplifying the above points. The full address of the organising committee, which proved extraordinarily difficult to obtain is: The General Secretary, The Olympic Council of Asia, Japan Olympic Committee, Kishi Memorial Hall 1-1-1, Jinnan, Shivuya-Ku, Tokyo 150 Japan.

393. *Independent*, *ibid*, 'The Rape of Peking' Michael Fathers and Andrew Higgins. The exact number of those killed and wounded will probably never be known, as is the case with the Lhasa Uprising in Tibet in March 1959. There is now good reason to believe that this figure has been exceeded since shooting continued for days after June 3rd when the massacre began. Press and media coverage throughout the world has been immense and even the British tabloids contained detailed reports of the massacre and the events following it.

394. *Independent*, 8/6/89, 'Army Successfully Controls Peking Say Intelligence Sources' Mark Urban, p. 9

395. *Observer*, 4/6/89, 'Bloodbath in Tiananmen', Jonathan Mirsky, *Op. cit.* Another article by Jonathan Mirsky which appeared in the *Observer* 8/10/89 entitled 'Peking's Ignoble Response' gives a revealing insight into the attitude of the current Chinese leaders when they heard that the Dalai Lama had been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, with the consequent sharpening of Tibet as an international issue. They were furious and declared that this foreign action had 'hurt the feelings of the Chinese people'. It seems that Chinese exiles mostly still regard Tibet as part of the 'Motherland'. In late September in Paris Chen Yizi, former chief economic advisor to the disgraced Party boss Zhao Ziyang, told a representative of the Dalai Lama who had been invited to address the Democratic Front: 'We are sorry the Chinese have behaved so badly in Tibet, but we cannot imagine separation. 'The retort of the Tibetan is not recorded.

An article in the *Guardian* (6/10/89) 'Prize Points Beyond Peking'

Martin Woollacott, provides some interesting perspectives on the consequences of the Dalai Lama being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. 'But the greater significance of the choice is that it raises two related issues whose importance can hardly be exaggerated: the future of minority nationalities in the two great communist states and the danger that the Soviet and Chinese may, in desperation, turn to the use of force against their own peoples-majority as well as minority. This choice then is about Tiananmen Square, Armenia, Estonia, and Eastern Europe as well as Lhasa'.

396. *Independent*, 8/6/89. 'Gunshot Diplomacy in a City Gone Mad', Andrew Higgins. See also the *Guardian*, 15/6/89 'China Claims No One Died in Tiananmen', Jasper Becker.

397. These reactions of Beijing citizens were recorded by reporters from the main Western news agencies AP, Reuters, UPI and AFP, and appeared in a fuller form in the *Independent*, 5/6/89, 'Everyone who Saw It Wept'. p. 10. Coverage of the hunger strike and the events of Tiananmen Square was particularly good on British television. Long reports were featured on *Channel 4 News* presented by Peter Sissons, and on *Newsnight* BBC 2, presented by Peter Snow and Donald MacCormick. All other news programmes gave extensive and detailed coverage featuring reports from correspondents on the spot including *Six O'Clock News*, BBC 1 and *News at Ten*, Channel 3. There were numerous reports from Tiananmen Square sent by Kate Adie, Brian Barron, Jeremy Thompson and many others. James Miles, BBC China correspondent sent reports to *Radio 4 News at 7*. am and 8. am and the *Today Programme*, BBC 4, devoted much time to detailed coverage of these events. The standard of reporting in all cases was extremely high. An insight into the problems of today's non-stop, highly technical, problem fraught reporting may be found in *The Listener* (21/9/89) 'Non Stop News' by Kate Adie, Chief Correspondent BBC. p. 4-6. This extract was taken from a speech given by Kate Adie at the Royal Television Society earlier in September. Her comments about the problems of reporting the Tiananmen Massacre are fascinating. In particular it seems that the Chinese authorities allowed cassettes to go out by 'pigeon' that is volunteers who would fly such material to Tokyo or to Hong Kong, or any area that has a working ground satellite transmission station. Kate Adie states that the cassettes were allowed out because the Chinese authorities 'didn't give a damn!' Historically that will be a very plaus-

ible line of argument; they don't give a damn what we think and what we watched on television. And we've probably realised over the succeeding weeks that they still don't care.' There are very few regimes which display such total indifference under such circumstances, and it is likely that many correspondents are aware of a typically Sinocentric attitude which regards the rest of the world, and its reactions to events in China, with an almost total indifference. However, the Chinese authorities did cut the Cable News Network some 10 or 12 days before Tiananmen, but Kate Adie thinks it was cut because of incoming material '...they don't even like the small number of people carrying CNN in hotels and offices showing coverage from outside.' A programme which particularly reflected changing media perceptions of China was *The Great Wall of Iron*, BBC 2, 29/6/89 and 30/6/89, a two part documentary compiled by BBC reporter Mark Brayne. The programmes provided chilling insights into the nature of China's armed forces and the all pervasive political indoctrination. Part of the second programme was devoted to Tibet and Mark Brayne stated that 'it is impossible to overstate the horrendous aspects of Chinese rule in Tibet', having on a former occasion described the ruins of some 6,000 Tibetan monasteries as resembling a 'nuclear aftermath'. The films were followed by a long discussion by panelists, among them Dr. Chong Pin-lin of Georgetown University who pointed out that he had unambiguously stated that the Chinese Government would use force to clear the students and their supporters from Tiananmen Square.

398. This example, together with several others, is to be found in *China: The Human Rights Exception*, Roberta Cohen (PHRG) p. 17 Op. cit. Such writing can still be seen, though the Tiananmen Massacre should result in its virtual disappearance. A misleading article entitled 'Xizang. The Tibetan Autonomous Region', appeared in the *Contemporary Review*, November 1987. Vol 251 written by Professor Thomas Stapleton who serves on the Council of Chatham House, London. No impression was conveyed to readers that the old Tibet had been exterminated involving the deaths of over one million Tibetans, full scale massacres and other crimes against humanity. We read that '...the Chinese were hoping that Tibetans would co-operate in the development of the region. Yet, in any old established society, it is very difficult to get everyone to believe that a change is both desirable and possible towards education, health care and agricultural

development...' 'There are formidable difficulties in bringing an old society into the 20th Century; while one can argue that one should not even try to do so, that is an impractical attitude'; 'Tibet will always be part of China'; Education is apparently flourishing in Tibet and teachers '...Both Tibetan and Han are keen and dedicated.' This impression is contradicted by many facts given in *Tibet: The Facts*, (see section entitled 'Education and Language'), and one is surprised to learn that. 'The teachers' one worry is that the brightest school-leavers do not come to them, preferring electronics and mechanical occupations'. Hospital facilities are praised but the testimony of Julie Brittain contradicts this impression (see section entitled 'Health, Hospitals, Sterilisations and Abortions'). We further learn that 'For the Tibetans, family planning is not yet emphasised, although education about it has commenced in the schools'. This statement is contradicted by material given to Amnesty International, London, containing accounts of trucks full of women being taken away to be sterilised and the testimony of women who have undergone sterilisation, as well as detailed accounts of forced abortions. Despite being Emeritus Professor of Child Health at the University of Sydney and visiting China ten times since 1960 Professor Stapleton is evidently unaware of child labour seen in many parts of Tibet, the continuing prevalence of hunger which causes parents to sell their children as they are unable to support them, widespread and continuing poverty, and a high infant mortality rate. However, as a child care specialist Professor Stapleton did care to comment on a monk who twisted his pupil's ear if he stopped saying his prayers.

Tibetan forests are apparently in good order. 'While great efforts are being made in rational developments of the forests, some unwise unauthorised felling still takes place'. The section entitled 'Ecological Devastation' indicates, with clear reference to sources, that prolonged deforestation is bringing Tibet to the brink of ecological disaster and seems to be affecting the regularity of the monsoon. Professor Stapleton seems to be unaware of this fact. Readers were also interested to learn that '...there were some over enthusiastic attempts made to persuade the Tibetans to grow wheat instead of barley, but now the farmer can grow whatever he likes and, seeing the success of improved varieties of wheat, some choose to grow it in preference to barley'. It is rather unfortunate that Professor Stapleton did not find it necessary to add that Tibetan farmers were liable to death or imprisonment if they refused to grow wheat which was favoured by the Chinese, or that

over 300,000 Tibetans starved to death as a result of Chinese policies, (see footnote 39).

It is this kind of writing which has resulted in so much controversy and trouble over a long period of time when those concerned with human rights abuses in Tibet have attempted to expose its fallacies and misrepresentations both to the media and to the public at large. Two replies to Professor Stapleton were printed in the *Contemporary Review*, April 1988, written by W.P. Ledger, author of *The Chinese and Human Rights in Tibet*, issued by the Parliamentary Human Rights Group in 1988, and by Paul Ingram, Secretary of the Scientific Buddhist Association (now OPTIMUS). Both letters criticised Professor Stapleton and cited many facts omitted in his article. Copies of the letters were sent to Professor Stapleton with a request that he answer the points raised. Professor Stapleton did not reply to this letter, neither did he submit a rejoinder to the *Contemporary Review*, or if he did it was not published.

399. *Moulds of Understanding*, Joseph Needham. George Allen & Unwin 1976. p. 276. However, Needham has recently criticised the 'Cultural Revolution' and has also castigated Chinese leaders for the Tiananmen Massacre. *Guardian*, 10/6/89 'Comment and Analysis', p. 23.

400. *ibid* p. 276.

401. *The Tibetans: Two Perspectives on Tibetan-Chinese Relations* by C. Mullin (Report 1) and P. Wangyal (Report 2). This statement was made by C. Mullin, Report, 1.p. 9 an erstwhile writer on Tibet. Interestingly enough Mr. Mullin successfully stood for the post of Hon. joint secretary to the All Party Tibet Group in the House of Commons. The other Hon. secretary is Neil Thorne (Con). The All Party Tibet Group was *formally* established on June 20th 1989, but it has in fact been in existence for a much longer period of time and it does not seem to have been particularly active. Its new President is Lord Ennals, former Foreign Office Minister and its new Vice-President is Lord Avebury known for his activities on behalf of Tibetans. It is likely that this new leadership will herald a new and dynamic era and there is no doubt that many people are looking forward to the prospect of numerous meetings and talks, visits of speakers from Britain and abroad, who are concerned with Tibet and with the continuing repression there, together with the prospect of MP's being fully acquainted

with the Tibetan situation. It is also to be hoped that there will be forthright condemnations of Chinese repression in Tibet, both in the House of Commons and the House of Lords.

402. *In Exile from the Land of Snows*, John Avedon, now published by Wisdom, London Op. cit. See particularly the sections entitled 'The Long Night' and 'Tibet Enslaved', for a detailed description of appalling prison conditions endured by Tibetans. The previously mentioned Dr. Tenzin Choedak, (see footnote 46) was only able to stay alive by making use of his rigorous training as a Tibetan physician and identifying various plants and grasses that he could eat. There is now evidence that Tibetan medical techniques may help play a part in defeating cancer and Aids. See *Tibetan Bulletin* July-August 1987, *Tibetan Review* Jan-Feb 1987, and *Tibetan Review* December 1986. Dr. Choedak, who is deeply involved in this research, gave a comprehensive lecture on this subject in London 5/4/88. It is interesting to note that the Chinese, while frequently using and applying Tibetan medical techniques, claim them as their own and give no credit at all to the medical insights of this culture they have all but exterminated.

403. *Independent*, 5/6/89, 'I Wept For The People, Betrayed by Their Leaders', Michael Fathers.

404. *The Birth of Communist China*, C.P. Fitzgerald, Penguin Books, 1964, p. 115. In fact the walls of the city were never bombarded as it surrendered and it seems likely that the Chinese, or perhaps some of their supporters, invented this story. Similar stories have had a considerable impact among admirers of China and have, almost until the time of the Tiananmen Massacre (3/6/89), somehow contrived to invest the Chinese Revolution with an air of 'ancient wisdom' despite the 'Great Leap Forward' and the 'Cultural Revolution'. The changes inflicted upon this once beautiful city, seemingly precipitated by a love of all things concrete, probably did nearly as much damage as would have been the case with an artillery bombardment.

405. *Chinese Characteristics* by Arthur H. Smith, Ravell, New York 1894. The author was a missionary who spent many years in China and this book should be studied by anyone who wishes to gain an insight into the psychology of the Chinese as it provides many fascinating and unique perspectives which are the result of the author's direct personal experience.

406. *Behind the Wall* by Colin Thubron. Heinemann 1988 (£10.95p.).

407. See letter written by Isa Alptekin, former General Secretary of the Provincial Government of Eastern Turkistan, sent to the Prime Minister of the Peoples Republic of China featured in the *Tibetan Review* January 1984. As has been pointed out in this analysis both Eastern Turkistan (Sinkiang or Xinkiang) together with Inner Mongolia and Manchuria have long been claimed by China, along with parts of the Soviet Union and other areas of Asia. Isa Alptekin draws attention to the terrible sufferings of the largely Moslem peoples of E. Turkistan (Sinkiang) under Chinese Communist rule. He further points out that appalling as colonialism was (and is) the Chinese have added a new dimension to it by physically exterminating the cultures of the lands they have occupied.

It seems increasingly likely that both Hong Kong and Taiwan will suffer a fate similar to that of Tibet. Because of world scrutiny the Communist China is unlikely to devastate these small islands on the Tibetan scale. But they will probably introduce a rigid bureaucracy, a police apparatus designed to pry into the smallest details of people's personal lives, and severely curtail whatever freedom of expression still exists when they take over.

Taiwan, which seems determined not to be reunited with the 'one big Motherland' nevertheless maintains a characteristically Chinese stance over Tibet, which is virtually indistinguishable from that of Communist China. The Republic of China (Taiwan) claims Tibet as part of China and explains the Tibetan exodus in the 1950's and '60's as the consequence of the communist takeover of China, not as the result of the Chinese occupation of a formerly independent Tibet. Taiwan maintains a 'Mongolian and Tibetan Affairs Commission' whose claims the Dalai Lama's 'Government in Exile' is often at pains to refute. Magazines produced in Taiwan which deal with Chinese history often show pictures of Tibetan soldiers and Tibetan people with captions such as 'The strong and superior Tibetan army during the T'ang Dynasty' and 'Daily life of the Tibetan people during this T'ang Dynasty' with the clear implication that Tibet was part of China during this period in history. It is difficult to resist the impression that Taiwan and Communist China understand each other very well indeed. Radio Beijing has recently confirmed this stating that 'The recent Lhasa riots were plotted by a splittist clique abroad which

sent people to smuggle firearms across the border into Tibet. The KMT and the CCP may hold different political views. However, their stands on such a major issue of principle concerning safeguarding the unity of the motherland and opposing the breaking up of our nation should be identical because, after all, both sides are Chinese'. *Radio Beijing*, (12/3/89). As regards the Mongolian Empire of Genghis Khan both Taiwan and Communist China adopt a similar stance. China was conquered by the Mongols by about + 1280 and remained under their rule for nearly a century. When the Chinese freed themselves from Mongolian rule certain traditional fudging tactics were swiftly followed. Firstly, the Chinese always referred to the conquering Mongol Dynasty of Genghis Khan as the *Yuan Dynasty*, and the word Yuan is in fact Chinese for Mongol. But to most people the word *Yuan* sounds as though it refers to an indigenous Chinese dynasty, not a conquering Mongolian one. Although the Chinese retained the word Mongol they adopted its sinocised version *but did not use the word Mongol* which is used by the Mongolians to describe their dynasty which ruled over China. By this subtle, but extremely important device, the Chinese sought to disguise the realities of Mongolian rule, and they do this even today in UN fora, when they are attempting to defend their human-rights record. Given the Chinese capacity to rewrite and distort history perhaps it is rather surprising that they did not rechristen the conquering Mongolian dynasty as the Wong Dynasty. Secondly, when the Chinese ejected the Mongols, *they then proceeded to lay claim to many of the areas conquered by the Mongols, but which had never been under the control of a Chinese emperor. This constitutes an important component of their claim to Tibet today.*

It is a fact that various supporters of China appear on television and unblinkingly assert that Tibet has been part of China since the Yuan Dynasty, but prefer to maintain a decent reticence on the two above points. A particularly striking example of this may be found in a book written by Mr. A. Tom Grunfeld, A Canadian Sinologist, *The Making of Modern Tibet*, Zed Books, 1987, p. 36–37 (for a critique of Mr. Grunfeld's book see appendix).

For example, he writes about the Mongol armies of Genghis Khan in the early 13th Century in a very guarded and restricted way. He states that the Mongols were conquering 'the areas of Han China we now know as Gansu (Kansu) and Qinghai provinces'. In fact ALL China was overwhelmed by about 1280, but Mr. Grunfeld does not

admit this, even though he states that '...the Tibetans sent a delegation of submission to the Khan, seeking a formal alliance.' Only obliquely does Mr. Grunfeld hint that China was under the sway of the Mongols when he writes 'The denouncement came with the fall of the Mongol Dynasty in China and the emergence of a new ethnic Han dynasty (the Ming) in 1368'. One would have to read this passage very carefully indeed to realise that the Chinese were *defeated* by the Mongolian armies who then established their own dynasty which lasted for nearly a century during which time the Chinese were ruled with a rod of iron though Mr. Grunfeld, does at least admit in a later passage that the Mongols fell 'from power over all of China'. p. 37. As can be seen the matter of Chinese defeat and Mongolian rule is approached in a somewhat tentative and evasive manner, but no such scruples inform his writing on the matter of Tibetan submission to the Mongols, but he omits to mention that unlike China Tibet was not actually *conquered* by the Mongols.

Mr. Grunfeld continues: 'When the Ming rulers consolidated their power in China they followed the policies of their Yuan dynastic predecessors toward Tibet by inviting leading clerics to visit the imperial court in Beijing'. This is the first time in this section ('The Mongolian Connection') that the word *Yuan* is used and it appears without any explanation. It refers of course to a conquering Mongolian dynasty but the phrase 'Yuan dynastic predecessors' somehow serves to blur this fact and could be taken as implying continuity of some form rather than outright military conquest. There is no doubt that some Sinologists treat this subject with a great deal of unjustified circumspection.

There are very few exact historical parallels with the Mongolian conquest of China, but one is worth examining. As is well known Duke William of Normandy conquered England in 1066 and the years following his rule saw the establishment of the Angevin Kings of England who still ruled over Norman territories in France. If the English now used Chinese arguments they could claim not only N. France but all territories once under control of the Norman kings. They would proceed to rebaptise the Norman Conquest perhaps referring to it as the 'English Supremacy' and would ignore the fact that England was thoroughly defeated by Normandy. They would then proceed to claim Normandy and various areas once under Norman control by referring to treaties concluded centuries ago, or possibly invented recently, and would insist that all the former Norman

territories would one day be reunited with the 'one Big Motherland'.

Both Taiwan and Communist China maintain this stance and vast areas of Asia including Tibet, E. Turkistan (Sinkiang), Inner Mongolia and Manchuria have been occupied and devastated by Communist China on the basis of claims of this nature. It is this kind of claim which the Communist Chinese are increasingly having to defend in UN and other international fora. Only the remoteness of the territories and a general ignorance about their history has so far prevented a general reaction bordering on stupefaction. But this will surely come.

An excellent feature on the current condition on Inner Mongolians under Chinese rule may be found in *Geographical* (September 1989) 'Life in an Ethnic Epicentre' by David Sneath p. 16–19.

408. The 13th Dalai Lama Thupten Gyatso, (1876–1933) made strenuous efforts to bring Tibet into the 20th Century. His ultimate failure to do this must be attributed mainly to the innate conservatism of the Tibetan monastic establishment and of the Tibetan aristocracy. Had he succeeded Tibetan history might have been very different and it is likely that a considerable part of Tibet would have been denied to the Chinese. Ultimately the Tibetan tragedy could be ascribed to the fact that most Tibetans, particularly the young Dalai Lama's advisors, had little or no understanding of the dimensions of the threat posed by Communist China. This was primarily due to the fact that since the end of the 18th Century Tibet had been virtually closed to foreigners resulting in a general ignorance of events in the outside world and to a lack of modern education. Before the Gurkha invasion of 1792 Tibetan borders had been relatively accessible to foreigners but after the Gurkhas had been expelled, the Chinese persuaded the Tibetans that such intruders would undermine their religion and the Tibetans accordingly closed their borders. It seems likely that the Chinese acted in this fashion in order to minimise foreign intervention in Tibet though they could hardly have believed that any power would have attacked them via Tibet since such an invasion would have entailed enormous problems of transport and supply involving the crossing of many dangerous mountain ranges. They probably spread this rumour in order to keep Tibet safe for *them*. However, when the Chinese again intervened in Tibet more than a century later the Tibetans stoutly resisted them, threw them out and declared their independence. The closing of Tibetan borders was a tragedy since it was responsible for a general ignorance about Tibet on the part of the

international community, which in turn made it impossible for Tibet to participate in most important events in Asia, particularly during the first half of the 20th Century.

This unfortunate shortcoming could have been partly remedied if at least some Tibetans had received a western education during the years of Tibetan independence (1912–1949) and the 13th Dalai Lama did in fact make some efforts in this direction. Some Tibetans were sent to be educated in Britain and a small English school was opened in Gyantse in 1924, directed by an intrepid Englishman, Frank Ludlow, for the children of noble and middle class Tibetan families, and the cost was born by the Tibetan Government. However, the school was closed as a result of pressure from the monasteries who feared that their position would be undermined. Had the school flourished from 1924 until the coming of the Chinese in 1949 it seems reasonable to assume that at least several hundred Tibetans, many of them in powerful families, would have possessed the framework to recognize that the peril Tibet faced in 1949 was of a qualitatively different order to any dangers faced by Tibet in the past. It is also possible that such people might have been able to alert the Dalai Lama to the fact that Tibet was unlikely to survive unless helped by the international community and that all attempts to compromise with Communist China, inspired as it was by the zeal, intolerance and dogma of a missionary faith, would be unproductive. Such counsel was almost entirely lacking though.

The Thirteenth Dalai Lama's awareness of world events and of the precariousness of Tibet's international situation, probably derived from his extensive travels. After narrowly avoiding capture by the invading Chinese armies he spent some 4 years in Darjeeling (1910–1914), before returning to Tibet. In 1904 he had fled from the advancing British Younghusband expedition, which briefly occupied Lhasa, and travelled to Mongolia where he spent some 2 years, during which time he refused at least one (and possibly more) invitations to visit China emanating from the Chinese Government. He then journeyed to Amdo in E. Tibet and after a long hesitation he eventually consented to visit Peking (Beijing). He then returned to Lhasa and after only a few months he was forced to seek asylum in India, when the Chinese occupied large parts of Tibet. While he was temporarily exiled in India fighting was continuing in Tibet and it seems that some of his advisors believed that he should respond to reported Chinese overtures and return while the Chinese armies were still occupying parts

of Tibet, particularly Kham and Lhasa.

However, unlike his successor, the 13th Dalai Lama did not do so, perhaps recognising that Tibet would not remain open as an international issue if he returned and that the Tibetans could inflict considerable damage upon the discontented Chinese armies, which indeed happened. It is probably correct to say that the 13th Dalai Lama's attempts to modernise Tibet and to bring it into line, at least to some degree, with the demands of the 20th Century, failed owing to the resistances of the Tibetan monasteries and of the Tibetan aristocracy. He was horrified when he observed the way in which the Soviet communists destroyed Buddhism in Mongolia and warned his country about the approaching threat in the strongest possible terms. 'In particular we must guard ourselves against the barbaric Red Communists, who carry terror and destruction with them wherever they go. They are the worst of the worst...it will not be long before we find the Red onslaught at our own front door. It is only a matter of time before we came into a direct confrontation with it, either from within our own ranks, or else as a threat from an external (Communist) nation. And when that happens we must be ready to defend ourselves. Otherwise our spiritual and cultural traditions will be completely eradicated.... The monasteries will be looted and destroyed and the monks and nuns killed or chased away... We will become like slaves to our conquerors and will be made to wander helplessly like beggars. Everyone will be forced to live in misery, and the days and nights will pass slowly, and with great suffering and terror.' 'The great Thirteenth's Last New Year Sermon' transl. by Glenn H. Mullin, *Tibetan Review* October 1987.

Tragically the Tibetan Government did not resist the Chinese incursions, though many Tibetans took up arms in Kham and Amdo, and this Sermon with its terrible prophecy went unheeded. I have been told by a Tibetan that the 13th Dalai Lama left instructions that his Last Sermon must be widely distributed throughout Tibet after his death, but that this was not done owing to the laziness and treachery of some aristocrats in the Dalai Lama's Cabinet (Kashag), having possibly been bought by Chinese silver dollars and it seems likely that less prominent Tibetans, particularly in the east of the country, had proved similarly perfidious. Little is to be gained by condemning Tibetan inactivity or various treacherous elements as though they existed in isolation and were exceptions to international conduct elsewhere in the world. During the same period (the 1930's) many

officials high in the French Government were weak and pro-German and the fact that French morale was so low generally owes a considerable amount to the French provincial press, sections of which were bribed and bought by the Nazis, as George Orwell pointed out.

The present Dalai Lama has observed that 'It was almost like everyone went to sleep after he (the 13th Dalai Lama) passed away'. Before censoring the Tibetans too strongly for this it should be remembered that Britain, and in particular the British Foreign Office, 'went to sleep' during the years of Appeasement, in the sense that like those in charge of the destiny of Tibet, it failed to see the obvious and nearly lost the War because of it. Various politicians such as Lord Hailsham and the former Tory Prime Minister Edward Heath, who were strong advocates of this catastrophic policy, now dislike being reminded of this fact. But for the existence of the English Channel it is overwhelmingly likely that Britain would have shared the fate of France in 1940 and that of Tibet in 1959. General Guderian's Panzers would have streamed towards London from the South coast, and it seems unlikely that their strength could have ultimately been withstood.

The tragedy of Tibet should blind nobody to the fact that apathy, treachery and grievously mistaken policies are to be found at all periods of human history and during the 1930's such behaviour was present not only in Tibet, but in Europe too. The Tibetans with their strange combination of innocence and extreme sophistication, were unable to discern the dimensions of the oncoming threat. Had the Tibetan Government taken bold and resolute action in accordance with the last prophecy of the 13th Dalai Lama, the great mountain ranges might have saved them or gained them valuable time in which to attract international support for their cause. But it was not to be.

Tibet: The Facts was compiled by the non-political Scientific Buddhist Association, London, for the United Nations Sub-Commission on Human Rights. The result of meticulous research, *Tibet: The Facts* is an unbiased, truthful and powerful account of China's invasion, occupation and continuing campaign to obliterate Tibetan religion, culture and national identity. Accepted everywhere as a standard reference on Tibet, it is a must reading for all those interested in the issue of Tibet.

Another great advantage of *Tibet: The Facts* is that it is presented in a manner comprehensible even to one reading about Tibet for the first time. Written in an engaging and compelling prose, it can be said that no other report on Tibet of comparable length has had so profound an impact.

An equal amount of care and hard work has gone into bringing out this New Edition. Completely revised and up-dated, this report contains a wealth of information—some of which have only recently become available—and covers all recent developments.

TIBETAN YOUNG BUDDHIST ASSOCIATION
Mcleod Ganj, Dharamsala—176219
H.P. INDIA